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THE JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CHIEF JUDGE WILLIAM J.
HOLLOWAY, JR.
The son of a former Oklahoma gover-
nor, Judge Holloway was born in Hugo,
Oklahoma, in 1923. He and his family
moved to Oklahoma City in 1927. He
served as a First Lieutenant in the Army
during World War II. He then returned to
complete his undergraduate studies at the
University of Oklahoma, receiving his B.A.
in 1947. He graduated from Harvard Law
School in 1950.
In 1951 and 1952,Judge Holloway was
an attorney with the Department of Justice
in Washington, D.C. Afterwards, he re-
turned to private practice in Oklahoma City
where he was appointed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit by Lyndon B. Johnson in 1968 and be-
came Chief Judge on September 15, 1984.
He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and Phi
Gamma Delta.
JUDGE JAMES K. LOGAN
Judge Logan was born in Quenemo,
Kansas, in 1929. He received his A.B. from
the University of Kansas in 1952 and was
graduated magna cum laude from Harvard
Law School in 1955. He went on to be U.S.
Circuit Judge Walter Huxman's law clerk in
1956 and then practiced with the Los An-
geles firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. He
became Dean of the University of Kansas
Law School in 1961 and served in the ca-
pacity until 1968.
Since 1961 he has been a visiting pro-
fessor at Harvard Law School, The Univer-
sity of Texas Law School, Stanford
University, and the University of Michigan.
He was a commission for the U.S. District
Court from 1964 until 1967 and was a can-
didate for the U.S. Senate in 1968.
Judge Logan is a Rhodes Scholar, a
member of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the
Coif, Beta Gamma Sigma, Omicron Delta
Kappa, Pi Sigma Alpha, Alpha Kappa Psi,
and Phi Delta Phi. He has co-authored nu-
merous books on estate planning and ad-
ministration. In 1977 he was appointed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit.
JUDGE JAMES E. BARRETT
The son of the late Frank A. Barrett,
who served as Wyoming's Congressman,
Governor, and U.S. Senator, Judge Barrett
was born in 1922 in Lusk, Wyoming. He
attended the University of Wyoming for
two years prior to his service in the Army
during World War II. After the War, he at-
tended Saint Catherine's College at Oxford
University. He received his LL.B. from the
University of Wyoming in 1949. In 1973
he was given the Distinguished Alumni
Award from his alma mater.
Prior to his appointment, Judge Bar-
rett had been involved in private practice in
Lusk and had served as County and Prose-
cuting Attorney for Niobrara County;
Town Attorney for the towns of Lusk and
Manville; and attorney for the Niobrara
County Consolidated School District. In
1967 he was appointed by Governor Stan-
ley K. Hathaway to serve as Wyoming At-
'torney General and he remained in that
position until 1971.
Judge Barrett is a member of the Judi-
cial Conference Subcommittee on Federal
Jurisdiction, the U.S. Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review, and is a
trustee of Saint Joseph's Children's Home.
He was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
1971.
JUDGE MONROE G. McKAY
Judge McKay was born in Huntsville,
Utah, in 1929 and lives in Provo. He grad-
uated from Brigham Young University in
1957 with high honors. He received his
J.D. from the University of Chicago and be-
came the law clerk forJusticeJesse A. Udall
of the Arizona Supreme Court in 1960.
From 1961 to 1974, Judge McKay was with
the firm of Lewis and Roca in Phoenix, tak-
ing two years out to serve as Director of the
United States Peace Corps in Malawi, Af-
rica. He was a law professor at Brigham
Young University from 1974 until he was
appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1977.
JUDGE STEPHANIE K.
SEYMOUR
Judge Seymour was born in Battle
Creek, Michigan, in 1940. She graduated
from Smith College, magna cum laude, in
1962 and earned her J.D. from Harvard
Law School in 1965. She was admitted to
the Oklahoma bar in 1965.
Judge Seymour has practiced law in
Boston, Massachusetts, 1965-1966; in
Tulsa, Oklahoma, 1967; and Houston,
Texas, 1968-1969. Most recently, she has
practiced with the Tulsa firm of Doerner,
Stuart, Saunders, Daniel & Anderson from
1971 to 1979. Judge Seymour is a member
of Phi Beta Kappa, and the American,
Oklahoma, and Tulsa County Bar associa-
tions. She served as a bar examiner from
1973 through 1979.
Judge Seymour was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit by President Carter in 1979.
JUDGE JOHN P. MOORE
Judge Moore was born in Denver, Col-
orado in 1934 and still lives in Denver. He
received his B.A. from the University of
Denver in 1956 and received his LL.B.
from the University of Denver College of
Law in 1959. Following graduation he
practiced as an associate at the Denver law
firm of Carbone & Walsmith until 1962.
From 1962 through 1975 Judge Moore
worked in the Colorado Attorney General's
Office. He served as Assistant Attorney
General from 1962 through 1967, as Dep-
uty Attorney General from 1967 through
1972, and, ultimately, as Attorney General
for the State of Colorado from 1972
through 1975.
In January of 1975, Judge Moore was
appointed to the Bankruptcy Court of the
United States District Court for the District
of Colorado. Judge Moore served as a
bankruptcy judge until July of 1982 when
he was appointed to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Colorado by
President Reagan. President Reagan ap-
pointed Judge Moore to the United States




Judge Anderson was born in 1932. He
attended Eastern Oregon College between
1949 and 1951, and Brigham Young Uni-
versity in 1955 and 1956. He received an
LL.B. degree from the University of Utah
College of Law in 1960. Judge Anderson
served in the United States Department of
Justice between 1960 and 1964. He was a
trial attorney in the tax division of the De-
partment ofJustice. In 1964, he became a
member of the law firm of Ray, Quinney,
and Webeker, P.C., in Salt Lake City, Utah.
From November, 1985, until the present,
Judge Anderson has served as a Circuit
Judge on the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit.
Judge Anderson has appeared as lead
counsel in 17 courts throughout the United
States. He has served as President and
Commissioner of the Utah State Bar. He
was a member of the Utah Judicial Counsel
and the Utah Judicial Conduct Commis-
sion. In addition, Judge Anderson pres-
ently serves as the chairman of the Utah
Law and Justice Center Committee and is a
member of the Fellows of the American Bar
Foundation. Judge Anderson has been a
director of three major corporations and
has held prestigious positions with the Salt
Lake Area Chamber of Commerce and the
University of Utah Law School Alumni
Association.
JUDGE DEANELL R. TACHA
Deanell Reece Tacha grew up in
Scandia, Kansas. She graduated from the
University of Kansas in 1968 with a B.A.
degree with honors in American Studies.
At K.U., she was a member of Mortar
Board and Phi Beta Kappa. She attended
law school at the University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, Michigan, and received a J.D.
degree there in 1971. In the spring of
1971, Judge Tacha was selected to be a
White House Fellow. During her
fellowship, she was sent on official trips to
Southeast Asia, East and Central Africa,
and the European Economic Community.
Following her year as a White House
Fellow, Judge Tacha was an associate with
the law firm of Hogan and Hartson in
Washington, D.C. In 1973, she returned to
Kansas and was engaged in a private law
practice in Concordia, Kansas.
In the fall of 1974, she was appointed
to the faculty of the Law School at the
University of Kansas. In 1979, she was
appointed as the Associate Vice Chancellor
for Academic Affairs, and in 1981 the Vice
Chancellor for Academic Affairs. In
December of 1985, President Reagan
appointed her to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, where she
now serves as a Circuit Judge. With her
appointment to the Court of Appeals, she
became the seventeenth woman to be
appointed to that court in its nearly 200
year history.
BOBBY R. BALDOCK
Judge Bobby R. Baldock was born in
Rocky, Oklahoma, in 1936 and grew up in
Hagerman and Roswell, New Mexico. He
is a graduate of the New Mexico Military
Institute in Roswell (1956) and received his
J.D. from the University of Arizona College
of Law (1960). He is a member of the New
Mexico and Arizona bars. Judge Baldock
was appointed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in late
1985. Since 1983, he had served as a fed-
eral district judge in Albuquerque, New
Mexico. Before that and for 23 years, he
had been a trial lawyer in the firm of Sand-
ers, Bruin & Baldock, P.A. Judge Baldock
resides in Roswell.
SENIOR JUDGE OLIVER SETH
Judge Seth was born in New Mexico in
1915 and grew up in Santa Fe. He received
his A.B. degree from Stanford University in
1937 and his LL.B. from Yale in 1940.
During World War II he served as a
Major in the U.S. Army and was decorated
with the Croix de Guerre. Judge Seth has
been a director of the Santa Fe National
Bank, chairman of the Legal Committee of
the New Mexico Oil and Gas Association,
and counsel for the New Mexico Cat-
tlegrowers' Association. He has also been
a regent of the Museum of New Mexico and
a director of the Santa Fe Boy's Club. In
1962 he was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit by
President John F. Kennedy. He became
Chief Judge in 1977 and held this position
until September 15, 1984. On December
25, 1984, Judge Seth assumed senior
status.
SENIOR JUDGE ROBERT H.
McWILLIAMS
Judge McWilliams was born in Salina,
Kansas, in 1916 and moved to Denver in
1927 where he has lived ever since. He re-
ceived his A.B. and LL.B. degrees from the
University of Denver. In 1971, he was
awarded an Honorary Doctor of Law de-
gree from the University.
During World War I1, Judge McWil-
liams served in the United States Army and
was with the Office of Strategic Services.
He has served as a Deputy District Attor-
ney, a Colorado district court judge, and
was a member of the Colorado Supreme
Court for nine years prior to his appoint-
ment to the Court of Appeals.
Judge McWilliams is a member of the
Judicial Conference Committee on the Ad-
ministration of the Criminal Law, Phi Beta
Kappa, Omicron Delta Kappa, Phi Delta
Phi, and Kappa Sigma. He was sworn in as
a Judge of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit in 1970. On
August 31, 1984, Judge McWilliams as-
sumed senior status.
SENIOR JUDGE DELMAS C.
HILL (Retired)
Judge Hill was born in Wamego, Kan-
sas, in 1906. He received his LL.B. from
Washburn College in 1929. From 1929 to
1943 he practiced law in Wamego, serving
as an Assistant U.S. Attorney from 1934 to
1936. He was general counsel for the Kan-
sas State Tax Commission from 1937 to
1939 and Chairman of the State Demo-
cratic Committee from 1946 to 1948. Dur-
ing World War II he was a Captain in the
U.S. Army. In 1945, he assisted in the
prosecution of General Yamashita in Ma-
nila. He was a U.S. District judge from
1949 until 1961 when he was appointed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit. Judge Hill became a Senior
Judge on April 1, 1977.
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During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit reviewed several deci-
sions handed down by administrative agencies, following the pattern of
recent years.' This article will discuss seven of the most important of
these cases. The Tenth Circuit concentrated its review of the cases in
the following areas: sufficiency of evidence, 2 the duty to follow prece-
dent,3 the parameters ofjudicial restraint,4 and the scope of protection
offered by the fifth amendment in an administrative action. 5 While judi-
cial deference remained the general rule in reviewing an administrative
decision, it is important to note that the Tenth Circuit reversed the ma-
jority of the cases discussed herein.
I. SUBSTANTIALITY OF EVIDENCE
A. Background
It is a general rule in administrative law that a "reviewing court shall
... hold unlawful and set aside agency action findings .. .and conclu-
sions found to be... unsupported by substantial evidence .... ,,6 While
this empowers a reviewing court to reverse an agency's decision on the
grounds of insubstantial evidence, it leaves to the courts to define ex-
actly where the line between "insubstantial" and "substantial" evidence
is to be drawn. Substantial evidence has been defined as more than a
mere scintilla. 7 It has also been said to be such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.8
Unfortunately, these standards are nothing more than ad hoc defini-
tions. Thus, in order to give them meaning, one must examine a court's
ad hoc reviews of substantial evidence issues.
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit reviewed two cases
concerning the substantiality of evidence. Both cases involved decisions
by the Social Security Administration ("SSA"), and both cases were
1. See Note, Administrative Law, 64 DEN. U.L. REV. 105 (1987); Note, Administrative
Law, 63 DEN. U.L. REV. 165 (1986).
2. Talbot v. Heckler, 814 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1987); Weakley v. Heckler, 795 F.2d
64 (10th Cir. 1986).
3. Big Horn Coal Co. v. Temple, 793 F.2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1986).
4. United Transp. Union v. Dole, 797 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1986); E.E.O.C. v. Com-
mercial Office Prods. Co., 803 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1986) revd., 108 S.Ct. 1666 (1988);
Rutherford v. United States, 806 F.2d 1455 (10th Cir. 1986).
5. Roach v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 804 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
108 S.Ct. 1732 (1988).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(e) (1980).
7. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
8. Id.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
reversed. 9
B. Talbot v. Heckler'
°
The claimant, Harley Talbot, applied for social security disability
benefits onJune 9, 1982, and again onJune 13, 1983. Each application
was denied by the SSA."l Talbot appealed the second denial to an ad-
ministrative law judge ("ALJ"), who affirmed the SSA's decision. Talbot
then sought review in the Appeals Council of the Secretary of Health
and Human Services ("Council"), but was again denied benefits. 12 He
then brought his case to the federal district court, only to have that court
uphold the administrative actions.' 3 Talbot then sought review of his
case by the Tenth Circuit.
1. The ALJ's Decision
Talbot appeared before the ALJ without the benefit of counsel. Af-
ter hearing his testimony and allowing him an opportunity to comment
on the documentary evidence, the ALJ concluded that Talbot was not
disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and therefore not entitled
to benefits. 14
The ALJ based his inquiry on whether or not Talbot was able to
either return to his previous occupation or to engage in other work, as
required by the SSA regulations. 15 The ALJ determined that Talbot
could not return to his past work, which required medium to heavy exer-
tion, because his residual functional capacity ("RFC") would not allow
it. 16 However, the ALJ also found that Talbot did retain the RFC for a
wide range of light work, restricted only "by inability to work in environ-
ments with excessive dust, fumes or gases."'
17
The ALJ's decision recognized no substantial exertional limitations
on Talbot's ability to perform the full range of light work. However, the
ALJ explicitly recognized the environmental restrictions which are con-
sidered non-exertional limitations on the ability to perform work. 18 In
the end, the ALJ concluded that the "claimant's capacity for the wide
range of light work has not been significantly compromised by his non-
exertional limitations."' 19 He further concluded that, pursuant to Rule
202.14 of the SSA's Medical Vocational Guidelines concerning residual
strength, age, work experience and education, Talbot was not
9. See supra note 2.
10. 814 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1987).
11. Id. at 1457. The impairments are listed in Appendix I of the Social Security Act
regulations, 20 C.F.R. § 1.
12. Talbot, 814 F.2d at 1457.
13. Id.





19. Id. The non-exertional limitations were an "inability to work in environments




2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The primary issue for the Tenth Circuit was whether there was sub-
stantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding that Talbot had the exer-
tional capacity to perform a full range of light work. 2 ' Relying on an
analysis of the entire record of the case, the court determined that many
of the conclusions upon which the ALJ based his decision lacked sub-
stantial evidence.
The ALJ had concluded that the claimant's testimony was "not
wholly credible and ... somewhat probably exaggerated."' 22 The court
found this conclusion to be unwarranted, noting that the ALJ had failed
to give any particular reasons for drawing this conclusion.23 The ALJ
had also made the inference that the claimant had himself showed that
he thought he was capable of returning to work by seeking retraining.
2 4
The ALJ used this inference as support for his ultimate finding that Tal-
bot's respiratory impairments imposed only "an insignificant environ-
mental restriction" on his ability to work. 25 The court found the logic of
this conclusion inconsistent, and again ruled there was a lack of substan-
tial evidence.
2 6
The ALJ had further concluded that Talbot's combined impair-
ments had not prevented him from performing light and sedentary work
"on a regular and continued basis," and used this conclusion to support
his finding of insignificant environmental conditions. 27 The court found
this conclusion to be in defiance of the record, noting that the uncontra-
dicted information in the record suggested a contrary conclusion, and
was not even addressed by the ALJ.
28
Lastly, the ALJ had concluded that, despite a conflicting series of
medical reports on Talbot by various doctors, Talbot was capable of en-
gaging in a full range of light work.29 The court noted that the ALJ had
failed to properly evaluate and explain the conflicting reports of the
physicians, and thus based his decision on impressions and mis-
20. Id. n.l. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, § 202.00, Table No. 2, Rule 202.14
(where one's age, education, and previous work experience are factors considered in mak-
ing a decision).
21. 814 F.2d at 1461.
22. Id. at 1459.
23. Id. at 1461.
24. Id. Talbot had applied for rehabilitation training-training which was denied be-
cause of his impairments, using different criteria for disability than the SSA criteria.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1461-62. "Light" and "sedentary" work are defined in C.F.R.
§§ 404.1567(a) & (b) (1986). The ALJ determined that Talbot's attempt to do some paint-
ing and install a shower was a performance of light and sedentary work on a regular basis.
The ALJ failed to consider that Talbot was unable to finish or keep these jobs because of
health problems, and was never paid for them.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1463.
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characterizations. 30 Because of the insubstantial evidence which formed
the basis for many of the ALJ's conclusions, the Tenth Circuit reversed
the decision, and awarded benefits to Talbot commencing from the date
of his second application.
3 '
C. Weakley v. Heckler
In Weakley v. Heckler,32 the Tenth Circuit was confronted with the
second of the "SSA" cases involving the issue of "substantiality of evi-
dence." George Weakley had appealed the denial of his disability insur-
ance benefits which he had applied for after suffering a back injury at
work.3 3 The ALJ who conducted the hearing found that Weakley's back
impairment met listing 1.05(c) of the Social Security Listing of Impair-
ments. 34 However, the ALJ found that Weakley was not entitled to ben-
efits because he failed to give an acceptable reason for refusing to have
the back surgery his physician had prescribed.
3 5
The Council denied Weakley's subsequent appeal, forcing Weakley
to seek review in federal district court. That court rejected Weakley's
claim for benefits, in an opinion which failed to consider the fact that
Weakley's back impairment had been found to meet listing 105(c) of the
Social Security Listing of Impairments.
3 6
1. The Tenth Circuit Decision
Once again, the primary issue on appeal was whether there was sub-
stantial evidence to support the administrative decision, as required by
42 U.S.C. section 405(g).3 7 In this case, the decision was made by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to deny Weakley his benefits
because he refused to submit to prescribed surgery.
38
The court found that Weakley had met his burden of demonstrating
impairment, noting that the Secretary did not dispute that the back in-
jury met listing 105(C). 3 9 However, the court held that the Secretary had
failed to meet its burden of demonstrating why Weakley's refusal to sub-
mit to prescribed surgery was unjustified.40 Because the Secretary did
not present substantial evidence that the rejected back surgery was ex-
pected to restore Weakley's ability to work, the first element of the four-
30. Id. at 1464.
31. Id. at 1466. The court decided that it was only at this time that the record con-
tained substantial evidence of Talbot's disability.
32. 795 F.2d 64 (10th Cir. 1986).
33. Id. at 65.
34. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R., pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 1. listing 1.05(c)).
35. Id.
36. Id. Apparently, the district court acted as merely a rubber stamp in affirming the
ALJ's decision. However, it is not entirely clear upon what exactly the district court based
its decision.
37. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 4 0 5(g) (Supp. 1985), "The findings of the Secretary . . . if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ......
38. 795 F.2d at 65. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1530 (1987).
39. Weakley, 795 F.2d at 65.
40. Id. at 66. The applicable test is as follows: Once the claimant demonstrates that
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prong test was not satisfied, and the denial of benefits was in error.4 '
D. Analysis
An analysis of the Talbot and Weakley decisions must be conducted
within the framework of 42 U.S.C. section 40 5 (g), which provides that
federal review of an agency's factual findings must be limited to the
question of whether substantial evidence supports the factual finding.
4 2
The analysis must also consider the review standards discussed above.
Of the two cases, the Talbot case is the more expansive. The Talbot
court specifically adopted the Supreme Court's holding that substantial
evidence must be "more than a mere scintilla" and of "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.' 4 3 However, the Talbot court also stated that the search for
adequate evidence does not include a weighing of the evidence, and a
court must refrain from substituting its discretion for that of the
agency.44 Still, the Talbot court felt that the reviewing court must con-
sider the record as a whole, and the "substantiality of the evidence must
take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its
weight."
45
With these basic parameters providing the backdrop, the Talbot and
Weakley decisions appear to be soundly reached. As stated above, the
Talbot court found the reasoning behind the ALJ's major conclusions to
be less than persuasive. The ALJ's conclusion as to the claimant's credi-
bility was rejected, not because it was beyond his authority to make such
a judgment, but because he failed to provide any particular reasoning
for discounting Talbot's credibility except to observe that there were no
witnesses present when Talbot suffered his alleged blackouts.
4 6
Concerning the ALJ's second conclusion that Talbot himself be-
lieved he could return to work by trying to retrain himself,4 7 the court
again did not question the authority of the ALJ to make such an infer-
ence. However, the court refused to allow the use of the inference to
he is impaired, the government has the burden of demonstrating each of the four ele-
ments:
I. The treatment at issue should be expected to restore the claimant's ability to
work;
2. The treatment must have been prescribed;
3. The treatment must have been refused;
4. The refusal must have been without justifiable excuse. See Teter v. Heckler, 775
F.2d 1104, 1107 (10th Cir. 1985). See also Jones v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 950, 953 (1 1th Cir.
1983); Cassiday v. Schweiker, 663 F.2d 745, 749 (7th Cir. 1981).
41. 795 F.2d at 66.
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp. 1985).
43. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison
Co. v. NRLB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
44. Talbot, 814 F.2d at 1461.
45. Id. (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951)). Similarly,
the Weakley court felt that its role was to consider the record as a whole, and determine
whether that record contained substantial evidence to support the administrative decision.
46. Id. at 1461. Talbot had experienced blackouts and dizzy spells over a period of
several years prior to his application for benefits.
47. Id.
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conclude that Talbot thought he could work at a full range of activity
rather than a limited range of light or sedentary activity.4 8 This particu-
lar substantial evidence issue provides a useful illustration of how far an
agency's evidentiary finding may go in terms of supporting differing
conclusions. The court was willing to allow the fact that Talbot at-
tempted to retrain himself as sufficient to sustain the conclusion that he
thought he could work.4 9 But the court refused to allow that factual
finding to sustain the further conclusion that Talbot thought he could
work at a certain activity level. 50 To determine the activity level, more
evidence was needed.
Lastly, the court addressed the ALJ's finding of insignificant envi-
ronmental restrictions, 51 which the ALJ attempted to support with the
conclusion that Talbot had been able to perform light and sedentary
work on a "regular and continued basis."' 5 2 The court examined this
conclusion by comparing the evidentiary record with the requirements
of the social security definitions, and found the ALJ's conclusion to be
"highly questionable. ' 5 3 The information in the record suggested that
Talbot did not meet the definitional requirements. However, the court
did not reverse the ALJ for making a conclusion in defiance of the rec-
ord, but did so because the ALJ failed to even address the contradictory
information that was contained in the record.
54
The Weakley decision is more straightforward. The court focused on
a single issue: whether the Secretary had met his burden of showing
that the rejected back surgery was expected to restore Weakley's ability
to work. 5 5 The Secretary presented the testimony of one doctor who
stated that Weakley's problem was correctable by surgery, and that fol-
lowing the surgery, Weakley would have an estimated residual disability
of 15% to the body as a whole. 56 This testimony was in contradiction to
several doctors' testimony on behalf of Weakley that there was a good
possibility that there would be no improvement with the surgery. 57
The court found the ALJ's decision lacked the requisite substantial
evidence. The court could not see how one doctor's statement, which
itself admitted that a significant residual disability would remain, could
somehow outweigh the contrary opinions of several other doctors. 58
Again, the court did not quarrel with the decision. It suggested that the








55. Weakley, 795 F.2d at 66.
56. Id. The physician based his estimate on the probable results of the surgery and





not, 59 but it refused to "rubber-stamp" a decision based on insubstan-
tial evidence.
E. Conclusion
The conclusion to be drawn from the Talbot and Weakley decisions is
that judicial deference to agency decisions ends when unsubstantiated
conclusions are drawn by administrative judges and panels. From Tal-
bot, one may assume that credibility judgments made by an ALJ must be
based on more than mere impression or any other single subjective fac-
tor. One may also conclude that some factual findings may be sufficient
to establish general inferences. 60 From both Talbot and Weakley, one
may assume that conclusions which are drawn in defiance of the record
will be reversed. Beyond their illustrative examples, neither Talbot nor
Weakley provides a definite standard as to what constitutes "substantial
evidence." Instead, the standard has been, and is likely to long remain,
what a court believes would persuade a reasonable mind.
II. THE AGENCY'S DUTY TO FOLLOW ITS OWN PRECEDENT
A. Background
In Midwestern Transportation, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Commission,6
1
the Tenth Circuit held that a court "must require the agency to adhere
to its own pronouncements or explain its departure from them; an
agency must apply criteria it has announced as controlling or otherwise
satisfactorily explain the basis for its departure therefrom." '6 2 This
holding was in line with the Tenth Circuit's earlier holdings as well as
previous United States Supreme Court rulings. 6 3 During the survey pe-
riod, the Tenth Circuit was again faced with reviewing an agency deci-
sion which departed from its own precedent.
B. Big Horn Coal Company v. Temple64
In Big Horn, the Tenth Circuit was petitioned to review the final or-
der of a Department of Labor Benefits Review Board (the "Board")
which had upheld a previous ruling by an ALJ. The ALJ had awarded
disability benefits to Edward Temple, an employee of Big Horn, under
the Black Lung Benefits Act (the "Act"). 65 Because the ALJ had failed
59. In doing so, the court limited itself to the record. Since the Secretary had agreed
that Weakley was in fact disabled, the court had no choice but to limit its review to the
question of whether Weakley's refusal was reasonable. The court thus affirmed that review
of an agency decision is confined to the record.
60. For example, Talbot's retraining attempts could sustain a conclusion as to his
state of mind, but this same factual finding may be insufficient to sustain a legal conlcusion
that Talbot could work at a definite level of activity.
61. 635 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1980).
62. Id. at 777.
63. Squaw Transit Co. v. United States, 574 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1978); see also Atchi-
son, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800 (1973).
64. 793 F.2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1986).
65. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1986) (providing in part that "the purpose of this sub-
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to consider evidence which the Board, in previous cases, had deemed
necessary to a decision, 66 the Tenth Circuit reversed the Board's order
and remanded for further proceedings.
1. The ALJ's Decision
Temple had originally filed his claim for benefits under the Act in
1976.67 In 1977, the claim was informally denied on the basis that
neither the x-ray report nor the ventilatory study showed pneumoconio-
sis under the applicable regulations. 68 In 1978 the Act was amended69
and Temple's original application was reviewed. The informal denial
was reversed, and Temple was ruled eligible for benefits under the
Act. 70 Big Horn generally denied Temple's claim and requested a hear-
ing in front of an ALJ.
After the hearing, the ALJ issued a Decision and Order which found
that Temple had pneumoconiosis under the interim presumption found
in 20 C.F.R. section 727.203(a)(3). This section essentially provides that
if a coal miner has been employed as such for at least ten years, he will
be presumed to have work-related pneumoconiosis if the blood gas
studies reveal an impairment in the transfer of oxygen from the lungs to
the blood when the values equal or exceed those in the appropriate ta-
ble. 7 1 The ALJ specifically found that the applicable criteria necessary
to invoke the presumption was satisfied.
72
Upon finding the "interim presumption" triggered, the ALJ then
turned to the question of whether Big Horn had rebutted the presump-
tion under C.F.R. section 727.203(b). The ALJ ruled that Big Horn
failed to rebut the presumption under the enumerated methods in that
section. 73 The ALJ stated that there was no medical evidence which
chapter is to provide benefits.., to coal miners who are totally disabled due to pneumo-
coniosis and to the surviving dependents of miners whose death was due to such disease
66. See Martino v. U.S. Fuel Co., 6 BLACK LUNG REP. 1-33 (1983).
67. Big Horn Coal Co., 793 F.2d at 1166.
68. Id.
69. Among the 1978 amendments to the Act was § 902(0, which broadened the term
"total disability" in an attempt to liberalize the award of benefits. 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)
(1978).
70. Id.
71. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(3) provides:
(a) Establishing interim presumption. A miner who engaged in coal mine employ-
ment for at least 10 years will be presumed to be totally disabled due to pneumo-
coniosis .. . if one of the following requirements is met: ...
(3) Blood gas studies which demonstrate the presence of an impairment in
the transfer of oxygen from the lung alveoli to the blood as indicated
by values which are equal to or less than the values specified in the
following table ....
The ALJ specifically found that the values necessary to invoke this presumption were pres-
ent. Id. at 1167.
72. The specific values which triggered the presumption were "a P.C02 of 31 and
P.02 of 57 at rest and a P.C02 of 32 and P.02 of 67 upon exercise." Id.
73. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b) provides:
(b) Rebuttal of interim presumption. In adjudicating a claim under this subpart, all
relevant medical evidence shall be considered. The presumption in paragraph [20
C.F.R. § 727 .203(a)] shall be rebutted if: .. (1) in light of all relevant evidence it
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would permit a finding that Temple did not have "any chronic pulmo-
nary disease ... aggravated ... by coal mine employment." 74 This rul-
ing was subsequently approved by the Board. Big Horn objected to this
ruling, and raised on appeal the issue of whether the Board had erred in
approving the ALJ's evaluation of the arterial blood gas tests without
considering the effects of altitude and weight.
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit focused its review on the rebuttal evidence of-
fered by Big Horn. Specifically, the evidence consisted of testimony by
Dr. Hoyer, a physician who reviewed and commented on Temple's 1979
Arterial Blood Gas ("ABG") test results. Dr. Hoyer testified that the
tests used on Temple "did not establish a pulmonary abnormality in
light of the post-exercise results, the age of the miner, and the altitude at
which the test was performed."' 75 The ALJ ignored this conflicting evi-
dence, and his actions were affirmed by the Director of the Office of
Worker's Compensation Programs, Department of Labor.
On appeal, the Director conceded that it was error for the ALJ to
have not considered the rebuttal testimony of Dr. Hoyer, but claimed
that the omission was harmless error. 76 Big Horn, however, claimed
that the omission was reversible error, and relied upon the Board's own
decision in Martino v. United States Fuel Company.
77
In Martino, the Board rejected a challenge to the validity of C.R.S.
section 727.203(a)(3) interim presumption because the table standards
were not adjusted for altitude. 78 However, the Board also explained
that the AL must consider rebuttal evidence regarding the effect of alti-
tude and other factors on the AGB test results. 79 The Board ruled that
"if a blood gas study produces abnormal results which can be attributed
to altitude rather than pathogenic dysfunction, then this evidence ... is
relevant medical evidence which the fact finder must consider if intro-
duced ...."80
Because the Director had acknowledged that the ALJ had failed to
consider the kind of evidence which Martino deemed necessary to a deci-
sion, the Tenth Circuit found little difficulty in reversing the Agency's
decision. Since no explanation was offered for the divergence from Mar-
tino, the Tenth Circuit held that the failure to consider the rebuttal evi-
dence was reversible error.8 '
is established that the individual is in fact doing his usual coal mine work or com-
parable or gainful work ....
Emphasis added.
74. Big Horn Coal Co., 793 F.2d at 1167 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 727.202).
75. Id. at 1168.
76. Id.
77. 6 BLACK LUNG REP. 1-33 (1983).
78. Big Horn Coal Co., 793 F.2d at 1168.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1169.
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3. Conclusion
It is important to note the uncompromising posture which the court
assumes in Big Horn. Although the equities, and certainly the sympa-
thies, of the case point toward an award of benefits to a black lung vic-
tim, the court intransigeantly clings to the time-honored rule that an
agency shall be bound by its own precedent unless adequate explanation
exists for a departure from it. 82 The court, by remanding, is forcing the
agency to go through the proper hoops, even if doing so prevents an
individual suffering a compensable occupational disease from recover-
ing compensation. The law in this area appears to be etched in stone:
An agency will not be allowed to deviate from its own precedent, absent
an explanation for doing so.
III. THE AGENCY'S INTERPRETATION OF PROMULGATED RULES AND
JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
A. Background
The standard for federal review of agency decisions is set forth in 5
U.S.C. section 706.83 Although this section provides broad grounds for
such review, historically courts have shown a reluctance to overturn an
agency decision. Among the first cases espousing the need for judicial
restraint in reviewing agency decisions was Ford Motor Credit Company v.
Milhollin.84 There it was held that an agency's construction of its own
regulation is entitled to substantial deference from the judiciary. 8 5 The
Tenth Circuit expanded this rule in Emery Mining Corp. v. Secretary of La-
bor,86 stating that judicial deference is especially appropriate if agency
expertise or technical knowledge is involved, or if the agency's construc-
tion is contemporaneous with the regulation's promulgation.
8 7
Three times during the survey period, the Tenth Circuit was con-
fronted with the difficult issue of whether to replace an agency's inter-
pretation of a regulation with that of its own.8 8 In two of the cases, the
82. National Conservative Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 626 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Midwestern Transp., Inc. v. ICC, 635 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1980).
83. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1980). "The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be... unsupported by substantial
evidence .... "
84. 444 U.S. 555 (1980). A group of car buyers whose retail purchase contracts were
assigned to a finance company, filed suit against the finance company for violations of the
Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. § § 1601-1700) and Regulation Z of the Federal Reserve
Board (12 C.F.R. part 226). The alleged violations centered on undisclosed acceleration
clauses. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of a clear expression by either the
Act or Regulation Z, a high degree of deference must be shown to the Reserve Board and
its staff.
85. Id. at 556.
86. 744 F.2d 1411 (10th Cir. 1984) (dealing with the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Review Commission's finding that a mine operator had violated the miner retraining re-
quirements of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act). The court of appeals held that
agency's interpretation of its enabling statute and its own regulations is entitled to
deference.
87. Id. at 1415.
88. United Transp. Union v. Dole, 797 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1986); E.E.O.C. v. Com-
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court overruled the agency interpretation. However, in each of the two,
a vigorous dissent was filed on the issue of whether to defer to agency
interpretation and expertise. In the third case, the agency interpretation
was upheld by a unanimous panel.
B. United Transportation Union v. Dole
89
1. Background
The Federal Railway Administration ("FRA") and the Secretary of
the Department of Transportation ("Secretary") are charged with en-
forcing the railroad safety laws by the Hours of Service Act (the
"Act").9 0 Among other things, the Act seeks to improve the safety of
sleeping accommodations which railroads provide for their crews, spe-
cifically prohibiting the housing of crews in a dorm if the buildings are in
the immediate vicinity (within 1/2 mile) of railroad tracks where hazard-
ous materials are switched. 9 1 However, the Act also establishes a grand-
father clause, whereby buildings which were in existence before July 8,
1976, are exempt from the location requirements unless construction or
reconstruction is performed on the building.9 2 The term "construc-
tion" is defined by the Act and its implementing regulations to include
acquisition and use of an existing building.
93
In United Transportation Union, the FRA was charged with failure to
fulfill its mandatory enforcement obligations against the St. Louis
Southwestern Railroad Company ("SSW"). The specific charge was that
the FRA failed to issue orders prohibiting SSW from housing its em-
ployees in a dormitory located in the Armourdale yard in Kansas City,
Kansas.
94
The Armourdale dormitory had been constructed by the Chicago,
Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company in 1966. In March of 1980,
SSW purchased the dormitory along with some trackage and the sur-
rounding railyard. The dormitory was built within 300 feet of tracks
where switching operations for hazardous materials took place. During
mercial Office Prods. Co., 803 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S.Ct. 1666 (1988);
Rutherford v. United States, 806 F.2d 1455 (10th Cir. 1986).
89. 797 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1986).
90. 45 U.S.C. § 64(b) (1986) (which states in part, "lilt shall be the duty of the Secre-
tary of Transportation to lodge with the appropriate United States Attorney information
of any violation as may come to the knowledge of the Secretary"); 49 C.F.R. § 1.49(d)
(1985) (the Federal Railroad Administration is delegated authority to: "(a) investigate and
report on safety compliance records of applicants seeking railroad operating
authority .. ")
91. United Transp., 797 F.2d at 825.
92. Id. at 826.
93. See 49 C.F.R. § 228.101(c) (1985) which provides:
(c) As used in this subpart-
(1) "Construction" shall refer to the-
(i) Creation of a new facility;
(ii) Expansion of an existing facility;
(iii) Placement of a mobile or modular facility;
(iv) Acquisition and use of an existing building.
Emphasis added.
94. United Transp., 797 F.2d at 825.
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the period between May 1980 and July 1983, the dormitory was used as
a locker facility in lieu of a sleeping facility. At the end of this period,
however, the SSW announced plans to refurbish the structure and re-
sume use of it as a sleeping facility. Thus, there arose the situation
where a grandfathered facility was transferred from one railroad to
another.
For its defense, the FRA asserted that, according to its own inter-
pretation of its regulations, the transfer in question did not fall within
the definition of "construction," and was therefore exempt from the lo-
cation requirements of the Act.95 Specifically, the FRA claimed that the
regulation which provides that "construction refers to acquisition and
use of an existing building" did not include within its purview those
buildings which were sold from one railroad to another, as in the pres-
ent case.
96
The trial court granted FRA's motion for summary judgment on
this ground, holding that the rulemakers were not concerned with the
transfer of grandfathered facilities from one railroad to another.97 It
further held that "SSW's plan for rehabilitation of the dormitory facility
does not meet the definition of construction... [contained in] 49 C.F.R.
section 228.101 (c) (1). '98 However, the trial court failed to explain why
this definition was not met 99 and United Transportation Union
("UTU") appealed, challenging the FRA's interpretation of its own
regulations.1 00
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
After a preliminary determination of waiver,' 0 ' the court focused
on the FRA's interpretation of 49 C.F.R. section 228.101(c). 10 2 FRA
maintained that the regulation did not include existing buildings which
are transferred from one railroad to another.' 0 3 UTU urged that all ac-
quisitions are subject to the prohibition on construction.1
0 4
In a split decision, in which each of the three participating judges
wrote an opinion, the court ruled that the agency's interpretation was
inconsistent with congressional intent, the plain language of the regula-
tion, and its own prior administrative interpretations. 10 5 Although the
court acknowledged the general rule that substantial deference must be
95. Id. at 828.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 827.
98. Id.
99. United Transp., 797 F.2d at 826-27.
100. Id.
101. The issue of waiver before the court was whether UTU had abandoned the issue
because of its failure to adequately develop the issue in its brief. The court held that
because the issue was at least superficially discussed in UTU's brief, was adequately dis-
cussed in FRA's brief, and was an issue of importance and first impression, the issue was
not now waived. Id. at 827.
102. Id. at 828.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 829.
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shown to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation,10 6 it refused
to allow that deference to become "blind adherence."' 1 7 Because the
issue was one involving a question of statutory interpretation, a question
of law, the court ruled that it was the final authority. 108 Under that au-
thority, the court reversed the lower rulings, and found SSW's proposed
reopening of the Armourdale facility to be within the definition of "con-
struction" as contemplated by 49 C.F.R. section 228.101(c).10 9
Interestingly, the dissent used the same analytical framework as the
majority to reach a completely opposite result. In examining the statute
and its legislative history, the dissent found nothing which would sug-
gest that existing facilities should lose their statutory exemption and be-
come "new construction" if the ownership of a railroad passed from one
railroad to another.' 10 It directed the court's attention to the fact that
in the face of an economic climate which was conducive to mergers and
acquisitions, Congress nowhere provided a caveat that transfer of own-
ership would trigger the prohibition.I I 1 Thus, Congress' primary intent
was to prevent the abrupt loss of railroad capital assets through an artifi-
cial external event, such as legislation or changes in the ownership of
railroads.' 12
In examining the regulations, the dissent pleaded for judicial re-
straint, maintaining that if there was any ambiguity in such a case, a
court is compelled to defer to an agency's interpretation, especially
when that agency interprets its own regulation.' 1 When there is such
ambiguity, "the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation,
which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation."' 14 In opposition to the majority, the
dissent found no such error.
In response to the dissent, a concurring opinion was filed. It dis-
agreed with the dissent's interpretation of the congressional intent be-
hind the statute. The concurrence felt that the intent was for employee
safety, not railroad economics. 1 15 The grandfather clause was added to
ameliorate the loss incurred by the railroads, but not to eliminate their
obligation to provide safe housing.' 16
The concurrence also took the position that judicial responsibility
demands review of agency interpretation when an agency overindulges
106. Id.
107. Id. See also Talbot v. Heckler, 814 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1987) (where the court
also discusses the limits of judicial deference in area of sufficiency of evidence).
108. United Tramp., 797 F.2d at 829. See also SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1943).
109. Id. at 829-30.
110. Id. at 834 (dissenting opinion).
111. Id.
112. Id.
i13. Id. at 835 (citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965)). See also Hoover &
Bracken Energies, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 723 F.2d 1488, 1489 (10th Cir.
1983).
114. United Traosp. 797 F.2d at 835.
115. Id. at 832 (concurring opinion).
116. Id.
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in "ad hoc" decision making or "after the fact rationalizations."''117 It
found dispositive the fact that the FRA itself had stated that the "acquisi-
tion of an existing structure for use as sleeping quarters is listed as an
event clearly within the purview of the statute and these regulations, and
found nothing in the record to suggest that the agency had previously
taken the position it was advocating before the court."' 18 In light of
these facts, the concurrence saw the purpose of the statute and its imple-
menting regulations as the prevention of railroads from making signifi-
cant additional investments in sleeping quarters near hazardous railroad
switching operations after July, 1976.1 19
3. Analysis
The decision in United Transportation appears to be soundly reached.
The majority opinion found that the interpretation being urged by the
FRA was inconsistent with the version set forth when the regulation was
promulgated. °2 0 The majority also found that the agency's interpreta-
tion was inconsistent with the statute it was designed to implement.' 2'
Finally, the majority found that the plain language of the regulation was
inapposite to the agency's interpretation. 122 What emerges from this
analysis is the groundwork for a tripartite test for judicial review of an
agency's interpretations of regulations.
12 3
But the foundation which the majority lays for such review is under-
mined by the dissent's plea for judicial restraint. Fortunately, the dis-
sent's reasons for deferring to the agency interpretation are not as well
reasoned as the majority's. The dissent felt that an examination of the
legislative history revealed an element of ambiguity in the underlying
congressional intent.124 Such ambiguity would compel the court to de-
fer to the expertise of the agency and accept its interpretation. 12 5 The
dissent was in favor of judicial restraint in this case, citing that the
agency's interpretation was not plainly inconsistent with an ambiguous,
general regulation. 1
2 6
While sound in concept, the dissent fails to reconcile its principles
with the facts of the case. As the majority points out, the case does not
involve an area of expertise peculiar to the FRA. 12 7 It is a case of statu-
tory interpretation, a task for which the court is unquestionably quali-
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 832.
120. Id. at 829.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. The test, although not specifically designated as such by the court, would be as
follows: An agency's interpretation of its rules will not be shielded from judicial review
when its interpretation is inconsistent with: (I) congressional intent; (2) the plain lan-
guage of the regulation; and (3) its own prior administrative interpretations.
124. Id. at 836.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 829. The court declines to explain what such specialized knowledge would
be. However, based on its later decision in Rutherford v. United States (806 F.2d 1455
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fled. Secondly, the dissent's assertion that the intent behind the Act was
to "prevent the abrupt loss of railroad capital assets" strains credibility.
While this was certainly a pragmatic, conciliatory measure taken by Con-
gress in promulgating the Act, there is little doubt that Congress was
more concerned with worker safety than railroad economics.
12 8
The dissent's analysis of the implementing regulation does appear
more persuasive than its interpretation of the Act's intent. The regula-
tion states that the word "construction" includes "acquisition and use of
an existing building."' 129  The dissent reasoned that since the
rulemakers did not explicitly address the issue of whether railroads are
prohibited from acquiring or using "grandfathered" sleeping quarters,
the court should refrain from imposing its own interpretation. 130 This
analysis is hardly compelling. While it is true that such a situation was
not specifically addressed, it seems more logical to assume that the over-
all intent of Congress, that is, that railroads should make no additional
investment in hazardous sleeping quarters after 1976, eliminates the
ambiguity. To pretend that there is too much ambiguity not to defer,
seems to go beyond judicial deference and into the realm of blind
adherence.
C. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Commercial
Office Products Co. 131
1. Background
On March 26, 1984, Suanne Leerssen filed a charge with the EEOC
after being discharged by Commercial Office Products Co. ("Commer-
cial"), alleging violations of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
13 2
On March 30, the EEOC forwarded a copy of the charge, along with a
charge transmittal form, to the Colorado Civil Rights Division
("CCRD") which stated that the EEOC would initially process the
charge pursuant to a work-sharing agreement between it and the
CCRD.'3 The CCRD returned the charge transmittal form to the
EEOC, indicating that the CCRD waived its right to initially process the
charge. On April 4, 1984, the CCRD sent a letter to Leerssen explaining
that it had waived its right to initially process the charge, but stated that
it specifically retained jurisdiction over her case.
134
The EEOC's investigation began on March 26, 1984, the date that it
(10th Cir. 1986)), such specialized knowledge would involve technical expertise which the
court does not possess.
128. United Transp., 797 F.2d at 825. See also Atchison, T.& S.F.Ry. Co. v. United States,
244 U.S. 336 (1917); Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 197 (1918).
129. United Transp., 797 F.2d at 835.
130. Id.
131. 803 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1986), rev d, 108 S.Ct. 1666 (1988).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 2 0 00e (1985). Section 2000e-2 forbids discrimination in employment
opportunities because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Section 2000e-5 out-
lines the procedure for invoking the Act's protections.
133. Commercial Office Prods., 803 F.2d at 584.
134. Id.
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initially received the complaint.' 3 5 After Commercial refused to cooper-
ate in providing relevant information, the EEOC issued an administra-
tive subpoena.13 6 Commercial refused to comply with the subpoena on
the grounds that Leerssen's charge was untimely filed.' 3 7 The EEOC
sought enforcement of the subpoena at the district court level, but was
denied enforcement on the grounds that the filing of the Title VII
charge was not timely.
138
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit was confronted with the issue of
whether Leerssen's complaint was timely filed under the 300-day filing
requirement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 139 The court's first
consideration was whether the state agency had been given its sixty days
to act upon the charge. 140 The court looked to the Supreme Court's
decision in Love v. Pullman,14 ' and interpreted it to mean that when a
complainant files a charge with the EEOC, the deferral of that charge by
the EEOC is an initial filing in the state agency sufficient to commence
the 300-day time limitation. 14 2 The court found that the EEOC had ini-
tiated the charge with the CCRD on behalf of Leerssen, and that the
300-day limitation was invoked.1
43
The court then turned to the question of the meaning of the word
"filed" as contemplated by section 706(e).' 4 4 The court found that the
referral of a charge from the EEOC to the state agency begins a period
of "suspended animation" during which the state has a maximum of 60
days to resolve the charge before it can be filed officially with the
135. Id.
136. Id. The commission issued its subpoena pursuant to the power granted by 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(2) (1985).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. The statutory scheme adopted in § 706 of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5
(1985) makes a distinction between states which have an approved state civil rights en-
forcement agency (deferral states), and those states which do not (non-deferral states),
providing different time limitations for each. In non-deferral states, a charge must be filed
within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice began. An exception to
this 180 day time limit applies in deferral states which effectively grant a 300 day filing
limit for claimant in those states. However, this limit is also subject to the requirement
that no such charge may be filed with the EEOC until the state agency has had 60 days to
file the charge.
140. Commercial Office Prods., 803 F.2d at 585.
141. 404 U.S. 522 (1972). The court dealt with the complaint of a black porter who
filed a complaint to the EEOC. The EEOC orally notified the Colorado Civil Rights Com-
mission ("CCRC") of its receipt of the complaint. The CCRC waived its right to action,
and the EEOC commenced its own action. The defendant refused to comply on the
grounds that the EEOC had failed to properly notify the CCRC of the complaint, and had
thus failed to follow proper filing procedure. The district court granted summary judg-
ment and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the
'oral filing," by the EEOC had been in full compliance with intent of the act, and the time
limits had therefore been properly adhered to.
142. Commercial Office Prods., 803 F.2d at 586.
143. Id.
144. See 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-5 (1985).
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EEOC. 14 5 The court found this despite the contrary language of an
EEOC Procedural Regulation, holding along with Love, that Congress
chose to prohibit the filing of any federal charge until after state pro-
ceedings had been completed, or until 60 days had passed.
146
The court agreed with the Supreme Court's Mohasko 147 rationale,
that the combination of a 300-day filing requirement and a 60-day defer-
ral period means that a complainant must file his charge within 240 days
of the alleged discriminatory practice in order to preserve his federal
rights.' 4 8 It also means that any charges brought between the 240th
and 300th day are timely filed with EEOC only if the state agency hap-
pens to complete its proceedings before the expiration of the 60-day
deferral period, and prior to the 300th day. 14 9
The court found that since the 60-day deferral period did not begin
until the 289th day after the alleged unlawful practice, it did not end
until the 349th day, well beyond the 300-day limit.150 Thus, the court
reasoned, the charge could only have been timely filed with the EEOC if
the CCRD had terminated its proceedings under section 706(c) before
expiration of the 300-day limit. '51
The EEOC had argued that a state agency "terminates" its proceed-
ings under section 706(c) when that agency waives its right to initially
process a charge, defers to the EEOC, and retains jurisdiction to act
after the EEOC has completed its proceedings.' 52 This interpretation
was categorically refuted by the Tenth Circuit.
The court chose to adopt the plain and ordinary meaning of the
word "terminate" which, in the context of section 706(c), contemplates
the moment when the agency completely surrenders its jurisdiction over
a complaint.' 53 It likewise interpreted the term "proceedings" to mean
those actions a state agency must take in resolving a charge under Title
VII.1 54 The court was thus faced with deciding whether the forwarding
by the EEOC of the charge to the CCRD, and the CCRD's subsequent
waiver to "initially process" the charge, was a commencement and ter-
mination of state proceedings sufficient to shorten the mandatory 60-
145. Commercial Office Prods., 803 F.2d at 586.
146. Id.
147. Mohasko Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980). The Court decided the question of
whether a letter from a discharged employee sent to the EEOC 291 days after alleged
discriminatory discharge was "filed" for purposes of ritle 7. The Supreme Court held
that the statute prohibited the EEOC from allowing the charge to be filed on the date it
was received. The Court further held that even if the EEOC were allowed to file the com-
plaint automatically for the employee, it would still be required to wait 60 days or until the
state had terminated its proceedings. The state did not terminate its proceedings. There-
fore the 60-day period was invoked and added to the 291 days elapsed after discharge,
putting complainant well above the 300 day limit.
148. Id. at 821.
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day limit. 1 55 The court was convinced that it was not.
The court found that CCRD merely acknowledged receipt of Leer-
ssen's charge, waived initial processing, and retained jurisdiction reserv-
ing the right to act or to adopt the EEOC findings after the EEOC had
terminated its proceedings.156 The court refused to construe this as a
commencement and termination of proceedings.1 5 7 Once this was de-
cided, simple mathematics eliminated Leerssen's complaint. The defer-
ral period required by section 706(c) had not concluded until the 349th
day, and the CCRD had not terminated its proceedings by the 300th
day.1 5 8 The charge was thus ruled not timely filed.
The dissent first contested the majority's interpretation of the legis-
lative history behind Title VII and its implementing legislation. 159 At
the heart of this argument was the idea that Congress did not intend the
burden of a statutory ambiguity to fall on the victims of discrimina-
tion. 160 The ambiguity concerning who is to file when, and to what
agency, was admitted even by the majority.
16 1
The dissent then made a plea for judicial restraint, claiming that the
agency had already interpreted the statute, and the court should defer to
that construction, particularly when that statute is ambiguous. 16 2 It
cited the Supreme Court's rationale that when Congress is silent as to a
statutory question, the court's sole inquiry is to determine whether the
agency's interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute.'
63
The dissent maintained that the EEOC's interpretation of the statute
was clearly rational and consistent with the statute's purpose, and was
thus entitled to judicial deference.
164
3. Analysis
The Commercial decision is surprising, in that the majority opinion
admits that the confusion surrounding the filing requirements defeats
two important congressional goals: (1) the ease of filing civil rights
charges by lay complainants, and (2) timely resolution of civil rights
charges. 16 5 However, in the same breath, the court disqualifies itself
from the task of implementing these goals, claiming that it had no choice
but to follow the text of the statute, the legislative history, and the rele-
vant judicial interpretations. 1
6 6
155. Id. at 589.
156. Id. at 590.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 591.
159. Id. (McKay, J., dissenting).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 585.
162. Id. at 591-92 (citing Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734 (10th
Cir. 1982).
163. Id. at 592 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
164. Id.




That "choice" turns out to be far less obligatory than the court
would have us believe. The decision of the case turned essentially on
what constitutes the termination of proceedings. 16 7 In Isaac v. Harvard
University, 16 8 the First Circuit adopted the EEOC's interpretation of sec-
tion 706(c), meaning that a state agency terminates its proceedings
when the agency waives its right to initially process a charge, defers to
the EEOC, and retains jurisdiction to act after the EEOC has completed
its proceedings. The Commercial Office Products opinion expressly refutes
this interpretation, claiming it to be contrary to legislative history and
judicial interpretation.
16 9
In reviewing this "contrary legislative history," the majority seems
to have lost sight of the forest because of the trees. While Congress no
doubt intended to encourage state and local agencies to resolve civil
rights disputes, and to prevent premature federal intervention, it is diffi-
cult to see how these intentions would pre-empt the overall purpose of
the statute, which is to provide a means of redress for the victims of
discrimination.
The dissent is on target in this respect: "One would have to attri-
bute either congressional hostility to discrimination claimants or a lack
of congressional concern for the inability of lay people to understand
this complex statute to suggest [Congress] intended such a result."
7 0
For the majority to rule otherwise, shows an almost slavish obsession to
the technicalities of the law, and a troublesome neglect of the equities of
the case.
This strict constructionist approach is also troublesome in the con-
text of the court's other decisions during this survey period. As in United
Transportation Union,17 1 the court again refuses to defer to an agency's
interpretation of its own rules. While this is not surprising, it nonethe-
less illustrates an incipient antagonism between the court and adminis-
trative agencies.
Nowhere is this more clear than in the majority's footnote number
15.172 There, the court recognized that the time limitations for a Title
VII suit in federal court are subject to equitable modification. It even
hinted that Leerssen, should she decide to raise such an argument in her
own action, would prevail. 17 3 However, since it was the EEOC who
167. Id. at 589.
168. 769 F.2d 817 (1st Cir. 1985) (where a state agency's waiver of its right to initially
process a faculty member's employment discrimination charge was held to constitute a
"termination" for the purposes of the 60-day deferral provision of Title VII).
169. Commericial Office Prods., 803 F.2d at 587.
170. Id. at 592.
171. 797 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1986).
172. Commercial Office Prods., 803 F.2d at 590-91 ("We recognize that the time limita-
tions for filing a Title VII suit in federal court are not jurisdictional prerequisites for the
court but rather are subject to equitable modification.... The EEOC, however, failed to
argue to the district court that any equitable circumstances existed in this case that would
have justified a departure from the time limitations .. ").
173. Id. ("Leerssen... can raise any equitable arguments that she might have in seeking
to persuade a court to hear her case despite her failure to file a timely charge with the
EEOC.").
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raised the issue, and since the EEOC failed to argue it before the district
court, the court refused to consider it. 1
74
Lastly, the majority opinion throws away an opportunity to clarify a
confusing situation. The split among the circuits 1 75 has led to a confus-
ing state of affairs for both the layman and the lawyer. The Tenth Cir-
cuit admitted this problem in Commercial Office Products, and refused to
act, under the guise of "separation ofjudicial and legislative functions."
Unfortunately, the court's non-action in this case seems less a separation
of powers than an act ofjudicial apathy.
D. Rutherford v. United States
1. Background
In Rutherford v. United States,17 6 the Tenth Circuit was asked to con-
sider an appeal which was the culmination of nearly twelve years of liti-
gation between terminally ill cancer patients and the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA"). 177 The litigation centered around the drug
Laetrile, a substance which had been classified by the FDA in 1971 as a
"new drug" for the purposes of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act (the "Act"). Such a classification normally requires the filing of a
new drug application and subsequent FDA approval before the drug
may be administered.1
78
The introduction of such a "new drug" into interstate commerce is
prohibited by the Act unless the FDA has approved a new drug applica-
tion. In order to be exempt from the new drug requirements, the drug
must be generally recognized by qualified experts as safe and effective
when used in the prescribed manner. 179 Normally, this means that the
proponents of a drug must define its effectiveness by articulating what
the drug is supposed to do. 180
174. Id. ("The EEOC ... failed to argue to the district court that any equitable circum-
stances existed in this case that would have justified a departure from the time limitations
... We adhere to the rule that a party may not raise an issue on appeal that it did not raise
before the district court.") Cf. United Transp. Union v. Dole, 797 F.2d 823, 827 (10th
Cir. 1986) (where the court considered issues on equitable grounds despite the parties'
failure to develop the issue in their brief, according to procedure).
175. See Commercial Office Prods., 803 F.2d at 592 (and cases cited therein). The cases in
support of the proposition that a state agency's waiver of its right to initially process a
charge may constitute a "termination" for the 60 day deferral provision, are in the major-
ity. See Isaac, 769 F.2d at 827-28; EEOC v. Ocean City Police Dep't, 617 F. Supp. 1133 (D.
Md. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 787 F.2d 955 (4th Cir. 1986), reh 'g granted, 795 F.2d 368
(4th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 820 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1987), vacated, 108 S.Ct. 1990
(1988); Thompson v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 580 F. Supp. 662 (D.C. 1984). But
see Klausner v. Southern Oil Co., 533 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (waiver of initial
processing did not constitute a termination of state proceedings).
176. 806 F.2d 1455 (10th Cir. 1986).
177. Id. at 1457. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (Supp. 1985) outlines the procedure and requires
that samples be submitted with the proper documentation of the veracity of all statements
within 180 days. The application will either be approved, or a hearing on the question of
approvability will be held within 90 days.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1458.
180. Id. at 1458.
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In Rutherford, the plaintiffs claimed that Laetrile alleviates pain and
that pain reduction should be a criterion for effectiveness.18' This ques-
tion had been raised in the earlier decisions, as well as in the FDA hear-
ings. 182 However, the FDA determined that there was no general
recognition of effectiveness for pain alleviation. This determination was
based on both medical studies and physician testimony.
183
On appeal from the FDA's decision, the district court affirmed the
FDA's ruling that Laetrile was not "generally recognized as safe and ef-
fective," thus classifying it as a new drug.' 8 4 However, the district court
further held that Laetrile was exempt from new drug status because of a
1962 grandfather clause.' 8 5 After two reviews by the Tenth Circuit on
the issue of exempt status, and an order to dismiss, the district court
instead allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint.' 8 6 In their
amended complaint, the plaintiffs asserted that a new issue had arisen
which would justify reconsideration of their case. The district court
agreed and reopened the case.
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The crucial issue before the Tenth Circuit in Rutherford was whether
the district court had erred in reopening the case and allowing the plain-
tiffs to amend their complaint. The court held in the affirmative.
Although acknowledging that a district court generally has discretion to
allow an amended complaint when the appellate court reverses and re-
mands, such discretion is not unbounded.' 8 7 The court held that if an
appellate court ruling either calls for or precludes amendment, then the
district court has no discretion in allowing an amended complaint. '
8 8
In applying this general principle to the facts in Rutherford, the
Tenth Circuit found that because it had previously affirmed the district
court's ruling regarding laetrile's "lack of effectiveness," the district
court was bound by that decision.' 8 9 The court further held that the




184. Id. at 1459.
185. See 21 U.S.C.S. § 3 2 1(p)(1) (1984) ("[A] drug ... shall not be deemed to be a
"new drug" if at any time prior to this chapter it was subject to the Food and Drugs Act of
June 30, 1906 ...."). See also Public Law No. 87-781, § 107(c)(4), 76 sta. 788 ("In the case
of any drug which, on the day immediately preceding the enactment date, (A) was com-
mercially used or sold in the United States, (B) was not a new drug as defined by section
201 (p) of the basic Act as then in force, and (C) was not covered by an effective application
under section 505 of that Act, the amendments to section 201 (p)... shall not apply....").
186. Rutherford, 806 F.2d at 1459.
187. Id. at 1459-60. See R.E.B., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 525 F.2d 749, 751 (10th Cir.
1975). See also Beltran v. Myers, 701 F.2d 91, 93 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1134
(1983) (lower courts may decide an issue on remand so long as the issue was not expressed
or impliedly disposed of on appeal).
188. Rutherford, 806 F.2d at 1460.
189. Id.
190. Id. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff's assertion of a new issue was in fact
merely an assertion of newly discovered evidence.
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appellate mandate, and justify reconsideration at the district court level.
The court held that the district court simply did not have jurisdiction to
hear the new evidence, and that the proper forum for such reconsidera-
tion was with the body that initially decided the issue-the FDA.' 9 '
Thus, the plaintiffs' remedy lay with the FDA and not the district court.
3. Analysis
The Rutherford case presents a new twist in the area of judicial re-
straint in the review of agency decisions. Unlike United Transportation
and Commercial Office Products, the restraint here imposed is jurisdictional,
rather than doctrinal.
The plaintiffs had attempted to introduce a new issue into the case
for the purpose of reopening it. '9 2 They stated the new issue to be "as
of 1984, Laetrile was an ordinary drug not requiring any 'new drug' ap-
proval because [it was] generally recognized as safe and effective to alle-
viate or reduce pain .... ,193 This issue differed only by date, from the
one previously disposed of. 19 4 The Tenth Circuit refused to consider
this a new issue, finding that a simple change of date was not a statement
of a new issue, but rather an indication of newly developed evidence. 195
As such, the initial jurisdiction to hear that evidence lay with the FDA
and not the district court.
The court cited its previous holding in Trujillo v. General Electric
Co., 196 stating that "[a]dministrative agencies have an inherent authority
to reconsider their own decisions, since the power to decide in the first
instance carries with it the power to reconsider."' 19 7 In doing so, the
court established jurisdictional parameters on judicial review of agency
decisions. Normally, the Tenth Circuit has permitted lower courts al-
most plenary power in the decision to review or not to review.19 8 How-
ever, the court was not willing to allow a district court to usurp initial
jurisdiction of an administrative case since hearing evidence is not the
function of a reviewing court, and in the case of administrative hearings,
the district court is a reviewing court.
The Tenth Circuit was very concerned with maintaining the proper
separation of the FDA and the district courts as contemplated by the






196. 621 F.2d 1084 (10th Cir. 1980) (where the court held that district director of the
EEOC had the power to reconsider his earlier determination, and had the power to re-
verse his finding and rescind his earlier notice of right to sue).
197. Id. at 1086.
198. See supra note I.
199. Rutherford, 806 F.2d at 1461. See 21 U.S.C.S. § 355(h) (1984) (Until the record is
filed for appeal, the Secretary may modify his order concerning a new drug application.
After the record is filed, the petitioner may apply to the court to present additional evi-




ing the intent of Congress to give the FDA primary jurisdiction in deter-
mining evidentiary matters concerning new drugs. 200 It is also apparent
that the court was uneasy with the district court's failure to defer to
agency expertise in a matter which demanded such expertise.
2 0 '
The Rutherford case is an unusual example ofjudicial restraint in the
review of agency decisions. The case history of the Tenth Circuit has
been in favor ofjudicial review. 20 2 However, the court in this instance
could not allow the district court to use its right to review an agency
decision as a way to "supplant the FDA by making a de novo determina-
tion of 'new drug' status after reviewing evidence never considered by
the FDA. '"203 The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed that the judicial role in
agency cases is not to conduct evidentiary hearings, but merely to review
the final decisions that result from those hearings.
IV. REGULATORY OR PUNITIVE? THE CHARACTERIZATION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS AND THE PROTECTIONS OF THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT.
A. Background
The fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause 20 4 protects not
only a defendant's right to refuse to take the witness stand at his own
criminal trial, but also the privilege of any witness, in any formal or in-
formal governmental proceeding, to refuse to answer questions when
the answers might incriminate him. 20 5 The witness's privilege against
self-incrimination not only protects the individual against being involun-
tarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution, but
also privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any
other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the an-
swers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings. 20 6 How-
ever, this is a privilege to decline to respond to inquiries, not a
prohibition against inquiries designed to elicit responses incriminating
in nature. 20 7 To rely on this facet of the amendment's protection, a wit-
ness must normally take the stand, be sworn to testify, and assert the
privilege in response to each allegedly incriminating question as it is
asked. 2
0 8
The defendant's right to refuse to take the stand is the right of an
200. 21 U.S.C.§ 355(h) (1985).
201. Cf. United Transp. Union, 797 F.2d at 829.
202. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 672 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1982); Sabin v. Butz, 515
F.2d 1061 (10th Cir. 1975); Bramble v. Kleindienst, 357 F.Supp. 1028 (D.C. Colo. 1973),
aff'd, Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1974).
203. Rutherford, 806 F.2d at 1461.
204. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ... ").
205. See, e.g., United States v. Housing Found. of Am., 176 F.2d 665 (3rd Cir. 1949);
United States v. Gay, 567 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 (1978).
206. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
207. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 130 at 315 (3d Ed. 1984).
208. United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682, 685 (5th Cir. 1974), cerl. denied, 419 U.S.
826 (1974).
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accused at his own criminal trial to avoid not only giving incriminating
responses to inquiries put to him, but to be free from the inquiries
themselves.2 0 9 The defendant may invoke this protection by simply not
offering to testify.2 10 While this protection is absolute in a criminal pro-
ceeding, it does not extend to proceedings which are administrative in
nature. In the case of administrative proceedings, the issue centers
around the characterization of the sanction being contemplated, and
whether that sanction is regulatory or punitive.
The test applied to determine whether a statutorily defined penalty
is civil or criminal has traditionally proceeded on two levels. 2 11 The first
level is to determine the intent of Congress in establishing the penalty.
Second, where Congress has indicated an intent to establish a civil pen-
alty, is to determine whether the statutory scheme was so punitive in
either purpose or effect as to negate that intention.
2 12
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit was asked to consider a
case where the defendant in an administrative hearing sought protection
under the fifth amendment's witness and defendant clauses. 2 13 The
court granted the review, and held that neither protection was available.
B. Roach v. National Transportation Safety Board
1. Facts
In Roach v. National Transportation Safety Board,2 14 Joseph A. Roach
petitioned for review of a final order of the NTSB which suspended
Roach's commercial pilot's certificate for thirty days.2 15 The suspension
was the result of flight violations made by Roach at the La Junta, Colo-
rado, airport. After conducting a sales demonstration flight, Roach took
off with a Roach Aircraft Sales Representative, for a return flight to Den-
ver. Before returning to Denver, however, Roach made three passes
over the LaJunta airport runway at an altitude of approximately 500 feet
so that his clients could see the plane in flight. At the end of the third
pass, Roach executed an aileron roll and then left for Denver.
2 16
As a result of this incident, the Federal Aviation Administration
("FAA") ordered Roach's license suspended for 60 days.2 1 7 Roach
sought review of this order with the FAA's regional office. At a de novo
hearing, the ALJ ruled that the FAA Administrator failed to prove that
Roach had violated any Federal Aviation Regulations because he failed
to prove that Roach flew within 500 feet of any building when he made
209. See supra note 204.
210. United States ex rel. Santana v. Fenton, 570 F. Supp. 752, 759 (D.N.J. 1981), rev'd.
on other grounds, 685 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1115 (1983).
211. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980), reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 916 (1980).
212. Id. at 248.
213. See Roach v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 804 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1986).
214. 804 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1986).
215. Id. at 1150.
216. Id. at 1149 (An aileron roll is an acrobatic manuever accomplished by rolling a
plane to one side in a complete somersault.).
217. Id. at 1150.
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his three passes over the runway.218 However, the ALJ upheld the re-
maining charges concerning the aileron roll, finding that the sales repre-
sentative was not a crew member who was performing crew member
duties, and he was not wearing a parachute, which violated FAA regula-
tions. 2 19 Accordingly, the ALJ reduced the suspension from 60 days to
30 days, a sentence which was subsequently affirmed by the NTSB.
2 20
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The key issue before the court was whether Roach's fifth amend-
ment rights were violated when the Administrator was allowed to call
him as an adverse witness. 22 1 Essentially, the court was faced with de-
termining exactly which rights under the fifth amendment would sup-
port Roach's argument. The answer to this problem centered on
whether the protections normally afforded a defendant in a criminal
proceeding extend to an administrative hearing as well. The court held
that if the suspension was intended as punishment, then it was criminal
in character, and the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by
the fifth amendment would apply.
2 22
The character of the sanction was to be determined by the Congres-
sional intent behind the statute. 22 3 After a lengthy analysis, the court
found the Congressional intent behind the enactment of the legislation
to be regulatory rather than punitive, and that the "clear proof" neces-
sary to override that intent did not exist. 22 4 Roach's trial was thus regu-
latory in nature, and not within the scope of the "self-incrimination"
clause of the fifth amendment.
2 2 5
Roach further claimed that the ALJ's interpretation of the applica-
ble FAA rules was unprecedented, and as such, violative of his due pro-
cess rights.2 26 While agreeing that parties have a right to be "informed
with reasonable certainty and explicitness of the standards by which a
license may be revoked," 22 7 the court ruled that the ALJ's findings had
followed long-standing NTSB interpretations, and that no violation of
due process had occurred.
22 8
Roach also claimed that the ALJ had created a novel definition of
"crew member" by interpreting the term to include only the persons





222. Id. at 1152.
223. Id. at 1153.
224. Id. (citing United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 365
(1984); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 916 (1980)) ("only
the clearest proof... will override Congress' manifest preference for a civil sanction").
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1155.
227. Id. at 1155 (quoting Sorenson v. Nalional Transp. Safety Bd., 684 F.2d 683, 686 (10th
Cir. 1982)).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1156.
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Again, the court found this argument unpersuasive. The court found
that the ALJ's interpretation of the word "crew member" 23 0 was consis-
tent with the FAA's long-standing position on the issue. The court thus
found that Roach had fair warning of the scope of the regulation, and its




In affirming the decision of the agency on all counts, the court was
particularly concerned with the self-incrimination aspect of Roach's fifth
amendment argument. Although the court had often dealt with the
question of self-incrimination in criminal proceedings, it had little expe-
rience in applying the fifth amendment in administrative hearings. 2 3 2
The court looked to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms23 3 for the test which would trigger the protec-
tion of the fifth amendment. The Firearms court had stated that for a
party in an administrative hearing to be able to assert a defendant's fifth
amendment right not to take the stand, it must be decided whether the
sanctions contemplated by the hearing are regulatory or punitive in
nature.234
The Tenth Circuit then relied upon the standard for the regula-
tory/punitive distinction as set forth in United States v. Ward.23 5 The
Ward court stated that the "inquiry in this regard traditionally proceeds
on two levels. The first step inquires as to Congress' intent in establish-
ing the penalizing mechanism. The second step inquires as to whether
the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect so as to
negate that intention.
'23 6
The Tenth Circuit concentrated its analysis on the list of considera-
tions set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.2 3 7 That court stated those
considerations as follows:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or re-
straint, whether it has been historically regarded as punish-
230. Id. The FAA does not provide a definition for "crew member." However, the
court felt that the student pilot exemption contained in 14 C.F.R. § 91.15(d) (1987) should
have placed Roach on notice that mere assistance during the flight would not elevate his
passenger to crew member status. The court thus held that the parachute requirements of
14 C.F.R. § 91.15(c)(1987) were reasonably applied to the facts.
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., United States v. Nunez, 668 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1981); Enrichi v. United
States, 212 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1954).
233. 465 U.S. 354 (1984). The Court held that gun owner's acquittal on criminal
charges involving firearms does not preclude a subsequent in rem forfeiture proceeding
against the same firearms. Neither collateral estoppel nor double jeopardy bars a civil
proceeding initiated following an acquittal on criminal charges.
234. Id. at 362. If the sanctions contemplated are punitive in nature, then the absolute
self-incrimination protections of the fifth amendment may be invoked. If the sanctions are
regulatory in nature, then the fifth amendment's protections do not apply.
235. See supra note 208.
236. Roach, 804 F.2d at 1153.
237. 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (where the Court held that deprivation of citizenship was
penal in nature and that draft evaders were entitled to fifth amendment protection).
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ment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of pun-
ishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative pur-
pose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it,
and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned .... 238
However, the Tenth Circuit also placed this "test" within the confines of
a "showing of only the clearest proof."
2 3 9
The court found that this clear proof did not exist, and hence, Con-
gress' apparent intent that the sanction be regulatory rather than puni-
tive could not be overcome by a theory of overriding effect or
purpose. 240 This ruling was consistent with other courts' holdings in
other cases. 24 1 In those cases, the courts generally found that when an
act includes a penalty within a civil section, and discusses criminal penal-
ties in an entirely separate section, a strong indication is made that Con-
gress intended the penalty to be civil. 2 42 The case at bar was precisely
of this type; the act in question discussed criminal penalties in a separate
section which expressly excluded violations of safety regulations from its
purview.
24 3
The ruling was also consistent with that line of cases 24 4 in which
courts have found that license suspension or revocation proceedings are
not criminal for the purposes of determining the admissibility of previ-
ously immunized, compelled testimony. 2 45 The court acknowledged a
contrary line of cases, 246 fostered by Judge Prettyman's dissent in Lee v.
Civil Aeronautics Board,24 7 in which the Civil Aeronautics Board held that
a suspension of an airman's certificate was penal in nature. 248 However,
the Tenth Circuit ruled that the more recent judicial trend was toward
the former rationale. 24 9 The court thus held that since the suspension
did not have a clearly penal purpose or effect, no fifth amendment rights
were violated.
238. Id. at 168-69.
239. Roach, 804 F.2d at 1153. The Kennedy factors are analyzed in the overall frame-
work of the lWard "clearest proof" test.
240. Id. at 1153-54.
241. Id. at 1153.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. (The court relied on such cases as In Re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 476-77 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied sub. nom Daley v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of the
Supreme Court of Illinois, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Burley v. United States Drug Enforcement
Agency, 443 F.Supp. 619, 622-23 (M.D. Tenn. 1977).
245. Id. at 1154 n.7.
246. Lewis H. Brubaker and Charles E. Olsen, 19 C.A.B. 885, 886-87 (1954); Herbert
R. Galloway, INTSB 2104, 2105 (1972); Pike v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 303 F.2d 353, 357
(8th Cir. 1962).
247. 225 F.2d 950, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Judge Prettyman's dissent maintained that
suspension of pilots' certificates was punitive in nature, and therefore the pilots were enti-
tled to fifth amendment protection.
248. Roach, 804 F.2d at 1154 n.7.
249. Id. at 1154.
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4. Conclusion
The Roach decision appears to be a soundly reached decision, and is
a step forward in clarifying the line which divides regulatory and penal
administrative hearings. In reaching its decision, the Tenth Circuit had
many additional factors weighing in favor of its ruling. For example,
Roach's flight certification was a privilege voluntarily granted, thus its
revocation was "characteristically free of the punitive criminal ele-
ment."' 2 50 However, it is also significant to note that Roach's privilege
was also the means by which he earned his living. The argument could
have been advanced that he was being deprived of a vested property
right, which may have triggered a more independent standard of
review.
25 '
The court also had public interest on its side. As the NTSB found,
there was a substantial public interest in the safety of air commerce and
air transportation which Roach violated with his low passes and acro-
batic rolls. 2 5 2 Lastly, the equities of the case pointed toward an affirm-
ance of the agency/ALJ ruling. The penalty which Roach received was a
thirty-day suspension of his pilot certificate, 2 53 a penalty which could
hardly have shocked the conscience of the court. It was thus not difficult
for the court to defer to the agency's decision.
The Roach case was an excellent opportunity for the court to clarify
a somewhat muddled situation among the circuits concerning the scope
of fifth amendment protections in agency proceedings.2 54 The court
took advantage of this opportunity to provide a framework in which the
nature of agency proceedings may be analyzed. 2 55 Only time will reveal
the impact this case will have on the uniformity of such decisions in
other circuits.
CONCLUSION
If there were hopes that the "doctrine" of judicial restraint in the
review of agency decisions would become a more settled area of law,
they were quickly frustrated by the recent survey period. The cases were
factually complex, yet among those facts, one struggles to find the keys
to what triggers judicial restraint and what does not.
Particularly difficult to reconcile are the United Transportation and
250. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
251. See Halaco Eng'g Co. v. South Cent. Coast Regional Comm'n, 720 P.2d 15, 227
Cal. Rptr. 667, 42 Cal. 3d 52 (1986) (where developer claimed he had vested right to
continue his development, it was proper for court to apply independent standard of
review).
252. Roach, 804 F.2d at 1154.
253. Id. at 1150. The ALJ had dropped one of the four charges against Roach, because
the Administration had failed to prove that Roach had flown within 500 feet of a building
in violation of Federal Aviation Regulation 91.57. In view of Roach's long history in avia-
tion, the ALJ reduced the original 60 day suspension to 30 days.
254. See 804 F.2d 1147 and cases cited therein.
255. It should be noted that the court was able to decide the issue while deferring to
the ALJ's decision-which no doubt made their own decision easier to attain.
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Commercial Office Products cases. In the former, the Tenth Circuit inter-
preted a statutory term based on congressional intent, the plain lan-
guage of the regulation, and the agency's prior interpretations. 2 56 In
doing so, the court refused to defer to the agency interpretation. In the
latter case, the court determined that congressional intent and agency
interpretation were outweighed by the plain language of the regula-
tion.2 57 The court also refused to defer to agency interpretation. It is a
troublesome pattern, with common elements being considered, but with
almost irreconcilable results being reached. Between the two cases, the
only common denominator it seems, is the court's refusal to defer to
"agency expertise."
Fortunately, the Rutherford case sheds some light. Despite its
pretensions of dealing with jurisdictional limits, one cannot overlook the
fact that the case dealt with the scientific issue of what constitutes a new
drug. 258 The court was very uneasy about allowing a lower court to
wander too far into an unknown realm. 2 59 In contrast, the court seems
much more confident about its ability to decide issues that deal with
statutory interpretation, e.g., the United Transportation Union and Commer-
cial Office Products cases.
In the attempt to reconcile these cases, no true test emerges. What
does emerge however, is the somewhat amorphous rule that the limits
on judicial pre-emption of an agency ruling are drawn at the point where
the court no longer feels more qualified than the agency to adjudicate
the issue.
ADDENDUM
On May 16, 1988, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Commerical Office Products Company.26 0 In so doing, the Court concen-
trated on two questions. The primary question considered was whether
a state agency's decision to waive its exclusive sixty-day period for initial
processing of a discrimination charge, pursuant to a work sharing agree-
ment with the EEOC, "terminates" the agency's proceedings within the
meaning of section 706(c) of Title VII, so that the EEOC immediately
may deem the charge filed.
The Tenth Circuit had reasoned that a state agency "terminates" its
proceedings only when it completely surrenders its jurisdiction over a
charge. 26 1 Since the Colorado Civil Rights Division ("CCRD") had re-
served jurisdictional right to review the EEOC's decision in this case, the
256. United Tramp., 797 F.2d at 829.
257. Commercial Office Prods., 803 F.2d at 588-89.
258. Rutherford, 806 F.2d at 1461.
259. Id.
260. 108 S.Ct. 1666 (1988). Justice Marshall wrote the majority opinion. Justice
O'Connor filed an opinion in which she concurred in part and with the judgement. Justice
Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia
joined. Justice Kennedy did not participate.
261. 803 F.2d at 587.
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Tenth Circuit held that the CCRD did not "finally and unequivocally
terminate its authority."'2 62 The Tenth Circuit had expressly rejected
the First Circuit's interpretation of the same filing provisions in Issac v.
Howard University.2 6 3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the conflict.
I. THE DECISION
The majority opinion concentrated on the definition of the term
"terminated" as contemplated by the statute. The Tenth Circuit had
held, in the face of the EEOC's conficting interpretation, that "termi-
nates" meant "completely relinquish[ing] its authority to act on the
charge at that point or in the future."' 264 The Supreme Court rejected
this interpretation and adopted the First Circuit's view that "terminates"
includes "cessation in time.''265 This interpretation supported the
EEOC's position that a state agency "terminates" its proceedings when
it declares that it will not proceed for a specified interval of time.
The basis of the Supreme Court's decision was a finding by the
Court that the EEOC's interpretation of ambiguous language in the en-
abling statute was entitled to judicial deference. The Court found that
the EEOC's interpretation was more than amply supported by the legis-
lative history of the deferral provisions of Title VII, the purposes of
those provisions, and the language of other sections of the Act. 26 6 The
secondary issue considered by the Court was Commerical Office Prod-
ucts' argument that the extended 300-day federal filing period is inappli-
cable to this case because the complainant failed to file her
discrimination charge with the CCRD within Colorado's 180-day limita-
tions period. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, affirming the
decisions of the various circuits which had ruled on the question. 26 7
The Court reasoned that the imposition of state limitation periods upon
section 706(e) would confuse lay complainants and contradict the reme-
dial scheme of Title VII in which lay persons, not lawyers, are expected
to initiate the process.
2 68
The Court further reasoned that such consideration of state limita-
tion periods would unnecessarily involve issues of state law.2 69 The
Court was not willing to force the EEOC to decide such issues as
whether state limitation periods are waived or equitably tolled. The
Court thus affirmed its ruling in Mohasco Corp. v. Silver,2 70 in which the
Court held that a complainant "need only file his charge within 240 days
262. Id. at 590.
263. 769 F.2d 817 (1st Cir. 1985).
264. 803 F.2d at 589 n.13.
265. 108 S.Ct. at 1676.
266. 108 S.Ct. at 1671.
267. See Gilardi v. Schroeder, 833 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1987); Mennor v. Fort Hood
Nat'l Bank, 829 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1987); Maurya v. Peabody Coal Co., 823 F.2d 933 (6th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. at 1030 (1988).
268. 108 S.Ct. at 1676.
269. Id.
270. 447 U.S. 807 (1980).
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of the alleged discriminatory employment practice in order to ensure
that his federal rights will be preserved." 2 7 1 The Court found that such
a holding "establishes a rule that is both easily understood by complain-
ants and easily administered by the EEOC."
27 2
In a brief concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed with the
majority's opinion that the agency's construction was reasonable and
therefore entitled to deference. 2 7 3 However, she was careful to point
out that the majority's strong language in rejecting the respondant's po-
sition, 274 should not be interpreted as a statement by the Court that an
agency decision to adopt the respondant's position would be rejected by
the Court. 2 75 This concurrence took a strictly deferential approach,
based solely on the "traditional deference accorded the EEOC in the
interpretation of the statute."
2 7 6
The dissent simply took the position that the Court's decision "is
not faithful to the plain language of the statute, the legislative compro-
mise that made it possible to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or to




The Supreme Court's decision is a reaffirmation of the doctrine of
judicial deference to agency interpretation of statutes. The Tenth Cir-
cuit had refused to accept the EEOC's construction of its own enabling
statute, even though the interpretation appeared to be reasonable. The
Supreme Court's decision reaffirms the circuit court's obligation to de-
fer to agency interpretation when that interpretation appears reason-
able. If the circuit courts had begun to exceed the boundaries ofjudicial
pre-emption of agency decisions, the Supreme Court's holding re-estab-
lishes those parameters.
On a more practical level, the decision benefits those for whom Ti-
tle VII was designed to benefit, lay claimants who are the victims of dis-
crimination. It removes the filing procedures for such claims from the
dockets of the courts and returns them to the local agencies and lay
claimants where they may be dealt with in a more efficient manner. By
clarifying the law on this matter, the Court may have gone a long way
toward relieving the antagonism which had manifested itself between
the Tenth Circuit and the EEOC in this case.
Greg Jaeger
271. Id. at 814.
272. 108 S.Ct. at 1676.
273. Id.
274. The majority had labelled the respondant's position "absurd." Id. at 1674.
275. 108 S.Ct. at 1676 (concurring opinion).
276. Id. at 1677.





This survey reviews two recent Tenth Circuit opinions which deal
with antitrust law interpretations. In the first opinion, Westman Commis-
sion Co. v. Hobart International, Inc.,' the court of appeals found no con-
spiracy in restraint of trade nor a per se antitrust violation when a
manufacturer refused to grant a distributorship. In reaching this hold-
ing, the court determined the scope of the relevant product market to be
restaurant equipment generally sold by dealers, irrespective of the "one-
stop shopping" classification. The relevant geographic market was de-
termined to include nothing less than the Denver metropolitan area. 2 In
the second opinion, Fox Motors, Inc. v. Mazda Distributors (Gulf), Inc. ,3 the
Tenth Circuit held that there was no per se tying arrangement which
could be construed to be in violation of antitrust laws. The court con-
cluded that such arrangements were actually procompetitive rather than
anticompetitive.
4
Both decisions involved vertical agreements where the trial court
erroneously found the arrangements to be illegal per se. The analysis of
the Tenth Circuit opinions focused on the fundamental problem of the
lower court's desire to protect specific competitors in lieu of properly
protecting competition in general. In addition, these decisions involved
end distributors or dealers who were unable to prevent the procompeti-
tive impact of the manufacturers' actions. The Tenth Circuit concluded
that the actions of the dealers did not limit intrabrand competition but
rather ultimately benefited the consumer by creating interbrand rival-
ries. Thus, the dealers did not violate the purpose of the antitrust laws,
which is to promote consumer welfare.
5
This article discusses: (1) vertical price fixing and tying arrange-
ments, and (2) the Tenth Circuit's most recent approach in determining
whether price fixing and tying arrangements are anticompetitive.
I. PRICE FIXING AND TYING ARRANGEMENTS IN GENERAL
A. The Right to Refuse to Deal and Exclusive Dealing
The antitrust laws do not inhibit a seller's or buyer's right to refuse
to deal with anyone. However, refusal to deal must not stem from an
illegal motive or an anticompetitive result. For example, exercising the
right of refusal in conjunction with others, on a horizontal level, to
1. 796 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1986)[hereinafter Westman II].
2. Id. at 1229; see Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 627 (D.
Colo. 1978)[hereinafter JVestman I].
3. 806 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1986).
4. Id.
5. Westman 11, 796 F.2d at 1220.
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freeze another out of business will bring such motive and action within
the "combination ... or conspiracy" language of section one of the
Sherman Act. 6 In addition, the refuser must demonstrate lack of domi-
nance in the market place, otherwise there is a violation of the monopo-
lization concept in section two of the Sherman Act.7 Under present
Tenth Circuit law, a unilateral refusal to deal is normally permitted.
8
Refusal to deal is critical to a manufacturer's ability to control his
distributor's resale price and, so long as there is no concerted action or
monopoly power, a manufacturer may refuse to deal or even threaten to
refuse to deal with any distributor who cuts resale prices.9 Accordingly,
resale price maintenance is permissible so long as the motive or intent
behind it is not unlawful, such as concerted action.' 0 In other words, for
the refusal itself to be lawful, it must be unilateral, and must effect only
the one refusing and the one refused."
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not ex-
ceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred
thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id. See 2 L. ALTMAN, CALLMANN UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES 11,
§ 10.03 (4th ed. 1982); see, e.g., United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not ex-
ceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred
thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id. Industrial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336, 1342 (9th Cir.
1970). A manufacturer who enjoys a dominant position in the market cannot choose or
replace distributors at will if "the public is left with only the manufacturer instead of the
manufacturer and the independant distributor."
8. Card v. National Life Ins. Co., 603 F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1979).
9. 2 L. ALTMAN, supra note 6, § 10.03, at 11.
10. Id. The anticompetitive aspect of exclusive dealing is that it restricts a buyer from
being able to choose and buy from any other seller. Consequently, exclusionary dealing
precludes the buyer from participating in a competitive market. 16A J. vONKALINOWSKI,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: ANTITRUST TRADE LAws: TRADE REGULATION, § 6G.02[l], 6G-10
(1987). The crux of antitrust law is protection of the consumer and the economy from the
abuses commonly associated in a private monopoly. Therefore, any activity between buyer
and seller which impinges on the free market place is considered unlawful. See D.J. AR-
MENTANO, ANTITRUST POLICY: THE CASE FOR REPEAL 47 (1986).
11. 2 L. ALTMAN, supra note 6, § 10.04, at 19. Unilateral refusal to deal is likely to be
anticompetitive unless and until it can be shown that multiple parties are involved. Pres-
ently, an exclusive dealing arrangement is tested for its anticompetitiveness and, as such, is
probably not violative under section one of the Sherman Act unless it affects 50% of the
relevant market. 16AJ. vONKALINOWSKI, supra note 10, § 6G.03 [2], at 6G-29. The rule of
reason determines whether a competitor is foreclosed from access to the relevant market.
Thus, an exclusive agreement does not foreclose a competitor's access to a market if the
excluded competitor has an alternative means to the consumer. See, e.g., M & H Tire Co. v.
Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973 (Ist Cir. 1984). For further discussion on the
rule of reason approach to exclusive dealing arrangements see 16A J. voNKALINOWSKI,
supra note 10, § 6G.04 [l](a), at 6G-30.
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The principal "refusal to deal" has a corollary to it: the manufac-
turer may in good faith refuse to market his product, but good faith
need not be shown when selecting distributors.12 When an anticompeti-
tive action is employed to achieve exclusive dealing arrangements and in
effect restricts the competition's access to the market, then it is an un-
lawful restraint of trade and a violation of the antitrust laws.
13
A vertical agreement between a manufacturer and a dealer is lawful
if reasonable. This is also true for a vertical arrangement with several
manufacturers. However, agreements which tend to eliminate competi-
tion between horizontal competitors may be found to be illegal per se.14
Therefore, it is often the legality of the purpose for the agreements, hori-
zontal or the vertical found to be horizontal in nature, that will deter-
mine the legality of the restraint itself.15
B. Anticompetitive Distribution Practices.- Tying Arrangements
Tying arrangements are a form of exclusive dealing arrangements
whereby a seller, who has sufficient control over an item supplied (the
"tying" product), will condition the availability of the original product.
Usually, the seller will require the purchase or lease of a second product,
whether or not that product (the "tied" product) is complementary or
supplementary to the originally supplied item. 16 Tying arrangements
create the opportunity for a manufacturer to expand his economic
power from one product to another. Often tying arrangements are em-
ployed to boast the sales of one product which lacks demand. 17 An-
ticompetitive tying arrangements are generally found to be illegal per
se. 18 The "tied" product, not the "tying" product, is insulated from
competition and causes an antitrust violation. 19
12. 2 L. ALTMAN, supra note 6, § 10.06, at 19. The reasonableness or unreasonable-
ness of an exclusive dealing arrangement depends upon the overall anticompetitive effect.
Specifically, this requires analysis of the effect in light of: (1) the relevant product market
(reasonable interchangeability of use, cross-elasticity of demand); and (2) the relevant geo-
graphic market (ability of buyer to find other sources of supply, transportation costs of the
seller). 16AJ. VONKALINOWSKI, supra note 10, § 6G.04 [1], at 6G-31. However, a business
usually has the right to deal or refuse to deal with whomever it wishes. This includes the
right of a franchisor either to refuse to grant a franchise, or having already granted a
franchise, the right to terminate it. See 16AJ. vONKALINOWSKI, supra note 10, § 6H.02 [2],
at 6H-6; 2 L. ALTMAN, supra note 6, § 10.16, at 98.
13. United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127 (1966); White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). Both Courts stated that if a manufacturer initiates restrictions
to eliminate competition, then the restrictions are illegal per se.
14. All exclusive dealerships are illegal per se when they tend to stifle competition or
promote a pernicious effect. 2 L. ALTMAN, supra note 6, § 10.16, at 98.
15. United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978)("Price is the 'central nervous system of the economy,' and an agreement that 'inter-
fere[s] with the setting of price by free market forces' is illegal on its face."); Cernuto, Inc.
v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 1979)(price-fixing motives were the
main reason for refusal to deal).
16. 2 L. ALTMAN, supra note 6, § 10.18, at 104.
17. There may be several reasons for this. For example, a manufacturer may want to
insulate himself against competition in the tied product, protect his goodwill with respect
to the tying product, or facilitate introduction of a new product into the market. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. The sale of the tied product is no longer based on demand, rather the sale of
19881
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The fundamental requirement in demonstrating a violation is that
the arrangement involves two separate and distinct products that are so
unrelated that they are considered disassociated from each other.
20
Although tying arrangements are voluntary contractual agreements be-
tween buyer and seller, these agreements result in restricting the buyer
in certain ways. 2 1 Historically, tying arrangements were believed to be
harmful to competition and the final consumer. 2 2 Recently courts have
leaned toward the idea that vertically restrictive agreements might be
procompetitive in that they could serve to discriminate prices 2 3 , pre-
serve goodwill, shift business risks, and financially strengthen a distribu-
tion or reduce inefficient "free riding" activity.2 4 However, a tying
arrangement will be held anticompetitive for one of several reasons:
(1) if its probable effect is to "substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce," a violation of section three
of the Clayton Act; 25 (2) if it results in an unreasonable restraint which
effects a "not unsubstantial amount of interstate commerce," a violation
of section one of the Sherman Act; 2 6 or (3) if it is shown to be "in con-
flict with basic policies" of the antitrust laws, a violation of section five of
the Federal Trade Commission Act.
27
Special note should be given to the distinction between an exclusive
the product is dependent on the demand of the tying product. See supra notes 6 and 7 and
accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., 2 L. ALTMAN, supra note 6, § 10.16, at 98 citing United States v. Jerrold
Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). The four crite-
ria used in determining the relation or distinction of two products in a tying arrangement
are: (1) trade usage or practice in the field; (2) sale of a consistently homogeneous combi-
nation of the two products; (3) lump sum billing for the combination; and (4) existence of
other related products not included in the unit. 2 L. ALTMAN, supra note 6, § 10.16, at 98.
21. Restrictions imposed on the consumer include territorial restrictions, full line
forcing, and tie-in sales. D.J. ARMENTANO, supra note 9, at 48; see also supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
22. D.J. ARMENTANO, supra note 10, at 49.
23. Industrial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336, 1345 (9th
Cir. 1970)(manufacturer offers prices to other distributors which discriminate against an-
other distributor).
24. The inefficiency of "free ride" services take place in, for example, the computer
industry when a manufacturer wants the distributor to provide pre-sale information,
and/or post-sale service. The inefficiency of this system occurs where the consumer takes
full advantage of the pre-sale information and ultimately buys the product from the dis-
count distributor. The intrabrand competition may drop the price of the product, thereby
causing the manufacturer to suffer with respect to interbrand competition. Courts there-
fore feel that permitting the manufacturer to impose limited territorial restrictions and
resale price maintenance agreements may serve to remedy the situation by creating "more
efficient" rivalries with other manufacturers. D.J. ARMENTANO, supra note 10, at 49-50 (cit-
ing R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTUS 171-84 (1976)).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982). See 2 L. ALTMAN, supra note 6, § 10.19, at 118; see, e.g.,
Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). Buyers of space for gen-
eral display and classified advertising in the Times-Picayune could only purchase com-
bined insertions appearing in both the morning and evening papers, and not in either
separately. Suit was filed under the Sherman Act, which challenged the "forced combina-
tion" contracts as unreasonable restraints of interstate trade, and as tools in an attempt to
monopolize a segment of interstate commerce. The contracts were viewed as tying ar-
rangements. Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 597.
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dealing arrangement and a tying arrangement. The Tenth Circuit views
an exclusive dealing arrangement as a manufacturer's general response
to market conditions, and is therefore procompetitive rather than an-
ticompetitive. On the other hand, a tying arrangement is viewed as a
restriction imposed by a dominant seller, and serves no economic pur-
pose.28 In both Westman and Fox, the Tenth Circuit focused on viola-
tions of section one of the Sherman Act. Both decisions reflect an
approach followed in United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co. 29 Schwinn bal-
anced the anticompetitive effects versus the procomptitive effects of ex-
clusive dealing and tying arrangements.
II. RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKET, GEOGRAPHIC MARKET, AND PER SE
ANALYSIS: WESTMAN COMMISSION Co. v. HOBART
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
A. Facts
Defendant, Hobart International (Hobart), is a manufacturer of one
of fifty-three lines of kitchen equipment sold by Westman Commission
Company, plaintiff. Westman is a Denver metro restaurant equipment
supplier in competition with Nobel, Inc. Until 1977, Nobel was one of
eight successful competitors in the Denver area, which sold kitchen
equipment products to the restaurant and food service industry. Until
1973, Westman was involved only in the wholesale grocery business, but
thereafter acquired the assets of the WE-4 Division of Wilscam Enter-
prises, Inc. (WE-4), and became an active competitor in the restaurant
supply market.
30
At the time Westman acquired WE-4, WE-4 had an informal distrib-
utor agreement with Hobart. This relationship was continued by West-
man for about fourteen months after acquisition, at which time Hobart
informed Westman that it had no intention of formally offering West-
man a distributorship. Hobart then permanently terminated its casual
sales relationship with Westman in 1976.31
Given the above circumstances, Westman brought an antitrust ac-
tion claiming that the denial by Hobart to grant Westman a distributor-
ship was a conspiracy on the part of Nobel and Hobart to prevent
Westman from competing with Nobel in the Denver area restaurant sup-
ply market. 3 2 The trial court agreed with Westman, and found that Ho-
28. 2 L. ALTMAN, supra note 6, § 10.18, at 104; see Westman 11, 796 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir.
1986); see also Fox Motors, Inc. v. Mazda Distributors (Gulf), Inc., 806 F.2d 953 (10th Cir.
1986).
29. 388 U.S. 365 (1967)(overruled on other grounds by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)). Schwinn was rejected by the trial court since this case
did not involve an exclusive distributorship or franchise, and the evidence revealed that
'much of Hobart's product line [did] not have equivalent brands available in the market."
lWestman I1, 796 F.2d at 1225 (quoting testman 1, 461 F. Supp. 627, 637 (D. Colo. 1978)).
See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
30. J4estman 11, 796 F.2d at 1219.
31. Id.
32. The record of the lower court revealed that Nobel had informed Hobart that
granting WE-4 a distributorship would "jeopardize" Hobart's pre-existing business rela-
1988]
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bart Int'l violated section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act.33
B. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the lower court's decision was
incorrect because the analysis provided by the trial court was improper.
More specifically, the lower court incorrectly defined the relevant prod-
uct market and relevant geographic market, and consequently errone-
ously found a per se violation.
3 4
i. Relevant Product Market
In Westman I, the court found that the relevant product market was
the "one-stop shopping" market.3 5 This type of market is a method of
marketing whereby the distributor carries multiple lines of the same
type of product in addition to a line of complimentary products. As a
result of this type of marketing, one distributor can provide for all of the
needs of a food service operator.
3 6
Proper determination of the relevant product market requires an
examination of the commodities which are reasonably interchangeable
by a consumer for the same purpose.3 7 The critical error on the part of
the lower court was its improper focus on the marketing methods of the
restaurant supply competitors and not on the product selection of the
ultimate consumer.3 8 The Tenth Circuit Court found nothing in the
record to suggest that the cross elasticity of Hobart products was inelas-
tic. 3 9 The Tenth Circuit also found that the trial court erroneously fo-
tionship with Nobel. The appeals court found that this "veiled threat" was the underlying
reason for denying the distributorship. Id. (citing Westman 1, 461 F. Supp. 627, 635 (D.
Colo. 1978)).
33. Westman 1, 461 F. Supp. at 627; see also 15 U.S.C. § I (1982). Here, the sole basis
for Westman's action was that denial of the distributorship based upon the "veiled threat"
was a conspiracy, and, therefore, a per se violation. Westman II, 796 F.2d at 1219.
34. Westman I1, 796 F.2d at 1219-20.
35. This type of sales based strategy is also known as full line distribution where the
consumer of the distribution is able to benefit more from the convenience, cost savings,
and better service offered here than from a specialty house distributor. Id. at 1220 (citing
Westman 1, 461 F. Supp. at 628).
36. Westman II, 796 F.2d at 1220.
37. Id. at 1221 (citing United States v. E.I. du Pont de NeMours & Company, 351 U.S.
377, 395 (1956)). In JWestman I, an expert witness gave testimony saying that "in certain
lines of restaurant equipment there is a noticeable absence of acceptable substitutes at a
price comparable with that of Hobart products." Westman 1, 461 F. Supp. at 628. The
importance being that substitutes do in fact exist, however it is difficult to find a substitute
at an equivalent price. In other words, the simple fact that one manufacturer is more
prominent than another does not necessarily mean that other manufacturers' products are
not reasonably interchangeable. Westman H, 796 F.2d at 1221.
38. "Any definition of line of commerce which ignores the buyers and focuses on what
the sellers do, or theoretically can do, is not meaningful." Westman 11, 796 F.2d at 1220-21
(quoting United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)).
39. The expert witness testified that there were other manufacturers competing with
Hobart in the same market. l1estman 1I, 796 F.2d at 1221. Elasticity and inelasticity merely
relate to the freedom of demand within the relative product market. In other words, are
the buyers able to chose freely what product they wish to buy (an elastic market) or are
they limited in their choices due to inadequate selections and excessive prices (an inelastic
market). Elasticity is most important with respect to the court's determination of the rele-
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cused on the products generally sold by restaurant equipment dealers,
and that it was irrelevant whether or not the brands sold by other restau-
rant equipment dealers were classified as "one-stop shopping."
40
On appeal, Westman attempted to support the lower court's deci-
sion by defining the relevant restaurant supply market as a "cluster or
package" of goods and services.4 1 Westman relied on JBL Enterprises,
Inc. v. Jhirmack Enterprises, Inc. 4 2 This argument, as well as the "one-stop
shopping" analysis, was rejected by the appellate court on the basis that
the restaurant equipment market, unlike the beauty supply market of the
JBL case, did not generally operate at the full-line-of-services level.43 In
addition, the availability of other products in the market created elastic-
ity. In the final analysis, the court stated that if Hobart were ever to raise
its prices, this would only force the buyer of restaurant equipment sup-
plies to purchase a lower priced competing brand rather than cause
other restaurant supply manufacturers to raise their prices. 44 Conse-
quently, Hobart's pricing strategy was not found to be an anticompeti-
tive price fixing scheme.
ii. The Relevant Geographic Market
The relevant geographic market is defined as "the narrowest market
which is wide enough so that products from adjacent areas . . . cannot
vant product market and the optimum cross-elasticity of demand, which is the extent to
which a consumer is able to shift freely between two or more products. 16A J. VONKALI-
NOWSKI, supra note 10, at § 6G.04 (1](l)(a) & (b), at 6G-30.
40. Westman 11, 796 F.2d at 1221. The court focused on a line of commerce that ig-
nored what buyers actually do and considered mainly what sellers do or can do. However,
the focus of the lower court was misplaced in determining the relevant market (i.e. "[t]he
fact that a distributor is able to satisfy all of his customer's needs at one location does not
mean that it is free from competition from other types of distributions"). Id. (citing United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)).
41. Westman 1I, 796 F.2d at 1211.
42. 698 F.2d 1011, 1016-17 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983).
43. Evidence of the "one-stop-shopping" market strategy was the fact that, until
Westman entered the restaurant supply market, Nobel was the only one of eight Denver
area metro suppliers, that used the "one-stop-shopping" method. Furthermore, nothing
in the lower court record suggested that such a market strategy existed outside the Denver
metro area. Moreover, the lower court erroneously determined the relevant geographical
market to include even less than the Denver area. The appeals court found that the rele-
vant geographic market also included "non-one stop shopping" restaurant distributors.
Jtestman I1, 796 F.2d at 1222. On appeal, Westman sought to have the court consider the
findings of authorities which suggested that sellers who provide a full line of products or
services create a separate product market or a "cluster or package" of goods and services.
However, the "cluster" must be the object of consumer demand and is only appropriate
where the "product package" appeals to the buyer on a significantly different basis than
would an individual product considered separately. Id. at 1221 (quotingJBL Enters., Inc.
v. Jhirmack Enters., Inc., 698 F.2d 1011, 1016-17 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829
(1983). The court therefore felt that the "cluster" of goods was not the object of consumer
demand in the restaurant equipment market, unlike the hair care and cosmetics industry,
where it is generally necessary to carry a "full-line" of products and the generally accepted
practice in advertising and promoting is to group the products together. lVestman I1, 796
F.2d at 1221.
44. The fact that there were other manufacturers competing with Hobart reveals
cross-elasticity within the market and not inelasticity. lVestman 11, 796 F.2d at 1221. The
elasticity of the market place makes Hobart's actions procompetitive, rather than anticom-
petitive, and supportive of intrabrand rivalry.
1988]
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compete on substantial parity with those included in the market." 4 5 The
Tenth Circuit held that the relevant geographic market should have in-
cluded those restaurant equipment distributors who compete to supply
to the Denver area restaurants, including those distributors from the
multistate region that bid on Denver area contracts. 4 6 Accordingly, the
appellate court held that it was unreasonable for the lower court to con-
clude that the relevant geographic market included less than all the res-
taurant equipment suppliers located in the Denver metro area.
4 7
iii. The Per Se Test in Vertical Restraints
Since the lower court found that Westman had been excluded from
participating in the relevant product and geographic markets, it held
that Hobart had committed a per se violation of section one of the Sher-
man Act.48 However, the Tenth Circuit, holding this analysis and con-
clusion erroneous, found the per se test in vertical restraint cases to be
in a "state of evolution," and chose to align itself with the approach of
the Seventh Circuit. 49 The Seventh Circuit holds that "in the absence of
any evidence of intent to raise prices . . . an agreement whereby a sup-
plier of some good or service refuses, at the behest of one of his distrib-
utors, to deal with a competitor of that distributor is not illegal per
se." 50 Other circuits, such as the Third Circuit, have rejected this
45. [T]he outer boundary of the relevant product market is reached, if one were
to raise the price of the product or limit its volume of production, while demand
held constant, and supply from other sources beyond the boundary could not be
expected to enter promptly enough and in large enough quantities to restore the
old price or volume.
Satellite Televisions and Assoc. Resources, Inc. v. Continental Cablevision of V.I., Inc.,
714 F.2d 351, 356 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1027 (1984) (citing L. SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 41, § 12 (1977)). Satellite Television involved the chal-
lenging of an exclusivity provision of a contract between Continental and apartment own-
ers, where the provision gave apartment owners the option of either paying the expense of
wiring their building for cable or giving Continental exclusive pay television rights to their
apartments. The exclusivity provision was not found to be in violation of any antitrust
laws. Satellite Television, 714 F.2d at 353.
46. tVestman 11, 796 F.2d at 1222. Distributors from a multistate region competed with
Westman and Nobel, thus falling within the relevant geographic market. id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1222-23.
50. Id. (quoting Products Liability Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Crum and Forster Ins. Cas., 682
F.2d 660, 663 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 780
F.2d 1212, 1218 (5th Cir. 1986) ("In order for a manufacturer's termination of a distribu-
tor to be illegal per se, it must be pursuant to a price maintenance agreement with another
distributor."); Ron Tonkin Gran Turisimo, Inc. v. Fiat Distributors, 637 F.2d 1376, 1386-
87 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 831 (1981)(citing A.H. Cox & Co. v. Star Mach. Co., 653
F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1981)). The Ninth Circuit held that restraints solicited by a
distributor but implemented by a manufacturer were not automatically illegal per se but
only came within the per se analysis if they "clearly had or [were] likely to have, a perni-
cious effect on competition and lacked any redeeming virtue." Ron Tonkin, 637 F.2d at
1386-87. Other courts have rejected the views of the Seventh, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth
Circuits by stating that a manufacturer who refused to deal with a distributor commits a
per se antitrust violation if the refusal is made at the request of a competing distributor
even though the manufacturer's refusal to deal is a vertical restraint. The agreement be-
comes horizontal in nature when the distributor seeks to "supress its competition by utiliz-
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view. 5 1 However, the court in Westman H found that such a rejection has
occurred in situations where a price fixing motive has been the basis of
the manufacturer's refusal to deal.
52
Here, the court of appeals relied on the reasoning of Monsanto Co. v.
Spray Rite Service Corp. 5 3 In Monsanto, the Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff's failure to establish a price fixing agreement, as a prerequisite
to per se liability in a distributor termination case, precluded it from
surviving a directed verdict. 54 Similarly, Westman failed to assert, and
the record did not reveal, any price fixing or tying arrangements on the
part of Hobart. Therefore, Hobart's refusal to deal could not be found
to be illegal per se.
55
C. Conclusion
The court of appeals, in rejecting the lower court's analysis, con-
cluded that a manufacturer should generally be given wide discretion in
determining the "profile" of its distributors, and cited Schwinn for sup-
port. Unlike Schwinn, the appeals court agreed that the case at hand did
not involve an exclusive franchise agreement. However, the court held
that Schwinn was applicable in that a manufacturer's ability to choose its
own customers should not hinge on whether the limited distribution is
by exclusive contract or not.56 A manufacturer's ability to grant or deny
distribution rights should not be restricted by whether or not its deci-
sion is made to obtain an exclusive franchise agreement. 57 The decision
to distribute or not will involve not only customer loyalty, but will ulti-
mately turn on whether more or less distribution would make a manu-
facturer's products more or less competitive in the market.
5 8
A manufacturer's ability to expand or limit distributorships should
not be restricted merely because of an absence of equivalent brands
within the market place unless such a distributor possesses market
power. 59 "Market power" is the ability to raise prices above those that
would be charged in the competitive market, and requires a showing of
either "power to control prices" or "power to exclude competition."
'60
ing the power of a common supplier." Cernunto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d
164, 168 (3d Cir. 1979).
51. Westnian 11, 796 F.2d at 1223. See also, supra note 54 and accompanying text.
52. Westman 11, 796 F.2d at 1223.
53. 465 U.S. 752, reh'g denied, 466 U.S. 994 (1984).
54. Plaintiff must show that the "distributors are not making independent pricing deci-
sions." Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762.
55. If there was evidence of price fixing and tying arrangements, then the approach
would have been quite different. See Jestman 11, 796 F.2d at 1224-25.
56. In addressing the issue of vertical restraints, the Schwinn court stated: "[A] manu-
facturer of a product other and equivalent brands of which are readily available in the
market may select his customers, and for this purpose he may 'franchise' certain dealers to
whom, alone, he will sell his goods." United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
363, 376 (1967).
57. Westman II, 796 F.2d at 1225.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1225 n.3 (quoting Board of Regents v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1158 (10th
Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984)).
1988]
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
The existence or lack of market power depends upon the availibility of
competing products to which a purchaser can turn when faced with price
increases." The appellate court relied on "sound economic theory" to
conclude that the "only real incentive for a manufacturer to restrict distri-
bution" is to make its product more competitive. 6 2 The manufacturer
therefore gains nothing by limiting its distribution. 6 3 If a manufacturer
decides to limit the number of distributors with whom it wishes to deal,
the Tenth Circuit will permit it to do so. However, such refusals to deal
with the distributors would be invalidated if the refusals were related to
illegal pricing or tying arrangements.
64
D. Concurring Opinion
In the concurring opinion, Judge Seth arrives "at the same result
but by a slightly different route." 6 5 He felt that there were no "substan-
tial problems" with the product market analyses of the lower court.
66
This was evident when he stated that the lower court tried the case with
the understanding that the relevant product market was the restaurant
supply market, and the use of "one-stop shopping" distribution meth-
ods was not a market conclusion, rather it was a marketing method
description.
6 7
Justice Seth's definition of the relevant geographic market differs
from the majority in that he would disregard the location of suppliers,
and instead examine the trade area. For example, a trade area would be
defined by the area "where a price increase or supply reduction would
cause a prompt influx of products of others not already in the area."
6 8
Although Justice Seth agreed with the majority that the trial court's ref-
erence to the "one-stop shopping" was not a market conclusion but
rather a marketing method description in the Denver area, he believed
that use of the "one-stop shopping" method alone could not be consid-
ered a restraint of trade.
69
61. However, only as it applies to the relevant geographic market. Westman 11, 796
F.2d at 1226; see also supra notes 42 and 43 and accompanying text.
62. Westman 1I, 796 F.2d at 1227.
63. The court listed several reasons why it is procompetitive to permit a manufacturer
to limit its distribution:
First, when a manufacturer limits the number of its distributors, it may reduce its
distribution costs by allowing each distributor to achieve economies of scale and
to spread fixed costs over a large number of products .... Second, refusals to
deal may facilitate the entry of a new manufacturer into the market .... Third,
limiting the number of outlets that distribute a product may encourage distribu-
tors to provide promotional activities. . . . Finally, restricting distribution can
reduce transaction costs by permitting a manufacturer to deal only with distribu-
tors with whom it believes it can develop an efficient working relationship.
Id. at 1227. See Bork, Vertical Restraints & Schwinn Overruled, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 171, 180-
81.
64. IWestman 11, 796 F.2d at 1229 (only one distributor in the Denver area used "one-
stop shopping").
65. Id. (concurring opinion).
66. Id. (concurring opinion).
67. Id. (concurring opinion).
68. Id. (concurring opinion).
69. Id. (concurring opinion).
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In addition,Justice Seth agreed with the majority that the defendant
exercised no market power, and for the trial court to find otherwise was
clearly erroneous. 70 He further agreed with the majority that no evi-
dence existed to find a per se violation since nothing in the facts alleged
illegal pricing or tying arrangements.
7 1
On the other hand, Justice Seth disagreed with the majority's reli-
ance on Schwinn 72 because Schwinn had been overruled by Continental
T V., Inc. v. G. T.E. Sylvania, Inc.73 Furthermore, Schwinn relied on unsup-
ported and unreliable authorities. 74 Justice Seth concluded that reliance
on "sound economic theory," as reiterated in part V of the majority
opinion, depends on one's view of a given situation.
7 5
III. TYING ARRANGEMENTS, SALES BASED ALLOCATION SYSTEMS: Fox
MOTORS, INC. v. MAZDA DISTRIBUTORS (GULF), INc.
A. Facts
Mazda automobiles are manufactured in Japan and distributed,
once imported, throughout the United States to numerous dealers.
76
One of those dealers was Central who distributed Mazdas to thirty-one
western and mid-western states. Central distributed to Gulf, the defend-
ant, who was an independently owned company and distributor of
Mazda automobiles to dealers in eleven states in the southern Gulf of
Mexico area. Plaintiffs, Fox and Meyers are dealers within the Gulf dis-
tribution area and have dealt with Mazda since 1972. Neither Fox nor
Meyers carried competing manufacturer's products with Mazda even
though this freedom had been available since 1973.
7 7
Between 1974-1977 Mazda experienced a slump in sales, and in
1978 the only available Mazda automobile was the Mazda "GLC." As a
70. Id. at 1230 (concurring opinion).
71. Id. (concurring opinion).
72. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). Antitrust suit under section one of the Sherman Act was
brought against Schwinn, which challenged the consignment or agency arrangements with
distributors and retailers. The arrangements involved direct shipment to retailers with
Schwinn invoicing the dealers, extending credit, and paying a commission to the distribu-
tors taking orders. In addition, specific territories were assigned to each wholesale distrib-
utor and all were instructed to sell only to franchised dealers in their respective territories.
Id. at 370-71. The Court found this type of price fixing to be anticompetitive. Further-
more, the Court found that the promotion of self-interest alone did not invoke the rule of
reason to immunize illegal conduct. Id. at 381-82.
73. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). GTE sold television sets through retailers who were allowed
only to sell within a given geographic area. Continental, a retailer, claimed a violation of
section one of the Sherman Act. Id. at 43. However, the Court affirmed the appellate
court's decision that the location restriction had less potential for competitve harm than
the restrictions invalidated in Schwinn and, thus, should be judged under the rule of rea-
son. Moreover, the Supreme Court overruled the per se rule in Schwinn. Id. at 58-59.
74. llestman II, 796 F.2d at 1230 (concurring opinion).
75. Id. (concurring opinion). It would seem Justice Seth viewed the "sound economic
theory" approach as purely subjective and of very little substance in determining antitrust
issues.
76. Fox Motors, Inc. v. Mazda Disinbutors (Gulf), Inc., 806 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1986).
This case dealt with claims in antitrust as well as claims based on the Dealers Day in Court
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1982).
77. Fox Motors, 806 F.2d at 956.
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result of the slump, Gulf had a glut of GLC models in stock which cre-
ated a financial burden for many dealers. Dealers were encouraged by
their distributors that newer and better models would soon be available
to "take up the slack."' 78 In 1978 Mazda followed through with the in-
troduction of the "RX-7" which became extremely popular and scarce in
supply. To better serve the interests of each individual dealer, distribu-
tors were encouraged to establish an allocation system.
79
In the case at bar, the allocation system was commenced by Central
and passed on to Gulf and its dealers. Pursuant to the Gulf allocation
system, those dealers who had been more successful at moving the GLC
were to receive the greater number of RX-7s. The crux of the allocation
system was that a dealer could not get RX-7s merely by purchasing more
GLCs, but instead it had to sell more GLCs. Thus, many dealers were
selling the GLCs at a discount in order to move them more quickly and
improve their inventory. There were also many new dealers being
signed up with Gulf who were not initially affected by the allocation sys-
tem and were given an allotment of RX-7s. As a result, new dealers
were not initially dependent upon their success of moving the GLCs.
8 0
This allocation system lasted from 1978-1979.81
In conjunction with the implementation of the allocation system,
the "drastic action" system, was used by Gulf to eliminate established
but financially failing dealerships. 8 2 Fox and Meyers were targets of this
system, and Gulf even threatened to terminate Meyers for contemplat-
ing legal action in response to its allocation system.
8 3
At the trial level, the antitrust claims were submitted to a jury, which
found that Gulf's allocation method constituted a presumptively illegal
tying arrangement, and that Central had conspired with Gulf to imple-
ment the system. A verdict and damages were rendered in favor of Fox
and Meyers.
84
On appeal, Gulf and Central argued that the trial court errored in
sending the tying arrangement issue to a jury pursuant to a per se in-
struction. Plaintiffs claimed that the tying arrangement should not have
been characterized as per se since the elements thereof were never es-
tablished as a matter of law. Gulf also claimed that the evidence of a
conspiracy that was alleged to have taken place between Central and







83. Id. The Tenth Circuit considered the "drastic action" in determining whether
there was a violation of the Dealer's Act. However, the Tenth Circuit found nothing illegal
with the "drastic action." Id. at 960.
84. Id. at 956.
85. Gulf and Western submit that nothing in their actions could be taken as collusive
or conspiring to restrain trade, especially in view of the fact that no "tying arrangement"




The Tenth Circuit held that it was unreasonable to apply antitrust
principles in a way that assumes every tying arrangement to be illegal
per se. 86 As viewed by the Tenth Circuit, an arrangement violates the
antitrust laws when a seller exploits his control over a market and forces
buyers to purchase an unwanted product.
87
The court suggested that a three-part analysis be used in order to
determine whether exploitation has been the motive behind the tying
arrangement. 88 This analysis requires a finding of the following:
(1) purchase of the tying product must be conditioned upon purchases
of a distinctly tied product,8 9 (2) a seller must possess sufficient power in
the tying market to compel acceptance of the tied product,90 and (3) a
tying arrangement must foreclose to competitors of the tied product a
"not insubstantial" volume of commerce. 9 '
To support the procompetitive approach to tying arrangements, the
court cited NCAA v. Board of Regents, 92 where the Supreme Court held
that a tying arrangement may have procompetitive justifications making
condemnation thereof inappropriate without a substantial amount of
market analysis. 9 3 The Tenth Circuit determined that when the above
three-part analysis is fulfilled, then it is appropriate to presume an un-
lawful restraint which warrants a per se condemnation pursuant to the
antitrust laws. 94 Therefore, the court held that the initial characteriza-
tion of a challenged restraint as a tying arrangement is crucial in deter-
mining which method of analysis, the per se or rule of reason, is most
appropriate.
9 5
86. Fox Motors, 806 F.2d at 957 (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 9-14 (1984)).
87. Where a seller has power in one market, he is not permitted, pursuant to the
antitrust laws, to use such power to impair competition. In addition, purchasers may not
be denied the freedom to select the best buy in the market. Fox Motors, 806 F.2d at 957
(citing Hyde, 466 U.S. at 1559-60).
88. Fox Motors, 806 F.2d at 957.
89. Id. (citing Fixture Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969);
Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953)).
90. Where a seller offers a unique or otherwise desirable product which competitors
cannot economically offer themselves, or where the market shares are high, then the seller
posses power to compel buyers to accept a tied product. Fox Mlotors, 806 F.2d at 957 (cit-
ing Fiture Enters., 394 U.S. at 504-06 n.2; Times-lhcayune, 345 U.S. at 611-13).
91. Fox Motors, 806 F.2d at 957 (quoting Northern Pac. Ry Co. v. United States. 365
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958)); see Former Enter. v. United States Steel, 394 U.S. 495, 499 (1969). In
determining "not insubstantial," the Court discussed the "small percentage" of land that
was foreclosed to competitors for development.
92. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
93. 'his analysis concerns only the elements which would establish a presumption of
anticompetitive forcing. Fox .loors, 806 F.2d at 957 n.2 (citing .\C4. 468 U.S. 85 (1984)).
94. Where these elements are found to exist, then any procompetitive approach is
discharged and the per se analysis is used alone to determine whether there is a sufficiently
great anticompetitive effect. The per se analysis requires no further determination of the
market conditions. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde. 466 U.S. 2 (1984), states
that the court may utilize strict treatment for certain tying arrangements, and precludes
any application of the rule of reason where the three part analysis has been met.
95. Fox Motors, 806 F.2d at 958; see P. AREEDA, THE "'RUI.E OF REASON" IN ANTITRUST
ANALYSis: GENERAL ISSUES, 30-32 (1981).
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The facts in Fox were unlike the traditional violative tying arrange-
ment because the availability of the alleged "tied" product (the RX-7)
was not based on purchases but rather on sales.9 6 This distinction ap-
peared to make a great difference to the Tenth Circuit because this
meant that the allocation system achieved a procompetitive effect by
promoting price competition and, thereby, avoided the inherent evils
associated with tying arrangements.
9 7
C. Conclusion
Since the allocation system was based on sales rather than
purchases, it did not violate any antitrust laws.9 8 Aside from lack of neg-
ative consumer impact, the allocation system did not satisfy the per se
requirements because it did not foreclose competing manufacturers of
the GLC from participating in the market.99 For the foregoing reasons,
Fox and Meyers were complaining only of interference with their free-
dom of choice in purchasing the GLC. 0 0 Unfortunately for them, the
antitrust laws were established to protect competition and not competi-
tors.101 Thus, the judgment of the lower court which held originally for
Fox and Meyers was reversed.
10 2
CONCLUSION
In both Westman H and Fox Motors, the Tenth Circuit was faced with
allegations of vertical restraints on trade. When a vertical restraint on
trade is so alleged, the courts are permitted to apply one of two stan-
dards: (1) the rule of reason standard (used to determine Sherman Act
legality or illegality taking into account all factors which may impair
competition);' 0 3 and (2) the per se standard (under which certain re-
96. Fox Motors, 806 F.2d at 958.
97. Since Gulf had succeeded in moving its inventory of GLCs to dealers as a result of
dealers' discount sales, the ultimate consumer obtained the advantage of the lowered price
and helped successful dealers to obtain a greater number of RX-7s. Id.
98. Here, unlike the normal tying arrangement, a dealer had to depend entirely on
consumer demand in order to obtain more RX-7s. Thus, for a dealer, any increase in retail
purchases of the GLC'flowed from legitimate dealer discounts or independent market fac-
tors. The ultimate consumer made his choice free of any tie, and most likely in accordance
with the advantageous discount. Id.
99. The testimony of dual dealers in the lower court record revealed that there was no
claim on their part that they were ever precluded from buying those vehicles competitive
with the GLC as a result of the allocation system. There is also no evidence in the record
that the alleged tying arrangement influenced the level of dealer purchases from compet-
ing manufacturers. Id.
100. Id.
101. id. (citing, Atlas Bldg. Prods., Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950,
954 (10th Cir. 1959)). Hyde held: "[Wlhen a purchaser is 'forced' to buy a product he
would not have otherwise bought even from another seller . . . there can be no adverse
impact on competition because no portion of the market which would otherwise have been
available ... has been foreclosed." Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,
16(1984).
102. Fox Motors, 806 F.2d at 959.
103. In using the rule of reason analysis, factors considered are: positive or negative
economic eflects of the restraint, the market power of the parties involved in the restraint,
and the intent underlying the restraint. Friedman, Perntsable and Impermissible IVertical Re-
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straints are presumed to violate the the Sherman Act on their face with-
out any proof of actual effect on competition). 10 4 In order for a party to
prevail under a rule of reason analysis it is necessary to prove that the
anticompetitive effect of the restraint outweighs the procompetitive ef-
fect. 105 On the other hand, per se analysis permits courts to make expe-
dient determinations on the underlying assumption that some conduct,
by its nature, gives way to serious anticompetitive consequences and is
at the outset, without further consideration, deemed illegal.1
0 6
In both Westman H, where the court addressed an alleged conspiracy
in restraint of trade and Fox, where the court addressed the proper ap-
proach to be given to an alleged tying arrangement, the Tenth Circuit
rejected the lower court's findings. Both cases permitted the Tenth Cir-
cuit to reject the alleged per se violations and utilize the rule of reason
standards to capitalize on the procompetitive effects of each vertical ar-
rangement. Both Westman H and Fox are illustrative of the liberal rule of
reason preferance given to the vertical arrangements when plaintiffs are
unable to allege and prove that the anticompetitiveness of the circum-
stances falls within the per se standard.' 0 7 Neither of these cases
presents innovation with respect to antitrust laws as they are applied to
vertical restraints, but rather, both follow the present law.' 0 8
Carolyne M. Kelly
straints Under the Sherman Antitrust Act: Does 'Justice" Care?, 63 DEN. U.L. REV. 127, 128
(1985); see Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
104. Friedman, supra note 103, at 128.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Restraints determined to be illegal per se include price fixing and tying arrange-
ments. For further in-depth discussion see supra notes 6-28 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374 (Ct. CI. 1971); Chi-





Six significant cases testing the limits of federal court jurisdiction
came before the Tenth Circuit during this survey term. A dispute
originating in Utah between an oil company and an Indian tribe over oil
and gas leases required delineation of the limits of tribal court sover-
eignty and the availability of the federal courts to a non-Indian plaintiff.'
An action by several aliens challenging deportation practices of the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service limited the original jurisdiction of
the circuit courts of appeals under section 106(a) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act 2 . The personal jurisdiction cases for the term raised
the questions of whether federal court diversity jurisdiction over neces-
sary third parties can reach out of the forum state, 3 and whether a dis-
trict court can inquire into its jurisdiction over parties sua sponte.
4
Intervention was denied a party whose interests were not sufficiently co-
terminous with those of the litigants in a case, resolving an apparent
conflict in prior Tenth Circuit analyses of the interest requirement for
intervention of right. 5 Finally, a state court's determination and en-
forcement of the statute of limitations against a section 1983 civil rights
plaintiff was accorded res judicata effect.
6
I. LIMITS OF INDIAN TRIBAL COURT JURISDICTION:
SUPERIOR OIL CO. v. UNITED STATES
A. Facts
Superior Oil filed a complaint in federal district court arising from a
dispute between it and the Navajo Indian Tribe over oil and gas leases
granted by the tribe to Superior's predecessors in interest.7 Sole au-
thority to regulate oil and gas exploration on the tribal reservation was
claimed by Superior to be vested in the Secretary of the Interior, pre-
empting regulatory control by the tribe. Superior contended that the
tribe intentionally sought to deprive it of property interests in the oil
and gas leases by refusing to grant permits allowing seismic operations.
Superior further alleged that the sole reason for the refusal was to cause
the leases to expire, so that the tribe could negotiate new leases on more
favorable terms. The tribe moved for summary judgment and dismissal
1. Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 674 (D. Colo. 1985), rev'd, 798
F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1986).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1982); Salehi v. District Director, INS, 575 F. Supp. 1237 (D.
Colo. 1983), rev'd, 796 F.2d 1286 (10th Cir. 1986).
3. Quinones v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1167 (10th Cir. 1986).
4. Williams v. Life Sa. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200 (10th Cir. 1986).
5. FDIC v. Jennings, 816 F.2d 1488 (10th Cir. 1987).
6. DeVargas v. Montoya, 796 F.2d 1245 (10th Cir. 1986).
7. Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 674 (D. Colo. 1985), rev'd, 798
F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1986).
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asserting that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction and that
its sovereign immunity shielded it from suit.8 The district court dis-
missed the case agreeing that the determination of whether to issue seis-
mic permits was within the tribe's sovereign authority. The court,
therefore, did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Superior's
claim. 9
B. The Tenth Circuit's Holding
The Tenth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Superior's complaint
relying on National Farmer's Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,10
which was handed down after the district court's decision. Although 28
U.S.C. § 133111 empowers a federal district court to review the federal
question of whether a tribe's action has exceeded the limits of its sover-
eign authority, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in
reaching the question of whether the tribe's sovereign immunity
shielded it from suit, without first requiring Superior to exhaust its claim
in tribal court. 12 National Farmers was quoted for the proposition that
exhaustion of tribal remedies is not required where tribal authority is
asserted in bad faith. The court then held that Superior's claims con-
cerning the tribe's motives for withholding the seismic permits were al-
legations of bad faith which, if proven, would be sufficient to vest




Two obstacles must be overcome to challenge a tribe's assertion of
its sovereign powers in a federal court action. The tribe's sovereign im-
munity must be circumvented, and the question presented must be one
over which a federal district court has subject-matter jurisdiction.
1. Tribal Sovereignty
Indian tribes preceded the United States as North American polit-
ical entities. 14 Tribal sovereignty (and its concomitant power of self-
government) is recognized as inherent by virtue of the tribes' existence
as independent political communities. 15 Limits are placed on tribal soy-
8. 605 F. Supp. at 676-77.
9. Id. at 686. The United States contended that it had no authority over the granting
of seismic permits, and therefore the suit was dismissed on the ground that there was no
case or controversy involving it. The Tenth Circuit did not address the question of the
government's dismissal. 798 F.2d 1324, 1331.
10. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
11. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
12. Superior Oil, 798 F.2d at 1329.
13. Id. at 1330-31.
14. See generally Russell, The Influence of Indian Confederations on the Union of the American
Colonies, 22J. AM. HIST. 53 (1928).
15. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). See also F. Cohen,
COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, 229-252 (1982). Cohen's book is the classical
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ereignty because of the protectorate relationship existing between the
United States and Indian tribes. 16 The limits derive from tribes' incor-
poration within United States territory and acceptance of its protection,
federal statutes (which evidence Congress' plenary control over tribal
sovereignty) 17 and treaties where sovereign powers have been given up
voluntarily. ' 8
Shaped through treaties, federal statutes, and to a lesser extent ju-
dicial decisions, tribal sovereignty over Indians includes the right to de-
termine tribe membership, ' 9 and jurisdiction to try and punish Indians
for criminal offenses committed on Indian lands, the power to legislate,
and the right to determine the form of tribal government.2 0 The power
over non-Indians is more narrowly defined. It includes the power to
exclude persons from tribal territory.2 some degree ofjurisdiction over
civil disputes between Indians and non-Indians, and various other pow-
ers derived from inherent sovereignty which have not been withdrawn
by treaty, statute or as a result of the Indians' dependent status on the
United States.22 The extent of this jurisdiction has not been "fully
determined."
2 3
For some time after the enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968,24 several tribes purported to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. 2 5 In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,2 6 the Supreme
Court held that Indian tribes cannot try non-Indians for crimes commit-
ted in Indian country.2 7 The Court held that tribal power to try non-
Indians is inconsistent with Indian tribes' submission to the overriding
sovereignty of the United States.
2 8
work in the area of federal Indian Law, and is recognized as authoritative by the courts.
See, e.g., Nat l Farmer's, 471 U.S. at 855 n. 17; Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S.
130, 139 nn.6, 8 (1982); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 199 n.9
(1978).
16. See F. COHEN, supra note 10, at 234; Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557. See generally
Mettler, A Unified Theory of Indian Tribal Sovereignty, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 89 (1978).
17. Conquest of tribes by the United States rendered them subject to its legislative
power. See F. COHEN, supra note 10, at 241.
18. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
19. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); F. COHEN, SUpra note 10, at
248.
20. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194-96. See generally F. COHEN, supra note 10, at 247-49.
21. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137.
22. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323. See also Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191. See generally McCoy, The
Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty, 13 HARVARD C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 357 (1978); Collins, Implied Limi-
tations on the Territorial Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54 WASH. L. REV. 479 (1979).
23. F. COHEN, supra note 10, at 253. See generally Note, Implication of Civil Remedies Under
the Indian Civil Rights Act, 75 MICH. L. REV. 210 (1976).
24. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982)).
25. Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191.
26. Id. Oliphant was a non-Indian resident of the reservation. He was arrested by
tribal authorities at an annual tribal celebration and charged with assaulting a tribal officer
and resisting arrest. Id. at 194.
27. "Indian country" has been defined as "all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation .... ", 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982).
28. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210. The Court's conclusions on tribal authority were based
largely on congressional, executive and lower federal court opinions which hold that tribal
courts do not have the power to try non-Indians. Id. at 206. Justice Rehnquist's majority
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Two recent Supreme Court cases have helped delineate the author-
ity of Indian tribes to exercise jurisdiction over civil disputes between
Indians and non-Indians. In Washington v. Confederated Tribes,29 the Col-
ville tribal government refused to collect a Washington state sales tax on
cigarettes sold on the reservation. Instead, the tribe collected a smaller
tribal tax, enabling merchants on the reservation to undercut the prices
of non-reservation competitors, with the result that non-Indians living
nearby came to the reservation to buy cigarettes.3 0 The tribe argued
that the practice was justified because the revenue generated enabled it
to provide necessary governmental services to tribal members on the
reservation. 3 ' The Court rejected this argument, holding that the price
differential achieved by refusing to collect the state tax was not gener-
ated by activities on the reservation in which the tribe had a significant
interest; therefore, the action was not part of the inherent sovereignty
retained by the tribe.
3 2
The "significant interest" test was also employed in Montana v.
United States,3 3 where the issue was the authority of the Crow Tribe to
regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on reservation lands owned
by non-Indians.3 4 Recognizing that a tribe retains inherent civil author-
ity over the actions of non-Indians when those actions threaten or di-
rectly affect the political or economic security of the tribe, the Court
held that the hunting and fishing rights in question were not of sufficient
importance to justify the tribe's exercise of its sovereignty over them.3 5
As part of tribal sovereignty, Indian tribes possess the traditional
common-law sovereign immunity from suit, similar to that enjoyed by
the United States.36 The immunity is subject to Congress' plenary con-
trol and may be expressly waived by Congress, or in limited situations,
by the tribe itself.
3 7
Tribal sovereignty was considered in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,38
opinion contains an excellent historical outline of all three branches' views on the subject.
Id. at 197-206.
29. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
30. Id. Similar taxes on motor vehicles were challenged as well.
31. Id. at 154. The Court found that the tribes did have the sovereign power to collect
their own taxes on the reservation, but the tribal power to tax did not oust the state's
taxation power. Id. at 152, 155.
32. Id. at 155. The tribe based its challenge on federal statute, policies favoring tribal
self-government, and the Indian Commerce Clause, all of which were discussed and found
unsupportive of the tribe's position.
33. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
34. Id. at 547.
35. Id. at 566. The Court overturned the Ninth Circuit's holding which stated that
inherent sovereignty, and United States treaties with the Crow Tribe in combination with
the federal trespass statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1982), both afforded the tribe regulatory
power over the disputed hunting and fishing rights. Montana v. United States, 604 F.2d
1162 (1979).
36. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58; F. COHEN, supra note 10, at 324.
37. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58; F. COHEN, supra, note 10, at 325-27.
38. 436 U.S. 49. Respondent Martinez brought suit challenging a tribal rule that ex-
cluded her children from membership in the tribe because their father was not a member.
Id. at 52-53. The district court and Tenth Circuit both reached the merits of respondent's
claim. The district court ruled that the tribe's membership rules did not violate the equal
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an action brought by a member of the Pueblo against the Pueblo and its
officers individually. The Court held that sovereign immunity protected
the tribe, but did not extend to its officers. 39 In analyzing Santa Clara
Pueblo, the Tenth Circuit relied on the principle that tribal immunity ex-
tends to its officers when the tribe's power to perform the action com-
plained of is not disputed because the tribe has the necessary authority
to act. 40 Where the sovereign's authority to make or enforce the law
under which the official act is attacked, however, the official is subject to
suit.
4 1
Because of the potential for injustice in disputes between a tribe
and a non-Indian where the tribe refuses access to its courts and asserts
its sovereign immunity to suit in federal court, a narrow exception to
sovereign immunity as described in Santa Clara Pueblo4 2 has developed.
This exception was promulgated in the Tenth Circuit's Dry Creek Lodge,
Inc. v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes43 decision. The Dry Creek Lodge was
closed by the tribe after a tribe member complained that the access road
to the lodge infringed on his property. The tribal court refused to hear
the lodge owners' case. Next, the lodge initiated a suit against the tribe
in federal district court which was dismissed pursuant to the tribe's as-
sertion of its immunity to suit.44 The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding
that sovereign immunity4 5 should not be applied to leave a plaintiff
without a forum.
46
2. Federal Jurisdiction over Civil Disputes Between Indians and
Non-Indians
Determining whether the exercise ofjurisdiction by a tribal court is
protection language in the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8). ("No In-
dian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws . . ."), because the tribe was best situated to
balance the competing interests of those seeking membership, with its own interests in
preserving its cultural identity by controlling tribe membership. 402 F. Supp. 5, 18-19
(D.N.M. 1975). The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the tribe's interest in controlling
its membership was not sufficient to justify the sexual discrimination inherent in the mem-
bership rules. 540 F.2d 1039, 1047-48 (10th Cir. 1976). On appeal the Supreme Court
held that the equal protection clause of the ICRA did not expressly or impliedly waive the
tribe's sovereign immunity; therefore, the tribe was competent to assert its immunity to
bar respondent's action. 436 U.S. at 58, 60-73.
39. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59.
40. Tenneco v. Sac and Fox Tribe, 725 F.2d 572, 574 (10th Cir. 1984).
41. Id. The fact situation in Tenneco bears a close resemblance to that in Superior Oil. In
Tenneco, the Sac and Fox Tribe attempted to impose new taxes and licensing requirements
on oil and gas leases held by Tenneco and its predecessors in interest for over 50 years.
725 F.2d at 573-74. Like Superior, Tenneco bypassed tribal remedies for federal court.
The Tenth Circuit held that there was federal question jurisdiction and remanded the case
to the district court for a determination of the sovereign immunity issue. Id. at 574-75.
Exhaustion of tribal remedies was not an issue because Tenneco was decided before Nat '
Farmer's. 471 U.S. at 845.
42. 436 U.S. 49, 58. See also supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
43. 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980).
44. Id. at 683-84.
45. 436 U.S. 49, 58. The tribal sovereign immunity set forth in Santa Clara Pueblo is
the traditional common law immunity, subject to Congress' power to waive it.
46. Dry Creek Lodge, 623 F.2d at 685.
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lawful requires analysis of the limits of tribal sovereignty. 4 7 Petitioners
in National Farmers successfully argued that because federal law regulates
tribal sovereignty, questions relating to the limits of that sovereignty are
within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 48 Specifically, petitioners
took the position that the right to be protected against an unlawful exer-
cise of tribal jurisdiction has its source in federal law. 4 9
A grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction in the civil area by the Na-
tional Farmer's court, as the Oliphant court granted in the criminal area,
would have foreclosed tribal court jurisdiction over claims involving
non-Indians. 50 Owing to the lack of a congressional pronouncement on
tribal exercise of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, and the govern-
ment's larger interest in protecting the rights at stake in criminal cases
than in civil controversies, Oliphant was distinguished, enabling the Na-
tional Farmer's court to hold that tribal court civil jurisdiction is not auto-
matically foreclosed. 5 1 Instead, tribal authority to exercise jurisdiction
over civil disputes involving non-Indians is first determined in the tribal
court. In making the determination, the tribal court must conduct a
careful analysis to determine that tribal sovereignty in the subject area
has not been divested by treaties, executive branch policies, or judicial
decisions.
52
The requirement that tribal remedies be exhausted before a federal
court will review the tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction has an ana-
logue. Federal courts refuse to take jurisdiction of claims alleging viola-
tions of constitutional rights in a state court proceeding, or as a result of
the enforcement of a state statute, when the complaining party has an
opportunity to present those claims in a state court. 53 Situations where
exhaustion of tribal remedies is not required derive from the same anal-
ogy. Where the exercise of tribal sovereign authority (by its courts or
otherwise) is "motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad
faith," or where exhaustion would otherwise be futile, exhaustion of
remedies is not required.
54
47. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). The Court
evaluated the tribe's retained inherent powers to determine its ability to try a non-Indian
for a crime committed in Indian country.
48. National Farmer's Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845,
850-51 (where petitioners' claim of federal jurisdiction was founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1982)). See supra note 10.
49. Nal Farmer's, 471 U.S. at 851. The Court reasoned that the jurisdiction question
is a federal issue, because the Indian tribe's power to exert civil jurisdiction over a party is
dependent on whether federal law has divested the tribe of that power. Id. at 852.
50. Id. at 854.
51. Id. The Court also relied on an 1855 advisory opinion by Attorney General Cush-
ing, 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 175, 179-181 (1855), stating that Congress had only divested the
tribes ofjurisdiction in the criminal area.
52. Natl Farmer's, 471 U.S. at 855-56.
53. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
54. Vat'l Farmer's, 471 U.S. at 856 n.21 (quotingJuidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977)
where theJuidice Court stated that the principles of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),





The standard that applies to determinations of whether a tribal
court's exercise of jurisdiction over a dispute involving non-Indians is
lawful is the "significant interest" test. 5 5 In Superior Oil, the Tenth Cir-
cuit followed the reasoning set forth in National Farmer's, by holding that
the first opportunity to determine the significance of the tribe's interest
in its dispute with Superior rested with the tribe.56 The court noted that
the extent of tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians is not well-de-
fined, and that the requirement of exhaustion of tribal remedies 57 pro-
vides a method of determining that jurisdiction in a manner consistent
with the "significant interest" test.5 8 Congress' policy of encouraging
tribal self-government, 59 and the value of the tribal court record in re-
viewing the significance of the tribe's interest 6° were also cited as favor-
ing an initial tribal court determination of its authority over the
dispute.
6 1
Due to Superior's allegation of bad faith on the tribe's part, the
Tenth Circuit had occasion to apply the exception of the exhaustion of
tribal remedies requirement set forth in National Farmer's.62 This excep-
tion apparently applies only to the extent of allowing a non-Indian plain-
tiff to take its dispute directly to federal district court. National Farmer's
does not explicitly address what effect a tribal assertion of sovereign im-
munity to the federal court proceedings would have following the find-
ing of a bad faith assertion of tribal jurisdiction over a claim. However,
a review of the range of possible outcomes to the tribe's assertion of
sovereign immunity verifies that the process 63 set forth in National
Farmer's will not deny the non-Indian plaintiff a forum to air his
complaint.
In one situation, the (non-Indian) plaintiff's complaint poses a chal-
lenge (which a federal district court is able to entertain because one of
the National Farmer's requirements has been satisfied 6 4) to some tribal
action as being outside the bounds of its sovereignty. Tenneco 65 and
55. See supra text accompanying notes 24-30.
56. Superior Oil, 798 F.2d 1324, 1329. The Tenth Circuit also held that the district
court could review the exercise of tribal court jurisdiction under federal question jurisdic-
tion. See Nat'l Farmer's, 471 U.S. at 852-53.
57. Natl Farmer's, 471 U.S. at 857.
58. Superior Oil, 798 F.2d at 1329.
59. See Nail Farmer's, 471 U.S. at 856; New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462
U.S. 324, 332 (1983); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 138; Washington v.
Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134.
60. 7atl Farmer's, 471 U.S. at 856-57.
61. In light of the Tenth Circuit's observation that the reach of tribal court jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians is "far from determined," Superior Oil, 798 F.2d at 1329, the value of
tribal court guidance in evaluating the significance of the tribe's interest is all the more
apparent.
62. 471 U.S. at 856 n.21. See also supra text accompanying note 47.
63. See Superior Oil, 798 F.2d at 1329. Nat'l Farmer's detailed the processes to evaluate
the reach and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
65. 725 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1984).
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Santa Clara Pueblo66 stand for the proposition that where the validity of a
law under which a tribal officer purported to act is challenged, the of-
ficer is liable for the action, even though the tribe itself can successfully
assert sovereign immunity. 67 In this situation, the federal courts serve
as the final forum for relief.
In another situation, where the plaintiff is forced to concede that
the tribe has the authority to act, Santa Clara Pueblo seems to foreclose
access to a federal forum because the tribal officers are shielded by sov-
ereign immunity. 68 If the tribe refuses to open its courts to the plaintiff,
Dry Creek Lodge69 comes into play. Dry Creek Lodge provides a narrow ex-
ception to the holding announced in Santa Clara Pueblo in that a non-
Indian can sue a tribe in federal court when there would otherwise be no
forum to adjudicate the controversy. 70 If the tribal court takes jurisdic-
tion over the dispute, its decision is final. The review mechanism of Na-
tional Farmer's7 1 is inapposite, because by hypothesis, the tribe's action
giving rise to the dispute is concededly within its sovereign powers.
72
Its courts, therefore, have exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over the
dispute.
The final situation to consider is dismissal of a case by the federal
district court, pursuant to National Farmer's,73 because the plaintiff has
not exhausted all tribal remedies. Subsequent refusal by the tribal court
to adjudicate the dispute presumably triggers the Dry Creek exception to
Santa Clara Pueblo in order to avoid leaving the plaintiff without a fo-
rum.7 4 Thus, although narrow, the Dry Creek exception serves as a safety
net for plaintiffs who would otherwise be left without a remedy by the
National Farmer's strict holding.
II. APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 106(A) OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT: SALEHI v. DISTRICT
DIRECTOR, I. N. S.
A. Facts
In a consolidated action, petitioners Salehi, Lahigani, and
Hakimzadeh, all Iranian citizens living illegally in the United States, filed
habeas corpus petitions in United States District Court after being ar-
rested by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). 75 The
66. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
67. Tenneco, 725 F.2d at 574.
68. Id.
69. 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981).
70. 623 F.2d at 685. See also supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
72. The facts in Dry Creek Lodge provide an example of this situation. There the plain-
tiffs did not allege that the tribe did not have the authority to close the lodge, but that the
tribe member's complaint resulting in the closure was without foundation. Dry Creek Lodge,
623 F.2d at 683-84.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
74. Dry Creek Lodge, 623 F.2d at 685.
75. Salehi v. District Director, INS, 575 F. Supp. 1237 (D. Colo. 1983), rev'd, 796 F.2d
1286 (10th Cir. 1986).
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court granted preliminary injunctions restraining the INS from detain-
ing petitioners pending resolution of their claims. Petitioners claimed
the right to apply for asylum, and the affirmative right not to be de-
ported if section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act),76
or article 33 of the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 77 were
satisfied. They also alleged they had been denied due process of law
because INS regulations failed to provide for a stay of deportation and
automatic hearing upon application for asylum. Petitioner Salehi con-
tended that INS denial of his application for a stay of deportation consti-
tuted an abuse of discretion. 78 The district court dismissed the action
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under section 106(a) of the Act.
7 9
B. The Tenth Circuit's Holding
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court's jurisdiction over
both the habeas writ and petitioners' requests for declaratory relief.8 0
The court held that section 106(a) of the Act did not operate to vest
exclusive jurisdiction in the court of appeals because the petitioners did
not directly challenge the validity of a final order of deportation. Since
the district court was held to have jurisdiction over the general claims,
the Tenth Circuit did not address the types of claims for relief that could
be entertained in an action based exclusively on habeas corpus. 8 ' The
district court also had jurisdiction over Salehi's abuse of discretion claim
because again, the claim did not constitute a direct challenge to the va-
lidity of the final order of deportation outstanding against him.
82
C. Background
In section 106(a), Congress provided for the judicial review of final
orders of deportation entered by the INS pursuant to hearings author-
ized under section 242(b) of the Act.8 3 The review procedure of section
106(a) vests exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of final deportation or-
ders of the INS in the United States Courts of Appeals. 84 This judicial
review mechanism is the method by which final orders of other adminis-
76. "The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to a country if the
Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such
country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982).
77. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1968, art. 33, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6276,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
78. Salehi, 575 F. Supp at 1238-9. See generally Eligibility for Withholding of Deportation:
The Alien's Burden Under the 1980 Refugee Act, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1193 (1983).
79. Section 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1 105a(a) (1982), provides that the United States Courts
of Appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to review final orders of deportation entered pursu-
ant to administrative proceedings conducted under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982).
80. Salehi, 796 F.2d at 1289.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1290, 1292.
83. "A special inquiry officer shall conduct proceedings under this section to deter-
mine the deportability of any alien, and . . . [and] shall make determinations, including
orders of deportation." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982).
84. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1982) and 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (1982). 28 U.S.C. § 2342
provides for circuit court jurisdiction over appeals of orders of several administrative
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trative agencies are reviewed by the courts. 8 5 Congress justified its
choice of the court of appeals as the initial forum for judicial review
under section 106(a) on two grounds: the appeals courts' experience in
reviewing orders of other administrative agencies and the House-Senate
conference committee's conclusion that initial appellate court review
would result in greater protection of the rights and security of the alien
seeking review. 8 6 Because section 106(a) is somewhat vague 87 in
specifiying exactly which INS orders are within the appeals courts' exclu-
sive jurisdiction, the courts have undertaken to interpret it and its legis-
lative history on a number of occasions.
1. Section 106(a) of the Act
Congress' stated intent in enacting section 106(a) was to "[c]reate a
single, separate, statutory form of judicial review of administrative or-
ders for the deportation . . .of aliens from the United States .... 88
The need for a single form of review arose out of exploitation of the
existing review procedure by aliens intent on frustrating their legitimate
deportation. 89 The existing procedure allowed declaratory and habeas
corpus review, 90 as well as injunctive relief9 ' of final orders of deporta-
tion, resulting in a virtually unlimited appeal process.
92
The right of an alien in custody to petition for habeas corpus is
preserved by section 106(a)(9). 9 3 Such review is not limited to the
courts of appeals.9 4 In order to curtail dilatory appeals, however, sec-
tion 106(c) 9 5 limits the circumstances under which appeals to deporta-
tion orders may be taken. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is
required before an alien may seek habeas corpus or statutory review
pursuant to section 106(a). 96 A petitioner is required to disclose
whether the deportation order affecting him has been upheld in a prior
judicial proceeding; petitions challenging orders which have been judi-
agencies and was adopted as the method for controlling review of INS determinations of
deportability under section 106(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § I 105a(a).
85. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2351 (1982).
86. H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2950, 2972.
87. See Tai Mui v. Esperdy, 371 F.2d 772, 778, n.3 (2d Cir. 1966) cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1017 (1967). See generally Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators
Who Won't, 63 COL. L. REV. 787, 795-796 (1963).
88. H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 21, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2950, 2966.
89. H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 22-23, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2950, 2967-68. For a documented example of the delay tactics
referred to in the House Report, see United States ex rel. Marcello v. District Director, INS,
634 F.2d 964, 973-977, app. (5th Cir.) cert.denied, 452 U.S. 917 (1981).
90. See Brownell v. Rubinstein, 346 U.S. 929 (1954) mem., aff'g, 206 F.2d 449 (D.C.
Cir. 1953).
91. See Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955).
92. See Marcello, 634 F.2d at 967 n.1.
93. 8 U.S.C. § I105a(a)(9) (1982).
94. H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2950, 2973.




cially upheld will not be entertained. This limitation applies to both
statutory review and habeas corpus.
9 7
2. Judicial Interpretation of Section 106(a)
The Supreme Court has handed down several decisions addressing
the breadth of appellate court jurisdiction under section 106(a).98 The
Court's first case to address a jurisdictional question arising under sec-
tion 106(a) was Foti v. INS.99 Foti addressed whether INS denials of dis-
cretionary relief in proceedings in which a final order of deportation is
entered come under the statutory grant of appellate court jurisdiction in
section 106(a).
In an opinion by ChiefJustice Warren, the Court acknowledged that
the phrase "final orders of deportation" in section 106(a) is susceptible
to varying interpretations and therefore turned to the Act's legislative
history to resolve the ambiguity.10 0 Foti recognized that Congress' pur-
pose in providing a single statutory form of review was to curtail dilatory
appeals. The Court deemed this purpose best served by broadening the
court of appeals' jurisdiction under section 106(a) to include all deter-
minations made during and incident to administrative proceedings con-
ducted pursuant to section 242(b).10 '
The holding of Foti expressly excluded the question of whether ju-
dicial review of a Board of Immigration Appeals' refusal to reopen de-
portation proceedings was included under section 106(a). 10 2 Giova v.
Rosenberg10 3 subsequently answered the question affirmatively in a brief
memorandum opinion. The next case appearing before the Court which
involved the application of section 106(a) illustrated that the Giova hold-
ing was a logical extension of Foti.
0 4
In Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 10 5 the trend of broadening circuit court
jurisdiction under section 106(a) established by Foti and Giova was
97. Id. See generally Note, The Forum for Judicial Review of Administrative Action: Interpret-
ing Special Review Statutes, 63 B.U.L. REV. 765 (1983).
98. See Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217 (1963); Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U.S. 18 (1964), mem.
revg, 308 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1962); Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1968); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
99. 375 U.S. 217.
100. Id. at 224-5. The Court accepted statements made on the House floor during
debates by three Congressmen who were "knowledgeable in deportation matters" as indi-
cating that Congress knew that determinations of deportability and rulings on discretion-
ary relief were commonly made in the same administrative proceedings. Id. at 223-24; see
105 CONG. REc. 12728 (statements of Reps. Walter, Lindsay and Moore). The Court
based its analysis of legislative purpose on the HouseJudiciary Committee report concern-
ing section 106(a). Id. at 224-25; see H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23,
reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2950, 2967.
101. 375 U.S. at 229.
102. Id. at 231. The Court stated that the question of refusal to reopen hearings is
somewhat different than determinations made during the hearings, because the determi-
nation of refusal to reopen is not made in the proceedings entering the final orders of
deportation.
103. 379 U.S. 18 (1964), mer., revg, 308 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1982).
104. See Cheng Fan Kwok, 392 U.S. at 217 (1968).
105. Id. at 206.
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halted. The issue in Cheng Fan Kwok was whether INS refusals of discre-
tionary relief, not entered in the course of proceedings conducted under
section 242(b), come within section 106(a). 10 6 Neither Foti nor Giova
was held to be controlling, and the question of construction presented
was remarked to be much closer than in either of those cases. 10 7 The
Court rested its decision on the lack of any language in section 106(a)
itself to indicate that the statutory judicial review process was to extend
beyond determinations made during and incident to proceedings con-
ducted under section 242(b). Reliance was also placed on the lack of
any intent to so extend section 106(a) in the legislative history. 10 8
The narrow holding of Cheng Fan Kwok sets forth that section 106(a)
only applies to judicial review of determinations made in proceedings
conducted under section 242(b), including determinations made inci-
dent to motions to reopen those proceedings.' 0 9 Several circuit courts
decided jurisdictional questions to which section 106(a) was urged to
apply subsequent to Cheng Fan Kwok. A majority of those courts held
that petitions for relief "not inconsistent with" 01 0 final orders of depor-
tation (rather than those which posed a direct attack on such orders)
were not within the jurisdictional grant of section 106(a).'" The Third
Circuit, however, read Cheng Fan Kwok as holding that section 106(a)
covered only those issues that could be raised in section 242(b) proceed-
ings.1 12 In INS v. Chadha,1 13 the Court resolved the conflict among the
appeals courts. The appeal in Chadha involved a challenge to the consti-
tutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2), which provided that the House of
Representatives could overturn INS decisions entered pursuant to pro-
ceedings conducted under section 242(b)."1 4 Chadha expressly adopted
the test espoused by the majority of the circuits which had ruled on the
issue and concluded that matters on which the validity of the final order
is contingent are included within the appellate court jurisdiction granted
by section 106(a). 15
106. Id. at 207-8. Petitioner was a seaman who had deserted his ship and remained
unlawfully in the United States. In deportation proceedings conducted pursuant to
§ 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b), he conceded deportability, but was granted permission to
leave the United States voluntarily. After failing to depart, petitioner was ordered to sur-
render for deportation, at which time he requested a stay of deportation while he applied
for discretionary relief from the order.
107. Id. at 211.
108. Id. at 213-15. For a review of immigration law at the time section 106(a) was
enacted, see Note, Deportation and Exclusion: A Continuing Dialogue Between Congress and the
Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 760 (1962).
109. Cheng Fan Kwok, 392 U.S. at 216.
110. Id. at 213 (quoting Tai Mui v. Esperdy, 371 F.2d 772, 777 (1966)).
111. See Pilapil v. INS, 424 F.2d 6 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 908 (1970); Tai Mui
v. Esperdy, 371 F.2d 772 (1966) cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1017 (1967); Haitian Refugee Center
v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Jean v. Nelson,
727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984); Waziri v. INS, 392 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1968).
112. See Dastmalchi v. INS, 660 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1981).
113. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). The implications of the Chadha holding are discussed in
Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. REV. 473 (1984).
114. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1981).
115. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 938. Several cases appeared before Chada which deter-
mined the application of section 106(a) by applying the test of whether an appeal stating
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3. Expansion of Habeas Corpus
Changes in the availability of habeas corpus resulting from the re-
definition of the phrase "in custody" have the potential of substantially
increasing the use of the habeas writ as a vehicle for review of deporta-
tion orders." 6 At the time section 106 was enacted, custody as applied
to habeas corpus meant physical detention.11 7 That definition was sub-
stantially broadened by two subsequent Supreme Court cases. In Jones
v. Cunningham," 18 the Court held that a person on parole was in custody
for habeas purposes. Then, in Hensley v. Municipal Court, 1 9 a person
free on his own recognizance was held to be in custody and therefore,
eligible to sue out a writ of habeas corpus. Jones set forth the test stating
that persons subject to governmentally imposed restraints not shared by
the general public satisfied the custody requirement for habeas corpus
relief. 120 Hensley applied the Jones standard to find that a person free on
his own recognizance was subject to sufficient restraints to be eligible
for habeas corpus because he could be ordered to appear at any time or
place by a court of competent jurisdiction.'
2 '
In United States ex rel. Marcello v. District Director, INS, the Fifth Circuit,
citing Hensley, held that an alien subject to a final order of deportation
was in custody for habeas purposes. 122 Marcello challenged the validity
of a final order of deportation through habeas corpus proceedings.
Although noting that the use of habeas corpus in this fashion defeated the
purpose of section 106(a), the Fifth Circuit went on to determine the
merits of Marcello's challenge to the deportation order. 12 3 A situation
similar to Marcello occurred in Daneshvar v. Chauvin,124 decided by the
Eighth Circuit. The court again held that the existence of an outstand-
ing order of deportation was a sufficient restraint on liberty to make
habeas corpus relief available. 12 5 The Eighth Circuit, however, con-
constitutional grounds poses a direct challenge to the validity of the final order of deporta-
tion. See Pilapil v. INS, 424 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1970); Menezes v. INS, 601 F.2d 1028 (9th
Cir. 1979); Ferrante v. INS, 399 F.2d 98 (6th Cir. 1968).
116. See Marceto, 634 F.2d at 967; Daneshvar v. Chauvin, 644 F.2d 1248 (8th Cir.
1981). See generally Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991 (1985).
117. See Marcetto, 634 F.2d at 967.
118. 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
119. 411 U.S. 345 (1973).
120. Jones, 371 U.S. at 242.
121. Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351.
122. Marcetlo, 634 F.2d at 971. The petitioner in Marcello was perhaps the ultimate
example of a litigant engaged in dilatory tactics. Marcello's habeas corpus petition fol-
lowed nearly 30 years of litigation in the courts of the United States and Italy. The Fifth
Circuit included a history of Marcello's attacks on his deportation orders in two appendi-
ces to its opinion. See Marcello, 634 F.2d at 973-79.
123. 634 F.2d at 972.
124. 644 F.2d 1248, 1249 (1981). Daneshvar had admitted his deportability during
deportation proceedings, and was granted permission to leave the United States volunta-
rily. Rather than leaving within the time allowed, he moved to reopen the deportation
proceedings. The writ of habeas corpus was filed after Daneshvar was arrested and jailed
for failing to leave. His release on bail was ordered by the district court which held that it
had jurisdiction over the actions of the INS in taking Daneshvar into custody, but nojuris-
diction to review the validity of Daneshvar's final orders of deportation.
125. Id. at 1251.
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strued section 106(a)(9) as only creating district court habeas jurisdic-
tion when the petitioner's challenge does not directly attack the validity
of a final order of deportation. 126 By having statutory reviewand habeas
corpus apply to mutually exclusive situations, this holding preserves the




In reaching its decision in Salehi,' 2 8 the Tenth Circuit relied on the
Supreme Court constructions of section 106(a), as set forth in Foti, Gi-
ova, Cheng Fan Kwok and Chadha. The Tenth Circuit first found that
under Foti, Giova and Cheng Fan Kwok, it did not have exclusive jurisdic-
tion of petitioners' asylum and due process claims because those claims
did not constitute direct attacks on the validity of the final orders of de-
portation against the petitioners. The court then separately applied the
standard developed in Chadha.
129
Application of the Chadha standard also yielded the result that sec-
tion 106(a) did not apply to the petitioners' claims. The rationale was
that, even if successful, the petitioners would be entitled only to a hear-
ing to determine their eligibility for asylum; therefore, the validity of the
final orders was not contingent on the success of their claims.' 3 0 The
court also pointed out that a subsequent finding that the petitioners
were eligible for asylum would not overturn the deportation order,
rather it would constitute collateral relief from the order.1
3 1
From a factual perspective, Salehi and Cheng Fan Kwok bear a close
resemblance to one another. It is not surprising that their holdings are
also in accord. The consistency of outcomes in Salehi of the separate
applications of the Chadha and Cheng Fan Kwok standards is also not sur-
prising, considering that the Supreme Court set out to achieve a result
in Chadha which was in accord with Cheng Fan Kwok. This observation
leads to the conclusion that the Salehi decision could have been based on
Chadha or Cheng Fan Kwok without losing its force of reason.
A broader issue raised by the Salehi decision is how effective it is in
preserving the congressional intent of curtailing dilatory appeals to de-
portation orders. Admittedly, the Salehi holding does provide for an ex-
tra level of judicial review, which superficially appears to thwart the
purpose of section 106(a). In addition, Salehi could open the door to
evasion of the statutory review procedure by the use of habeas corpus.
There are, however, considerations which support the Tenth Circuit's
holding in Salehi.
126. Id. See also United States ex rel. Parco v. Morris, 426 F.Supp. 976 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Te Kuei Liu v. INS, 483 F. Supp. 107 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
127. See supra text accompanying note 83.
128. Salehi, 796 F.2d at 1286.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 109-111.




The Salehi holding is rather narrow. The types of challenges to
which section 106(a) does not apply are limited to (1) applications for
relief collateral to the final deportation order and (2) procedural attacks
on INS practices. Respecting collateral challenges to final deportation
orders, the Supreme Court decision in Cheng Fan Kwok held that such
challenges were intended by Congress to be outside the application of
section 106(a), foreclosing any appellate court discretion in the matter.
Procedural attacks are of a sufficiently limited class that they do not pro-
vide a significant opportunity for delay oriented appeals. Procedural at-
tacks are limited because they apply only to allegations that INS
practices of general application are unconstitutional; section 106(a) pre-
sumably applies to appeals of procedural rulings in individual cases.
132
The Salehi court avoided deciding whether section 106(a)(9) should
be construed as limiting district court habeas jurisdiction to those claims
not directly attacking deportation orders. The court noted that in Pi-
lapil 133 it had suggested in dicta that section 106(a)(9) would permit
direct attacks on deportation orders. The court also noted that there
was authority to the contrary provided by Daneshvar.134 Refusal to de-
cide the issue in Salehi, coupled with the recognition that prior Tenth
Circuit authority is not binding, leaves the court free to decide the ques-
tion entirely on its own merits in a future case.
III. THE RULE 4(F) EXPANSION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER
NECESSARY THIRD PARTIES: QUINONES 1. PENNStYLVANIA
GENERAL INSURACE CO.
A. Facts
In an action commenced in the state court system of New Mexico,
Quinones, a New Mexico resident, filed a claim for damages against
Penn General under an uninsured motorist policy.135 The claim arose
out of an automobile accident that occurred in Texas between plaintiff
and Mowad, a resident of Texas. Penn General removed the suit to the
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, and filed a
third-party complaint under Rule 14136 for subrogation against appellee
Mowad. Mowad was served in Texas, pursuant to Rule 4()1 3 7 at a point
approximately forty miles from the federal court in Las Cruces, New
Mexico. The district court dismissed the complaint against Mowad on
his motion asserting that the court lacked personal jurisdiction. 138 Qui-
nones appealed several evidentiary rulings and Penn General appealed
the dismissal of the complaint against Mowad.
132. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1033 (5th Cir. 1982). For a
discussion of due process in deportation proceedings, see Verkuil, A Study of Immigration
Procedures, 31 UCLA L. REv. 1141 (1984).
133. 424 F.2d 6, 8-9 (10th Cir. 1970).
134. 644 F.2d 1248 (8th Cir. 1981).
135. Quinones v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 1986).
136. FED. R. Civ. P. 14.
137. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
138. Quinones, 804 F.2d at 1169.
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B. The Tenth Circuit's Holding
The district court had disallowed testimony from several of the
plaintiff's witnesses ruling that an adequate foundation had not been
laid to establish the relevance of the testimony. 139 The Tenth Circuit
upheld all of the trial court's rulings noting that it had not abused its
discretion in making them. 140 Turning to the jurisdictional issue, the
Tenth Circuit held that by providing for service of third-party defend-
ants at locations outside the forum state, but within 100 miles of the
federal courthouse, Rule 4(f) did confer personal jurisdiction over
Mowad, even though he did not have any contacts with the forum state
(New Mexico). 141
C. Background
Before the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Judiciary Act of 1789142 limited the in personam jurisdiction of the
federal district courts to parties served within the district.143 Rule 4(f)
as first promulgated provided for service "anywhere within the territo-
rial limits of the state in which the district court is held."' 144 The rule
was amended in 1963 to provide for service of necessary third parties
brought pursuant to Rules 14 and 19 who could be served within 100
miles of the forum court.
1. The Purpose Underlying the Amendment of Rule 4(f)
The advisory committee's note pertaining to the 1963 amendment
of Rule 4(1) provides insight into the intentions behind the change.
14 5
In enacting the provision in Rule 4(f) that provides for extended service
on necessary third parties (regardless of whether such parties are within
the forum state), the stated intent was to "promote the objective of en-
abling the court to determine entire controversies."' 14 6 Considering
modern travel and communication capabilities, the advisory committee
felt that extension of the territorial range in which service is allowed
would not work hardship on parties summoned.14 7 The advisory com-
mittee's note has been interpreted as intending that Rule 4(f) extend the
139. Id. at 1170-1172.
140. Id. The Tenth Circuit relied on several of its cases for the elementary proposition
that a trial court ruling on evidence will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of
discretion. See, Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1331 (10th Cir.
1984); Rasmussen Drilling, Inc. v. Kerr-Mcgee Nuclear Corp., 571 F.2d 1144, 1149 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978) (this case contains a veritable gold mine of eviden-
tiary propositions along with Tenth Circuit supporting authority for them at 1148-1149).
Because the evidentiary rulings in Quinones are neither controversial nor of first impres-
sion, they will not be discussed further.
141. Quinones, 804 F.2d at 1177.
142. 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
143. Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619 (1925).
144. See Mississippi Publishing v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 443 (1946).
145. See Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1979); Coleman v. Ameri-
can Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1968).




territorial limits of district court jurisdiction, rather than merely provid-
ing for service on necessary third parties already subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the forum state.
14 8
2. Power to Determine the Limits of Federal Process
Determining that the intent in amending Rule 4(f) was to effect an
increase in district court jurisdiction resulted in a need to decide
whether the Supreme Court, acting through its advisory committee, had
the power to make such a change. 149 In Mississippi Publishing Corp. v.
Murphree,150 the Supreme Court was faced with the analogous question
of whether, under the original version of Rule 4(f), it had the power to
promulgate a rule expanding district court service of process to encom-
pass the whole of the forum state.
The Court, after pointing out that Congress could provide for ser-
vice of process anywhere in the United States, 151 analyzed whether Con-
gress had delegated that power to the Court. 15 2 The Act of June 19,
1934, authorizing the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, provided that the rules were not to "abridge, enlarge or modify"
the substantive rights of litigants. 153 In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,' 54 the
court held that the proper test for a rule's validity was not whether it
might affect a litigant's rights, but whether it was directed at regulating
"the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by sub-
stantive law .... 155 Mississippi Publishing expressly recognized that
rules fixing jurisdiction did affect the rights of litigants, but relied on
Sibbach as allowing such abridgments if incidental to the operation of a
procedural rule. 156 The Court then emphasized that a rule specifying a
federal court's jurisdiction did nothing to change the rules of decision
148. See Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 250, 251 ("If
the amendment had done no more than [permit personal service on necessary third parties
already subject to the court's jurisdiction] . . .it would have accomplished little."). Id. at
251-52.
149. See Id. at 252; Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412, 416.
150. 326 U.S. 438, 440.
151. Id. at 442 (citing Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925);
United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 98 U.S. 569, 604 (1879); Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838)). For a critical review of the constitutionality of nationwide ser-
vice of process in diversity cases, see Abraham, Constitutional Limitations Upon the Territorial
Reach of Federal Process, 8 VILL. L. REV. 520 (1963).
152. Alississippi Publishing, 326 U.S. at 445.
153. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
154. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
155. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). Petitioner in Sibbach had originally brought a personal
injury action against respondent. Petitioner had been jailed for contempt by the district
court for refusing to submit to a court ordered medical examination for the purpose of
determining the extent of her injuries. Id. at 6-7. Her only challenge to the district court's
action was based on her claim that FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a), providing for medical examina-
tions when physical condition is an issue, was invalid because it abridged her substantive
rights. Id. at 11. The Court rejected this claim, but ordered the petitioner's release based
on plain error, because the remedy for failure to submit to a medical examination ordered
pursuant to rule 35(a), provided in FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2), does not include punishment
for contempt. id. at 16.
156. Mississippi Publishing, 326 U.S. at 445-446 (citing Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 11-14).
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used by the court to adjudicate the parties' rights. 157  Interpreting
Rule 4(f) as extending federal court jurisdiction over necessary third
parties beyond the forum state's borders presents an issue not covered
in Mississippi Publishing. The doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 158 has
been interpreted as requiring that federal court in personam jurisdiction
in an ordinary diversity case be determined with reference to state
law. 159 In Arrowsmith, Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit,
held that in the absence of an overriding federal statute, rule or policy, a
federal district court cannot assert personal jurisdiction over a party in a
diversity case, unless a court of the forum state would assert its jurisdic-
tion over that party. 16 0 The Arrowsmith court did not express an opinion
on whether Rule 4(f) would be limited by the forum state's jurisdictional
bounds. 161
3. Constitutional Due Process
By providing for service of process beyond the borders of the forum
state, Rule 4(f) raises questions of due process under the minimum con-
tacts standard set forth in International Shoe v. Washington. 16 2 The specific
issue is whether the area of minimum contacts analysis remains confined
to the forum state, or expands beyond its borders. In Coleman v. Ameri-
can Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 163 the Second Circuit held that out of
state service on a party pursuant to Rule 4(f) is valid if the state in which
service is made could serve the party there. This is equivalent to ex-
tending the area of minimum contacts analysis to the whole of the state
of service.
The Second Circuit pointed out that limiting the minimum contacts
area to the forum state would result in Rule 4(f) providing a federal
court with nothing more than a method of utilizing the forum state's
long-arm statute. 16 4 Under such a limitation, the amendment of Rule
4(f) would have little effect, since Rule 4(e) expressly provides for ser-
vice pursuant to a state's long-arm statute.' 65 The Second Circuit also
found support for extension of the minimum contacts area by reading
the advisory committee's note as intending to expand district court
jurisdiction. 166
Expansion of the minimum contacts area relating to Rule 4(f) was
157. Id. (citing Guarantee Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)).
158. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
159. See Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219 (1963).
160. Id. at 223. The court held that federal law would only come into play in a chal-
lenge to the state's ability to constitutionally assert jurisdiction. Id. at 222.
16 1. Id. at 228 n.9. See generally Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the
In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CI. L. REV. 569, 623 (1958).
162. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
163. Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 252, 253 (1968).
The court indicated that out of state service pursuant to Rule 4(1) would "very likely" be
valid only on persons over which the state of service would actually choose to exercise
jurisdiction. Id. at 252.
164. Id. at 252.
165. Id.
166. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 142-145.
[Vol. 65:4
CIVIL PROCEDURE
deemed necessary by the Fifth Circuit in Sprow v. Hartford Insurance
Co. 167 The court again found that confining Rule 4(f) to providing for
service on parties having sufficient minimum contacts with the forum
state would reduce it to a duplicate of Rule 4(e). 168 The Fifth Circuit
also adopted the Second Circuit's interpretation of the purpose behind
the amendment of Rule 4(f).
16 9
Sprow and Coleman differ on the extent of expansion of the minimum
contacts area under Rule 4(). The Sprow court held that a third party
must have minimum contacts with either the forum state or the 100 mile
bulge to be amenable to service under Rule 4(). 170 Keeping the mini-
mum contacts area coincident with the territory of the forum's jurisdic-
tion was put forth as the most logical method of adapting the
International Shoe due process test to the expansion of diversity jurisdic-
tion beyond state borders. 17 1 The Fifth Circuit also noted that it might
be fundamentally unfair to subject certain parties served in the 100 mile
bulge area to the jurisdiction of a federal court sitting in another state.
The court's example of such a party was a corporation which had an
agent for service of process in the state containing the bulge, but no
contact with the forum state or the 100 mile bulge other than the agent's
temporary presence within the bulge. 172 Under the Second Circuit's
standard set forth in Coleman, since the same hypothetical corporation's
agent could be served by a court in the state containing the bulge at any
place within its borders, the agent could be served in the bulge by a
federal district court of the forum state.
D. Analysis
Sprow and Coleman were reviewed with approval in Quinones as reach-
ing what the Tenth Circuit considered to be the proper result.
17 3
Rather than relying on those holdings, however, the jurisdictional reach
of Rule 4(f) was analyzed according to basic principles.
The Tenth Circuit first relied on Sibbach v. Wilson as authorizing
Congress to delegate rule-making power to regulate federal court proce-
dure to the Supreme Court. 174 The extension of common-law jurisdic-
tion brought about by Rule 4(f) as originally promulgated was then
reviewed. 1
75
As the first case to consider the provisions of the original Rule 4(f),
167. 594 F.2d 412, 416 (1979).
168. Id. at 417.
169. See supra text accompanying note 162. The purpose behind the expansion in juris-
diction was seen by both the Second and Fifth Circuits as that expressed in the advisory
committee's note to Rule 4(f). Coleman, 405 F.2d at 250 n.3; Sprow, 594 F.2d at 417. See
also supra text accompanying notes 142-145.
170. 594 F.2d at 416.
171. Id. See also Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963, 77
HARV. L. REV. 601, 633 (1964).
172. Sprow, 594 F.2d at 416.
173. Quinones, 804 F.2d at 1173-1174.
174. Id. al 1174 (citing Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. at 9-10).
175. Quinones, 804 F.2d at 1174-1175.
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Mississippi Publishing176 was recognized as a road map for interpreting
the extension of district court jurisdiction by a procedural rule of the
Court. The central proposition of Mississippi Publishing, that Rule 4() ac-
complished a congressionally authorized enlargement of district court
territorial jurisdiction,' 77 was used to dispose of appellee's contention
that Rule 4() merely described effective service, rather than the extent
of the district court's in personam jurisdiction.17 8 To extend Mississippi
Publishing to the case at bar, reference was made to the advisory commit-
tee's note to ascertain that the 1963 amendment of Rule 4(f) was in-
tended to expand the district court's territorial jurisdiction.179 By direct
analogy with Mississippi Publishing, the Tenth Circuit then held that the
intended expansion of territorial jurisdiction was accomplished by Rule
4(f).1 8 0
The Tenth Circuit became the first circuit court to go through a
reasoned discussion to support the holding that the Rule 4(f) extension
of diversity jurisdiction beyond state lines is not precluded by the Erie
doctrine.' 8 ' As suggested inArrowsmith,18 2 the Tenth Circuit held that if
a federal rule or policy so requires, a federal district court may assert
personal jurisdiction in a diversity suit where a state court would not. 1
8 3
Reading Rule 4(f) in the light of its underlying federal policy of ending
controversies with one lawsuit, convinced the court that there was suffi-
cient justification for finding that the rule did extend the federal district
court's jurisdiction beyond the borders of the forum state.'
8 4
The Quinones court followed Sprow by interpreting International Shoe
as requiring minimum contacts with the territory of the forum, rather
than minimum contacts with the forum state.' 85 This reading mandated
the finding that the area of minimum contacts analysis for Rule 4(f) is
the forum state plus the 100 mile bulge area. Since Rule 4(f) is of fed-
eral origin, it makes sense to dispense with the concept that federal
court territorial jurisdiction is inextricably linked to one or more states'
borders. The Tenth Circuit's well-reasoned finding that the Erie doc-
trine does not compel adherence to state law in the case of Rule 4()'
8 6
makes this conclusion all the more compelling. Thus, the interpretation
176. 326 U.S. 438. See supra text accompanying note 147.
177. Mississzppi Publishing, 326 U.S. at 444-445. Mississippi Publishing also addressed the
question of whether the Court's interpretation of Rule 4(f) as expanding territorial juris-
diction was inconsistent with FED. R. Civ. P. 82 which prohibits construing the rules to
extend or limit district court jurisdiction. The Court in Mississippi Publishing found no in-
consistency by interpreting Rule 82 as applicable to subject matter jurisdiction and venue,
but not personal jurisdiction. Id. at 445. The appellee in Quinones advanced the same in-
consistency argument, which the Tenth Circuit rejected in the same way. Quinones, 804
F.2d at 1175 n.6.
178. Quinones, 804 F.2d at 1175.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 142-145.
180. Quinones, 804 F.2d at 1175.
181. Id. at 1176-1177.
182. 320 F.2d 219, 226 (1963). See also supra text accompanying notes 155-156.
183. Quinones, 804 F.2d at 1177.
184. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 142-145.
185. Quinones, 804 F.2d at 1177. See also Sprow, 594 F.2d at 416-417.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 177-180.
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of the minimum contacts area in Quinones is preferable to that adopted in
Coleman. 18 7 There may be little practical difference between the two
standards because of the limited application of Rule 4(0,188 and the
scarcity of situations in which a party served in the bulge area would
have minimum contacts with the state of service, but not the bulge itself.
IV. RES JUDICATA EFFECT OF STATE COURT DISMISSAL OF SECTION
1983 ACTION: DEVARGAS V. MONTOYA
A. Facts
The facts underlying plaintiff's claim were simple: DeVargas al-
leged that guards at the New Mexico State Penitentiary beat him while
he was incarcerated there.' 8 9 The procedural aspects of the ensuing liti-
gation complicated matters considerably. The alleged beating occurred
on September 21, 1976. On July 6, 1977, DeVargas filed a complaint in
New Mexico state court alleging violation of his civil rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983190 by the state of New Mexico, its Department of Correc-
tions, and several prison guards and officials.19 1 Following defendants'
motion to dismiss, DeVargas allowed the case to lie dormant for 28
months. 19 2 On August 5, 1980, plaintiff filed a pleading, entitled
"Amended Complaint," altering the parties' defendant, referring by
name to seven parties listed as "Does" in the original complaint and
adding several claims for relief. The New Mexico Court of Appeals
found the new complaint to be original and dismissed it on the defense's
assertion of the statute of limitations.' 9 3 DeVargas then turned to fed-
eral district court, filing a complaint containing claims brought in state
court, several new claims, and alleging that the decisions on the statute
of limitations by the state court of appeals were in error.194 Defendants
again raised the statute of limitations and the district court dismissed the
action, relying on the doctrine of claim preclusion in adopting the state
court's determination that the action was time-barred. On appeal to the
Tenth Circuit, DeVargas claimed denial of due process and equal pro-
tection in the state court proceedings and asked for review of both the
state court rulings that the action was time-barred and the federal dis-
187. See supra text accompanying note 159.
188. See Quinones, 804 F.2d at 1173.
189. DeVargas v. Montoya, 796 F.2d 1245, 1247 (10th Cir. 1986).
190. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State or Territory... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
191. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1247.
192. Id. The delay was allegedly due to an oral agreement with defense counsel to
enter into settlement negotiations.
193. DeVargas v. State ex rel New Mexico Dept. of Corrections, 97 N.M. 447, 640 P.2d
1327 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. quashed, 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d 166 (1982).
194. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1248.
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trict court's adoption of the state court decisions.' 9 5
B. The Tenth Circuit's Holding
Ruling on the applicability of claim preclusion, the Tenth Circuit
first held that the state court dismissal of the action as time-barred con-
stituted a determination on the merits for purposes of res judicata.
196
The Tenth Circuit found no error in the state court's choice of the appli-
cable statute of limitations; therefore, the state court's refusal to extend
the statute of limitations was entitled to res judicata 19 7 effect in federal
court.19 8 Finally, the court ruled that the plaintiff had not been denied
due process or equal protection rights in the state courts.' 9 9
C. Background
1. Res Judicata
State court judgments are generally entitled to full faith and credit
in federal court.2 0 0 In determining whether to grant preclusive effect to
a state court judgment under the doctrine of res judicata, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 directs a federal court to refer to the preclusive effect that the
judgment would have in the state of its issuance, 20 ' Resjudicata is not
available to dispose of an issue or claim in federal court when the party
against whom it is asserted did not have a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue or claim in state court.20 2 The operation of resjudicata
is also inapplicable when a federal statute expressly or impliedly effects a
195. Id. DeVargas alleged that defendants were estopped from asserting the statute of
limitations because of alleged concealment and misrepresentation of information needed
by DeVargas to cure defects in his original complaint. Id. at 1248. See generally Note, Citizen
Trust and Government Cover-up: Refining the Doctrine of Fraudulent Concealment, 95 YALE L.J.
1477 (1986). DeVargas also appealed the dismissal of claims added to the complaint when
it was filed in federal district court. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1248.
196. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1250.
197. The general term "resjudicata" will be used here to encompass the more specific
terms of "issue preclusion," referring to the effect of ajudgment in barring relitigation of
an issue previously adjudicated, and "claim preclusion," which bars relitigation of matters
which should have been raised in a prior action. See Marrese v. American Academy of
Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 376, n.l (1985); Migra v. Warren City School Dist.,
465 U.S. 75, 77, n.l (1984).
198. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1252-54.
199. Id. at 1254-56.
200. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) provides in relevant part that "[J]udicial proceedings [of
any state] shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States
... as they have ... in the courts of such State ...." The phrase "every court within the
United States" has been construed to include the federal courts. See Huron Holding Corp.
v. Lincoln Mine Operations Co., 312 U.S. 183, 193 (1941); Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40
(1938).
201. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). See also supra text accompanying notes
19-20, 26-29,
202. The Court has recognized the full and fair opportunity to litigate exception in
both the issue preclusion and claim preclusion contexts. With regard to issue preclusion,
see Allen, 449 U.S. at 95; Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-29




partial repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 1738.203
Because of the importance of the federal interest in protecting indi-
vidual civil rights and a perception that state courts are an inadequate
forum for their protection, it has been suggested that full faith and
credit need not be given to all state court decisions in section 1983 ac-
tions. 20 4 In Allen v. McCurry,20 5 the Supreme Court found that section
1983 does not contain an implied repeal of the 28 U.S.C. § 1738 doc-
trine of preclusion. The Court reached its conclusion of no implied re-
peal because Congress, in enacting section 1983, did not manifest a
clear intent to override either 28 U.S.C. § 1738 or the common law doc-
trine of res judicata.
2 0 6
Although rejecting the implied repeal theory, the Allen Court reaf-
firmed the policy of not allowing preclusion to be asserted against a
party who did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim or
issue in state court. 20 7 This policy was stated more generally in Kremer v.
Chemical Construction Corporation,2 0 8 where the Court held that ajudgment
not meeting the requirements of due process could have no resjudicata
effect. The Court reasoned that since a state could not grant preclusive
effect to a judgment not meeting the requirements of due process, 28
U.S.C. § 1738 prevented the federal courts from allowing such a judg-
ment to be used preclusively.
20 9
Implicit in the due process prerequisite to the application of res
judicata is the requirement that the judgment for which preclusive effect
is sought was an adjudication on the merits of the claim or issue in ques-
tion. A prior judgment need not have reached the substantive issues of
203. See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 468, Allen, 449 U.S. at 98-99. See generally Smith, Full Faith
and Credit and Section 1983: A Reappraisal, 63 N.C.L. REV. 59, 110-111 (1984).
204. See, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 509 n.14 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See also Currie, ResJudicata: The ,eglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 317 (1973); Averitt,
Federal Section 1983 Actions after State Court Judgment, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 191 (1972); Devel-
opments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1335-43 (1977).
205. 449 U.S. at 90, 99 (1980). Several of the circuit courts have suggested that in
section 1983 actions, claim preclusion should not bar federal court litigation of a federal
issue which was not, but could have been, raised in a prior state court proceeding. See
Graves v. Olgiati, 550 F.2d 1327 (2nd Cir. 1977); Lombard v. Bd. of Education, 502 F.2d
631 (2nd Cir. 1974); Mack v. Florida Bd. of Dentistry, 430 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1970). The
Allen Court noted but expressed no opinion on this narrow exception. Allen, 449 U.S. at 97
n.10. Another narrow exception to the operation of claim preclusion occurs when a plain-
tiff has multiple claims, some of which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts, arising out of a single set of facts. The Court has stated that an implied partial
repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 might be appropriate in such a case (depending on the con-
gressional intent in conferring exclusive federal jurisdiction) if state preclusion rules
would bar subsequent litigation of the exclusively federal claims. Marrese v. American
Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 386 (1985).
206. 449 U.S. at 99. The Court required a clear intent to repeal 28 U.S.C. § 1738,
because repeals by implication are disfavored. Allen, 449 U.S. at 99 (citing Radzanower v.
Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976)).
207. Allen, 449 U.S. at 101.
208. 456 U.S. 461, 482 (1982).
209. Id. Kremer was a Title VII action brought in federal court after dismissal of admin-
istrative and state court claims arising from the same alleged injury: the defendant's fail-
ure to rehire petitioner after being layed off, when several other employees laid off by
defendant were rehired.
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a claim in order to have provided a full and fair opportunity for the par-
ties to litigate their claims.2 1 0 In Angel v. Bulington,2 1 the Court stated
that an adjudication declining to reach the ultimate substantive issues
may be sufficient to bar a subsequent action attempting to relitigate the
same issues.
2. Due Process Limits on Full Faith and Credit
As suggested above, the fourteenth amendment due process clause
assures that state judicial proceedings which do not afford a party a full
and fair opportunity to litigate can not be used preclusively against that
party. 2 12 For situations covered by 28 U.S.C. § 1738, Kremer provides
that state court proceedings which meet the minimum due process re-
quirements of the fourteenth amendment qualify for full faith and
credit.
2 13
Satisfaction of fourteenth amendment due process is determined in
an individual case by examining the procedures available to a state court
litigant in prosecuting his claim.21 4 The Court has stressed that due
process does not require a uniform type of procedure, nor is there a
single model by which due process is to be judged.21 5
Due process review of state court judgments in order to determine
their preclusive effect arises frequently when a litigant attempts to pur-
sue federal claims subsequent to state court litigation arising out of the
same alleged injury.2 16 When this occurs, the federal courts assess
whether a litigant had a full and fair opportunity to pursue his federal
claim in the state court.21 7 A determination that the state court pro-
210. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) ("the State certainly accords
due process when it terminates a claim for failure to comply with a reasonable procedural
or evidentiary rule, citing Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 351 (1909)).
211. 330 U.S. 183, 190 (1947). Due process must be satisfied in an action dismissed on
procedural grounds in order for it to bar a subsequent attempt to relitigate claims arising
out of the same facts. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 204-05. See also Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481.
213. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 482. The Court pointed out that under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution, Art. IV, § 1, a full and fair opportunity to litigate entails
the procedural requirements of due process. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 483 n.24 (citing Sherrer
v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 348 (1948)); Baldwin v. Iowa Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S.
522, 524 (1931); Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25, 30 (1917). Interpreting the
purpose underlying the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 as implementing the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, provided the connection between due process and full faith and credit.
Kremer, 456 U.S. at 483 n.24 (citing Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430
(1943)); Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1938).
214. See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 483; Kiowa Tribe v. Lewis, 777 F.2d 587 (10th Cir. 1985).
215. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 610 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 650 (1972); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 885, 895 (1961); NLRB v.
Mackay Co., 304 U.S. 333, 351 (1938).
216. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Mar-
rese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985); Spence v. Lat-
ting, 512 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1975).
217. See Marrese, 470 U.S. at 380. Even if there was not a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the federal claim in state court, issue preclusion may still apply to issues common
to the federal and state claims. See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 466-67, 485; Marrese, 470 U.S. at
381-82, 385. See generally Smith, Full Faith and Credit and Section 1983: A Reappraisal, 63
N.C.L. REV. 59 (1984).
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ceedings did not provide an opportunity to litigate the federal claim
does not necessarily mean that full faith and credit can not bar the fed-
eral action. Assuming that state preclusion rules would bar the subse-
quent federal action if it were brought in state court, analysis of whether
28 U.S.C. § 1738 is expressly or impliedly partially repealed by the fed-
eral statute creating the claim must be undertaken. 2 18 Even though ad-
herence to full faith and credit may bar a federal action without the
plaintiff having had any previous opportunity to pursue the federal
claim, the rigorous "implied repeal" test, which developed in cases
where the federal claim was litigated in state court,
2 19 is applied. 2 20
3. Statutes of Limitations Applicable to Section 1983 Actions
In section 1983 actions, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 requires that federal
courts refer to state law in deciding issues not provided for by federal
law. 22 1 There is no federal statute of limitations applicable to section
1983; therefore, state law must provide the statute of limitations. Prior
to Wilson v. Garcia,2 22 courts entertaining section 1983 claims adopted
the statute of limitations applicable to the most analogous state cause of
action.2 23 The Tenth Circuit's approach before Garcia was to analyze
the nature of the claim's allegations and adopt the statute of limitations
applicable to the comparable state action. 2 24 In Garcia, the Supreme
Court resolved the inconsistencies in the methods used by courts to de-
termine the most similar state action, holding that state statutes of limi-
tations applicable to personal injury actions were to apply to section
1983.225
One important exception to the adoption of state statutes of limita-
tions in civil rights actions is the proviso that the state limitations statute
218. See Marrese, 456 U.S. at 383.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 201-02.
220. See Marrese, 456 U.S. at 381, 385. As the Court noted in Marrese, since most state
preclusion laws do not apply where the subject matter jurisdiction of the initial court was
not competent to entertain the subsequent claim, the potential for unfairness due to the
rigor of the "implied repeal" test is lessened. Id. at 382.
221. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) provides that federal statutory civil rights shall be en-
forced in conformity with the laws of the United States. If the laws of the United States are
deficient in an area, state law is to be used, as long as it is not inconsistent with the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States.
222. 471 U.S. 261 (1985). For a discussion of the applicability of tort remedies to fill in
the gaps in federal section 1983 law, see Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA.
L. REV. 1479 (1987).
223. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
224. See Clulow v. Oklahoma, 700 F.2d 1291, 1299-1300 (10th Cir. 1983) (section 1983
action alleging wrongful confinement in a mental hospital); Zuniga v. AMFAC Foods, Inc.,
580 F.2d 380, 383 (10th Cir. 1978) (action for wrongful discharge from employment).
The Third Circuit followed the same procedure as the Tenth Circuit. See Meyers v. Pen-
nypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894, 900-903 (3d Cir. 1977). The Sev-
enth Circuit rejected the case-by-case determination method in favor of a uniform
limitation for all claims founded on federal civil rights statutes. See Beard v. Robinson, 563
F.2d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 1977).
225. Garcia, 471 U.S. at 276. See generally Note, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Rico Actions
after Wilson v. Garcia, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 529 (1987).
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not be applied if it is inconsistent with federal law. 22 6 Inconsistency is
to be determined by reference to the Constitution, federal statutes, and
the policies underlying both.2 2 7 Despite the acknowledged "broad
sweep''228 of section 1983, the Court, in Robertson v. Wegmann, 2 29 held
that there is nothing in section 1983 or its underlying policies that is
inconsistent with a state law causing an action to abate.
230
The Court has required that federal courts honor not only state
statutes of limitations, but also state rules on how the statutes are to be
tolled. In Board of Regents v. Tomanio,2 3 1 a New York rule providing that
the statute of limitations is not tolled during a period when a plaintiff
pursues a related but independent claim, was upheld to bar a federal
action resting on section 1983.232 Writing for the Court, Justice Rehn-
quist applied the test that absent an inconsistency between the New
York tolling rule and the policies underlying section 1983, the state toll-
ing rule was to be followed in federal court.2
3 3
Relying on the foundation laid by Robertson,2 34 the Court noted that
there is no presumption or policy in federal law disfavoring state poli-
cies of repose.2 35 Recognizing that the two principal purposes behind
section 1983 are deterrence and compensation, 23 6 the Court found that
the New York rules of repose did not hamper a plaintiff's ability to ob-
tain relief under section 1983.237
In contrast to the uniform federal acceptance of state tolling rules,
several circuits determine the accrual of actions according to federal
law. 2 38 The Tenth Circuit views accrual as analogous to tolling, and in
226. This exception is contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). See supra note 217. See
also Robertson, 436 U.S. at 589-90; cf UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966)
(choice of statute of limitations in suits on collective bargaining contracts under the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982)).
227. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 590; Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.
454, 465 (1975).
228. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 590 (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971)).
229. 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
230. In Robertson, the Court was concerned with a Louisiana statute that caused the
deceased plaintiff's action to abate because he was not survived by a spouse, parents, sib-
lings or children. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 587.
231. 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
232. Id. at 480 (plaintiff was a practicing chiropractor in New York, but was unable to
pass a state board examination required by a newly enacted state statute. Plaintiff claimed
that the state's refusal to waive the examination requirement, in view of her professional
experience, violated due process of law).
233. Id. at 485-86.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 222-26.
235. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 488.
236. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 590-91.
237. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 488. The Court also rejected the argument that federal uni-
formity in the area of tolling rules was of sufficient importance to justify striking down New
York's rule. Id. at 489.
238. See Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984); Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d
377, 382 (2d Cir. 1983); Perez v. Laredo Junior College, 706 F.2d 731, 733 (5th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1042 (1984); Gowin v. Altmiller, 663 F.2d 820, 822 (9th Cir.




Clulow v. Oklahoma,2 39 held that questions of accrual are to be answered
by reference to state law. The court reached its holding by reading
Tomanio and Johnson v. Railway Express Agency 24 0 as directing federal
courts to follow state rules relating to limitations statutes as well as the
statutes themselves, unless there is an inconsistency between the state
rules and federal law.
24 1
D. Analysis
In DeVargas v. Montoya,242 the Tenth Circuit, was faced with a fed-
eral action issue, as well as a collateral attack on prior state court adjudi-
cations. Defenses of resjudicata and failure to comply with the statute of
limitations were asserted to bar both actions. The court analyzed the
actions separately, and that format will be adopted here as well.
1. Original Federal Action
The New Mexico Court of Appeals, in dismissing DeVargas' com-
plaint, never reached the substantive issues;2 43 therefore, the first task
before the Tenth Circuit was to determine whether the state court dis-
missal constituted an adjudication on the merits. 2 44 Following the well
established rule that a federal court refer to the preclusive effect ajudg-
ment would have in the state of its issuance, 24 5 the Tenth Circuit deter-
mined that the dismissal was a judgment on the merits pursuant to state
law, 24 6 and that New Mexico adhered to the majority rule that claim
preclusion was applicable both to issues which were and which could
have been raised.2 4 7 These basic issues were dispensed with essentially
in summary fashion by the court.
DeVargas's only serious challenge to the applicability of resjudicata
was that the federal courts' independent powers to determine issues
such as tolling, waiver and estoppel somehow avoided the mandate of
full faith and credit. 24 8 In disposing of this argument, the Tenth Circuit
undertook a brief analysis of the extent of independent federal power.
It was noted that the Supreme Court settled conclusively that state toll-
239. 700 F.2d 1291 (1983).
240. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
241. See Clulow, 700 F.2d at 1300. In Clulow, the Tenth Circuit went on to find that
there was no conflict between the section 1983 or its underlying policies and Oklahoma's
accrual rules. Id. at 1301.
242. 796 F.2d 1245 (10th Cir. 1986).
243. DeVargas v. State ex rel. New Mexico Dept. of Corrections. 97 N.M. 447, 642 P.2d
166 (1982)"
244. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1249.
245. See supra text accompanying note 197.
246. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1249. The court cited Campos v. Brown, 85 N.M. 684, 515
P.2d 1288 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973) and Adams v. United Steelworkers of America, 97 N.M.
369, 640 P.2d 475 (1982) for their holdings that a dismissal with prejudice constitutes an
adjudication on the merits.
247. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1251. The court relied on First State Bank v. Muzio, 100
N.M. 98, 666 P.2d 777 (1983) as authority for New Mexico's view on applicability of claim
preclusion to issues which could have been raised.
248. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1250.
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ing rules are to be followed in section 1983 actions. 2 49 Clulow v.
Oklahoma was cited for the proposition that a claim of estoppel due to
concealment of information 250 was a question of accrual, and also for
the Tenth Circuit's position that accrual is determined according to state
rules.
2 5 '
Because of the well established consistency between state policies of
repose and section 1983,252 no investigation concerning the success
with which state rules fulfilled the purposes of federal statutes was un-
dertaken in DeVargas. The Tenth Circuit assumed the existence of in-
dependent federal power to determine issues of tolling or accrual, but
promptly discarded the idea of using such federal power, because claim
preclusion barred relitigation of the New Mexico decision, refusing to
recognize any extension of the limitations period. Presumably, in a case
where a party was able to put forth a claim in which the consonance of
state law and federal statute was not settled, the court would have un-
dertaken an analysis similar to that in Tomanio253 to determine whether
the state law was inconsistent with a federal statute or its underlying
purpose.
2. Collateral Attacks on State Court Proceedings
DeVargas attacked the state court proceedings based upon theories
of inconsistency with federal law and denial of due process. The incon-
sistency theory was grounded mainly upon Gunther v. Miller,25 4 which
was claimed to establish a binding determination that the four-year New
Mexico statute of limitations applied to section 1983 actions. 2 55 Gunther
was distinguished by the Tenth Circuit as holding only that the two-year
limitations period of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act 2 56 did not
apply.
2 57
After the dismissal of plaintiff's action by the New Mexico courts,
the Supreme Court handed down Garcia v. Wilson, 2 58 which mandates
use of state personal injury limitations statutes in section 1983 actions.
Retroactive application of Garcia would not have helped DeVargas, who
needed the four-year statute for miscellaneous actions, not the three-
year personal injury statute.25 9 Probably because of the court's interest
249. Id. at 1252. See supra text accompanying note 221.
250. See supra note 7.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 235-37.
252. See supra text accompanying note 229.
253. 446 U.S. 478. See supra text accompanying note 230-33.
254. 498 F. Supp. 882 (1980).
255. The four-year statute, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-4 (1978), is a catch-all provision for
miscellaneous actions not covered by specific limitations statutes. Other relevant statutes
of limitations are the two-year period set by the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 41-4-12 (1978), and the three-year period for personal injury actions, N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 37-1-8 (1978).
256. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-12 (1978).
257. Gunther, 498 F. Supp. at 882-83.
258. 471 U.S. 261 (1985). See supra text accompanying notes 218-21.
259. See supra note 251. See also Note, Wilson v. Garcia and Statutes of Limitations in Section
1983 Actions. Retroactive or Prospective Application?, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. (1986).
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in allowing a chance for DeVargas to obtain an adjudication of his sec-
tion 1983 claim on its substantive merits, the Tenth Circuit declined to
apply Garcia retroactively.
260
In situations where the Tenth Circuit has determined state statutes
of limitations applicable to federal laws, part of their analysis has cen-
tered upon analogous state court holdings. 26 1 The DeVargas court
agreed with the plaintiff's assertion that the characterization of an ac-
tion, brought in federal court under federal law for purposes of deter-
mining the applicable state statute of limitations, is a question of federal
law. The burdens of a federal policy not disfavoring state statutes of
repose 26 2 and the existence of a state court decision on the exact federal
issue before the federal court, in a circuit with a policy of actively adopt-
ing state court rulings on statute of limitations matters, proved to be
insurmountable to DeVargas.
The Tenth Circuit made it clear that the state court determination
carried great weight. Consequently, the inconsistency claim was again
dismissed summarily with no analysis of underlying federal purpose.
26 3
Such deference to state law characterizations of federal statutes is con-
sistent with the Supreme Court decisions in UA W v. Hoosier Cardinal Cor-
poration,264 Tomanio and Marrese. Hoosier stated the general proposition
that state law characterizations of federal law ought to be respected by
federal courts, unless inconsistent with federal law. 26 5 Tomanio applied
this proposition by accepting state tolling rules as part of state statutes
of limitations. 2 66 Marrese indicated the potential ultimate extent of def-
erence to the states by postulating that a plaintiff might be precluded by
a prior state court action from bringing a subsequent exclusively federal
claim.
2 6 7
DeVargas's due process attack on the state court proceedings was
very broad, challenging every adverse decision made by the New Mexico
courts. 2 6 8 The Tenth Circuit stated the general proposition that full
faith and credit required only that the minimum procedural require-
ments of due process be satisfied.2 69 Therefore, no detailed analysis of
plaintiff's constitutional claims was pursued. The court pointed out that
plaintiff was responsible for the delays in the state court litigation. Be-
cause of the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction over such appeals, it
was within the court's power to refuse to address the constitutionality of
260. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1253.
261. Zuniga v. AMFAC Foods, Inc., 580 F.2d 380, 386 (10th Cir. 1978). See supra text
accompanying notes 219-20.
262. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980). See supra text accompa-
nying note 231.
263. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1254.
264. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
265. Id. at 706.
266. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 483.
267. Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 386
(1985).
268. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1244-45.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 208-13.
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the state court proceedings in areas other than the due process issue.2 70
V. INTERVENTION OF RIGHT: FDIC v. JENNINGS
A. Facts
This case arose out of the insolvency of Penn Square Bank, N.A.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was appointed re-
ceiver for Penn Square and filed suit against former bank officers and
directors for breach of fiduciary duty. 2 7 1 The complaint was amended
to join the accounting firm Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, & Co. ("Peat
Marwick"), which was charged with negligence and breach of contract
arising out of an audit of Penn Square's financial statements. 272 Penn
Square's holding company, First Penn Corporation, moved to intervene
in the action pursuant to rule 24(a)(2), 2 73 alleging both derivative and
direct injuries arising from Peat Marwick's audit of Penn Square.2 74 The
derivative claims sought recovery for losses incurred by First Penn as a
shareholder in Penn Square. The direct claims alleged losses suffered
by First Penn in transactions with Penn Square which resulted from First
Penn's reliance on Peat Marwick's audit of Penn Square. 27 5 The district
court denied the motion to intervene 27 6 and First Penn appealed.
2 77
B. The Tenth Circuit's Holding
The Tenth Circuit disposed of the threshold issue of mootness,
which arose because of the settlement between the FDIC and Peat
Marwick, holding that the settlement did not moot every issue of the
action. 2 78 First Penn dropped its derivative claims; therefore, the Tenth
Circuit addressed intervention with respect to the direct claims only.2 79
After reviewing the merits of First Penn's intervention claim in detail,
the court upheld the district court's dismissal of the motion to
intervene.
2 80
270. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1245. The Tenth Circuit based its lack ofjurisdiction over
this appeal regarding the constitutionality of the state court decision on District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983), and 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982),
which grants exclusive jurisdiction over Constitutional appeals from state courts to the
Supreme Court.
271. FDIC v. Jennings, 816 F.2d 1488, 1490 (10th Cir. 1987).
272. Id.
273. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
274. Jennings, 816 F.2d at 1490.
275. Id.
276. FDIC v. Jennings, 107 F.R.D. 50 (W.D. Okla. 1985).
277. Jennings, 816 F.2d at 1490. FDIC and Peat Marwick settled while First Penn's ap-
peal was pending.
278. Id. at 1491. The court viewed settlement in a case where an appeal to intervene
was pending as posing a particular risk of injustice to a party with a legitimate intervention
claim.
279. Id.





Rule 24(a)(2) sets out standards for intervention by right. 28 ' The
prospective intervenor must claim an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and he must be so situated
that the disposition as a practical matter will impede his ability to protect
the interest. 28 2 Intervention is warranted under these circumstances un-
less the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties
to the action. 2 83 The analysis in intervention cases typically proceeds by
analyzing the interest, its impairment, and the adequacy of representa-
tion as separate, but frequently related, elements.
28 4
1. Intervenor's Interest in the Action
Since the 1966 amendment of Rule 24(a)(2) to its present form,
courts have had a difficult time formulating a precise test for the interest
necessary to justify intervention. 28 5 Soon after the rule's amendment,
the Tenth Circuit adopted what appeared to be a narrow view, requiring
that the interest be specifically legal or equitable.2 8 6 The Supreme
Court, in Donaldson v. United States,2 87 used an approach similar to the
Tenth Circuit's, refusing intervention to an applicant who did not have a
"significantly protectable interest. ' 288
Shortly after the Tenth Circuit's attempt to clarify the meaning of
interest, the District of Columbia Circuit, in Nuesse v. Camp28 9 allowed an
applicant asserting a general interest to intervene. The applicant in Nu-
esse was the Wisconsin Banking Commissioner, who sought to intervene
in an action between the American State Bank, a Wisconsin chartered
bank, and the United States Comptroller of the Currency. 290 American
challenged the Comptroller's approval of a national bank's application
281. See, FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), which provides for intervention:
[W]hen the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that inter-
est, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
282. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 578 F.2d 1341, 1343 (10th Cir. 1978).
283. See National Farm Lines v. ICC, 564 F.2d 381, 384 (10th Cir. 1977).
284. See .Vatural Resources, 578 F.2d at 1344-45; Jet Traders Inv. Corp. v. Tekair, Ltd.,
89 F.R.D. 560 (D. Del. 1981).
285. See Sanguine, Ltd. v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 736 F.2d 1416, 1420
(1984) ("[Clourts have enjoyed little success in attempting to define precisely the type of
interest necessary for intervention"); Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrus, 644 F.2d 849,
850 n.3 (10th Cir. 1981) ("[A]ttempts to add content to Rule 24(a)(2)'s 'interest' require-
ment have met with questionable success."); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir.
1967).
286. See Toles v. United States, 371 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1967).
287. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
288. Id. at 531. Donaldson sought to intervene in an action between his former em-
ployer, Acme, and the Internal Revenue Service. The IRS sued to enforce summons
served on Acme and its accountant requiring them to testify on matters relating to Donald-
son's tax liability. Donaldson moved to intervene in the action, citing his potential tax
liability as a sufficient interest. Id. at 518-19.
289. 385 F.2d 694 (1967).
290. Id. at 698.
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to open a branch office. The Commissioner's asserted interest was
based on his authority to enforce the state banking laws relied on by
American in bringing its action.2 9 1 The District of Columbia Circuit re-
jected a narrow approach in defining "interest," choosing instead to rely
on the purpose behind the interest test.2 92 The court perceived that the
interest test is "primarily a practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by
involving as many apparently concerned persons as is compatible with
efficiency and due process."
'2 93
Despite the Tenth Circuit's apparently limited formulation of what
constitutes a sufficient interest, it has made statements tending to sug-
gest a broader outlook than the "specific legal or equitable interest" test
would suggest.29 4 In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,2 9 5 the Tenth Circuit allowed intervention
by a party with a general economic interest in the action. In Natural
Resources, the Natural Resources Defense Council sued to prevent the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the New Mexico Environ-
mental Improvement Agency (NMEIA) from licensing a uranium mill
operated in New Mexico by United Nuclear Corporation without first
preparing environmental impact statements. 2 96 Kerr-McGee Nuclear
Corporation moved to intervene, claiming an interest in the action be-
cause it operated a uranium mill in New Mexico, and had an application
for renewal of its operating license pending before the NMEIA.
29 7
Describing the nature of interest meriting intervention, the Tenth
Circuit stated that the applicant need not have a direct interest in the
outcome of the action.2 98 The court relied on Cascade Natural Gas Corp.
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,299 a Supreme Court case where the state of
California was allowed to intervene in an antitrust action because the
outcome of the action might affect California's natural gas supply.
30 0
The specific legal or equitable interest test was not abandoned in Natural
291. Id.
292. Id. at 700. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note ("persons materially
interested in the subject of an action ... should be joined as parties so that they may be
heard and a complete disposition made.") and FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) advisory commit-
tee's note ("the amendment draws upon the revision of... [Rule 19] and the reasoning
underlying that revision."). See generally, Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to
Restructure Federal Rule 19, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061 (1985).
293. Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 700.
294. See National Farm Lines, 564 F.2d at 384 ("Our court has tended to follow a some-
what liberal line in allowing intervention."); Dowell v. Board of Ed. of Okla. City, 430 F.2d
865, 868 (10th Cir. 1970) ("[I]ntervention ... should be freely granted so long as it does
not seriously interfere with the actual hearings.").
295. 578 F.2d 1341 (10th Cir. 1978).
296. Id. at 1342-43.
297. Id. at 1344. The American Mining Congress also sought to intervene on behalf of
its members who were or might become uranium mill operators in New Mexico.
298. Id.
299. 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
300. Id. The Court had previously ordered that El Paso Natural Gas divest itself of the
Northwest Pipeline Corporation. See United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S.
651, 662 (1964). The instant action was to assure that Pacific Northwest, a natural gas
supplier subsidiary of Northwest Pipeline, be restored to a competitive position in the
California Market. Cascade, 386 U.S. at 132.
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Resources; however, Kerr-McGee's interest was of a more general and at-
tenuated nature than previously merited intervention in the Tenth
Circuit.
30 '
2. Impairment of Interest
The existence of an interest justifying intervention and the issue of
its impairment are not entirely separable. 30 2 Finding an interest has
been conditioned on whether it would be impaired by the outcome of an
action. 30 3 One issue analyzed solely in terms of impairment is the effect
of stare decisis on a prospective intervenor's ability to protect his inter-
est in a subsequent action.
Stare decisis was recognized as a sufficient "practical disadvan-
tage" 30 4 to warrant intervention of right soon after the 1966 amend-
ment of the Federal Rules. 30 5 Atlantis Development Corp. v. United States 3
0 6
was an early case on stare decisis impairment. The issue before the At-
lantis court was one of first impression, a factor upon which considerable
emphasis was placed in finding impairment based primarily on stare de-
cisis. 30 7 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the issue of first impression, in
the present action, would be a part of any subsequent claim brought by
Atlantis (the applicant for intervention); therefore, the principal action
constituted a trial on the merits of Atlantis's claim in a practical
sense.
308
The applicability of stare decisis to a finding of impairment of inter-
301. In Sanguine, Ltd. v. United States Dept. of Interior, 736 F.2d 1416 (1984), the
Tenth Circuit adopted the underlying purpose analysis of Nuesse, 385 F.2d 694. This
adoption indicated conclusively that the specific legal or equitable interest criterion would
not be applied literally. One court has noted that intervention is granted more freely in
"cases seeking injunctive relief where the grant of the relief sought would have broad
social or economic ramifications" than in actions seeking damages. See Jet Traders Inv.
Corp. v. Tekair, Ltd., 89 F.R.D. 560 (D. Del. 1981). The Tenth Circuit's decisions seem to
line up roughly along this guideline. Thus, intervention was allowed in Natural Resources,
where the intervenor (American Mining Congress) represented many companies which
might be impacted if the Natural Resources Defense Council prevailed. See supra text ac-
companying notes 291-93. Intervention was also granted in Sanguine, 736 F.2d at 1416,
where the applicant was an Indian tribe affected by a proposed change in the interpreta-
tion of oil and gas leases of Indian lands by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Sanguine, 736
F.2d at 1417-18. But see Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrus, 644 F.2d 849 (1981), where
intervention was denied. The applicant leased land containing coal deposits to Rosebud.
The royalty rate of the lease was tied to the royalty rate that the Department of Interior
charged Rosebud on federal lands. Rosebud was disputing an increase in the federal roy-
alty rate and subsequently, the applicant claimed an interest since its royalty rate was tied
to the federal rate. Rosebud, 644 F.2d at 849-50.
302. See Natural Resources, 578 F.2d at 1345.
303. Id. at 1344 (citing Cascade, 386 U.S. at 135-36).
304. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
305. See Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 826-29 (5th Cir. 1967);
Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 702.
306. 379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967).
307. Atlantis, 379 F.2d at 826. At stake in Atlantis was the ownership of a number of
reefs off the coast of Florida. The United States sued Acme, apparently at Atlantis' behest,
to enjoin Acme from building structures on the reefs without first obtaining a permit from
the United States Corps of Engineers. Atlantis was also interested in building on the reefs,
and moved to intervene. Id. at 820-21.
308. Id. at 826.
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est has been addressed in a number of cases since Atlantis, resulting in
refinement and definition of the doctrine. 30 9 Federal courts do not see
stare decisis as having any significant impairment effect in cases where
the precedent would only have persuasive effect in a subsequent action
by the applicant for intervention.3 10 Lack of identity of legal issues be-
tween the action and the applicant's claim, and federal court actions
based on state law, where the applicant's action would be tried in state
court, are two principal areas where the stare decisis effect does not rise
to the level of practical impairment. 3 1 1
3. Inadequate Representation of an Intervenor's Interest
A footnote in a 1972 Supreme Court case set the standard for evalu-
ating whether the existing parties to an action adequately represent the
proposed intervenor's interests. In Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of
America, 3 12 the Court stated that an applicant need only show that the
representation of his interest by existing parties may be inadequate. 3t 3
The Court went on to say that the applicant's burden in showing inade-
quacy is minimal.
3 14
Prior to Trbovich, at least one court had put the burden of showing
adequate representation by existing parties on those parties opposing
intervention.3 15 Even after Trbovich, a few courts continued to indicate a
preference for saddling parties opposing intervention with the burden
of showing adequate representation. 16 In National Farm Lines v. ICC,3 1 7
the Tenth Circuit was encouraged by a petitioner for intervention to put
309. See Jet Traders, 89 F.R.D. at 569; CRI, Inc. v. Watson, 608 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir.
1979); Natural Resources, 578 F.2d at 1341; Florida Power Corp. v. Granlund, 78 F.R.D. 441
(M.D. Fla. 1978); Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 1977); New York Pub. Inter-
est Research Group, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of New.York, 516 F.2d 350 (2nd Cir.
1975); Martin v. Travelers Indem. Co. 450 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1971).
310. See Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 954 (1977);Jet Traders, 89 F.R.D. 560.
311. Jet Traders, 89 F.R.D. at 569.
312. 404 U.S. 528 (1972). The Secretary of Labor brought suit under § 482(b) of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1982), to
overturn the results of a United Mine Workers election. Trbovich had initiated the com-
plaint with the Secretary, which led to the suit. Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 529. The Court
pointed out that the Secretary's statutory duty included protecting both the rights of indi-
vidual union members and the public's interest in fair union elections. Intervention was
granted because the Court perceived the Secretary's dual protectorate role could conceiv-
ably result in a conflict. Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538-39.
313. Id. at 538 n.10.
314. Id.
315. Auesse, 385 F.2d at 702.
316. See Corp. v. Merchandise Mart of S.C., Inc., 61 F.R.D. 684 (D. S.C. 1974); Holmes
v. Government of Virgin Islands, 61 F.R.D. 3 (D. St. Croix 1973).
317. 564 F.2d 381 (10th Cir.1977). National Farm Lines sought to intervene in an
action brought by the National Motor Freight Traffic Association against the ICC, attack-
ing the constitutionality of ICC regulations on motor carriers. Id. at 382. In assessing the
adequacy of the ICC's representation of National Farm Lines (National Farm Lines
benefitted from the reduced competition brought about by the regulation), the Tenth Cir-
cuit emphasized the significance of business knowledge and experience possessed by pri-
vate concerns which a government agency would not have, and the conflict inherent in the




the adequacy of representation burden of proof on the opposing
party.3 '8 The court followed Trbovich, holding that the burden of show-
ing inadequate representation, though slight, was on the petitioner.
31 9
Perhaps the more significant effect of Trbovich is its characterization
of the intervening applicant's burden as minimal. The Tenth Circuit's
interpretation of minimal was defined in Natural Resources as finding in-
adequacy of representation unless "there is no way to say that there is
no possibility that . . . [the interests of the intervenor and the existing
parties] will not be different .... ',320 Having parties before the court in
order to bind them to the result as well as to protect prospective inter-
venors' rights, were relied upon in Natural Resources as favoring a near
presumption of inadequacy of representation.
32 1
D. Analysis
Since First Penn dropped its derivative claims against Peat Marwick,
the Tenth Circuit only addressed whether First Penn's direct claims enti-
tled it to intervene in the action between the FDIC and Peat Marwick.
3 22
The court narrowed its analysis to the interest and impairment require-
ments for intervention after a brief discussion of the FDIC's ability to
represent First Penn's interests in the direct claims.
3 2 3
In advancing its direct claims, First Penn would have had to prove
that, absent Peat Marwick's alleged negligence in preparing the audit, it
would not have entered into certain loan transactions with Penn
Square.3 24 On the other hand, the FDIC's case did not depend on First
Penn's injuries allegedly incurred in reliance on the audit. Because the
facts clearly indicated at least a partial lack of overlap in the FDIC's and
First Penn's claims, the finding of inadequacy of representation de-
pended on the facts and required no legal analysis.
Turning to the issue of interest in the action, in particular, how to
assess a prospective intervenor's interest, the court adopted the previ-
ous Tenth Circuit requirement that the interest asserted be a specific
legal or equitable one, but stated that the test of interest is determined
with reference to the purpose underlying the interest requirement.
3 25
This juxtaposition of propositions, that had been considered inconsis-
tent by the District of Columbia Circuit in Nuesse,3 26 indicates that the
Tenth Circuit's specific legal or equitable interest requirement does not
mean specific in the sense of reliably known at the time of intervention;
but rather it means specific in the sense of legally cognizable within the
318. Id. at 383.
319. Id.
320. Natural Resources, 578 F.2d at 1346.
321. Id.
322. Jennings, 816 F.2d at 1491.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 1490-91.
325. Id. at 1491. See supra text accompanying notes 282 and 289.
326. Neusse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (1967).
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context of the action in which intervention is requested.3 27
While the divergence of issues worked to First Penn's favor on the
adequacy of representation issue, too great a divergence would preclude
finding that First Penn had a sufficient interest in the litigation to justify
intervention. The court did note that First Penn's claim would interject
new issues into the action.3 2 8 In keeping with the recognized interrela-
tionship between interest and impairment, however, the Tenth Circuit
addressed impairment before determining how burdensome the intro-
duction of new issues would be; essentially implying that a finding of
serious impairment would justify a larger burden on the existing
litigation.
3 29
The divergence of issues worked to First Penn's detriment in the
impairment analysis. The court noted that stare decisis could be suffi-
cient to satisfy the impairment requirement; however, the difference in
First Penn's and the FDIC's theories of recovery minimized the stare
decisis effect. Furthermore, Oklahoma law controlled First Penn's
claims, again minimizing the precedential impact of a federal court
ruling.
3 3 0
After finding the impairment of First Penn's claims to be minor, the
Tenth Circuit adopted the district court's finding that the introduction
of new issues would burden the existing action substantially. Citing the
burden on the existing action, the lack of stare decisis impairment, and
the divergence of the issues, the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's
determination that First Penn was not entitled to intervene in the
action.
3 3 l
VI. SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION:
WILLIAMS V. LIFE SAVINGS AND LOAN
A. Facts
Plaintiff Pamela Williams, acting pro se, filed a Title VII employ-
ment discrimination action against her former employer in the Colorado
federal district court.3 3 2 Defendant was a Rockford, Illinois bank, over
which the court could not obtain personal jurisdiction. 333 The com-
plaint was filed on April 26, 1985 and dismissed sua sponte by the dis-
trict court on April 29, 1985, for lack of personal jurisdiction over Life
Savings.
3 3 4
327. See supra text accompanying notes 285-93. Cf. Allard v. Frizzell, 536 F.2d 1332
(10th Cir. 1976) (intervention denied to applicants whose interest in the action was an
interest held by the public generally which would not be impeded by the disposition of the
action).
328. See supra text accompanying note 306. See also Natural Resources, 578 F.2d at 1345.
329. Jennings, 816 F.2d at 1492. See also supra text accompanying note 306-07.
330. Jennings, 816 F.2d at 1492. See also FDIC v. Jennings, 107 F.R.D. 50, 55 (1985).
331. Jennings, 816 F.2d at 1493.





B. The Tenth Circuit's Holding
The Tenth Circuit noted that the complaint was dismissed before
the date on which the defendant was required to appear or file a respon-
sive pleading. 33 5 In a per curiam opinion, the court held that a district
court's power to inquire sua sponte into its jurisdiction over the parties
is not to be exercised until a point is reached in the proceedings where a
defaultjudgment could be entered.3 36 Because Life Savings was not in
default when the complaint was dismissed, the district court's dismissal
was reversed, and the case remanded.
33 7
C. Background
1. Sua sponte dismissal
In certain circumstances, the limited jurisdiction of the federal
courts and considerations of judicial economy and fairness permit sua
sponte dismissal by the court. A federal court must dismiss an action
over which it does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, regardless of
whether or not the issue is raised by the parties.33 8 A judgment ren-
dered by a court lacking jurisdiction over the subject matter of the ac-
tion is void,3 3 9 and therefore, legally ineffective.3 40 Because subject-
matter jurisdiction can never be conferred by waiver or consent,3 4 1 and
a judgment rendered in its absence has no legal effect, a court is bound
to inquire into its jurisdiction before rendering judgment.
3 4 2
Sua sponte dismissal for lack of prosecution is supported by the pol-
icy of judicial efficiency. In Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 3 4 3 the Supreme
Court upheld a district court's dismissal of a dilatory plaintiff's ac-
tion. 344 Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan recognized that a court's
authority to control its docket was inherent, and governed by the control
necessary to "achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of
335. Id. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a) provides that:
[a] defendant shall serve his answer within 20 days after the service of the sum-
mons and complaint upon him, except when service is made under Rule 4(e) and
a different time is prescribed in the order of court under the statute of the United
States or in the statute or rule of court of the state.
336. Williams, 802 F.2d at 1203. FED. R. Civ. P. 55(a) provides for the entry of a default
judgment "[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has
failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to
appear by affidavit or otherwise ......
337. Williams, 802 F.2d at 1203.
338. See Mansfield, C. & L. Mich. Ry. v. Swan, 11l U.S. 379, 382 (1884); Fiedler v.
Clark, 714 F.2d 77, 78-79 (9th Cir. 1983).
339. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1938); Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S.
(18 Wall.) 457, 465 (1873) (a court must have "jurisdiction of parties and cause" for its
judgment to be valid); Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Vaughn, 450 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1971).
340. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S.
433 (1940).
341. See Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 243 (1934).
342. See Mansfield, 11l U.S. at 382.
343. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
344. Id. at 633.
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cases." 34
5
With respect to sua sponte dismissal, defects in personal jurisdic-
tion differ from defects in subject-matter jurisdiction and action by a
plaintiff which merits dismissal. Waiver of personal jurisdiction by a
party may be made as expressly provided for in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, or otherwise, subject only to due process protections.
Waivers which are not dependent on the Federal Rules include volun-
tary appearance,3 4 6 and consent to subject oneself to the in personam
jurisdiction of a particular court by contact.
34 7
Under Rule 12(h)(1), 3 4 8 the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction
is waived if it is not raised in a pre-answer pleading or in the answer
itself. Thus, lack of personal jurisdiction is a personal defense, as is the
assertion of the statute of limitations to bar an action. 34 9 Because it is
incumbent upon a party to raise the issue of defective jurisdiction over
his person, the court is precluded from raising it on his behalf.3 5 0
A court's assertion of its lack of personal jurisdiction over a defend-
ant in order to dismiss a plaintiff's action is distinguishable from a
court's dismissal of an action for reasons which are within the plaintiff's
control. In the case of jurisdiction, a sua sponte dismissal requires the
court to assert another party's rights against the plaintiff, on behalf of
the party. In the case of dismissal for failure of prosecution, the court is
essentially asserting its own right to control its docket against the
plaintiff.
3 5 1
2. Lack of Personal Jurisdiction in a Default Judgment
Default judgments present a peculiar situation in which a court may,
sua sponte, inquire into its jurisdiction over the parties. In determining
whether to enter a default judgment, a court has discretion to consider
whether it would later have to set it aside on a motion by the defend-
ant.3 52 Under Rule 60(b),35 3 a court may relieve a party from a final
judgment in a number of situations, one being when the judgment is
345. Id. at 630-31. Justice Harlan characterized the power of a court to dismiss an
action for lack of prosecution as having ancient origins in both law and equity. Id.
346. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
347. See National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964); Petrowski
v. Hawkeye Security Ins. Co., 350 U.S. 495 (1956) (personal jurisdiction may be conferred
by consent of the parties).
348. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(l).
349. See Zelson v. Thomforde, 412 F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1969); Wagner v. Fawcett Publica-
tions, 307 F.2d 409, 412 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 909 (1963) (the statute of
limitations is a personal defense, which is waived if not raised by the defendant).
350. See Zelson, 412 F.2d at 56. Improper venue is also subject to waiver, and the court
is similarly unable to dismiss an action sua sponte for want of venue. See Concession Con-
sultants, Inc. v. Mirisch, 355 F.2d 369, 371 (2d Cir. 1966).
351. See supra text accompanying note 341.
352. See Henry v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 3 F.R.D. 142 (W.D. Va. 1942). A defend-
ant's attack on a default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction may be made collater-
ally in the court rendering the judgment, or in a court where the plaintiff attempts to
enforce the judgment. See Covington Industries, Inc. v. Resintex, A. G., 629 F.2d 730, 733-
34 (2d Cir. 1980).
353. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
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void. The relief under Rule 60(b) is discretionary in a number of situa-
tions; however, there is no discretion in granting relief from a void
judgment.
3 54
The certainty that a default judgment rendered by a court lacking
personal jurisdiction is void and will be vacated in a collateral attack,
3 55
provides ample justification for a court's sua sponte inquiry into its juris-
diction over the parties before entering a default judgment. 35 6 After
refusing to enter a default judgment, a court has the option of dis-
missing the action 35 7 or transferring the action to a district court where
it could have been brought.
3 58
D. Analysis
The law on dismissal of actions pursuant to a court's sua sponte
inquiry into its jurisdiction over the parties is well established in both
cases and policy. 35 9 The district court's dismissal of Williams's action
prior to the time of the defendant's default3 60 was clearly inconsistent
with the prevailing rule that a court not dismiss an action (other than an
action for a default judgment) for lack of personal jurisdiction on its own
motion. As might be expected from the well settled state of the law, the
Tenth Circuit spent few words on its reversal of the dismissal.
Any lasting significance that Williams might enjoy will be due to the
court's dicta approving the transfer of actions which have reached the
default judgment stage with defects in personal jurisdiction.3 6' By
transferring rather than dismissing default judgment actions, both judi-
cial economy and the interests of litigants are advanced. Judicial econ-
omy benefits because the action is transferred to a forum where it may
be pursued on its merits or dismissed with prejudice. Litigants benefit
for much the same reason. Defendants' interest in disposing of litiga-
tion expeditiously is furthered because the court to which the action is
transferred has the power to make a final disposition of the action.
Plaintiffs bringing actions with such blatant jurisdictional defects as
those in Williams are usually acting pro se.36 2 By transferring the action,
a court may further the naive plaintiff's ability to obtain an adjudication
of his claim on its merits. Alternatively, in the case of a pro se plaintiff
whose action is brought for reasons other than obtaining relief from a
354. See V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 224 n.8 (1979); Austin v. Smith, 312
F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Hicklin v. Edwards, 226 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1955).
355. See Covington Industries, 629 F.2d at 732.
356. See First Nat'l Bank of Louisville v. Bezema, 569 F. Supp. 818, 819 (S.D. Ind.
1983); Bross Utils. Serv. Corp. v. Aboubshait, 489 F. Supp. 1366, 1368 n.3 (D. Conn.
1980).
357. See, e.g., Bross Utilities, 489 F. Supp. at 1368.
358. See Bezema, 569 F. Supp. at 821.
359. See supra text accompanying notes 344-46.
360. See Williams, 802 F.2d at 1202.
361. Id. at 1203.
362. Prisoners are a common example of pro se plaintiffs. See Brandon v. District of
Columbia Bd. of Parole, 734 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Redwood v. Council of the Dist. of
Columbia, 679 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Lewis v. State, 547 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
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legally cognizable injury, transferring the action furthers the public pol-
icy of discouraging litigation for its own sake.
363
CONCLUSION
On the whole, the cases considered in this article serve to increase
the availability of the federal courts to plaintiffs. Superior Oil will enhance
a non-Indian's ability to utilize the federal courts in disputes with Indi-
ans when tribal remedies prove inadequate. The holding in Salehi grants
full access to the federal court system to aliens with legitimate com-
plaints about Immigration and Naturalization Service practices, particu-
larly those practices affecting their constitutional rights.3 6 4 Quinones
recognized and furthered the federal policy of resolving controversies in
one action by extending diversity jurisdiction in an area where signifi-
cant rights are not threatened by the expansion. Williams is perhaps the
clearest expression of the Tenth Circuit's desire to reduce the proce-
dural complexities and resulting inscrutability of the federal courts to
non-lawyers.
DeVargas andJennings do not run counter to the trends of simplifying
litigation and enhancing the accessibility of the federal courts. DeVargas
did deny the plaintiff access to the federal courts; however, he had al-
ready had his day in state court. Enforcing the policy of repose serves to
facilitate access to those whose complaints have yet to be heard. Jennings
denied a potential plaintiff access not to the courts in general, but to a
particular action. A major underpinning for the denial in Jennings was
the procedural complexity that would be introduced into the case upon
the plaintiff's intervention.
None of the Tenth Circuit's holdings in these cases are indicative of
a desire to throw open the federal court's doors to all plaintiffs. Rather,
the slight expansions of subject-matter and personal jurisdictional
bounds seem intended and should serve to ease some of the procedural




363. Transfer of an action to a forum where jurisdiction over the parties can be per-
fected may work a hardship on a plaintiff; however, this hardship is inherent in the require-
ments of due process, not in the transfer policy advocated by the Tenth Circuit. See
generally Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking Under theJudicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct
and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 283 (1982).
364. See generally Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1395-99 (1983).
365. For an interesting perspective on federal jurisdiction in general, see Kerameus, A




Five decisions rendered by the Tenth Circuit during the 1986-1987
survey period in the area of civil rights addressed a number of important
issues arising from the context of employment discrimination. In decid-
ing these rather diverse issues, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals gen-
erally relied on cautious, conservative interpretations of statutory,
regulatory, and case law resulting in largely predictable conclusions.
Sex discrimination was examined in two distinct contexts: "no-
spouse" rules under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 (Title VII)
and parental or marital status under Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 19722 (Title IX). The court affirmed a ruling of no discrimina-
tion based on sex under a company "no-spouse" rule in Thomas v.
Metroflight, Inc. 3 In so ruling, the court reviewed the efficacy of statistical
analysis of the disparate impact standard. The dismissal of a claim of
sex discrimination arising from a termination based in part on the em-
ployee's parental or marital status brought under Title IX was affirmed
under the principal of issue preclusion in Mabry v. State Board of Commu-
nity Colleges and Occupational Education.4 In addition, the court established
the application of Title VII substantive standards to Title IX employ-
ment discrimination claims.
Age discrimination was examined in the application of mitigation
principles to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 5 (ADEA) in Gi-
andonato v. Sybron Corporation.6 In that case, an employee's rejection of
reinstatement offers made by the employer was held to end the accrual
of back pay damages.
Freedom of speech under the first amendment was considered in
Wren v. Spurlock 7 in which the court, employing a classic balancing of
interests, affirmed a damages award to a public school teacher arising
from a violation of her first amendment rights. In another first amend-
ment case, the court reversed a damages award to a county employee in
Ewers v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Curry.8 Applying ba-
sic due process principles, the Ewers court also reversed damages based
on deprivation of a liberty interest in reputation.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
2. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982).
3. 814 F.2d 1506 (10th Cir. 1987); see infra notes 19-37 and accompanying text.
4. 813 F.2d 311 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 148 (1987); see infra notes 38-69
and accompanying text.
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
6. 804 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1986); see infra notes 70-98 and accompanying text.
7. 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1287 (1987); see infra notes
99-137 and accompanying text.
8. 802 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1986), reh'g granted in part, 813 F.2d 1583 (1987), cert.
denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3460 (1988); see infra notes 138-72 and accompanying text.




No-spouse rules are a common means by which employers seek to
avoid nepotism in their employment practices. Typically, no-spouse
rules prohibit hiring spouses of employees or retaining both spouses
after co-workers have married. Most no-spouse rules are facially neu-
tral, often allowing co-workers who marry to choose who will quit or
terminating the spouse with less seniority in the absence of a choice. 9
No-spouse rules exist throughout the employment spectrum, affecting
blue-collar, white-collar, and professional employees alike, as well as all
sizes of employers. Several reasons are given for the necessity of no-
spouse rules: (1) spousal problems are brought into the workplace;
(2) spousal morale is affected when one spouse is dissatisfied; (3) fair-
ness is questioned when one spouse supervises the other; (4) spouses
may be favored during lay-offs; (5) scheduling of shifts, vacations, and
leaves creates problems; (6) discipline of a spouse may create problems;
(7) tardiness and absenteeism may be compounded by spouses commut-
ing together and; (8) spouses may disregard the safety of others in emer-
gencies. 10 With the reasonable exception of supervisory situations,
commentators question the validity of these reasons in the face of dis-
crimination based on marriage which prevents the employment of quali-
fied workers.' I
Despite their facial neutrality, no-spouse rules frequently discrimi-
nate against women. 12 Challenges to no-spouse rules have generally
been brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964'3 (Title
VII), which prohibits discrimination based on sex in employment.
14
Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to consider no-
spouse rules, the circuit courts have encountered no-spouse rules in a
9. Wexler, Husbands and Wives: The Uneasy Care for Antinepotism Rules, 62 B.U.L. REV.
75 (1982); Comment, (Mrs.) Alice Doesn't Work Here Anymore: No-Spouse Rules and the American
Working Woman, 29 UCLA L. REv. 199 (1981).
10. Kovarsky and Hauck, The No-Spouse Rule, Title VII, and Arbitration, 32 LAB. L.J. 366,
368-69 (1981).
11. Bierman and Fisher, Antinepotism Rules Applied to Spouses: Business and Legal View-
points, 35 LAB. L.J. 634, 636 (1984); Kovarsky and Hauck, supra note 10, at 368.
12. Wexler, supra note 9, at 92; Comment, supra note 9, at 202; Kovarsky and Hauck,
supra note 10, at 369; see also Yuhas v. Libby-Owens Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496, 498 (7th Cir.
1977) ("substantial discriminatory impact" established when 71 of 74 applicants excluded
by no-spouse hire rule were women), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978); EEOC Dec. 75-239,
EEOC Dec. 1983 (CCH), Par. 6492, at 4260-61 (March 2, 1976) (discrimination estab-
lished where 65 of 66 women applicants were rejected because of no-spouse rule); World
Airways, 74-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) Par. 8655, at 5471 (1975) (in all cases where em-
ployer applied its no-spouse rule, except present case, the women had resigned).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex or national origin. ...
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handful of cases. In Harper v. Trans World Airlines,15 the Eighth Circuit
ruled that the plaintiff had insufficient proof to establish discrimination
under a no-spouse rule where four out of five applications of the rule
resulted in job losses to women. However, in Yuhas v. Libby-Owens Ford
Co.,' 6 the Seventh Circuit held that "substantial discriminatory impact"
was established where seventy-one out of seventy-four applicants ex-
cluded by a no-spouse rule were women.
Discrimination under Title VII can be proved by a showing of either
disparate treatment, where an employer intentionally treats employees
or applicants differently, or by a showing of disparate impact, where
facially neutral employment practices result in adverse effects. The
United States Supreme Court ruled in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 17 that a
showing of disparate impact alone was sufficient to establish a prima fa-
cie case of discrimination. Once the plaintiff has established a prima
facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show that the
employment regulation or practice in question is justified by business
necessity. 18
2. Disparate Impact: Thomas v. Metroflight, Inc.
In a case of first impression, the Tenth Circuit held in Thomas v.
Metroflight, Inc.,' 9 the plaintiff had provided insufficient evidence to es-
tablish prima facie sex discrimination under Metroflight's no-spouse
rule. The holding demonstrates the difficulty of proving the discrimina-
tory nature of no-spouse rules, particularly in small business settings.
Metroflight, Inc. is a small commercial airline with about 500 em-
ployees. Thomas was a secretary at Metroflight working twenty-five per-
cent in the flight operations department and seventy-five percent in the
maintenance department when she married a Metroflight pilot working
in flight operations. Metroflight's no-spouse rule prohibits spouses
from working in the same department and allows affected employees to
choose which spouse will quit. If no choice is made, Metroflight then
fires the spouse with less seniority. Neither Thomas nor her husband
quit, so Metroflight fired Thomas since she had less seniority. 20 Prior to
Thomas' firing, co-workers at Metroflight had married eight other times.
In seven instances, the no-spouse rule was not violated because the em-
ployees worked in different departments or the company accommodated
them by either allowing one to transfer departments or simply ignoring
enforcement. In the remaining instance, the female employee was
fired.
2 1
15. 525 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1975).
16. 562 F.2d 496, 498 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978).
17. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
18. International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n. 15
(1977).
19. 814 F.2d 1506 (10th Cir. 1987).
20. Id. at 1507-08.
21. Id.
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a. Analysis
Since the challenged practices or regulations characterizing most
no-spouse rules are facially neutral, disparate impact must be demon-
strated by statistics. 22 In the context of a large business or institution, a
no-spouse rule may be shown to be discriminatory simply by examining
the actual number of women versus men affected by application of the
rule.23 However, no-spouse rules may be infrequently applied by
smaller businesses, resulting in statistically insignificant numbers of em-
ployees affected. 24 This was precisely the circumstances under which
Thomas was brought. In such a situation, the plaintiff must rely on other
forms of statistical proof to establish a prima facie case. For instance,
the plaintiff can compare the number of employees affected to a larger
relevant population such as the analogous population of the surround-
ing metropolitan area.2 5 In Thomas, since the sample of two women
fired in two applications of the no-spouse rule was too small to be statis-
tically significant, the plaintiff employed a statistics expert to analyze po-
tential applications of the no-spouse rule to the entire employee
population of Metroflight.2 6 Despite the expert's testimony, the court
ruled that Thomas had only presented evidence sufficierit to prove that
salary or seniority were controlling factors in a couple's decision as to
who would quit, but that Thomas had not established that salary or sen-
iority were in fact the predominantly controlling factors.
2 7
In light of the United States Supreme Court decision in Dothard v.
Rawlinson2 8 and the Eighth Circuit's decision in Harper v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc.,29 it is unfortunate that the Tenth Circuit demanded a
higher standard than the simple existence of disparate impact. The
Supreme Court first applied the Griggs disparate impact analysis to sex
discrimination in Dothard,3 0 holding that the disparate impact of a
height/weight regulation on the general female population was suffi-
cient to show discriminatory impact. 3 1 Addressing a no-spouse rule, the
Harper court required that the plaintiff prove disparate income potentials
to establish disparate impact.32 The Thomas court, however, additionally
demanded that the plaintiff prove that salary or seniority actually con-
trolled the decisions of affected employees. The bottom line of a no-
22. See generally Wexler, supra note 9, at 98-110; Comment, supra note 9, at 217-24.
23. See Yuhas v. Libby-Owens Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496, 497 (7th Cir. 1977); EEOC
Dec. 75-239; EEOC Dec. 1983, at 4260.
24. See Harper v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409, 412 (8th Cir. 1975).
25. See Wexler, supra note 9, at 101-02; Comment, supra note 9, at 222-24.
26. 814 F.2d at 1510. Thomas established statistically that considering all possible
marriages between employees in the same departments, more women than men would
terminate on the basis of preserving the higher salary and seniority. Based on a universe
of 3687 possible marriages, women had lower salaries in 62.1% and less seniority in
52.4% of the possibilities.
27. Id. at 1510-11.
28. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
29. 525 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1975).
30. 433 U.S. at 328.




spouse rule is the criteria by which one spouse is terminated by the em-
ployer. In the instant case, the deciding factor was lower seniority.
Thomas made a successful showing that a significantly higher number of
women had lower seniority in the universe of possible interdepartmental
marriages, thus establishing potential disparate impact.3 3 That showing
should have been sufficient for a prima facie case of discrimination
under the standard of Griggs and Dothard.
b. Implications
The decision in Thomas is a clear example of the difficulty plaintiffs
will continue to encounter when trying to demonstrate the disparate im-
pact of no-spouse rules, particularly in small business settings. This is
unfortunate because no-spouse rules not only discriminate in their own
right against women, but also tend to perpetuate other forms of sexual
inequality as well. Where couples choose which spouse will terminate,
the choice will most often be the woman because men tend to have
higher seniority, higher salaries, and better advancement potential, all of
which would be considered significant factors.3 4 Also, many couples will
choose for the woman to terminate regardless of their relative status
because they prefer the husband to support the family. 35 Thus, by de-
nying women the chance to advance their employment status, no-spouse
rules tend to reinforce the stereotypical roles of women as unequal in
the working place.
The court claimed it affirmed on the issue "reluctantly because we
suspect ... that 'no-spouse' rules in practice often result in discrimina-
tion against women .... .. 36 This observation was perhaps a veiled
implication that a legislative solution would be a superior method of
dealing with no-spouse rules, particularly in view of the small business
context. An amendment to Title VII proscribing no-spouse rules by
prohibiting discrimination based on marital status is one viable solution
which would still allow employers to control supervisory circum-
stances. 3 7 However, until such legislation becomes reality, women dis-
criminated against under no-spouse rules will bear difficult burdens of




Title IX of the Education Amendments of 197238 (Title IX) was en-
33. 814 F.2d at 1510 n. 4. Although the court disputed "whether a statistically signifi-
cant disparate impact is in all cases legally significant," it conceded that a showing of
52.4% women having lower seniority was statistically significant under Hazelwood School
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n. 14 (1977).
34. Comment, supra note 9, at 224.
35. Id.
36. 814 F.2d at 1509.
37. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 9, at 237.
38. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982).
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acted for the purpose of eliminating discrimination on the basis of sex in
educational institutions receiving financial assistance from the federal
government.3 9 It was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
196440 (Title VI), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, and national origin in programs receiving federal fund-
ing. Both Title VI and Title IX are enforced through the ultimate sanc-
tion of funding termination. 4 1 Under Title IX, however, any agency
providing federal financial assistance to an educational institution is also
authorized to promulgate regulations designed to insure adherence to
Title IX's non-discrimination goals.4 2 Pursuant to Title IX's authoriza-
tion of such regulatory power, the Department of Education (ED) in
1975 issued regulations governing the operation of federally funded ed-
ucational institutions. 4 3 Included were regulations which specifically ad-
dressed employment discrimination, an area not expressly provided for
in the implementing legislation.
44
Six United States courts of appeals subsequently handed down con-
flicting decisions on the validity of the ED's Title IX employment regula-
tions.4 5 The Second Circuit alone ruled that the ED's regulations were
valid as promulgated and within the scope of Title IX in North Haven
Board of Education v. Hufstedler.46 In order to resolve the conflict among
the circuits, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
ruled that the ED does have authority to regulate employment and pro-
39. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982) provides in pertinent part: "No person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance ......
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1981); 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982).
42. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982).
43. The regulations were actually issued by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW). However, in 1979, the Department of Education (ED) assumed the func-
tions of HEW relating to Title IX. 20 U.S.C. § 344 1(a)(3) (1982).
44. Contra Title VI, which expressly excludes employment from its coverage. 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1982). For text of the regulations relevant to the instant
case, see infra note 56 and accompanying text.
45. Four of the federal courts of appeals ruled that employment regulation was not
within the scope of Title IX. See Seattle Univ. v. United States Dept. of Health, Educ. and
Welfare, 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1980) (gender discrimination in salaries paid to faculty
members in School of Nursing), vacated sub. nom., Bell v. Dougherty County School Sys.,
456 U.S. 986 (1982); Romeo Community Schools v. United States Dept. of Health, Educ.
and Welfare, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.) (school refuses to alter maternity leave policy to
conform to ED's regulations), cert. denied 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Junior College Dist. v.
Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.) (discrimination in salaries), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972
(1979); Islesboro School Committee v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (Ist Cir.) (pregnancy not
treated in same manner as other temporary disabilities by school's leave of absence pol-
icy), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). The Fifth Circuit ruled that although employment
could be regulated under Title IX, ED's regulations were invalid because they did not limit
the regulated employment to positions directly funded by federal monies. See Dougherty
County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980) (salary supplement paid to
industrial arts teachers, but not to home economics teachers), vacated sub. nom., Bell v.
Dougherty County School Sys., 456 U.S. 986 (1982).
46. 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub. nom., North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456
U.S. 512 (1982). Two Connecticut school systems challenged ED's regulatory authority in
North Haven. Alleged discrimination related to maternity leave policy, job assignments,
working conditions, and renewal of employment contracts.
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hibit discrimination based on sex by educational institutions receiving
federal funding under Title IX.
4 7
2. Interaction of Title IX and Title VII: Mabry v. State Board of
Community Colleges and Occupational Education
The Tenth Circuit held in Maby"8 that a claim of discrimination
based on sex was not actionable under Title IX where brought in addi-
tion to a claim under Title VII which was unsuccessful at the trial level. 4
9
The holding ultimately strengthens and clarifies Title IX's application to
employment.
50
The plaintiff, Patricia Mabry, was employed as a physical education
instructor and coach at Trinidad State Junior College (Trinidad) from
1974 to 1982. She was terminated from her position at Trinidad due to
a reduction in force necessitated by declining enrollment at the college.
Two other instructors in the department, both male and with greater
seniority than Mabry, were retained. The President of Trinidad,
Thomas Sullivan, conceded that one factor in his decision to terminate
Mabry was that the other two instructors were married and had fami-
lies.5 1 After exhausting all administrative remedies available to her, Ma-
bry brought suit under Title VII, Title IX, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Sullivan, the State Board of Community Colleges and Occupational Ed-
ucation, and its individual members. She sought damages, reinstate-
ment with back pay and benefits, attorney's fees, and costs. 5 2 On
defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, the district court dis-
missed the Title IX and § 1983 claims on the grounds that the areas in
which Mabry taught were not federally funded programs within the
meaning of Title IX, and that the sufficiency of remedies under Title IX
precluded suit under § 1983. 53 Subsequently, in deciding the Title VII
claim, the district court found that Mabry's termination was not based
on discriminatory consideration of her sex, regardless of any considera-
tion given to marital or familial status. Mabry chose to appeal only the
dismissal of the Title IX claim.
5 4
47. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982). For discussion of North
Haven, see Note, Title IXApplies to Employees, 5 CAMPBELL L. REV. 249 (1982); Comment, Title
IV as a Toolfor Eliminating Gender-based Employment Discrimination at Educational Institutions, 14
N.C. CENT. L.J. 215 (1983); Note, Title IX Proscribes Sex-based Employment Discrimination in
Federally Funded Education Programs, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 117 (1983); Comment, "Person"
in Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments Includes Employees of Federally Funded Programs-
HEWV Regulations to Enforce Title IX are Valid, 12 U. BALT. L. REV. 548 (1983); Comment, Title
IX and Employment Discrimination: North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 17 U. RIcH. L. REV.
589 (1983); Comment, Employment Included in Title IX, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 131 (1982).
48. 813 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1987).
49. Id. at 314.
50. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
51. 813 F.2d at 313.
52. Id.
53. Mabry v. State Bd. for Community Colleges and Occupational Educ., 597 F. Supp.
1235 (D. Colo. 1984).
54. 813 F.2d at 313.
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a. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the trial court, based
its decision on three primary factors: (1) that the discrimination claim
based on marital status was actionable under Title VII; (2) that the regu-
lation under Title IX prohibiting discrimination based on marital status
was overbroad; and (3) that the finding of no discrimination under Title
VII by the trial court precluded the litigation of the same issue under
Title IX. In her appeal on the dismissal of the Title IX claim, Mabry
argued that her allegation of discrimination based on marital, familial,
or wage earner status was not actionable under Title VII according to an
EEOC guideline which stated that such policies were relevant only
where discrimination was ultimately based on sex. 55 Mabry then relied
on the Title IX regulation relating to marital, familial, parental, or wage
earner status to support the viability of her discrimination claim under
Title IX. The regulation states:
(a) General. A recipient shall not apply any policy or take any
employment action:
(1) Concerning the potential marital, parental, or family
status of an employee or applicant for employment which treats
persons differently on the basis of sex;
(2) Which is based upon whether an employee or applicant
for employment is the head of a household or principal wage
earner in such employee's or applicant's family unit.
56
The court rejected her argument, reasoning that subsection (1) treats
discrimination based on marital, parental, or family status precisely the
same as Title VII because discrimination is ultimately based on sex.
Thus, if Mabry based her claim on subsection (1), the claim would nec-
essarily be actionable under Title VII. 5 7 If, however, Mabry based her
claim on subsection (2), it would at first appear that a distinct right of
action based solely on head of household or principal wage earner status
was available. The court foreclosed this argument, however, by holding
that Mabry's interpretation of subsection (2) was overbroad. 5 8
In reaching that decision, the court began with the principle that in
order for a regulation to be valid, it must be "reasonably related to the
enabling legislation. ' '5 9 The court then pointed out that Title IX pro-
hibited discrimination on the basis of sex, but that the regulation pro-
hibited conduct that did not necessarily result in sex discrimination.
55. Id. at 314. The guidelines referred to appears at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.4(a) (1986),
which states:
The Commission has determined that an employer's rule which forbids or re-
stricts the employment of married women and which is not applicable to married
men is a discrimination based on sex prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act. It does not seem to us relevant that the rule is not directed against all fe-
males, but only against married females, for so long as sex is a factor in the appli-
cation of the rule, such application involves a discrimination based on sex.
56. 34 C.F.R. § 106.57 (1986).
57. 813 F.2d at 315.
58. Id. at 315-16.




The court thus concluded that Mabry could not rely on her interpreta-
tion of subsection (2) because it imposed a standard broader than that of
the enabling statute.
60
According to the court, then, the only claim available to Mabry
under Title IX was that she was discriminated against on the basis of her
sex, a claim clearly actionable under Title VII. Since the district court
found no sex discrimination under the Title VII claim actually brought
by Mabry, she was therefore precluded from raising the identical issue
under Title IX by fundamental preclusion principles. 6 1 In order to
come to that conclusion, however, the court stated that the substantive
standards used to determine discrimination must be the same under
both Title VII and Title IX. 62 The question of applicable substantive
standards under Title IX has scarcely been discussed by the courts.
63
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that since Title IX's application to employ-
ment essentially duplicates the purpose of Title VII, and since a well-
developed body of case law exists concerning Title VII, the substantive
standards of Title VII logically apply to Title IX. 64 Thus, the court con-
cluded that "Title IX certainly sweeps no broader than Title VII.
' 6 5
Consequently, it held that Mabry was not entitled to an additional op-
portunity to prove discrimination under Title IX based on the identical
facts of her Title VII claim.
66
b. Implications
Discrimination claims brought under Title IX, particularly those in-
volving employment, represent a confusing and evolving area of civil
rights law. The Tenth Circuit's decision in Mabry provides both clarifi-
cation and orientation for Title IX claims. Germane to the impact of
Mabry is the court's adoption of Title VII substantive standards to Title
IX claims. 67 At first blush this development appears to thwart the appli-
cation of Title IX to employment discrimination claims; however, sex
discrimination is actually more easily established with the express adop-
tion of Title VII substantive standards. This is so because the plaintiff
need only show disparate impact to establish discrimination and need
60. Id. at 316.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Although under Title VII discrimination need only be proved by disparate impact,
see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text, the Seventh Circuit ruled in Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 648 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981), that dispa-
rate intent must be shown in a Title IX claim. However, the Supreme Court upheld a
showing of disparate impact under Title VI, on which Title IX is patterned, in Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). Additionally, EEOC regulations state
that agencies shall "consider Title VII case law . . .in determining whether a recipient of
Federal financial assistance has engaged in an unlawful employment practice." 28 C.F.R.
§ 42.604 (1986).
64. 813 F.2d at 317.
65. Id. at 318.
66. Id.
67. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
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not show disparate intent. 68 Once discrimination is successfully estab-
lished, Title IX's powerful sanction of funding termination may be in-
voked in addition to Title VII's equitable remedies. 69 Thus, by allowing
a plaintiff to employ the same substantive standards under both Title
VII and Title IX, the Mabry decision more effectively discourages em-
ployment discrimination based on sex in federally funded educational
institutions. Although the plaintiff in Mabry did not successfully estab-
lish sex discrimination, future plaintiffs will have a more clearly defined
task of how to do so and, ultimately, easier access to Title IX's powerful
remedies.
II. MITIGATION AND THE ADEA
A. Background
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act 70 (ADEA) was adopted
by Congress in 1967 for the purpose of eliminating discrimination by
employers on the basis of age. Passed only three years after Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 196471 (Title VII), the prohibitory provisions of
the ADEA parallel those of Title VII, and the primary goal of both acts is
to end discriminatory employment practices. 7 2 A major difference be-
tween the two acts, however, is the way in which the acts are enforced.
Whereas Title VII provides only for equitable "relief," 73 the ADEA pro-
vides for "such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of
this Chapter."' 74 Furthermore, the ADEA expressly incorporates the
remedies and procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 193875
68. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
70. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1982). In pertinent part, the legislation states:
(a) Employer practices. It shall be unlawful for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would de-
prive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this
chapter.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (1982).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). In pertinent part the legislation states:
The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the pow-
ers, remedies, and procedures provided in sections 211 (b), 216 (except for sub-
section (a) thereof), and 217 of this title, [sections 11 (b), 16 and 17 of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938] and subsection (c) of this section.
For general discussion of ADEA remedies, see Marion, Legal and Equitable Remedies Under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 45 MD. L. REV. 298 (1986); Nosier and Wing, Remedies
under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 62 DEN. U.L. REv. 469 (1985); Rich-
ards, Monetary Awardsfor Age Discrimination in Employment, 30 ARK. L. REV. 305 (1976); Com-
ment, Coming of Age: Unique and Independent Treatment of the ADEA, 7 Am. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
583 (1984); Note, Damage Remedies under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 43 BRooK-
LYN L. REV. 47 (1976); Comment, Age Discrimination: Monetary Damages Under the Federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 58 NEB. L. REV. 214 (1979); Comment, Damages in Age Dis-




Although the ADEA officially adopts the FLSA remedies, 76 many
courts have chosen to follow Title VII precedent due to the similarities
of the non-discrimination goals of the two acts. While this practice
causes considerable confusion in some areas, it is not illogical. Since the
FLSA primarily addresses problems related to unfair wage and hour
practices, its remedial procedures are at times poorly suited to discrimi-
natory practices. Mitigation of damages by the plaintiff is not addressed
by either the provisions of the ADEA or the incorporated provisions of
the FLSA. Title VII, however, explicitly states that back pay be set off by
amounts "earnable with reasonable diligence."'7 7 Therefore, the courts
have been forced to turn to Title VII precedent in considering mitiga-
tion issues.
78
The United States Supreme Court held in Ford Motor Co. v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission79 (EEOC) that, absent special circum-
stances, the rejection by the claimant of an employer's unconditional
offer of the job previously denied ends the accrual of back pay liability.
The Court reasoned that tolling back pay upon such a rejection was in
keeping with Title VII's primary goal of ending employment discrimina-
tion by encouraging employers to compromise with claimants by making
unconditional job offers.8 0 Since the ADEA's primary goal is likewise to
end discrimination through compromise wherever possible, Ford has
been the basis for a number of subsequent ADEA decisions. 8 1
B. Title VII Standard of Mitigation: Giandonato v. Sybron Corporation
Relying on Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, the Tenth Circuit held in Gi-
andonato v. Sybron Corp.8 2 that the plaintiff's rejection of reinstatement
offers made by the employer ended the accrual of back pay damages.
8 3
By so holding, the Tenth Circuit reinforced the ADEA's primary goal of
sion of the legislative history of ADEA remedies, see Note, Set-offs Against Back Pay Awards
Under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 79 MIcH. L. REV. 1113 (1981).
76. The Supreme Court confirmed the adoption of FLSA remedies by the ADEA in
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978), holding that the ADEA provided for a jury trial via
its express incorporation of FLSA remedies.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
78. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir.
1984); Dickerson v. DeLuxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1983); Cowan v.
Standard Brands, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 1576 (N.D. Al. S.D. 1983); Fiedler v. Indianhead
Truck Line, 670 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600 (10th Cir.
1980); Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977); see also
Note, Set-Offs Against Back Pay Awards Under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 79
MICH. L. REV. 1113 (1981).
79. 458 U.S. 219, 241 (1982).
80. Id. at 228. For criticism of Ford, see Note, Ford Motor Company v. EEOC: A Setback for
Victims of Discrimination, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 707 (1983).
81. See, e.g., Cowan v. Standard Brands, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 1576 (N.D. Al. S.D. 1983)
(employee's refusal of reinstatement offer ended accrual of back pay); Dickerson v.
DeLuxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1983) (employer's job offer did not
toll accrual of back pay where job not substantially equivalent to job originally sought).
82. 804 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1986).
83. Id. at 125.
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ending discrimination through compromise. As stated in Ford, "the vic-
tims ofjob discrimination want jobs, not lawsuits." '8 4 Thus damages are
a secondary remedy intended to compensate victims of discrimination
when employers are unwilling to eliminate discriminatory practices.
The plaintiff in Giandonato worked as a salesman for Sybron for over
fourteen years when, due to a slow period in the industry, Sybron of-
fered Giandonato his choice of early retirement or a three month proba-
tion. Giandonato resigned and filed suit under the ADEA complaining
he had been harassed and constructively fired by Sybron based on his
age.8 5 Following Giandonato's resignation, Sybron paid him severance
pay, commenced pension benefits, and extended his insurance coverage
in order to allow coverage for his terminally ill wife. After the filing of
the complaint, Sybron offered to reinstate Giandonato three times, ulti-
mately offering to reinstate him without loss of service time, without a
probationary period, under a different supervisor, and without Gi-
andonato's repayment of severance pay.8 6 Sybron argued that Gi-
andonato's rejection of their reinstatement offers forfeited his right to
back pay under the ruling of Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC. Giandonato ar-
gued, however, that he was entitled to reject the offers of reinstatement
due to special circumstances. The circumstances claimed by Gi-
andonato were that the offers contained uncertainties, his wife was ter-
minally ill, and his supervisor was unsatisfactory.8 7 After a jury verdict
awarded Giandonato $327,357.00 in damages, the Tenth Circuit of Ap-
peals reversed.
1. Analysis
In deciding Giandonato, the Tenth Circuit relied exclusively on Title
VII precedent, presumably due to the absence of mitigation provisions
in both the ADEA and the FLSA. Furthermore, the court characterized
Ford as a "mandate" requiring ADEA claimants to minimize damages by
accepting reinstatement offers that are "substantially equivalent" to the
previous job.8 8 It was undisputed that Sybron had made bona fide, un-
conditional reinstatement offers to Giandonato which were substantially
equivalent to his former job and that he had rejected them.
Under the Title VII standard, then, the ultimate issue resolved by
the court was whether Giandonato rightfully rejected Sybron's offers
based on special circumstances. The court relied on two ADEA cases in
holding that Giandonato's circumstances did not comply with the Title
VII standard and did not justify his refusal of Sybron's offers.8 9 In Fied-
ler v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc. ,90 the Eighth Circuit held that an em-
ployee was not entitled to reject a reinstatement offer because he wanted
84. 458 U.S. at 230.
85. 804 F.2d at 121.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 122.
88. Id. at 124.
89. Id.
90. 670 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1982).
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EEOC investigations to continue, was grieving over the death of his
wife, and did not want to give up a new job.9 1 Likewise, the South Da-
kota District Court held in Cowan v. Standard Brands, Inc.92 that an em-
ployee was not entitled to refuse an offer because he did not believe it
bona fide and his feelings were hurt.93 The Tenth Circuit further rea-
soned that since Sybron agreed at Giandonato's request to additional
conditions, the negative effect of Giandonato's refusal was "magni-
fied."' 94 Significantly, Sybron's offer included no loss of seniority, a con-
dition which the Supreme Court expressly excluded under Ford.
9 5
2. Implications
Giandonato demonstrates that the Tenth Circuit will apply Title VII
standards of mitigation in cases brought under the ADEA. Considering
the lack of guidance provided by either the ADEA itself or the FLSA
concerning mitigation of damages by plaintiffs, this is the logical course
to take; however, an explanation to that effect would have been helpful
in clarifying why application of Title VII is necessary in the face of the
ADEA's explicit adoption of the FLSA remedies. Although the court
correctly applied Title VII, the reliance on Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC may
prove to be a mixed blessing for victims of age discrimination in the
Tenth Circuit. The basic rationale of Ford is that Title VII's primary
goal of eliminating discrimination is best met by encouraging employers
to compromise by offering unconditional reinstatement or employment
as often as possible. Damages are considered a secondary remedy appli-
cable only when employers refuse to comply.9 6 An analogous applica-
tion to the ADEA would likewise further the goal of getting and keeping
people employed. However, the question is whether plaintiffs who must
rely on damages for relief will be fairly compensated under Ford's hold-
ing that seniority need not be included in a job offer. In situations
where a claimant has begun another job before the defendant employer
makes an offer of reinstatement not including retroactive seniority, the
claimant may be forced to choose between refusing the offer to retain
some measure of seniority at the new job thereby cutting off damages
from the defendant, and accepting the defendant's offer thereby sacrific-
ing seniority. 9 7 Particularly because claimants in ADEA cases are more
likely to have built up considerable seniority, such sacrifices could be
extreme. Finally, allowing employers to make reinstatement offers lack-
ing retroactive seniority could affect the deterrent aspect of the ADEA
91. Id. at 808-09.
92. 572 F. Supp 1576 (N.D. Al. 1983).
93. Id. at 1581.
94. 804 F.2d at 124-25. Sybron agreed to: fully reinstate Giandonato with no reduc-
tion in salary or loss of service; hire a new district manager; make no changes in Gi-
andonato's territory, accounts, or sales quotas except by written agreement; and require
no repayment of severance pay Giandonato had received.
95. 458 U.S. at 232.
96. Id. at 230.
97. See Note, supra note 80, at 726-27.
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because potential damages to employers are greatly reduced.98 Thus,
employers who chose to take a "wait and see" attitude would not be as
effectively discouraged from discriminating against employees on the
basis of age.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
A. Background
Public employees are guaranteed freedom of speech under the first
amendment of the United States Constitution9 9 and its application to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. 10 0 This guarantee was
not recognized by the Supreme Court until relatively recently, however.
Under the "right-privilege doctrine," the courts formerly considered
public employment a privilege that the government could withhold re-
gardless of first amendment rights. 10 ' In a series of cases beginning with
Pickering v. Board of Education 102 the United States Supreme Court has
defined the application of first amendment rights to public employ-
ees. ' 0 3 Under Pickering, an employee's exercise of the right to speak on
issues of public concern could not be the basis of dismissal. 10 4 The
Court also adopted the defamation standard established in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 10 5 holding that when an employee made statements
with knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard for their truth or
falsity, the adverse action would be upheld. 10 6 The most pervasive as-
pect of the Court's holding in Pickering, however, was the emphasis on a
98. Id. at 719.
99. The first amendment states in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
100. The fourteenth amendment states:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
101. SeeJustice Holme's discussion of the doctrine in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bed-
ford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892), and the rejection of the doctrine in Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). For general discussions of the right-privilege
doctrine, see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1611, 1741-44 (1984).
102. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). In Pickering, a public school teacher was dismissed after writ-
ing a letter to the editor of the local newspaper criticizing the allocation of school funds
and the concealment of information regarding tax revenues by the school board.
103. See Developments in the Law--Public Employment, supra note 101; Eagle, First Amend-
ment Protectionfor Teachers Who Criticize Academic Policy: Biting the Hand that Feeds You, 68 CHI.[-
]KENT L. REV. 229 (1984); Lieberwitz, Freedom of Speech in Public Sector Employment: The Decon-
stitutionalization of the Public Sector Workplace, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 597 (1986).
104. 391 U.S. at 574.
105. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
106. 391 U.S. at 574. For discussion of Pickering, see Recent Decisions, Constitutional
Law: Balancing Test Applied to Teacher's Criticism of School Board, 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 270




balancing of interests between the employee and the state. 0 7
The Supreme Court refined the requirements set forth in Pickering
in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle. 10 8 Since the
teacher in Mt. Healthy had a controversial record of prior behavior, the
Court sought to avoid placing the teacher in a better position simply by
virtue of his exercise of first amendment rights. Therefore, the Court
held that once the employee has established that the disputed speech
was both constitutionally protected and a motivating factor in the em-
ployer's action, the burden of proof then shifts to the employer to show
that the action would have been taken as a result of other factors regard-
less of the protected speech.' 0 9 Two years later, the Supreme Court
increased the first amendment protection afforded public employees in
Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District "10 by holding that private
as well as public communications between employee and employer are
protected. I I In so holding, however, the Court required that when pri-
vate speech is at issue, the time, place, and manner of its delivery are
relevant.' 12
Connick v. Myers113 represented a significant narrowing of first
amendment protection for public employees. In a frequently criticized
decision, the Supreme Court strictly construed the meaning of the "mat-
ters of public concern" standard announced in Pickering."14 The Court
held that a questionnaire about working conditions in the office distrib-
uted by a district attorney was not involved with matters of public con-
cern, but was an extension of an internal dispute not entitled to
protection under the first amendment. '5 The Court reasoned that the
issue of whether an employee's speech was a matter of public concern
should be determined as a matter of law by its "content, form and con-
107. 391 U.S. at 568. The Court stated, "[tlhe problem in any case is to arrive at a
balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
the public services it performs through its employees." The Court noted that the need for
confidentiality and the effectiveness of working relationships were two factors which could
be considered relative to the state interest. Id. at 570 n. 3.
108. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). In Mt. Healthy a teacher called a local radio station and di-
vulged information from an administrative memorandum concerning teacher dress and
appearance which was then broadcast as a news item. The teacher was subsequently repri-
manded and not recommended for rehiring.
109. Id. at 285-87. For discussion of Mt. Healthy, see Lane, The Effect of Mt. Healthy City
School District v. Doyle Upon Public Sector Labor Law: An Employer's Perspective, 10J.L. & EDUC.
509 (1981); Wolly, What Hath Mt. Healthy Wrought?, 41 OHIo ST. L. J. 385 (1980).
110. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
Il. Id. at 415-16.
112. Id. at 415 n. 4. For discussion on Givhan, see Comment, Private Expression is Subject
to Constitutional Protection, 30 MERCER L. REv. 1079 (1979); Comment, First Amendment
Rights-Public Employees May Speak a Little Evil, 3 W. NEw ENGL. L. REV. 289 (1980).
113. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
114. 391 U.S. at 568; see supra note 107.
115. 461 U.S. at 147, 149-50. Matters addressed by the questionnaire included: confi-
dence and trust in supervisors, office morale, need for a grievance committee, and pres-
sure to work in political campaigns. In a single exception to their holding, the Court
stated that the issue of pressure to work in political campaigns was a matter of public
concern, but declined to give the entire questionnaire constitutional protection solely on
that basis.
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text... as revealed by the whole record." 16 The Court then concluded
that, balanced against the state's interest in the efficient operation of the
district attorney's office, the plaintiff's "limited First Amendment inter-
est" did not require that her employer tolerate expressions which he
reasonably felt would disrupt office functions and working relation-
ships.' 17 Thus, Connick effectively shifted the balance of interests in
favor of public employers by demanding that the "matters of public con-
cern" standard be strictly construed.
Tenth Circuit decisions on first amendment issues have relied on
the landmark decisions of Pickering and Mt. Healthy, focusing primarily
on the Pickering balancing test. In Childers v. Independent School District No.
1 of Bryan County, 118 National Gay Task Force v. Board of Education of the City
of Oklahoma City, 119 and Saye v. St. Vrain Valley School District RE- 1J, 120 the
Tenth Circuit balanced the need to protect public employees' first
amendment rights against the disruptive effect of first amendment ex-
pressions on official functions. In addition, the Tenth Circuit consid-
ered Connick when establishing whether expressions were matters of
public concern in Saye 12 ' and Wilson v. City of Littleton.1
22
B. Balancing of Interests
1. Wren v. Spurlock
Chiefly following the balancing of interests standard set forth in
Pickering, the Tenth Circuit held in Wren v. Spurlock 123 that a public
school teacher's first amendment rights were violated by her principal
when he harassed her in retaliation for her statements to the Wyoming
116. Id. at 147-48.
117. Id. at 154.
118. 676 F.2d 1338 (10th Cir. 1982). Childers involved the claim of a teacher that the
School Board had reassigned him in retaliation for his support of a candidate for the
Board and his activity involving union organization. The court stated in dictum that al-
tered employment conditions could be considered an unconstitutional infringement of
protected first amendment activity. Id. at 1342.
119. 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984). National Gay Task Force involved the challenge of
certain Oklahoma statutes proscribing homosexual activity and advocacy by public school
teachers. The court held that Okla. Stat. tit. 70, § 6-103.25 prohibiting the advocacy, en-
couragement, or promotion of homosexual activity was unconstitutionally overbroad. Id.
at 1274.
120. 785 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1986). Saye involved the claim of a teacher that the school
district had not renewed her teaching contract in retaliation for her criticism of the alloca-
tion of teacher aide time and her activities as a union representative. The court held that
the criticism was "tangential to a matter of public concern" and sufficiently disruptive to
foreclose first amendment protection. Id. at 866. The court held further that the plain-
tiff's union activities were entitled to protection and that a question of fact had been raised
as to whether the union activities were a motivating factor in her non-renewal. Id. at 867.
121. Id. at 866.
122. 732 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1984). Wilson involved the claim of a policeman that his
termination for refusal to obey an order to remove a black shroud on his badge was an
unconstitutional infringement of his first amendment rights. The court held that the wear-
ing of the shroud to express grief and solidarity over the death of a police officer from
another town was an expression of a "personal feeling of grief" which was not a matter of
public concern. Furthermore, the court stated that unless the expression is a matter of
public concern, the Pickering balancing test is not reached. Id. at 769.
123. 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1986).
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Education Association. The decision demonstrates the ability of this
Tenth Circuit panel of Judges McKay, McWilliams and Logan, to apply
accurately and fairly the precedents of the major Supreme Court cases in
this area to date: Pickering, Mt. Healthy and Connick.
The plaintiff, Lois Wren, taught for several years at the only public
school in Baggs, Wyoming, where the defendant, Nyles Spurlock, was
the principal. Although their professional relationship over the years
was at best strained, it deteriorated significantly in April of 1980 when
Wren and nine other teachers requested in a letter containing some
thirty-five separate issues that the Wyoming Education Association
(WEA) investigate Spurlock.1 2 4 Following the district teachers' associa-
tion's endorsement of the request for investigation, Wren was sus-
pended with pay for a half day, and following the WEA investigation of
Spurlock, which resulted in a reprimand, Spurlock recommended that
Wren's contract not be renewed. The school board rejected Spurlock's
recommendation and granted Wren's request for a leave of absence
without pay on the advice of her psychiatrist. Subsequently, the school
board denied an extension of the leave, but never formally acted on
Wren's status even though she did not return to teach. 12 5 Wren then
brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983126 against Spurlock,
the school district, and the superintendent alleging they retaliated
against her for her exercise of first amendment rights. The school dis-
trict and the superintendent settled with Wren for $125,000 and were
dismissed from the action, and a jury awarded Wren $113,000 compen-
satory and $7,500 punitive damages against Spurlock.1 2 7 The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
a. Analysis
In affirming the district court decision, the Tenth Circuit faithfully
followed both its own precedent' 2 8 and that of the Supreme Court. The
court expressed its standard as a basic two-step process derived from
Mt. Healthy and Pickering under which the plaintiff must show (1) the
speech was protected under the first amendment, and (2) the speech was
a motivating factor in the employer's negative action. 129 Under the first
step, which the court emphasized must be decided as a matter of law, '
30
protection under the first amendment applies only if the speech is a mat-
124. Id. at 1316.
125. Id.
126. The statute states in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State .... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
127. 798 F.2d at 1315-16.
128. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
129. 798 F.2d at 1317.
130. Id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. at 148 n. 7, 150 n. 10). The Supreme Court
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ter of public concern and if the constitutional right outweighs the em-
ployer's right to control official functions. 13 ' The court reasoned that
under Connick the contents of the teachers' letter to the WEA were mat-
ters of public concern due to the small size of the town and the relative
importance of the public school. 13 2 The court then applied the basic
balancing test of Pickering and reasoned that since school officials were
apparently satisfied with Wren's teaching performance, her statements
did not sufficiently disrupt official functions to preclude their protection
under the first amendment. 133 Although this issue erroneously went to
the jury at the trial level, the court of appeals ruled no reversible error
had occurred because they agreed with the outcome as decided by the
jury. 1
34
Having established that Wren's statements were constitutionally
protected, the court went on to examine whether the speech was a moti-
vating factor in Wren's adverse treatment. The court stated that Wren
presented sufficient evidence on the issue for the jury to reasonably con-
clude that her first amendment activity was at least a substantial motivat-
ing factor in Spurlock's actions.' 3 5 Unlike the first step, the court
pointed out that the motivation issue was properly one of fact for the
jury. 13 6 The remaining issue under Mt. Healthy of whether the employer
would have reached the same result due to factors other than the pro-
tected speech' 37 was not litigated in this case presumably because the
defendants disagreed over Wren's quality of teaching performance.
b. Implications
The decision in Wren v. Spurlock indicates that the Tenth Circuit is
capable of applying the Connick limitations to "matters of public con-
cern" without emasculating the first amendment rights of public em-
ployees. Particularly in situations where views of public employment
may still conjure up remnants of the "right-privilege" doctrine and first
amendment rights may consequently receive less than full consideration,
a cautious interpretation of Connick is critical to their survival. Thus, to
assure the future relative security of first amendment rights for public
employees in the Tenth Circuit, the court should continue to pursue the
prudent, well-crafted reasoning of Wren v. Spurlock.
stated explicitly that both elements of the first step should be decided as a matter of law
and that the second step should be decided as a matter of fact.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1317-18. The issues presented in the WEA letter included complaints of
high teacher turnover and sexual harassment of students and teachers. Furthermore, the
letter was signed by a majority of the school's teachers.
133. Id. at 1318.
134. Id.
135. The facts pointed to several connections between Wren's conduct and Spurlock's
actions. Wren was suspended the day after the district association endorsed the. WEA
investigation; she was recommended for non-renewal approximately two months after
Spurlock's reprimand; and she was more frequently remanded by Spurlock after the WEA
letter.
136. See supra note 130.
137. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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2. Ewers v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Curry
a. Summary
Since the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed both a first
amendment issue and a deprivation of liberty issue in Ewers v. Board of
County Commissioners of the County of Curry, 13 8 the facts of the case will be
presented first. The plaintiff, Walter Ewers, was employed from 1977 to
1981 by Curry County, New Mexico, as road superintendent to super-
vise road maintenance and advise the Commission on related matters.
Two members of the three member Board of County Commissioners,
Gattis and Merrill, were elected in November of 1980 after campaigning
for increased efficiency of county government, improved roads, and the
elimination of the road superintendent position. Consequently, after
Gattis and Merrill assumed office on January 1, 1981, the Board de-
clined to rehire Ewers and subsequently eliminated the position of road
superintendent, effective March 1, 1981.139 At the following meeting of
February 2, 1981, the Board told Ewers that it was concerned with the
amount of time taken to complete certain "co-op" projects with the
State Highway Department, and agreed to meet with officials from the
State Department at its next meeting to discuss the issue. Thereafter, at
the February 10, 1981 meeting, Merrill stated that "someone was 'drag-
ging out' the co-op projects and 'padding the books.' ,,140 Ewers re-
plied that the statement was false, and a State Highway Department
employee stated that "he did not believe that anyone had been
dishonest."'
14 1
Following his termination as road superintendent, Ewers was un-
successful at finding employment after considerable effort. He acknowl-
edged that poor health, a limited education, and age were contributing
factors in his inability to find a job. 1 42 Ewers subsequently brought an
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983143 against the Board of County Commis-
sioners, and Gattis and Merrill individually, alleging that he was termi-
nated in retaliation for his exercise of speech under the first
amendment, that he had been deprived of equal protection by a conspir-
acy of the Board, that he had been deprived of a liberty interest in his
reputation by the Board, and that he had been deprived of a property
interest without due process by the Board. 144 Only the first amendment
and liberty interest issues went to trial; Ewers was awarded general dam-
ages of $160,000 by the jury and attorneys' fees of $39,500 by the court.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the general verdict and judgment
138. 802 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1986).
139. Id. at 1244. The Board refused to rehire Ewers at theJanuary 5, 1981 meeting
and abolished the road superintendent position at the January 19, 1981 meeting. County
employees could only be terminated for good cause or due to the elimination of a position.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1245.
142. Id.
143. See supra note 126.
144. 802 F.2d at 1245. The defendants were granted summary judgment by the trial
court on the claims of conspiracy and deprivation of a property interest.
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of the jury as well as the court order for attorneys' fees. 14 5
b. The First Amendment Claim
i. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit held that the first amendment instruction submit-
ted to the jury by the trial court was overbroad in that it did not specifi-
cally identify the speech at issue. Thus, the court concluded that the
jury had insufficient facts for a damage award based on the first amend-
ment. 1 4 6 The court reasoned that in order for the jury to determine
whether the protected speech was a motivating factor in Ewer's termina-
tion as required by Mt. Healthy 147 the jury must have precise knowledge
of the nature of the protected speech. 148 The court based this conclu-
sion on the appropriate jury instruction, but pointed out that the rele-
vant evidentiary materials were not considered because they were not
included in the record on appeal. 14 9 Thus, the court concluded that
there was insufficient evidence for an award of damages based solely on
the instruction, not on the record as a whole which would indicate the
complete basis for the jury's decision.
An error in jury instructions distinct from the question of over-
breadth was not addressed by the Tenth Circuit. Under Connick, the is-
sue of whether the plaintiff's interest in protected speech outweighs the
employer's interest in efficiency of operation is to be decided as a matter
of law by the court, not as a matter of fact by the jury.' 50 In the instant
case, the court failed to point out that the trial court erroneously submit-
ted that element to the jury. 15 1 Although the trial court's error was a
possible basis for reversal at the appellate level, the Tenth Circuit's fail-
ure to address the error resulted in an inconsistent application of first
amendment precedent.
ii. Implications
The opinion in Ewers demonstrates that adjudication of first amend-
ment rights is a vastly inconsistent area in the Tenth Circuit. Whereas
the panel deciding Wren v. Spurlock 152 gave careful, step-by-step consid-
eration to applicable precedent in reaching a well-reasoned decision, the
panel in Ewers 153 gave cursory, inaccurate consideration to precedent
145. Id. at 1245, 1250.
146. Id. at 1247.
147. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
148. 802 F.2d at 1246.
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
151. 802 F.2d at 1246. Jury instruction number three read: "[the Plaintiff must estab-
lish] . . . [t]hat Plaintiff's interest in commenting upon matters of public concern out-
weighed the Defendants' interest in restricting Plaintiff's expression of his views because
such expression hampered or obstructed the efficient operation of the Road Department."
Id.
152. 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1986). The panel consisted of McKay, McWilliams, and
Logan, Circuit Judges.
153. 802 F.2d 1242. The panel consisted of Holloway, Chief Judge, Barrett, Circuit
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and the record in reaching a decision which is at best questionable as to
its fairness. Remand would have been a far more thoughtful and equita-
ble solution to the poor record and improper instructions which were
the basis of the trial court's decision. The public employees residing
and working in the Tenth Circuit deserve as much.
c. Liberty Interest
i. Analysis
The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the
jury verdict awarding damages for the deprivation of a liberty interest in
reputation and accordingly reversed the trial court's denial of a directed
verdict. In reaching this decision, the court followed the two-part stan-
dard of McGhee v. Draper 154 to determine what constitutes deprivation of
a liberty interest. First, the complained of action must have stigmatized
or otherwise damaged the plaintiff's reputation, and second, such dam-
age must have been involved with a tangible interest such as employ-
ment.155 Once reputational damage associated with employment has
been established, the plaintiff must be afforded a hearing to clear his
name. 1 56 Under McGhee, the constitutional sufficiency of such a hearing
is to be determined by the court as a matter of law. 1 57 Once again, the
Ewers court failed to point out that the trial court erroneously submitted
this issue to the jury.
1 58
The court of appeals then analyzed the liberty issue in terms of the
five-part jury instruction given by the trial court. 1 59 No precise author-
ity for the jury instruction was stated although in a general sense the
elements could be extrapolated from McGhee. After determining that
Ewers had satisfied the first two elements of the jury instruction, the
court stated that he had failed to prove, under the third element, a con-
nection between the Board's accusations and the elimination of the posi-
tion, because the accusations came after the official elimination of the
job.160 Contrary to the court's holding, time sequence of such a connec-
judge, and Sam, United States District judge for the District of Utah, sitting by
designation.
154. 639 F.2d at 639, 643 (10th Cir. 1981).
155. 802 F.2d at 1247.
156. See Curry, Name Clearing Hearings: Two Wrongs Make a Right, 14 URB. LAW. 303
(1982); Price, Name-Clearing Hearings: Public Interest Versus Personal Liberty, 16 COLO. LAW.
253 (1987); Toman, Practical Considerations for Liberty Interest Hearings in Public Employee Dis-
missals, 14 URB. LAw. 325 (1982).
157. 639 F.2d at 643.
158. 802 F.2d at 1248. See also supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
159. 802 F.2d at 1248. The instruction read:
Ewers . . . must prove . . . that: (1) defendants falsely accused him of padding
time records and dragging out cooperative road projects; (2) the accusations were
made in public; (3) the accusations were made in connection with the abolition of
his job; (4) the accusations stigmatized him and effected [sic] his future employ-
ment opportunities; and, (5) the defendants deprived him of an opportunity for a
hearing at which he could defend against the stigma which added injury to his
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tion is irrelevant, and the jury had sufficient facts to believe such a con-
nection existed. '
6 1
Under the fourth element, the court ruled that Ewers had not
proved that the statements stigmatized him and affected his ability to
obtain employment. For the concept of stigmatization, the court relied
on Asbill v. Housing Authority of Choctaw Nation 162 stating that in order for
statements to be stigmatizing, "they must rise to such a serious level as
to place the employee's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity at
stake."' 63 The court then conceded that the Board's false accusations
that Ewers had been "padding the books" and "dragging out" coopera-
tive projects were stigmatizing under the Asbill standard, but held that
the statements did not have the "general effect of curtailing" his em-
ployment opportunities under the trial court's instruction. 164 It is diffi-
cult indeed to understand how such clearly damaging and stigmatizing
statements could fail to have, at the very least, a "curtailing" effect on
future employment in a predominantly rural area where job opportuni-
ties tend to be scarce in the first place.' 6 5 Furthermore, there is no re-
quirement under Asbill or McGhee that stigmatizing statements be the
exclusive factor affecting employment opportunities; the McGhee court,
relying on the Board of Regents v. Roth, 16 6 stated that a liberty interest had
been violated where employment opportunities were "diminished."'
67
Thus, the Tenth Circuit failed to properly consider the effect of state-
ments it agreed were stigmatizing on the plaintiff's employment
opportunities.
Finally, the court concluded that Ewers had not proved that he was
denied an opportunity for a hearing to clear his name. 168 Although the
court reasoned that Ewers had sufficient notice of the accusations and an
adequate opportunity to respond to them, this failed to meet the stan-
dards set under the precedent of McGhee. The McGhee court affirmed as
law of the case an earlier court of appeals decision holding that the
plaintiff had not been given a sufficient opportunity for a hearing to
clear her name. 169 Under McGhee I the necessary due process factors for
a name-clearing hearing include reasonable notice of the substance of
the charges, opportunity to confront and cross-examine the accusers,
and indication of the proof relied on by the accusers.170 Although Ew-
ers had an opportunity to confront and cross-examine his accusers at the
Board meeting of February 10, 1981, there was no adequate notice of
161. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
162. 726 F.2d 1499 (10th Cir. 1984).
163. 802 F.2d at 1249 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972)).
The case actually quoted language from Asbill v. Housing Authority of Choctaw Nation,
726 F.2d 1499, 1503 (10th Cir. 1984).
164. 802 F.2d at 1249.
165. Curry County is located in eastern New Mexico, on the Texas border. Its county
seat is Clovis, population 31,000.
166. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
167. 639 F.2d at 643.
168. 802 F.2d at 1249.
169. 639 F.2d at 643, aff'd in part, 564 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1977).
170. 564 F.2d at 911-12.
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the substance of the charges because the accusations of "padding the
books" and "dragging out" the cooperative projects were made at the
same meeting. Thus, Ewers had no opportunity to prepare a response
or consult counsel regarding the statements.1 7 1 Additionally, there is
no indication that any evidence was offered by the Board supporting its
charges. Thus, the Board's meeting of February 10, 1981, failed to meet
the due process requirements of reasonable notice and indication of
proof. Furthermore, the sufficiency of the February 10th meeting as a
name-clearing hearing should have been decided as a matter of law by
the trial court.
ii. Implications
The Tenth Circuit's conclusion that there was no violation of a lib-
erty interest in reputation was based on an inaccurate application of the
Tenth Circuit precedent of Asbill and McGhee. The court effectively ig-
nored the facts of the case and affirmed the dismissal of an employee
which occurred under circumstances smacking of personal or political
vendetta.172 The decision amounts to a deplorable abuse of the very
due process liberty rights of which public employees in the plaintiff's
position are so desperately in need.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed a variety of
civil rights issues during the survey period. The task of applying and
reconciling the myriad federal civil rights statutes is often complex due
to their interdependence and overlap. The affirmation of no discrimina-
tion in Thomas set a precedent in the Tenth Circuit concerning no-
spouse rules, but the court left the door open for further challenge. The
effectiveness of Title IX employment claims was potentially strength-
ened by the Mabry court's decision to allow the application of Title VII
substantive standards to such claims. No other court of appeals to date
has so clearly endorsed that approach, and the decision represents the
Tenth Circuit's boldest effort of the survey period.
On the other hand, the court held a predictable and conservative
171. No further Board meetings are reported to have addressed the matters relevant to
the instant case. Although the plaintiff did not request further hearings, the court stated
that "[n]one were necessary under these facts." 802 F.2d at 1249. In McGhee I, the plaintiff
was similarly aware of rumors against her, but had no notice of specific allegations prior to
the hearing in front of the school board where the accusations were made. The court
stated that [a] hearing where the plaintiff was faced with such a blast of complaints, and
not knowing which incidents she needed to discuss, did not satisfy due process." 564 F.2d
at 911.
172. In addition to the fact that Commissioner Merrill stated in her campaign that the
county did not need a road superintendent, Commissioner Stockton informed Ewers that
he thought Merrill did not like Ewers. 802 F.2d at 1244. Furthermore, the duties of the
road superintendent were included in the newly created job of county manager, which
required a college degree, and in the jobs of the district crew foremen. Id. at 1245. Thus,
it is questionable whether abolishing the position of road superintendent actually saved
the county money.
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course in examining the role of mitigation in ADEA claims in Giandonato
by closely following the Supreme Court's ruling in Ford Motor Co. v.
EEOC. Although the opinion followed precedent logically, it also
demonstrated the Tenth Circuit's unwillingness to question or limit the
holding in Ford.
The Ewers court turned out a disappointing decision in its reversal
of both a deprivation of a liberty interest in a reputation claim and a first
amendment claim by basing its poorly crafted decision on the inaccurate
application of important principles of case law. In contrast, the court in
Wren produced a conservative but careful and protective application of
precedent to a first amendment issue. As a result, first amendment
claimants are justified in approaching the Tenth Circuit with extreme
prudence.
Martha Cox
COMMERCIAL AND CORPORATE LAW
The increasing number of corporations having debt problems is
clearly evident in the cases decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals during this survey period. Among the commercial and corporate
law cases before the court, three were in the area of secured transactions
under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). In re Tri-State
Equipment, Inc. I and United States v. Collingwood Grain, Inc. ,2 addressed the
effect of unclear or incomplete descriptions of collateral in the financing
statement. In Maxl Sales Co. v. Critiques, Inc. ,3 the court applied the provi-
sions of Article 9 concerning perfection in proceeds in the event of in-
solvency proceedings.
In the area of banking, the case of In re Continental Resources Corp.
4
highlighted the impact on a participating bank's security interest under a
loan participation agreement when the third-party debtor goes bank-
rupt. In Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Palermo,5 the court decided the
validity of a fraud counterclaim in a suit to recover on a promissory note,
where a loan officer misrepresented the loan value of an interest in real
property.
Outside of the debtor-creditor field entirely is McKinney v. Gannett
Co. ,6 in which the court resolved the issue of a parent company's liability
for breaching a subsidiary-employee contract.
I. SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 9
In recent years, Article 9 has been a heavily litigated portion of the
UCC. For the Tenth Circuit this past year was no exception. The Tenth
Circuit cases reflect that creditors continue to be plagued by their own
errors. Carelessly prepared financing statements are a particular
problem.
A. Description of Collateral in the Financing Statement
1. Background
Filing a financing statement is the most common method of perfect-
ing a security interest in personal property. While perfection is not a
status that is relevant with respect to the creditor's rights as against the
debtor, a secured creditor generally must be perfected to have priority
against third-party claimants. 7 Perfection results only when the creditor
1. 792 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1986).
2. 792 F.2d 972 (10th Cir. 1986).
3. 796 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 1986).
4. 799 F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1986).
5. 815 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1987).
6. 817 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1987).
7. T. CRANDALL, R. HAGEDORN & F. SMITH, JR., DEBTOR - CREDITOR LAW MANUAL
7.06(1] (1985).
DENVER UNIVERSITY L W REVIEW
can show: (1) the security interest is attached, and (2) a permissible "ap-
plicable step" has been taken. 8 The applicable step usually takes the
form of filing a financing statement.9
Whether a description of collateral in a financing statement is suffi-
cient for purposes of perfection is determined primarily by applying
UCC section 9-402(1)l and section 9-110.11 In interpreting these sec-
tions, most courts have focused on Official Comment 2 to section 9-402.
This comment makes clear that the filing system of the UCC is a notice
filing system, where the financing statement indicates merely that the
secured party may have a security interest in the collateral described.
The presumption is that prospective creditors will have to make further
inquiry to discover the complete state of affairs regarding the debtor's
property. As a result, courts generally approve the creditor's use of the
appropriate generic term used by the UCC drafters to classify collateral,
although creditors run into trouble when the description is too gen-
eral.' 2 Other problems may arise when a description is incorrect 13 or
ambiguous.
2. Description Need Only Provide Enough Notice of a Security
Interest to Lead Later Creditors to Make Further
Inquiry: In re Tr-State Equipment, Inc.
a. Case in Context
Tri-State Equipment 14 deals with the problem of an ambiguous de-
8. Id. Concerning attachment, U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (1978) provides: "[A] security in-
terest is not enforceable.., and does not attach unless: (a) the collateral is in the posses-
sion of the secured party pursuant to agreement, or the debtor has signed a security
agreement ... (b) value has been given; and (c) the debtor has rights in the collateral." (em-
phasis added). Without an enforceable, attached security interest, a creditor has no Article
9 rights.
9. Depending on the type of collateral involved, possession of the collateral or "au-
tomatic perfection" may constitute the applicable step. See U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (1978).
10. U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1978) provides in part:
A financing statement is sufficient if it gives the names of the debtor and the
secured party, is signed by the debtor, gives an address of the secured party from
which information concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a mail-
ing address of the debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the
items, of collateral.
(emphasis added).
I1. U.C.C. § 9-110 (1978) provides: "any description of personal property or real es-
tate is sufficient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is described."
(emphasis added).
12. See B. CLARK, THE LAw OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 2.9[5][c] (1980). Compare In re Fuqua, 461 F.2d 1186, 1188 (10th Cir. 1972)
("all personal property" too broad) with Leasing Serv. Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 252, 263 (D.N.J. 1976) ("any and all property,
wherever located" was sufficient); see also In re Mitchell Bros. Constr., 52 Bankr. 92, 93
(W.D. Wis. 1985) ("all business assets" not too broad). There are nine generic types of
collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-105 (1978) (chattel paper, documents, and instruments); id. § 9-
106 (accounts, and general intangibles); id. § 9-109 (consumer goods, equipment, farm
products, and inventory).
13. An erroneous description in the financing statement will prevent the security in-
terest from being perfected unless the error is "not seriously misleading." U.C.C. § 9-
402(8) (1978).
14. 792 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying Colorado law).
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scription of collateral. The Tenth Circuit held that a description of in-
ventory was sufficient even though there were three possible different
interpretations of what was covered. 15 The court concluded that leni-
ency was appropriate in light of Article 9's notice filing system. The
important principle established by the case is that ambiguities in a fi-
nancing statement are to be construed in favor of the secured party.'
6
b. Statement of the Case
Two secured creditors each claimed priority in a bankrupt farm
equipment dealer's inventory of used farm implements. The creditor
who filed first described the collateral as: "The debtor's inventory of
new and used Farm Equipment . . . and proceeds therefrom manufac-
tured by or offered for sale by Allis-Chalmers Corporation now owned
or hereafter acquired .... ,,17
In the bankruptcy court, this description was found to be sufficient
to perfect a security interest only in trade-ins the creditor had manufac-
tured. The bankruptcy judge held that the financing statement did not
sufficiently describe used equipment not manufactured or sold by the
creditor so as to provide inquiry notice to third parties of a possible
security interest in the equipment.' 8 The district court affirmed the
decision. 19
c. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower courts by holding
that the earlier financing statement gave legally sufficient notice of a se-
curity interest in all trade-ins, not just those manufactured by the
creditor.
2 0
The court framed the issue to be whether the description was suffi-
cient to put hypothetical later creditors on notice of a possible security
interest in all used farm implements traded in to the debtor.2 ' In resolv-
ing this type of issue, most courts are faithful to the broad notice filing
concept.2 2 Some courts have relied on UCC section 9-402(8) which
provides that a financing statement "substantially complying with the
requirements of [§ 9-402] is effective even though it contains minor er-
rors which are not seriously misleading."
'23
The dominant trend in this area is represented by the Eighth Cir-
15. Id. at 970-72.
16. Professor Clark takes this position. B. CuARK, supra note 12, 2.9[5][b] n.167.6
(cum. supp. no. 1, 1987).





22. This basically means that the function of the financing statement is to merely indi-
cate that the secured party may have a security interest in the collateral described. See
Official Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 9-402 (1978).
23. See B. CLARK, supra note 12, at 2.10 (citing cases).
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cuit's decision in Thorp Commercial Corp. v. Northgate Industries.2 4 In Thorp,
a financing statement covering accounts receivable was held valid even
though it described the collateral as "assignment accounts receivable."
Under the broad notice filing philosophy of Article 9, the use of the
extraneous word "assignment" did not prevent perfection in accounts
acquired in the future. The court held that the financing statement
served its purpose of alerting subsequent creditors of the need for fur-
ther inquiry into the exact collateral covered. 2
5
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Ti-State Equipment (under Colorado
law) is consistent with Thorp. In Colorado, the rule is that the descrip-
tion "need only put other creditors on notice of a possible security inter-
est in the collateral in question."'2 6 The burden is then placed on
subsequent creditors to protect themselves by making further inquiry
into any prior security agreements flagged by the financing statement; in
fact, they are obligatid to make further inquiry.
2 7
Extensive authority exists for the proposition that a marginally ade-
quate description imposes an obligation upon a prospective creditor to
make further inquiry before accepting property offered by a debtor as
collateral. 2 8 For example, in In re Kline,29 the court held that if the de-
scription is sufficient to permit a course of inquiry concerning the prop-
erty allegedly covered, the later creditor will be charged with notice of
all facts ascertainable by pursuing such an inquiry.
The Tenth Circuit supported its conclusion by stating that the de-
scription was not "seriously misleading.''30 In this regard, Professor
Clark states that the test should be whether the error was serious
enough to throw a third-party searcher off the trail. 3 1 The court appar-
ently adopted this test when it held that the notice was not so misleading
as to "simply stop future creditors from making the further inquiries
they were obligated by the U.C.C. to make." '32
In light of the lenient policy behind the UCC's notice filing system,
the Tri-State Equipment decision is at least defensible. It does, however,
stretch this policy to the limit. The bankruptcy judge's interpretation
appears to be the most plausible of the three possible interpretations. A
24. 654 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1981).
25. Id. at 1249-53. See also United States v. Southeast Miss. Livestock Farmers Ass'n,
619 F.2d 435, 438-39 (5th Cir. 1980).
26. Ti-State Equip., 792 F.2d at 971 (quoting Platte Valley Bank v. B &J Constr., 44
Colo. App. 21, 22, 606 P.2d 455, 456 (1980) (quoting Mountain Credit v. Michiana Lum-
ber & Supply, 31 Colo. App. 112, 116, 498 P.2d 967, 969 (1972)).
27. See generally Annotation, Sufficiency of Description of Collateral, 100 A.L.R.3d 10, 59
(1980).
28. Id. See Biggins v. Southwest Bank, 490 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1973); In re Hodgin, 7
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 612 (W.D. Okla. 1970).
29. 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) .628 (E.D. Pa. 1956). See also Leasing Service
Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 252 (D.N.J.
1976); In re Hodgin, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 612 (W.D. Okla. 1970); Cargill, Inc.
v. Perlich, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1159 (Ind. App. 1981).
30. Ti-State Equip., 792 F.2d at 972; see U.C.C. § 9-402(8) (1978).
31. B. CLARK, supra note 12, at 2.9[5][6].
32. Tri-State, 792 F.2d at 972.
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later creditor could very well have looked at the financing statement and
concluded, as did the bankruptcy judge, that the words "inventory of
new and used Farm Equipment . . . and proceeds therefrom manufac-
tured by or offered for sale by Allis-Chalmers Corporation" 33 meant
that Allis-Chalmers only claimed a security interest in the trade-ins that
it manufactured or sold. But the financing statement did give other no-
tice. The creditor had checked a box indicating simply that "proceeds of
collateral are also covered."13 4 Additionally, the words "new and used
Farm Equipment" preceded the reference to proceeds.
35
d. Implications of Holding
Tri-State Equipment indicates that the financing statement must be
read as a whole and that ambiguities are construed in favor of the se-
cured party. Thus, the normal contract rule that documents should be
construed against the drafter3 6 is simply inappropriate to the question
of whether a financing statement contains an adequate description.
Since the court took a fairly extreme position in finding for the first-to-
file creditor, it is not likely that a more lenient decision will be forthcom-
ing from the Tenth Circuit.
3 7
B. Description of Crops in the Financing Statement
1. Background
When the collateral involved is a crop, UCC sections 9-203(1)(a)
and 9-402(1) require in the security agreement and financing statement,
respectively, a description of the real estate upon which the crop is
grown or will be grown. Most of the controversy concerning the ade-
quacy of descriptions relating to crops arises over the sufficiency of the
description of the real estate upon which the crops are grown, or will be
grown, rather than the sufficiency of the description of the crops them-
selves. 38 UCC section 9-110 provides that the description of both col-
lateral and real estate is sufficient if it "reasonably identifies" what is
33. Id. at 969.
34. Id.
35. Id. (emphasis added). These cases are almost always lessons in drafting. The
following corrected version of the collateral description would probably have prevented
this case from arising: "The debtor's inventory of new and used Farm Equipment ... now
owned or hereafter acquired .... A creditor does not have to mention the term "pro-
ceeds" in either the financing statement or the security agreement. U.C.C. § 9-203(3)
(1978).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1979).
37. For another recent decision that is also very lenient see Mid City Bank v. Omaha
Butcher Supply, 222 Neb. 671, 385 N.W.2d 917, 922 (1986), where the court upheld a
description even though the creditor mixed up Article 9 categories by describing inventory
as "all equipment, supplies, and parts."
38. The question of the adequacy of a crop description was touched upon in United
States v. Big Z Warehouse, 311 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Ga. 1970) (reference to "crops" grow-
ing or to be grown adequate to describe a tobacco crop where all crops grown on the land
were collateral for the debt).
1988]
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described. Full blown legal descriptions are not necessary. 3 9 However,
omitting a real estate description altogether is not a de minimus error
under section 9-402.
Courts have become lenient in applying the "reasonable identifica-
tion" test. Most courts have held that a description is clearly sufficient if
it contains the name of the owner or lessor of the real estate, acreage,
county, township, and range of the real estate where the crops are grow-
ing.40 More general descriptions often suffice.
Consistent with section 9-1 10's reasonable identification standard,
two courts have provided some vague but at least partially helpful gui-
dance for determining how precise the description must be. In Chanute
Production Credit Association v. Weir Grain & Supply, 4 1 the Kansas court
stated that a creditor should not be required to make a general search of
the record or a general inquiry in the county as to the land involved.
4 2
In United States v. Oakley,4 3 the court held that the description need not
be of such specificity to enable a stranger to locate the property; a de-
scription is sufficient if it enables third persons, aided by inquiries which
the financing statement itself suggests, to identify the property.
44
2. Description Must Provide Clues Sufficient that Third Persons
by Reasonable Care and Diligence Might Ascertain the
Property Covered: United States v. Collingwood Grain,
Inc.
a. Case in Context
In Collingwood Grain,45 the Tenth Circuit held that a real estate de-
scription in a financing statement was sufficient to perfect a security in-
terest in the debtors' crops, even though the description did not give the
name of the land owner nor include a legal description. The description
still provided clues that were sufficient to enable third persons to rea-
sonably identify the property covered. The court departed from prior
law4 6 only in holding that the description need not contain the name of
the land owner.
39. See, e.g., Chanute Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Weir Grain & Supply, 210 Kan. 181, 499
P.2d 517 (1972); Big Z Warehouse, 311 F. Supp. at 283.
40. United States v. Oakley, 483 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. Ark. 1980); In re Colbert, 22
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 511 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1977); Big Z Warehouse, 311 F. Supp.
283; In re McMannis, 39 Bankr. 98 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983).
41. 210 Kan. 181, 182, 499 P.2d 517, 518 (1972). The financing statement, which was
held to be insufficient, contained the following description: "Crops: Annual and perennial
crops . . . on land owned or leased by debtor in Cherokee County, Kansas."
42. Id. at 182, 499 P.2d at 518.
43. 483 F. Supp. at 764. The description at issue in Oakley contained the name of the
owner of the realty, approximate number of acres of land involved, county and state where
the realty was located, and the distance and direction of the realty from a named town. The
description was upheld.
44. Id.
45. 792 F.2d 972 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying Kansas law).
46. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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b. Statement of the Case
The debtors gave two different creditors a security interest in grow-
ing crops on farm land leased by the debtors. The creditor who was first
to file a financing statement described the tract by including the percent-
age interest, number of acres, section, township, range, county, and
state. 4 7 The district court found the financing statement insufficient be-
cause it did not list the record owner of the land and failed to identify
precisely which tract within the specified section was encumbered.
4 8
c. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
In holding that the description was sufficiently precise to give the
requisite notice, the Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the district
court.
4 9
i. Name of land owner not necessary
The court first ruled that a creditor does not have to include in the
financing statement the name of the land owner as part of the real estate
description. 50 Under existing Kansas law, a real estate description in
connection with crops is sufficient if it contains: (1) the name of the land
owner, (2) the approximate number of acres, (3) the county of the loca-
tion of the land, and (4) the approximate distance and direction of the
land from the nearest town or city. 5 1 The court noted that this list
shows only what will guarantee sufficient description.
The requirement of listing the land owner finds no support in the
UCC, as far as a security interest in crops is concerned. The Kansas
version of section 9-402,52 as well as the Official Text, contain no hint of
such a requirement. Under Official Text section 9-402(5), the name of
the land owner only has to be included if the financing statement covers
timber to be cut, minerals, accounts arising from the sale of minerals at
the wellhead or minehead, or fixtures (for a "fixture filing"), and the
debtor does not have an interest of record in the real estate. If the draft-
ers had intended to subject a description of crops to the land owner
requirement, the word "crops" would have been included.
53
47. Collingwood Grain, 792 F.2d at 973.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 974.
51. In re McMannis, 39 Bankr. 98 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983); In re Roberts, 38 Bankr. 128,
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1984). Kansas law in this area is in accord with the majority rule; see text
accompanying note 40.
52. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-402 (1983).
53. The Kansas version is even less supportive of this requirement where the security
interest is in crops. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-402(5) is similar to the U.C.C. Official Text
except that the name of the land owner is always required when the financing statement
covers timber, minerals, accounts arising from the sale of minerals, or fixtures. Crops are
noticeably absent from this list. Additionally, in KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-402(3), part 2
(crops) of the sample form has a space for a real estate description but no space to include
the name of the land owner, while part 3 (fixtures, timber, minerals, accounts generated
from sale of the minerals) has separate spaces for both a legal description of the real estate
and the name of the record owner.
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ii. Full legal description not necessary
The second issue addressed by the Tenth Circuit was whether the
real estate description was sufficient despite the fact that it did not iden-
tify precisely where the land lay within the particular section specified.
In upholding the description, the court noted that a full blown legal de-
scription is not necessary. 54 Agreement among courts on this point is
virtually unamimous, given the UCC's general notice filing concept and
Official Comment 5 to section 9-402 which expressly rejects the notion
that the description must be by metes and bounds.
5 5
It is the general and vague descriptions that frequently give rise to
litigation. The court cited Chanute Production as an example of what is
not sufficient; the creditor there had described the crops as those "pro-
duced on land owned or leased by debtor in Cherokee County, Kan-
sas." 5 6 The court also mentioned the description requirements set forth
in In re McMannis57 and noted that those items will guarantee sufficient
description.
5 8
While the court expressly does not require the name of the land
owner in a real estate description, there is still some uncertainty as to
how far a creditor can stray from the McMannis requirements. The lead-
ing case of United States v. Big Z Warehouse59 seems to represent the limit.
There, the financing statement, covering all crops to be grown on the
farm of "Oscar R. Chancey" of approximately ninety acres .located "1
Mi. North of Offerman, Ga. All in the County of Pierce, State of Geor-
gia," 60 was held sufficient. 6 1 This decision finds support, since under
the UCC's notice filing system, the financing statement indicates merely
that the secured party may have a security interest in the described col-
lateral, and that further inquiry will be necessary to disclose the com-
plete state of affairs. 6 2 The conclusion to be drawn is that a description
54. Collingwood Grain, 792 F.2d at 974.
55. See Annotation, Sufficiency of Description of Crops, 67 A.L.R.3d 308 (1975). Creditors
should be aware, however, that U.C.C. § 9-402(5) (1978) requires a real estate description
sufficient for a mortgage (usually a legal description) where the collateral is timber, miner-
als, accounts arising from the sale of minerals, or fixtures (for a "fixture filing"). See also
Official Comment 1 and the important distinction drawn between the function of the de-
scription of land in reference to crops and its function in the other cases mentioned. The
comment states that:
[flor crops it is merely part of the description of the crops concerned, and the
security interest in crops is a Code security interest .... In contrast, in the other
cases mentioned the function of the description of land is to have the financing
statement filed in the county where the land is situated and in the realty records,
as distinguished from the chattel records.
Id.
56. 210 Kan. 181, 182, 499 P.2d 517, 518. See also Piggott State Bank v. Pollard Gin
Co., 243 Ark. 159, 419 S.W.2d 120 (1967).
57. 39 Bankr. 98 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983). See supra text accompanying note 51.
58. Id. at 100.
59. 311 F. Supp. 283 (1970).
60. Id. at 285.
61. Id. at 286.
62. U.C.C. § 9-402 Official Comment 2 (1978). See also Bank of Danville v. Farmers
Nat. Bank, 602 S.W.2d 160, 162-63 (Ky. 1980) ("farm of Dale Wilson on Lancaster Road,
4 miles from Danville, Boyle County, Kentucky" was sufficient). Compare United States v.
[Vol. 65:4
COMMERCIAL AND CORPORATE LA W
is sufficient if it is more precise than a county-wide description.63
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Collingwood Grain is consistent with
Big Z Warehouse. The court found it irrelevant that the description failed
to identify precisely where the 160 acres of land lay within the single
640-acre section. A reasonable investigation would have disclosed
which particular land was involved, without a general search of the rec-
ord or a general inquiry in the county.
Collingwood Grain is representative of the majority view that if the
financing statement provides enough information to enable third per-
sons through the use of reasonable care and diligence to identify the
property covered, sections 9-110 and 9-402(1) are satisfied, at least with
respect to the real estate description. 64
d. Implications of Holding
Because of the UCC's notice filing concept, most courts have be-
come lenient in judging the sufficiency of crop descriptions in the fi-
nancing statement. The Tenth Circuit's decision follows this trend, and
gives no indication of a more restrictive decision in the future. Yet,
creditors should not feel entirely comfortable in relying on any trend
when attempting to perfect a security interest in crops-or any other
collateral for that matter. The safest approach is to comply with the re-
quirements set forth in McMannis.
6 5
C. Maintaining a Perfected Security Interest in Proceeds in the Event of
Insolvency Proceedings
1. Background
UCC section 9-306(1) defines "proceeds" as "whatever is received
upon the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or
proceeds." A security interest attached to original collateral also be-
comes attached to any identifiable proceeds. 6 6 When the debtor re-
ceives cash proceeds and commingles them with other funds in a general
bank account, the question that arises is whether the creditor's security
interest continues in the commingled proceeds. Courts have generally
allowed creditors to trace cash proceeds through the use of the "lowest
intermediate balance" rule.
6 7
Newcomb, 682 F.2d 758, 762 (8th Cir. 1982) (financing statement that described the land
as being located in "Jasper County, Missouri, approximately 15 miles northwest of Car-
thage, Missouri" was upheld).
63. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-402 comment at 472 (1983) (discussing Chanute Pro-
duction).
64. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-110 comment at 409 (1983).
65. See supra text accompanying note 51. A creditor should not get the idea that using
a legal description is the best course to follow. If a legal description is used, no inquiry
beyond the financing statement is required because of the description's specificity. Thus,
the secured creditor bears the burden of ensuring that no seriously misleading clerical
errors appear. See In re Lions Farms, 54 Bankr. 241 (D. Kan. 1985).
66. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1978).
67. Under this rule, which is borrowed from the law of trusts, the assumption is that a
deposit of proceeds into a commingled account remains identifiable where the commin-
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As to perfection in proceeds, there are further complications. If no
insolvency proceedings have been instituted section 9-306(3) specifies
when perfection in proceeds occurs. When insolvency proceedings have
been instituted section 9-306(4) becomes applicable. 68 Concerning
"identifiable" proceeds under paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of section 9-
306(4), the secured party's rights are not affected by the insolvency pro-
ceedings if such proceeds can still be identified or traced as having been
received on the disposition of the collateral. However, the right to trace
"identifiable cash proceeds" under paragraphs (b) and (c) does not sur-
vive a commingling of the proceeds with other money. 6 9 When com-
mingling occurs, paragraph (d) applies. The provisions of that
paragraph are a substitute for the common law tracing rules, like the
lowest intermediate balance rule. 70 Thus, the ability of a creditor to
identify and trace a greater sum received prior to the ten-day period is
irrelevant; the creditor is limited to the amount deposited by the debtor
within ten days before the institution of the insolvency proceedings.
7 1
Subsection (4)(d) has been a continuing source of difficulty for the
courts. One problem is that the UCC does not specify whether the
phrase "any cash proceeds" should include proceeds received from any
source or only identifiable proceeds. In Fitzpatrick v. Philco Finance
Corp. ,72 the Seventh Circuit held that the cash proceeds were limited to
funds from the sale of collateral in which the creditor retained a per-
gled account has equaled or exceeded the amount of the deposit at all times since the
intermingling. See Universal CIT Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank of Portageville, 358 F.
Supp. 317 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
68. Section 9-306(4) is as follows:
(4) In the event of insolvency proceedings instituted by or against a debtor, a
secured party with a perfected security interest in proceeds has a perfected secur-
ity interest only in the following proceeds:
(a) in identifiable non-cash proceeds and in separate deposit accounts contain-
ing only proceeds;
(b) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of money which is neither commin-
gled with other money nor deposited in a deposit account prior to the insolvency
proceedings;
(c) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of checks and the like which are not
deposited in a deposit account prior to the insolvency proceedings; and
(d) in all cash and deposit accounts of the debtor in which proceeds have been
commingled with other funds, but the perfected security interest under this para-
graph (d) is
(i) subject to any right to set-off; and
(ii) limited to an amount not greater than the amount of any cash proceeds
received by the debtor within ten days before the institution of the insolvency
proceedings less the sum of (I) the payments to the secured party on account of
cash proceeds received by the debtor during such period and (II) the cash pro-
ceeds received by the debtor during such period to which the secured party is
entitled under paragraphs (a) through (c) of this subsection (4).
69. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 45.9 at 1338 (1965).
70. WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1013 (2d ed. 1980).
71. A few courts have disagreed with this analysis and have permitted tracing. For
example, in In re Intermountain Porta Storage, 59 Bankr. 793, 796 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986),
the court concluded that § 9-306(4)(d) was not applicable because the proceeds were
"identifiable" under the lowest intermediate balance rule. Accord In re Gibson Products of
Arizona, 543 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977); In re Dexter Buick-
GMC Truck Co., 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 243 (D.R.I. Bankr. 1980).
72. 491 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1974).
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fected security interest. 73 But, in In re Gibson Products of Arizona,74 the
Ninth Circuit held that the phrase referred to all cash proceeds, regard-
less of whether they arose from the sale of collateral in which the se-
cured creditor held a security interest. 7 5 Another problem arises from
the Bankruptcy Act of 1978. It is at least arguable that a few of the
bankruptcy provisions conflict with section 9-306(4)(d).
7 6
2. Uniform Commercial Code Section 9-306(4)(d) Provides
Exclusive Means for Recovering Commingled Proceeds
in the Event of Insolvency Proceedings: Maxi Sales
Co. v. Critiques, Inc.
a. Case in Context
In Critiques,77 the Tenth Circuit viewed the facts as requiring a
straight application of section 9-306(4)(d). The court held that the cred-
itor could not reclaim any proceeds since it offered no evidence showing
what amounts, if any, were proceeds received by the debtor within ten
days before the institution of insolvency proceedings. As a result of this
lack of evidence, the court did not reach the issue of what the phrase
"any cash proceeds" means. Nor did it discuss the issue of whether the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978 created any conflict with section 9-306(4)(d).
The dissent concluded that section 9-306(4)(d) was not applicable.
78
b. Statement of the Case
The creditor and debtor entered into two separate transactions.
One was a consignment agreement, and the other was a loan repre-
sented by a promissory note. For each transaction, a security agreement
was executed, and a corresponding financing statement filed. The
debtor defaulted on both security agreements. 7 9 Later, a district court
appointed a receiver to operate the debtor's business and hold in trust
any net revenue from operations. 80 The receiver liquidated the debtor's
existing inventory, plus inventory purchased by the receiver, at a public
sale. The debtor then filed for bankruptcy under Chapter VII of the
Bankruptcy Code and state court proceedings were stayed. Funds from
the sale were transferred to the trustee in bankruptcy and the creditor
73. Id. at 1292.
74. 543 F.2d at 656, cert. denied, 430 U.S. at 950.
75. Id. White and Summers argue that the approach in Gibson Products is not defensi-
ble and that the phrase "any cash proceeds" limits the creditor to proceeds of his own
collateral. WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1014-17 (2d ed. 1980).
76. But see WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1017 (2d ed. 1980) (find-
ing no conflict between § 9-306(4)(d) and I I U.S.C. §§ 547 and 545 (Supp. III 1985) or
any other section of the Bankruptcy Act).
77. 796 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying Kansas law).
78. Id. at 1301.
79. Id. at 1295.
80. The receiver was appointed after the state of Kansas had filed a consumer protec-
tion complaint against the debtor and the state court had issued a writ of attachment
against the debtor's property. Id.
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filed a reclamation claim. The bankruptcy court rejected the claim, s l
and the district court affirmed.
8 2
c. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower courts.8 3
Before reaching the ultimate task of applying section 9-306(4)(d), the
court had to determine whether the creditor had a perfected security
interest in proceeds under the two security agreements. The creditor
only had trouble with the consigned goods security agreement, which
incorporated a consignment agreement covering "certain items of furni-
ture, household goods, etc ..... ,,84 Although the creditor's failure to
specifically include the term "inventory" in the security agreement did
not prevent attachment under section 9-203 in the inventory assigned to
the receiver, the same omission in the financing statement did prevent
perfection.8 5 The court interpreted a Kansas non-uniform amendment
to section 9-402(1),86 an amendment that specifically authorizes the use
of generic descriptions of collateral, to mean that a creditor cannot com-
ply with this section by identifying collateral any less specifically than by
reference to the general categories of personal property used in Article
9.87
The security interest with respect to the promissory note was prop-
erly perfected. However, in applying section 9-306(4)(d), the court held
that since the creditor failed to show what amounts (if any) were pro-
ceeds received by the debtor within ten days before the institution of the
bankruptcy proceeding, it had no claim to the proceeds generated by the
liquidation sale. 8 8 It was this application of section 9-306(4)(d) that
gave rise to a persuasive dissenting opinion by Judge Logan,8 9 who
highlighted two important issues: (1) the meaning of "insolvency pro-
ceedings," and (2) whether section 9-306(4)(d) applies to proceeds com-
mingled after insolvency proceedings have been instituted. The majority
overlooked the importance of both of these issues.
81. In re Critiques, Inc., 29 Bankr. 941 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983).
82. Critiques, 796 F.2d at 1295.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. The financing statement listed "proceeds, accounts receivable and intangibles
arising from a certain consignment agreement. Id.
86. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-402(1) (1983).
87. Critiques, 796 F.2d at 1299. The court's ruling on this issue is strict in comparison
with its ruling in In re Tri-State Equip., 792 F.2d 967, 971-72 (10th Cir. 1986); see supra text
and accompanying notes 7-37. Nonetheless, without an appropriate reference to inven-
tory by either "item" or "type" under § 9-402(1), the secured party was limited by the
description in the financing statement and could not rely on the broader description in the
security agreement. This is an application of what Professor Clark calls the "double filter"
rule which limits perfection to the narrower of the two descriptions in the security agree-
ment and financing statement; neither document can expand the scope of the other. B.
CLARK, supra note 12, at 2.9[5][b] (cum. supp. no. 1 1987).
88. Critiques, 796 F.2d at 1301.
89. Id.
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i. The meaning of "insolvency proceedings" in Uniform
Commercial Code Section 9-306(4)
UCC section 1-201(22) defines "insolvency proceedings" as "any
assignment for the benefit of creditors or other proceedings intended to
liquidate or rehabilitate the estate of the person involved." Several
courts have held that there is an insolvency proceeding even where a
Chapter 11 petition in bankruptcy is filed and the debtor is seeking
merely to reorganize his estate, rather than liquidate it.90 Yet, the defi-
nition is broad enough to encompass more than bankruptcy situations.9 1
It specifically includes an assignment for the benefit of creditors as well
as liquidation and reorganization proceedings which may be equity re-
ceivership proceedings under state law that continue when not displaced
by federal bankruptcy law.9 2 The definition of insolvency proceedings
is, therefore, broad enough to include a state law receivership.
The majority in Critiques treated the bankruptcy proceedings as the
"insolvency proceedings" referred to in section 9-306(4), rather than
the state law receivership. 93 As discussed in the next section, the result
is a misapplication of section 9-306(4) for the purpose of applying the
ten day limit in paragraph (d).
it. Application of Section 9-306(4)(d)
The majority held that it did not matter whether the insolvency pro-
ceedings were deemed instituted when the receiver was appointed or
when the bankruptcy petition was filed, due to the fact that the creditor
offered no proof as to the amount of proceeds received by the debtor
within ten days preceding either date.94 In so holding, the majority as-
sumed that proceeds arising after insolvency proceedings are also con-
trolled by section 9-306(4).
Subsection (4) states that "[f]n the event of insolvency proceedings
a secured party with a perfected security interest in proceeds has a
perfected security interest only in . . . (d) . . . accounts of the debtor in
which proceeds have been commingled with other funds .. " The language
indicates that section 9-306(4)(d) applies only to proceeds commingled
prior to the date of insolvency proceedings. 9 5 Therefore, section 9-
306(4)(d) was simply not applicable to the facts before the court since
the proceeds were generated after the appointment of the receiver.
90. See, e.g., Morrison Steel Co. v. Gurtman, 113 N.J. Super. 474, 478, 274 A.2d 306,
310 (1971); In re Conklins, Inc., 14 Bankr. 318, (Bankr. D.S.C. 1981).
91. R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS at 217-18 (2d ed. 1979).
92. 1 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 1-201:359 (3d ed. 1981). See also
2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 45.9 at 1337 (1965) (insol-
vency proceedings may take place either under a state statute or under the liquidation or
reorganization provisions of the federal Bankruptcy Act).
93. Critiques, 796 F.2d at 1301.
94. Id. at 1300 n. 9.
95. Id. See also In re Gibson, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1193, 1196 (W.D. Okla.
1969) (holding that the secured party could recover from the trustee in bankruptcy the
proceeds received by the debtor within the ten day period prior to bankruptcy, plus the
amount collected by the trustee from accounts receivable subsequent to bankruptcy).
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What was before the court was basically a straight bankruptcy
question.
96
d. Implications of Holding
As the dissent noted, the problem with the majority's assumption
that section 9-306(4)(d) applies also to proceeds that were commingled
after insolvency proceedings have begun is that there will never be pro-
ceeds received within ten days before the institution of insolvency pro-
ceedings with regard to items sold after insolvency proceedings. As a
result, secured creditors will always lose here, unless they prevent the
receiver from commingling the proceeds with other money. 9 7 Fortu-
nately, other courts are not likely to follow the Tenth Circuit's approach
to section 9-306(4)(d). If the same facts were to arise again, the chances
are slim that another court would refuse to find that a state law receiver-
ship is an insolvency proceeding within the meaning of that section.
II. BANKING
The troubled oil and gas industry was the breeding ground for the
two banking cases decided by the Tenth Circuit during the survey pe-
riod. The issues in both cases were primarily contractual in nature. Not
surprisingly, the financial problems of at least one of the parties in-
volved in each case helped to give rise to these issues.
A. A Participating Bank's Risk Under a Loan Participation Agreement
1. Background
Under a loan participation agreement, an investing participant ad-
vances funds to the originating lender (referred to as the "lead"), either
for the purpose of purchasing an undivided interest in the obligation of
a third party and in any collateral or as an extension of credit to the lead.
Typically, a bank or other financial institution will attempt to participate
in a third-party obligation (the "loan") originated by the lead when it
has surplus cash to invest.9 8
For an investor contemplating the acquisition of a participation,
either by purchase or as security, there are several potential problems,
including: (1) insolvency of the lead, in which case the funds entrusted
to the lead may be subject to the adverse claims of the lead's creditors or
of its trustee in bankruptcy; (2) inability or unwillingness of the lead to
perform its contractual undertakings; and (3) insolvency of the third-
party obligor. With regard to this last problem, the existence of a future
advance clause in the security agreement between the lead and the third-
party obligor can have adverse consequences on the participant's secur-
ity interest in any underlying collateral.
96. See II U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp. III 1985).
97. Critiques, 796 F.2d at 1302.
98. See generally Simpson, Loan Participations: Pitfalls for Participants, 31 Bus. LAw. 1977,
1977-85 (1976).
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When there is a future advance clause, the lead will want to ensure
that the loan is secured not only to the extent of the amount owed on
the original advance but also to the extent of the amount owed on the
future advance.9 9 If the security agreement's future advance clause is
effective, the use of the original collateral to secure a future advance may
dilute any interest the participant might have in the collateral for the
loan if the value and amount of collateral remain the same. The partici-
pant's problem in this situation is compounded when the lead drafts the
participation agreement' 0 0 and in it disclaims any representations or
warranties with respect to the collateral. If the debtor becomes insol-
vent, the lead may be able to use the collateral to satisfy not only the
original advance but the future advance in which the participant may not
have an interest, all at the expense of the participant.
Often, the participant's only real chance to avoid such a result is to
argue that the future advance clause does not cover the later advance on
the ground that it was created for a different purpose than the original
advance. In response to this type of argument, several courts hold that
unless the future advance clause is ambiguous it encompasses all future
advances, and parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict the clear lan-
guage of the clause.' 0 ' Other courts look at both the security agree-
ment and parol evidence to ensure that the parties intended the future
advance clause to cover the particular type of subsequent advance.
These courts generally allow parol evidence to show whether the later
advance was of the "same class" as the initial obligation. This is an im-
portant determination because if the two obligations are not of the same
class the original collateral will not secure the later advance.'
0 2
99. Achieving attachment to the extent of the future advance requires a security
agreement that demonstrates the debtor's intent to give a security interest in the collateral
to cover the future advance. See T. CRANDALL, R. HAGEDORN & F. SMITH, JR., DEBTOR-
CREDITOR LAW MANUAL 7.04[2][b][vi] (1985). The collateral may be real as well as per-
sonal property. For example, a mortgage may secure future advances of value. In fact,
many states have enacted statutes validating the use of the mortgage (or trust deed) to
secure future advances. Id. at 8.04. As to personal property, see U.C.C. § 9-204(3)
(1978).
100. This agreement, between the lead and the participant, governs the participation
relationship. Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 733 F.2d 1403, 1408
(10th Cir. 1984).
101. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank in Dallas v. Rozelle, 493 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1974);
Kimbell Foods v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 557 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1977), aftd, 440
U.S. 715 (1979); State Bank of Albany v. United States, 468 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972).
102. See, e.g., Kitmitto v. First Pa. Bank, 518 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Marine Nat'l
Bank v. Airco, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Pa. 1975); In re Grizaffi, 23 Bankr. 137 (D.
Colo. 1982). See also T. CRANDALL, R. HAGEDORN & F. SMITH, JR., DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW
MANUAL 7.04[2][b][vi] (1985).
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2. Existence of Future Advance Clause Results in Dilution of
Collateral in the Absence of Protective Provisions: In re
Continental Resources Corp.
a. Case in Context
In Continental Resources,10 3 the Tenth Circuit disallowed parol evi-
dence with respect to the subjective intent of the parties in executing a
future advance but did apply the "same class" test. The court stated
that the future advance was of the same class as the initial advance and
therefore was secured by the original collateral. As a result, the partici-
pating bank's interest in the collateral was diluted.
b. Statement of the Case
The debtor entered into a revolving loan agreement with the lead
bank, the loan being secured by mortgages (collectively referred to as
"mortgage") on certain oil and gas properties. The mortgage contained
a future advance clause. 10 4 Following the execution of the note and
mortgage, another bank purchased a participation in the loan from the
lead bank. A few months later, the lead bank and the debtor entered
into an agreement for a second loan. The note for this second loan, in
which the participating bank did not have an interest, listed "oil and gas
mortgages" as collateral.' 0 5 After the debtor went bankrupt, the lead
bank filed an application with the bankruptcy court to have its claim
under the second note classified as secured (by the mortgage). The
bankruptcy court held that the second loan was subject to the future
advance clause and granted the application. 10 6 The district court
affirmed. 1
0 7
c. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit also affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision' 0 8
and rejected the participating bank's arguments that: (1) the lead bank
breached its duty of good faith by using the mortgage to secure the sec-
ond loan; (2) parol evidence should have been admissible to show that
the lead bank and the debtor did not intend to secure the second loan;
and (3) the second loan was not of the same class as the original loan.10 9
103. In re Continental Resources Corp., 799 F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying
Oklahoma law).
104. This clause contained the following language: "This mortgage is given to secure
the following indebtedness, to wit [original loan] . .. [and] all loans and advances which
Mortgagee may hereafter make to Mortgagor, and all other and additional debts .. "
Another section in the mortgage stated: "it being contemplated by Mortgagor and Mort-
gagee that Mortgagee may from time to time make additional loans and future advances
hereunder .. " Id. at 624-25.
105. Id. at 623.
106. 43 Bankr. 658 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1984).
107. Continental Resources, 799 F.2d at 623.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 624-27.
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i. The duty of good faith
Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and
fair dealing. According to the drafters of the Restatement of Contracts
(Second), the concept of good faith emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed
common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the
other party. I 10 Under the UCC, in the case of a merchant, good faith
means "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade."' I I A breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing occurs when one party to a contract seeks to pre-
vent its performance by, or to withhold its benefits from, the other party.
Without more, the mere exercise of one's contractual rights cannot con-
stitute a breach.] 
12
The participating bank's argument that the lead bank breached this
implied duty by using existing collateral to secure a future advance was,
not surprisingly, unsuccessful. The participation agreement clearly dis-
claimed any representations and warranties concerning the sufficiency of
the collateral. In addition, as the participating bank was aware, the
mortgage contained a future advance clause. In light of these provi-
sions, the participant could not have justifiably expected that the future
advance clause would remain dormant. The risk that the collateral
might be diluted via the exercise of the clause was apparent.
In a related argument, the participating bank claimed that the lead
breached a fiduciary duty. As the court noted, the specific terms of both
the participation agreement and mortgage qualified whatever fiduciary
relationship may have existed,. ' 3 and therefore precluded a finding of
breach.
ii. Application of the parol evidence rule
The parol evidence rule bars evidence of prior or contemporaneous
oral or written agreements and understandings which vary or contradict
the written contract.' 14 The rule only applies if the written contract is
an integration, that is, a final expression of the agreement. Moreover, if
the written contract is a completely integrated agreement, parol evi-
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979). See comments (a) and (d).
Comment (d) lists examples of bad faith: "evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of
diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a power to
specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party's perform-
ance." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979) Comment (d).
11. U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b) (1978).
112. Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 957 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965
(1981).
113. Continental Resources, 799 F.2d at 625. The assertion of a fiduciary relationship
between the lead and the participant is frequently helpful in the context of the lead's bank-
ruptcy, as opposed to the debtor-obligor's bankruptcy. If a participant can establish a
trustee-beneficiary relationship in this situation, it may be entitled to a return of any funds
advanced to the lead. See Simpson, Loan Participations: Pitfalls for Participants, 31 Bus. LAW.
1977, 1992-2003 (1976) and the cases discussed therein; Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Federal
)eposit Ins. Corp., 733 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1984).
114. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1979).
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dence is not even admissible to supplement the writing. 1 5 When a fu-
ture advance clause is involved, the rule generally followed is that the
language of the contract, unless ambiguous, represents the intention of
the parties and that testimony concerning the subjective intent of the
parties in adopting the clause is inadmissible."
16
In the present case, the participating bank argued that the parties
did not intend to secure the second loan with the existing mortgage but,
rather, had agreed to an unsecured negative pledge arrangement." 1 7
The court held that parol evidence to establish this intent was
inadmissible.
The court seems to have been extreme in its application of the parol
evidence rule. By definition, the rule should not be applied to evidence
of subsequent agreements or modifications. 118 Therefore, if the parties
actually did enter into a subsequent agreement that differed from the
original, as the participant claimed, then parol evidence should have
been admissible. The participating bank, however, could never really
prove that there was any kind of subsequent modification."l 9 In the
cases cited by the court, the issue was whether evidence prior to or con-
temporaneous with the writing was admissible. 120 In the present case,
the issue was whether there was a subsequent modification.
The court also addressed the issue of whether the participant was
subject to the parol evidence rule even though it was not a party to the
mortgage. 121 In Fulton v. L & N Consultants, Inc. ,122 the court noted that
in Oklahoma the general rule is "that the parol evidence rule only ap-
plies to parties to the agreement and their privies."i 23 As Professor
Williston notes, such a statement of the rule "has led to misapprehen-
sion."124 Except perhaps for the purpose of showing either fraud
against a third person or some invalidating facts which would be avail-
able to the parties themselves, the rule should apply with respect to
third parties. Furthermore, the parol evidence rule extends to a third
115. Id. The exceptions applicable to the parol evidence rule (e.g., when the writing is
ambiguous) are found in § 214. Id.
116. Kimbell Foods v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 557 F.2d 491, 496 (5th Cir. 1977).
117. Continental Resources, 799 F.2d at 625. A negative pledge is merely an agreement to
forebear from taking some manner of action. In re Continental Resources Corp., 43
Bankr. at 662.
118. The court recognized this facet but called it an "exception" to the parol evidence
rule. Continental Resources, 799 F.2d at 626.
119. The second note was blank when signed by the debtor's chief financial officer and
filled in later by personnel at the lead bank. The court concluded that filling in the blanks
of the note was not actually an alteration of the instrument, and that in such cases the issue
is whether authority existed to fill in the blanks. Continental Resources, 799 F.2d at 626
(citing In re Schick Oil & Gas, Inc., 35 Bankr. 282, 286 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983)).
120. Baum v. Great W. Cities, Inc., 703 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1983); Fulton v. L & N
Consultants, 715 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1982); Mercury Inv. Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co.,
706 P.2d 523 (Okla. 1985).
121. Continental Resources, 799 F.2d at 626.
122. 715 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1982).
123. Id. at 1418. See also In re Assessment of Alleged Omitted Property, 177 Okla. 74,
77, 58 P.2d 134, 137 (1936).
124. 4 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 647 (3d ed. 1961).
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person who makes a claim through the right of a party to a written con-
tract. 12 5 In the instant case, the Oklahoma rule created no "misappre-
hension" because the court did not consider the participant a stranger
to the contract for the purpose of applying the parol evidence rule. The
court reasoned that the participant was closely affiliated with the lead
bank and was a beneficiary of the agreement.1
26
iii. The "same class" test
The "same class" test, also referred to as the "relatedness rule,"
serves to limit the application of a future advance clause to those ad-
vances which are of the same class as the original loan. 12 7 In reference
to Article 9 of the UCC, Grant Gilmore (one of the Article 9 drafters)
states that "no matter how the clause is drafted, the future advances to
be covered must 'be of the same class as the primary obligation ... and
so related to it that the consent of the debtor to its inclusion may be
inferred.' "128
Different loans intended to provide a debtor with working capital
are of the same class.' 29 A loan is classified as working capital if the
debtor uses the money to obtain current assets or to satisfy current lia-
bilities. Current assets are those assets which are reasonably expected
to be converted into cash, sold, or consumed within the normal operat-
ing cycle of the business or one year, whichever is longer. 130 The court
rejected the participating bank's argument that the second loan was not
within the future advance clause, since both the original and second loan
were for working capital. Even though the debtor used the money from
the second loan for acreage acquisition, that loan was still for working
capital. Because the debtor was in the business of oil and gas explora-
tion and development, the properties acquired could be considered cur-
rent assets.
d. Implications of Holding
Continental Resources illustrates the importance to a participating
125. Id. at 1165.
126. Continental Resources, 799 F.2d at 626.
127. Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Dentsply Professional Plan, 617 P.2d 1340,
1346 (Okla. 1980); Kitmitto v. First Pa. Bank, 518 F. Supp. 297, 300 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
128. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 35.2 (1965) (quoting
National Bank of E. Ark. v. Blankenship, 177 F. Supp. 667, 673 (E.D. Ark. 1959), aff'd sub
non., National Bank of E. Ark. v. General Mills, 283 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1960)). But see
Thorp Sales Corp. v. Dolese Bros. Co., 453 F. Supp. 196, 200 (W.D. Okla. 1978) ("it is no
longer necessary, as between the original lender and the original debtor, for future ad-
vances to be of the same class as the primary obligation").
129. Continental Resources, 799 F.2d at 627 (citing Dentsply, 617 P.2d at 1345-46). The
term "working capital" refers to a firm's investment in current assets.
130. AMERICAN INST. OF CERTIFIED PuB. ACCOUNTANTS, RESTATEMENT AND REVISION OF
ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETINS, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH AND TERMINOLOGY BULLETINS,
(final ed. 43 1961), ch.3, § A, 4. An operating cycle is the average amount of time it
takes a firm to spend cash for inventory, process and sell the inventory, and collect the
receivables, converting them back into cash; thus, it is the time taken to go from "cash to
cash."
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bank of obtaining at least some representations and warranties from the
lead with respect to underlying collateral. Participating banks who do
not obtain these assurances face the very real risk of having their share
of the collateral seriously diluted if the third-party debtor borrows pur-
suant to a future advance clause and then becomes insolvent. The par-
ticipant in Continental Resources made the mistake of placing itself at the
mercy of the lead, and found that the court was unwilling to come to its
rescue. Other participants who fail to obtain warranties and representa-
tions can expect similar judicial treatment.
B. Fraud Counterclaim in Response to a Suit Seeking Recovery on a
Promissory Note
1. Background
Courts have often stated that fraud cannot be grounded on mis-
statements of opinion because the element ofjustifiable reliance is ab-
sent.131 The "puffing" rule, for example, allows a seller the privilege to
lie at will, so long as he says nothing specific. Not surprisingly, the rule
has not been favored, and whenever it can be found that there was some
kind of assurance as to specific facts the question of actionable misrepre-
sentation has been left to the jury.
132
A statement of value is generally regarded by the courts as a matter
of opinion. 133 However, transforming such a statement of opinion into
one of fact requires very little. Thus, a representation by the seller of
the price paid for the property being sold is considered one of fact.
134
When the seller misrepresents the price paid (cost), courts generally
give relief if the other elements of fraud are met. 1
3 5
2. Misrepresentation of Loan Value of Property Provides Basis
for Fraud Counterclaim: Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v.
Palermo
a. Case in Context
In Palermo, 136 it was not actually the price paid for the property that
131. See W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 109, (5th ed. 1984) (citing
cases) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
132. Id. at 757.
133. Byers v. Federal Land Co., 3 F.2d 9, 11-12 (8th Cir. 1924); Reeder v. Guaranteed
Foods, 194 Kan. 386, 394, 399 P.2d 822, 830-31 (1965).
134. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 131, at 758. Representations as to the price at
which similar property is selling, the amount of an offer made by a third person, the state
of the market, or even the lowest price at which a purchase can be made from another, are
also considered to be statements of fact. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 168-169. "An assertion is one of opinion if it expresses only a belief, without certainty,
as to the existence of a fact or expresses only a judgment as to quality, value, authenticity,
or similar matters." Id. § 168(1) at 455.
135. Fraud consists of: (1) a material, false representation; (2) made with knowledge of
falsity, or recklessly, and made as a positive assertion; (3) with intention that it be acted
upon by another; (4) actual reliance; and (5) resulting injury. D & H Co. v. Shultz, 579
P.2d 821, 824 (Okla. 1978); Johnson v. Eagle, 355 P.2d 868, 870 (Okla. 1960).
136. 815 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1987) (incorporating the law of Oklahoma as the federal
rule of decision).
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was misrepresented, but rather the amount owed- on the property. The
court held this to be a misrepresentation of fact, not opinion, and up-
held a jury verdict in the buyer's favor. 137 In reaching its decision, the
court, by analogy, relied on cases holding that a buyer of property may
maintain an action for fraud against a seller who misrepresents the price
he has paid for the property.'
38
b. Statement of the Case
Penn Square Bank was arranging the sale of an interest in oil wells
with problem loans. A loan officer at the bank phoned Palermo (buyer)
and represented, among other things, that the bank could not take less
than $130,000 for the interest because "that's what the man owes the
bank for it.' s 9 Evidence indicated that the loan officer knew that the
bank had actually loaned the owner only fifty thousand dollars (secured
by the oil wells). The buyer of the wells testified that the amount the
bank was willing to loan on the property was important to him in deter-
mining the value of the wells and that he would not have bought the
property had he known the truth.'
40
After production on the wells was lower than expected, the buyer
stopped making payments on the note. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, as receiver of the insolvent bank, sued to recover the bal-
ance due. The buyer defended the suit on the basis of fraud, and also
counterclaimed, seeking both rescission and damages. A jury rendered
a verdict in favor of the buyer.'
4 1
c. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit upheld the jury's verdict for the buyer on his
claim of fraud. 142 He was not allowed, however, to pursue the fraud
claim as one for rescission because he had not acted promptly in exercis-
ing his right of rescission.' 43 The buyer was able to assert the fraud
claim only as a set-off or counterclaim in the nature of recoupment to
reduce or eliminate his liability on the promissory note; the running of a
two-year state statute of limitations precluded any affirmative relief.'
44
On the issue of damages, the court set aside the jury's award and or-
137. Id. at 1336.
138. Id. (citing Withroder v. Elmore, 187 P. 863, 864 (Kan. 1920); Wisconsin Steel
Treating & Blasting v. Donlin, 23 Wis. 2d 379, 383, 127 N.W.2d 5, 8 (1964)).
139. Palermo, 815 F.2d at 1333.
140. Id. at 1336.
141. Id. at 1332.
142. Id. at 1341.
143. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 235 (West 1966).
Rescission, when not effected by consent, can be accomplished only by the use...
of reasonable diligence to comply with the following rules: 1. He must rescind
promptly, upon discovering the facts which entitle him to rescind ... and 2. He
must restore to the other party everything of value which he has received from
him under the contract; or must offer to restore the same ....
Id.; see also Harmon v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 196 Okla. 607, 167 P.2d 360 (1946).
144. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95 (West 1960).
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dered a new trial on this issue alone. 14 5
i. The fact-opinion distinction
The Tenth Circuit's opinion illustrates the difference between mis-
representations of "fact" and "opinion". The traditional rule is that,
while misstatements of fact may be actionable, misstatements of opinion
are usually not actionable when parties bargain at arm's length. 146 This
attempted distinction may not be a meaningful one; as noted by one
scholar, "it is scientifically impossible to distinguish fact from opin-
ion." 14 7 Still, the words probably have meanings which correspond
roughly to concepts sufficiently distinct from each other to justify some
differences in treatment." 48 Nonetheless, it is clear that the scope of
immunity for misstatements of opinion is constantly shrinking. 149
Notwithstanding a few older cases to the contrary, when a statement
goes beyond mere value to include assertions of the amount paid for
property, such assertions may be actionable. 150
The court's holding in Palermo that the bank loan officer's statement
of the amount loaned on the property was one of fact rather than opin-
ion and its application of the fact-opinion rule were clearly correct. To
say that the loan officer's statement was merely an opinion of value
would be to ignore reality. The statement is as much a fact as a state-
ment by a seller that he himself paid a certain amount for the property.
Therefore, the court could properly apply, by analogy, the law from
cases holding that misstatements of the amount paid (cost) are
actionable.
Despite this apparent logic, several early cases hold that a misstate-
ment by the seller of the price paid for the property does not lay the
foundation for a fraud action.iS The rationale used is that this type of
misstatement is no more than an indication of the seller's opinion of the
property's value-or mere "dealer's talk." The driving force behind the
cases seems to have been the doctrine of caveat emptor ("buyer beware"),
which had a significant influence on the courts' analyses. Consistent
with this doctrine, courts were strictly applying the materiality and justi-
fiable reliance elements of fraud.
To reach a different result from these cases, the Tenth Circuit
145. Palermo, 815 F.2d at 1341.
146. See James & Gray, Misrepresentation-Part 11, 37 MD. L. REV. 488, 490 (1978).
147. Keeton, Fraud. Misrepresentations of Opinion, 21 MINN. L. REV. 643, 657 (1937) (cit-
ing 7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1919 (rev. 1978)). Keeton believed that the important
distinction is between assertions of knowledge and those of opinion, rather than assertion
of fact and those of opinion. Id. at 657. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 168 comment a (1979), which follows this view.
148. James & Gray, supra note 146, at 489.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Wisconsin Steel Treating & Blasting Co. v. Donlin, 23 Wis. 2d 379, 383,
127 N.W.2d 5, 8 (1964).
151. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Conner, 60 Me. 578, 11 Am. Rep. 212 (1872); Annotation,
Fraud- Misrepresentation of Price, 66 A.L.R. 188, 191-93 (1930). Many of the cases so hold-
ing state that there must be a fiduciary relation between the seller and buyer before there
can be any kind of recovery. See, e.g., Banta v. Palmer, 47 Ill. 99 (1868).
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found it necessary to distinguish Steiner v. Hughes. 152 As the Tenth Cir-
cuit noted, the Oklahoma court in Steiner based its decision on a lack of
actual reliance. 153 The seller misrepresented the profit per share it
would make by selling stock to the buyer; but the buyer could not have
been misled because he had checked for himself the price of the stock on
the day in question. The Oklahoma court's statement of the law' 54 was
a portion of some misguided dicta which almost certainly would not be
followed today. 1
55
it. Measure of damages
Courts are divided over two standards for measuring damages in
fraud actions. One standard is the "out of pocket" rule, followed by a
minority of courts, whereby the injured party receives the difference be-
tween the value of what he has parted with and the value of the property
he has received. 156 This measure is always adopted as to a defense in
the nature of recoupment. 157 The other measure, called the "loss-of-
bargain" rule, gives the injured party the difference between the value of
the property as represented and its actual value on the date of
purchase. 1
5 8
After holding that the buyer could assert his fraud claim only as a
set-off or counterclaim in the nature of a recoupment, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that the appropriate measure of damages was the loss of bar-
gain rule, although the court did not label the rule as such. 15 9 Techni-
cally, the out of pocket rule should have been applied since the buyer
could only seek a set-off or recoupment. Yet, the court in effect did so
152. 172 Okla. 268, 44 P.2d 857 (1935). In Steiner, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
stated that:
[W]e have found no case, by this court, in which the contended fraud consisted
merely of a statement made by the seller, upon inquiry by the purchaser, that the
property was costing, or had cost him, the seller, more than it actually cost, where
this court has held that such a statement, unless coupled with other elements of
fraud, inequality of the parties, overreaching or confidential relations, has been
held to constitute actionable misrepresentation.
Id. at 270, 44 P.2d at 860.
153. Palermo, 815 F.2d at 1337.
154. See supra note 152.
155. See, e.g., Beavers v. Lamplighters Realty, 556 P.2d 1328, 1331 (Okla. Ct. App.
1976) (statement by seller that a third party had offered a certain sum for property is a
"statement of material fact affecting the value and may form the basis for an action of
deceit,") (quoting Chisum v. Huggins, 55 Okla. 423, 441, 154 P. 1146, 1152 (1916)); Varn
v. Maloney, 516 P.2d 1328, 1332 (Okla. 1973);Johnson, 355 P.2d at 871. Even many of the
earlier cases are in accord. See Annotation, Fraud - Misrepresentation of Price, 66 A.L.R. 188
(1930). For a more recent case that is representative of the increasing tendency of courts
to find that assertions of the amount which has been paid or offered for the property are
actionable, see Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm Bldg. Corp., 328 Mass. 341, 103 N.E.2d 692
(1952); Annotation, Fraud - Misrepresentation by Lessor, 30 A.L.R.2d 923 (1953). In
Kabatchnick, the defendant-landlord induced a tenant to agree to a substantially higher rent
by falsely stating that a prospective tenant had offered to lease the premises at the higher
rent.
156. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 131, at 767-68.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 768; A.A. Murphy, Inc. v. Banfield, 363 P.2d 942, 946 (Okla. 1961).
159. Palermo, 815 F.2d at 1340-41 (citing A.A. Murphy, Inc., 363 P.2d at 946).
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when it stated that under the circumstances "the value of the property as
represented is equal to the price paid for the property."' 160 Where, as
here, the injured party can recover only by way of set-off or recoupment,
the final result is that the damages for fraud' 6' are subtracted from the
amount due on the promissory note. The net result is a reduction in the
buyer's liability.
d. Implications of Holding
The Tenth Circuit's holding is consistent with the increasing ten-
dency among courts to find that misrepresentations of the price paid for
property are actionable. The case is certainly not surprising, but is a
warning to banks that they cannot misrepresent the loan value of prop-
erty when selling property covered by a security agreement and thereaf-
ter argue that the representation was a mere "opinion."
III. LIABILITY OF PARENT COMPANY FOR BREACHING SUBSIDIARY-
EMPLOYEE CONTRACT
A. Background
While the board of directors of a corporation is entrusted with the
general power of managing the business and affairs of the corporation,
the directors may delegate many decisions to corporate officers or
agents. 16 2 In most publicly held corporations, the full time, profes-
sional management runs the business-the directors having more of an
oversight role. The directors of large corporations find it necessary to
hire managers with specific expertise and to delegate to those managers
extensive authority. Nonetheless, problems may arise when too much
authority is delegated.
One problem in particular arises in the context of a parent-subsidi-
ary relationship where an employment contract exists between the sub-
sidiary and its highest ranking employee (usually called the chief
executive officer). Perhaps to the dismay of the employee, the parent
company might find it desirable from a managerial standpoint to involve
itself significantly in the subsidiary's day-to-day operations. When the
parent interferes with the employment contract, the employee may de-
cide to sue for breach. Aside from proving breach, the employee may
have to overcome some other obstacles before obtainiig a judgment
against the parent. One obstacle is the parent's argument that the con-
tract is invalid because it gives the employee so much authority that it
strips the subsidiary's board of directors of its essential function. An-
other obstacle is that of holding the parent liable when it is not a party
160. Id. at 1341 n.3.
161. The total damages would include consequential damages if proximately caused by
the fraudulent conduct. Barnes v. McKinney, 589 P.2d 698, 701-02 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
162. "All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the busi-
ness and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors,
subject to any limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation." REVISED MODEL BUsi-
NESS CORPORATION ACT § 8.01 (b) (1984) (emphasis added).
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to the contract. In this situation, a court may analyze the issue in terms
of whether the corporate veil of the subsidiary should be "pierced" in
order to reach through to the parent.
B. Parent Company as Non-Signatory Party Held Liable: McKinney v.
Gannett Co.
1. Case in Context
In McKinney, 163 the court held that the parent company could be
liable for breaching the subsidiary-employee contract on the ground
that the contract was inseparable from another contract to which the
parent was a party. Not content to rely on that ground alone, the court
also concluded that it was proper to pierce the subsidiary's corporate
veil using the "alter ego" doctrine so as to hold the parent liable.'
64
The contract itself was held to be a proper delegation of power, even
though the employee was in complete charge of most of the business
and operating aspects of the subsidiary.'
6 5
2. Statement of the Case
Pursuant to an "Agreement and Plan of Reorganization," the plain-
tiff, McKinney, sold his newspaper company to Gannett (parent com-
pany). The agreement included a ten year employment contract
between McKinney and the newspaper company (subsidiary). The em-
ployment contract, which the parent company did not sign, provided
that McKinney would remain in charge of the business, operations,
news, and editorial policies of the subsidiary for the first five years of the
contract period, and in charge of the news and editorial policies for the
second five years.
16 6
After the relationship between McKinney and the parent company
deteriorated, McKinney sued both the parent and the subsidiary. Mc-
Kinney won on his breach of contract claim in the district court, which
ordered the equitable remedy of "tolling" the running of the employ-
ment contract for the period from the date the parent effectively abro-
gated the plaintiff's contract rights until the final disposition of the
lawsuit. 167
3. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and agreed
that the parent company could be held liable for breach of contract;
168
163. 817 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1987) (applying New Mexico law).
164. Id. at 666-67.
165. Id. at 667-69.
166. Id. at 662.
167. Id. at 663.
168. The court held that the parent company breached the employment contract on six
different occassions; two of the breaches were material. Id. at 669-7 1. A material, or "to-
tal," breach of contract is a non-performance of duty that is so important as to justify the
injured party in treating the whole transaction as at an end. 4 A. COREIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 946 (1951).
19881
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
that the employment contract was a valid delegation of power from the
subsidiary's directors; and that the remedy of tolling was an appropriate
form of relief.
a. Basis for Parent Company Liability
In holding the parent liable despite the fact that it was not a signa-
tory to the employment contract, the court first ruled that the parent was
liable because it was a party to the "Agreement and Plan of Reorganiza-
tion" which was inseparable from the employment contract. This result
seems to follow from an application of ordinary agency rules, which the
court did not recognize. Considering that the parent (as principal) dom-
inated and directed the subsidiary (as agent) in the transaction by draft-
ing the employment contract and negotiating with the employee, the
subsidiary's act of contracting with the employee could be deemed the
act of the parent.' 6 9 Therefore, it was not actually necessary for the
court to also "pierce the corporate-veil" of the subsidiary as a way of
holding the parent liable.17
0
Aside from the question of whether it should have been used at all,
the application of the concept of piercing the corporate veil was proper
under the circumstances. To pierce the corporate veil is to disregard
the separate existence of a corporation and to deny a shareholder the
benefit of limited liability. The test-obviously result oriented-is sim-
ply whether recognition of the separate existence of the corporation
would produce unjust or undesirable consequences inconsistent with
any legitimate corporate purpose.171 Some courts, like the Tenth Cir-
cuit in the present case, have applied the "alter ego" doctrine as the
169. See C. Krendl and J. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing The Inquiry, 55 DEN.
L.J. 1, 3 n.9 (1978).
170. Professor Hamilton states:
[N]o conceptual problems emerge when liability is imposed upon shareholders
under conventional theories of agency or tort law. To argue that the corporate
veil is 'pierced' in such cases is both unnecessary and confusing. If the share-
holder is acting as a principal in his own name, he is clearly liable on the
obligation.
The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979, 983 (1971).
171. See H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, LAws OF CORPORATIONS § 146, at 346 (3d ed. 1983);
C. Krendl and J. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing The Inquiry, 55 DEN. L.J. 1, 15
(1978) (three requisites to piercing the corporate veil: instrumentality, improper purpose,
and proximate causation). In In re Clarke's Will, 204 Minn. 574, 578, 284 N.W. 876, 878
(1939) (cited by H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra, at 345), the court said:
Many cases present avowed disregard of corporate entity. But they all came to
just this-courts simply will not let interposition of corporate entity or action pre-
vent a judgment otherwise required. Corporate presence and action no more
than those of an individual will bar a remedy demanded by law in application to
facts. Hence, the process is not accurately termed one of disregarding corporate
entity. It is rather and only a refusal to permit its presence and action to divert
the judicial course of applying law to ascertained facts. The method neither
pierces any veil nor goes behind any obstruction, save for its refusal to let one fact
bar the judgment which the whole sum of facts requires.
For such reasons, we feel that the method of decision known as 'piercing the
corporate veil' or 'disregarding the corporate entity' unnecessarily complicates
decision. It is dialectally ornate and correctly guides understanding, but over a
circuitous and unrealistic trail. The objective is more easily attainable over the
direct and unencumbered route followed herein.
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basis for piercing the corporate veil.' 7 2 To invoke the doctrine, it must
be shown that the corporation was a mere instrumentality for the trans-
action of the shareholder's own affairs; that there is such a unity of inter-
est and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and
the shareholder no longer exist; and to recognize the corporation's sep-
arate existence would promote unjustice or protect fraud.
173
In its application of the alter ego doctrine, the court relied on the
following facts: (1) the parent had complete stock ownership of the sub-
sidiary and controlled its board of directors; 17 4 (2) the parent in effect
treated the subsidiary as a division of the whole; (3) all of the subsidi-
ary's revenue went to the parent; (4) all of the subsidiary's capital ex-
penditures were approved by the parent; (5) the parent drafted the
employment contract and negotiated with the plaintiff; and (6) the par-
ent directly intervened in the personnel matters of the subsidiary. 1
7 5
Moreover, the court concluded that the parent company's dominion
over the subsidiary was used for a wrongful purpose, which was to frus-
trate McKinney's contract rights.
b. Delegation of Managerial Authority
The board of directors has the ultimate responsibility for managing
the corporation. However, it may delegate the power to transact not
only ordinary and routine business but also business requiring the high-
est degree ofjudgment and discretion. 176 What the board may not do is
delegate its entire duties of management to an individual officer. 177 The
problem is determining when a particular delegation goes too far.
Although one of degree, the test seems to be whether the board of di-
rectors has retained at least its basic authority to govern. If it has not,
the delegation and any contract involved will be invalid. For example, in
Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 178 the board of directors of a corpo-
ration organized to operate a theatre employed a member of the board
to be general manager, and by contract attempted to transfer all control
over bookings, personnel, admission prices, salaries, contracts, expenses
and even fiscal policies to the general manager. The California court
172. E.C.A. Environmetal Management Serv. v. Toenyes, 679 P.2d 213 (Mont. 1984)
(parent liable for breach of contract damages where subsidiary was alter ego of parent);
Harlow v. Fibron Corp., 100 N.M. 379, 671 P.2d 40 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 100
N.M. 439, 671 P.2d 1150 (1983); McCulloch Gas Transmission Co. v. Kansas-Nebraska
Natural Gas Co., 768 F.2d 1199 (10th Cir. 1985).
173. 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41. 10 at 397
(perm. ed. 1983).
174. This fact is never conclusive by itself since such control is no more than a normal
consequence of controlling share ownership. See H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 171,
§ 148, at 355; London v. Bruskas, 64 N.M. 73, 324 P.2d 424, 427 (1958).
175. McKinney, 817 F.2d at 667. See Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979,
992-93 (1971).
176. 2 W. FLETCHER, supra note 173, § 495 at 498. Many statutes expressly authorize
delegation subject to certain limitations; see, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-48 (1978).
177. Boston Athletic Ass'n v. International Marathons, Inc., 392 Mass. 356, 467 N.E.2d
58 (1984).
178. 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 260 P.2d 823, 832-33 (1953).
1988] 495
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
held that the contract was void and unenforceable. The general man-
ager was under a duty to make periodic reports to the board, but that
was held not to constitute a sufficient retention of control by the
board. 1
7 9
In the instant case, the Tenth Circuit held that the contract was
valid because the subsidiary's board of directors had not totally dele-
gated its authority to run the affairs of the corporation to the plaintiff.
Unlike Kennerson, the employee was still responsible to the board of di-
rectors under the employment contract and the board did set corporate
and departmental budget limitations. 180
c. The Equitable Remedy of Tolling
After rejecting the parent company's argument based on election of
remedies, 18 the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's order that the
employment contract be tolled from the date of the first breach until the
date of final judgment. 1
8 2
Tolling is an equitable remedy that is often used to adjust the rights
of the parties under an oil and gas lease. Where a lessor has placed a
cloud on the title of the lease by seeking judicial cancellation of the
lease, a court may suspend (toll) the running of the lease terms. Out of
fairness to the lessee, the obligations of the lessee to the lessor are sus-
pended during the time such a claim is being asserted. 183 The purpose
of tolling is not to punish the lessor but to restore the parties to the
position they occupied originally.1
84
Tolling is not restricted to the oil and gas lease context. As the
Tenth Circuit held, the remedy may be appropriate where the term of a
179. Id. Apparently, this duty to report did not mean much since the board did not
retain the power to act in response to the reports. See also Sherman & Ellis, Inc. v. Indiana
Mutual Casualty Co., 41 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1930); Long Park v. Trenton-New Brunswick
Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633, 634-35 (1948) (the powers of the directors
over the management of the business were "completely sterilized").
180. McKinney, 817 F.2d at 668. The fact that a valid employment contract exists in
such a case does not limit the board's authority to remove the officer, with or without
cause. But removal without cause in breach of the contract usually subjects the corporation
to liability for damages. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT §§ 8.43-44 (1984);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-49 (1978).
181. If a party has more than one possible remedy, her manifestation of a choice of one
of them (by bringing suit or otherwise) is a bar to another remedy if the remedies are
inconsistent and the other party materially changes her position in reliance on the mani-
festation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 378 (1979). See also Three Rivers Land
Co. v. Maddoux, 98 N.M. 690, 652 P.2d 240, 243 (1982), overruled on other grounds, Univer-
sal Life Church v. Coxon, 105 N.M. 57, 728 P.2d 467, 469 (1986). The court rejected the
parent's argument on the ground that under Maddoux it was appropriate to consider the
conduct of the party asserting the doctrine of election to determine whether that party
should be allowed to benefit from its application, and that the parent's conduct was objec-
tionable enough to preclude an application of the doctrine. McKinney, 817 F.2d at 673.
182. McKinney, 817 F.2d at 672-74. The court relied on Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. An-
drus, 687 F.2d 1324, 1340-42 (10th Cir. 1982), where it tolled the primary term of leases
on a reservation during the pendency of the tribe's suit to cancel the leases.
183. Continental Oil Co. v. Osage Oil & Refining Co., 69 F.2d 19, 23-24 (10th Cir.
1934), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 616 (1932); Morrison Oil and Gas Co. v. Burger, 423 F.2d
1178, 1182-83 (5th Cir. 1970).
184. See 2 E. KUNTZ, OIL AND GAS § 26.14 (1964).
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contract has been interrupted by the conduct of one of the parties. 1
85
4. Implications of Holding
The importance of McKinney is its clear indication that a parent
company should not expect to be able to dominate a subsidiary to the
extent of interfering with the rights of those who have contracted with
the subsidiary and still obtain the benefit of limited liability. 18 6 If the
interference is deemed wrongful, courts are generally willing to find
some way of holding the parent liable even though it is not a party to the
contract. McKinney shows that the Tenth Circuit is no exception.
CONCLUSION
In its disposition of the Article 9 issues during the survey period,
the Tenth Circuit was faithful for the most part to the Uniform Commer-
cial Code's underlying policy of flexibility and leniency. In Ti-State
Equipment and Collingwood Grain, the court gave the first-to-file creditor in
each case the benefit of this policy in holding the description of collat-
eral sufficient to perfect the security interest. In Critiques, the creditor
was not so fortunate. The court there held a financing statement de-
scription of collateral to be insufficient, and erred significantly by apply-
ing the insolvency provisions of section 9-306(4), with regard to the
secured party's perfected security interest under the second of two se-
curity ageements.
Given the present economic environment, it is critically important
for creditors to take the proper steps to protect themselves. The partici-
pating bank in Continental Resources undoubtedly realized this after having
its share of the collateral diluted because of the use of a valid future
advance clause. In Palermo, the bank's attempt to rid itself of a problem
loan backfired when the court allowed the buyer of the collateral (real
property) to recover for fraud because the loan value of the property
was misprepresented.
Finally, in McKinney v. Gannett the court held the parent company,
Gannett, liable for breaching an employment contract between its sub-
sidiary and the subsidiary's chief executive officer.
Jeffrey S. Mulien
185. McKinney, 817 F.2d at 673. The court stressed that the remedy was not specific
performance in disguise. Id. at n.8 ("we are confronted with a declaration of contract
rights and not a coercive order decreeing enforcement of the employment contract.").
186. Of course, nothing is wrong with domination by itself since a majority or sole





During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals de-
cided several cases involving constitutional issues. Some of the cases
cast new light on old problems while others reinforced principles previ-
ously enunciated in settled precedent. Overall, the Tenth Circuit dis-
played a well-balanced approach to upholding the constitutional rights
of the individual, while meeting the legitimate concerns of the govern-
ment and the public. The Tenth Circuit was more protective of substan-
tive due process rights of students in public schools than the United
States Supreme Court in its decision regarding corporal punishment. In
its decisions in other areas, in particular involving the first, fifth, and
fourteenth amendments, the court effectively used precedent to further
develop the law.
Although no new concepts were introduced by the Tenth Circuit in
these cases, they are of interest as illustrations of this circuit's applica-
tion of principles previously discussed and accepted by this and other
circuits. The article which follows is a sampling of the more significant
and interesting cases.
I. THE STANDARD USED TO MAINTAIN SUIT IN FEDERAL COURT
A. Background
1. First Amendment
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "I This command has
two components: the establishment clause and the free exercise clause.
2
The basic purpose of the establishment clause is, in the words of
Thomas Jefferson, to erect "a wall of separation between church and
state." The image of a "wall", however, does not help very much in
determining what types of state actions violate the establishment
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1. The establishment clause is applied to the state via
the fourteenth amendment. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1974).
2. The establishment clause and free exercise clause were intended to be "mutually
supportive," vet each works separately to protect distinct liberties. The free exercise
clause seeks to prevent government from acting in a way that intrudes upon the individ-
ual's right to exercise religious beliefs, while the establishment clause is meant to restrain
the government from passing laws favoring a particular religion, thereby placing indirect
pressure upon citizens to adopt a particular belief as their own. See generally L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, § 14-2 (1978).
3. I. JEFFERSON, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 519 (S. PADOVER ed. 1943). See generally
CommentJefferson and the Church-State Wall: A Historical Examination of the Man and the Aleta-
phor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645 (1978).
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clause..
4
The courts presently employ a three-fold test to determine if the
command of neutrality imposed by the establishment clause is violated.5
In order to pass constitutional muster, state action must have a valid
secular purpose, have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion, and must avoid fostering an excessive entanglement between
government and religion.6 When an action is challenged under the es-
tablishment clause it must pass all three prongs of this test to be valid.
7
The establishment clause is not merely a command of equal treatment
among religions; the government cannot pass laws which aid one reli-
gion or prefer one religion over another.
8
Despite criticism from commentators9 and members of the Court, 10
the Lemon test remains the yardstick by which state endorsement of reli-
gion is measured. Although the Court has repeated its reluctance to
confine establishment clause analysis to the Lemon test, it officially re-
mains the standard in establishment clause cases.
2. Self-imposed Limitations on Judicial Review
a. Standing
Standing is a threshold inquiry concerned primarily with whether a
litigant's stake or interest in a suit is sufficient for judicial redress. 12 Lit-
igants generally have standing to challenge government action that
4. Comment, Hiding Behind the Wall: Friedman v. Board of County Comm 'rs, 64 DEN. U.L.
REV. 81, 82 (1987).
5. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
6. Id. at 612-13. What has become known as the Lemon test is really an amalgamation
of the holdings of three cases. The requirement that state action be motivated by a valid
secular purpose was first articulated in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961).
In that case, the Court upheld a mandatory Sunday closing law, finding that the state was
acting to further the nonreligious goal of assuring a uniform day of rest. In Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963), the Court added the requirement that
the effect of state action must neither advance nor inhibit religion. The Court held that a
Pennsylvania statute requiring daily bible readings in public schools had the effect of ad-
vancing religion, and therefore violated the establishment clause. Finally, the rule that
otherwise permissible state action will be invalidated if it fosters excessive entanglement
between government and religion was incorporated into establishment clause analysis in
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970). There the Court upheld a grant of tax-
exempt status to religious institutions. The Court justified its decision by finding that
denial of the exemption would entangle the government in the affairs of religion more
than granting of the exemption.
7. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam).
8. See generally Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
9. See Cornelius, Church and State-The Mandate of the Establishment Clause: Wall of Sepa-
ration or Benign Neutrality?, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 15-19; Redlich, Separation of Church and
State: The Burger Court's Tortuous Journey, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1094, 1122-26 (1985);
Note, Rebuilding the 1Wall: The Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretation of the Establishment
Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1473 (1981).
10. See generally Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
12. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972) ("Whether a party has
sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that
controversy is what has traditionally been referred to as the question of standing to sue.").
See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 3-17 (1980).
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would create a judicially cognizable right of action if committed by a
private party. 13 If, however, the plaintiff challenges a government ac-
tion that results in an indirect harm unprotected by a particular legal
interest, such as a government expenditure, standing becomes less
certain. 14
Until 1968, the only Supreme Court decision on whether federal
taxpayers have standing to contest violations of constitutional limits on
Congress' taxing and spending power was Frothingham v. Mellon. 15 In
Frothingham the Supreme Court squarely addressed the question of
whether federal taxpayers have standing to challenge government ex-
penditures. The taxpayer in Frothingham attacked the maternity Act of
1921,16 which provided grants to states engaged in programs to reduce
mother and infant mortality, as an unconstitutional infringement of the
states' tenth amendment rights. 17 Mrs. Frothingham alleged that she
was a taxpayer and in that capacity she was injured because "the effect of
the appropriations complained of will be to increase the burden of fu-
ture taxation and thereby take her property without due process of
law."1 8 The Court held that she lacked standing because her interest in
the moneys of the Treasury is shared with millions of others and "is
comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future
taxation . . .remote ."19
Frothingham barred federal taxpayer suits for forty five years until it
was questioned and partially overcome in Flast v. Cohen. 20 The plaintiff
taxpayers in Flast challenged federal expenditures to aid religious secon-
dary schools. 2 1 Their complaint alleged that the expenditures violated
the establishment clause of the first amendment. 2 2 The Flast majority
first held that the rule of Frothingham was one of judicial self-restraint
and not required by the Constitution, for "we find no absolute bar in
article III to suits by federal taxpayers challenging allegedly unconstitu-
tional federal taxing and spending programs." 2 3 The Court, however,
did not overrule Frothingham; rather it introduced a two-part standing
test, which examined the issues, "to determine whether there is a logical
nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudi-
cated. '"24 Applying this test to the federal taxpayers before it, the Court
13. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951).
14. See geverally C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 13 (4th ed. 1983).
15. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
16. Maternity and Infancy Hygiene Act, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224 (1921).
17. 262 U.S. at 479-80.
18. Id. at 486.
19. Id. at 487-88.
20. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
21. Id. at 85. The disbursements, made under Titles I and II of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 241a (Supp. 11 1984), were used to subsi-
dize instruction in basic studies, such as reading and arithmetic, and to purchase text-
books. Id. at 85-86.
22. Id. at 86. The establishment clause prohibits Congress from passing any "law
respecting an establishment of religion ... U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
23. 392 U.S. at 101.
24. Id. at 102.
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articulated two conditions that must be met as a requisite for standing.
First, plaintiffs must establish a connection between their status as tax-
payers and the legislation attacked.2 5 Taxpayers would thus have stand-
ing to challenge the constitutionality only of "exercises of congressional
power under the taxing and spending clause of art. I sec. 8," and would
consequently lack standing to challenge expenditures incidental to an
essentially regulatory scheme. 26 Second, taxpayer-plaintiffs must estab-
lish a further nexus between their status and the substantive issues they
seek to litigate. This prong requires that a taxpayer show that the chal-
lenged enactment exceeds "specific constitutional limitations" on the
congressional taxing and spending power, and not that it was simply
"beyond the powers delegated to Congress."' 27 When both prongs are
established, the litigant will have shown a taxpayer's stake in the out-
come of the controversy and will be a proper and appropriate party to
invoke a federal court's jurisdiction.
28
The major change in the direction of standing came in the 1974
companion decisions of United States v. Richardson 2 9 and Schlesinger v. Re-
servist to Stop the War.3 0 These cases emphasized separation of powers
principles in holding that a direct injury, not merely a general public
interest, is required for standing. Neither as a citizen nor as a taxpayer
may one invoke judicial review simply to vindicate a belief in the need
for lawful conduct by Congress or public officials.
3 1
In Richardson, the plaintiff alleged that the Central Intelligence
Act, 32 which provided for the nondisclosure of the CIA's expenditures,
violated the accounts clause of the Constitution.3 3 The Court held that
the plaintiff lacked standing under the Flast double-nexus test on two
grounds: first, because he challenged a statute regulating executive
agency action, not an exercise of Congress' taxing and spending power;
second, because he made no allegation that funds were spent "in viola-
tion of a 'specific constitutional limitation.' ",34 The Court therefore
concluded that there was no "logical nexus" between the plaintiff's sta-
tus "of taxpayer and the claimed failure of the Congress to require the
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 102-03. The Court distinguished Frothingham on this basis. Id. at 104-05.
Mrs. Frothingham alleged that Congress' action, by infringing the state's tenth amend-
ment rights, caused an increase in her tax bill. Id. at 105. She failed, however, to allege
any right that specifically protected her from the increased tax liability, and she therefore
lacked standing under the second nexus of the Flast test. Id.
28. Id. at 102-03. The Court stated that the plaintiffs satisfied the first nexus because
they challenged an exercise of Congress' taxing and spending power, and satisfied the
second nexus because the Court found the first amendment to be a "specific constitutional
limitation" on congressional taxing and spending power. Id. at 103.
29. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
30. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
31. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 67.
32. 50 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
33. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7, (the accounts clause requires that a "regular State-
ment and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published
from time to time")
34. 418 U.S. at 175.
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Executive to supply a more detailed report of the [CIA's]
expenditures."
'3 5
The plaintiffs in Schlesinger sought to enjoin the membership of con-
gressmen in the military reserves, alleging that such membership vio-
lated the incompatibility clause.3 6 On the issue of citizen standing,
37
the Court found only "injury in the abstract."3 8 The Court found that
taxpayer standing did not exist because the plaintiffs below "did not
challenge an enactment under art. I, sec. 8, but rather the action of the
Executive Branch in permitting Members of Congress to maintain their
Reserve status."
39
Since Richardson and Schlesinger the Court has continued to restrict
taxpayer standing, even in establishment clause cases. In Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,40 the
plaintiff organization alleged that the grant of federal property to a reli-
gious college violated the establishment clause.4 1 In holding that plain-
tiffs failed to satisfy the first nexus of the Flast test42 and therefore lacked
standing, the Court delineated a more precise definition. First, the ac-
tion challenged the decision of an executive agency to transfer property,
not an exercise of congressional power.4 3 Second, the legislation that
authorized the transfer was passed under the property clause of article
IV, not the taxing and spending clause of article I.
44
b. Political Question
The doctrine of standing is often confused with other aspects of
justiciability which focus on the issues in a suit and their amenability to
35. Id.
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (the incompatibility clause states that "no Person
holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his
Continuance in Office")
37. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. 208. The Court held that plaintiffs had no standing as citizens
because they had not suffered a judicially cognizable injury. 418 U.S. at 216-17.
38. Id. at 217. The Supreme Court has consistently rejected claims of standing predi-
cated on a citizen's right to require that the government behave in accordance with the
Constitution. See generally Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 482-83
(1982).
39. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 228.
40. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
41. Id. at 469. According to the Court, the plaintiffs lacked standing as citizens be-
cause they failed to allege a judicially cognizable injury, although the Court implied that
this result might be different had the plaintiffs resided near the transferred federal prop-
erty. Id. at 487 n.23.
42. 454 U.S. at 479-80.
43. Id. at 479. "The plaintiffs in Flast satisfied this test because '[t]heir constitutional
challenge [was] made to an exercise by Congress of its power under art. I, sec. 8, to spend
for the general welfare,'. . . and because the Establishment Clause, on which plaintiffs'
complaint rested, 'operated as a specific constitutional limitation upon the exercise by
Congress of the taxing and spending power conferred by art. I, sec. 8. Id. (quoting
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1968)).
44. Id. at 480. The authorizing legislation, the Federal Property and Administrative
Service Act of 1949, ch. 288, 63 Stat. 377 (1949) was an evident exercise of Congress'
power under the property clause, art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Id.
1988]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
judicial resolution. 4 5 However, because other justiciability inquiries are
concerned with the nature of the issues, they necessarily involve a more
extensive inquiry into the merits of the case.
4 6
Most discussions of the political question doctrine speak in terms of
justiciability. 4 7 This concept reflects judicial concern that goes beyond
the limits of article III of the Constitution: a concern for the "proper -
and properly limited - role of the courts in a democratic society." '4 8
This concern manifests itself in the judicially created prudential limita-
tions on the exercise of federal court jurisdiction which, while "closely
related ' 49 to the case or controversy requirement of article III of the
45. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-101 (1968) (standing does not involve a
determination of whether substantive issues in a case are suitable for judicial resolution,
i.e., justiciable). Those justiciability inquiries that focus on the substantive issues include
the political question doctrine, mootness, ripeness, and the prohibition against advisory
opinion. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 12, §§ 3-10 to 3-17.
In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Court provided a comprehensive list of
factors that indicate when an issue is a nonjusticiable political question. Id. at 217. These
factors range from those that constitutionally commit the issue to a separate branch, to
those that compel a court to avoid the issue because of policy concerns. Id. For a thor-
ough treatment of the possible constitutional, prudential, and functional sources of the
factors in Baker, see L. TRIBE, supra note 12, § 3-16, note 1.
The doctrines of standing and political question are often confused and used inter-
changeably, in part because of the Supreme Court's own imprecise characterization of the
two. For example, in Flast, the Court defined standing as an "aspect ofjusticiability" and
then cited Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Mis-use of "Standing", 14 STAN. L. REV. 433, 453
(1962), for the proposition that many of the problems with standing arise because it is
used as a shorthand for the "elements of justiciability," without defining precisely what
element ofjusticiability was represented by standing. 392 U.S. at 98-99. Moreover, the
Flast Court developed a standing test that required an examination of the substantive is-
sues, id. at 102, despite its declaration that standing questions are decided without refer-
ence to the justiciability of the substantive issues involved, id. at 100. See also L. TRIBE,
supra note 12, § 3-20 at 90 (in Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208 (1974), the Court unnecessarily used standing to dismiss the suit, although a variety of
pre-existing justiciability inquiries were already designed to handle the question
adequately).
46. E.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 206-07 (1974) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting). Justice Stewart argued that the case, though appealed on standing grounds, in
reality was dismissed on the issue of justiciability and that the case should therefore be
remanded, because a proper justiciability inquiry requires a more extensive analysis of the
merits than standing requires. Id.
Courts often dismiss cases on standing grounds to avoid more difficult and involved
justiciability inquiries. See Schlesinger v. Reservist Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
215 (1974) (the Court commented that "[t]he more sensitive and complex task of deter-
mining whether a particular issue presents a political question causes courts .. .to turn
initially ... to the question of standing to sue") For the proposition that Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), was decided on standing grounds to avoid an inquiry into the
justiciability of the issues involved, see Finklestein,Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REV.,
338, 359-64 (1923).
47. For discussion on the nature of a political question see Field, The Doctrine of Polit-
ical Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. REV. 485 (1924); Finkelstein, Further Notes on
Judicial Self-Limitation, 39 HARV. L. REV. 221 (1925); Henkin, Is There a "Political Question"
Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976);Jackson, The Political Question Doctrine: Where Does it Stand
After Powell v. McCormack, O'Brien v. Brown and Gilligan v. Morgan?, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 477
(1973); Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J.
517 (1966); Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARV. L. REV. 296 (1925); See also Bickel, The
Supreme Court 1960 Term-Forward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961); Wechs-
ler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
48. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
49. Id. at 500.
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Constitution, are "essentially matters of judicial self-governance. '"50
The "political question" doctrine postulates that there exist certain is-
sues of constitutional law that are more effectively resolved by the polit-
ical branches of government and are therefore inappropriate for judicial
resolution.
5'
The political question doctrine has existed in some form since the
earliest days of the republic. In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Mar-
shall recognized that "[q]uestions in their nature political, or which are,
by the [C]onstitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be
made in this court."'5 2 In 1962, the Supreme Court gave its fullest treat-
ment of the doctrine to date. In Baker v. Carr,5 3 voters in Tennessee
alleged that the apportionment of the state legislature produced ine-
quality of representation in violation of the equal protection clause. In a
detailed opinion, the Court held that the political question doctrine did
not bar the federal courts from considering an equal protection chal-
lenge to a state voting apportionment structure. 54 The Supreme Court
identified a list of general criteria to determine whether cases can prop-
erly be deemed political questions:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly
according to the settings in which the questions arise may de-
scribe a political question, although each has one or more ele-
ments which identify it as essentially a function of the
separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case
held to involve a political question is found a textually demon-
strable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
50. Id. See also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Bran-
deis, J., concurring). As professor Tribe aptly stated:
There is, thus, a political question doctrine. It does not mark certain provisions
of the Constitution as off-limits to judicial interpretation. But it does require fed-
eral courts to determine whether constitutional provisions which litigants would
have judges enforce do in fact lend themselves to interpretation as guarantees of
enforceable rights. To make such a determination, a court must first of all con-
strue the relevant constitutional text, and seek to identify the purposes the partic-
ular provision serves within the constitutional scheme as a whole. At this stage of
the analysis, the court would find particularly relevant the fact that the constitu-
tional provision by its terms grants authority to another branch of government, if
the provision recognizes such authority, the court will have to consider the possi-
bility of conflicting conclusions, and the actual necessity for parallel judicial and
political remedies. But ultimately, the political question inquiry turns as much on
the court's conception ofjudicial competence as on the constitutional text. Thus
the political question doctrine, like other justiciability doctrines, at bottom re-
flects the mixture of constitutional interpretation and judicial discretion which is
an inevitable byproduct of the efforts of federal courts to define their own
limitations.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 79 (1978).
51. The Supreme Court has held that the political question doctrine is inapplicable to
constitutional challenges to actions of state governments. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
226 (1962). However, one leading commentator has argued that the doctrine has not his-
torically been limited in this manner. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A
Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 538-39 (1966).
52. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). See also Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1
(1849) (the lawlessness of a state government is a political question committed to
Congress).
53. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
54. Id. at 209.
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political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political de-
cision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the
case at bar, there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on
the ground of a political question's presence. The doctrine of
which we treat is one of "political questions," not one of "polit-
ical cases." The courts cannot reject as "no law suit" a bona
fide controversy as to whether some action denominated
"political" exceeds constitutional authority. The cases we have
reviewed show the necessity for discriminating inquiry into the
precise facts and posture of the particular case, and the impos-
sibility of resolution by any semantic cataloging.
5 5
Several categories of cases have helped mold the political question
doctrine. One category contains cases arising under the guarantee
clause of article IV of the Constitution.5 6 In Luther v. Borden,57 the
Supreme Court refused to determine which of two competing bodies
was the legitimate government of Rhode Island. Referring to article IV,
the Court concluded that it is Congress'job to decide which government
was the proper one, and whether that government was republican.
Once this decision was made it could not be questioned by the
judiciary.
5 8
Another category of political question cases concerns the foreign
relations of the United States. One commentator argues that the consti-
tutionally granted power to administer foreign affairs is divided between
the executive and legislative departments, completely excluding the ju-
diciary. 59 In Baker, the Court agreed that foreign relations cases often
required standards for resolution beyond judicial competence, and that
there was often a need for a "single-voiced statement of the govern-
ment's views." '60 The Court concluded, however, that before acting in
55. Id. at 217.
56. U.S. CONST., Art. IV., section 4 states in part, "The United States shall guarantee
to every state in this Union a Republican Form of Government .. " The Supreme Court
has generally held that only Congress and the President, and not the judiciary, can enforce
the guarantee clause on the ground that all issues under the guarantee clause raise nonjus-
ticiable "political questions." See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Highland Farms
Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937); Ohio v. Akron Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74 (1930); Davis
v. Ohio, 241 U.S. 565 (1916); Pacific Telephone v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Taylor
and Marshall v. Beckham (No. 1), 178 U.S. 548 (1900).
57. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
58. Id. at 42, 47.
59. See Weston, supra note 47, at 318-29. See generally, Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of
Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513 (1962).
60. 369 U.S. at 21.1-12. In a footnote, Justice Brennan cited an example of such
"sweeping statements: " The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is
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some cases it needed to assess the handling of a question by the political
branches and the possible consequences of judicial action.6 1
The Court's role in deciding whether an issue is committed to an-
other branch, in the context of whether Congress can control its own
membership, is well illustrated by Powell v. McCormack.6 2 The area of
impeachment is often considered a political question. Article I, section
2 of the Constitution gives the House sole power of impeachment, and
section 3 gives the Senate sole power to try impeachments. No statute
defines impeachable offenses; thus it would be difficult for the Court to
apply any judicial criteria for review of a legislative decision to im-
peach. 63 Nonetheless, when presented with the issue, the Court did not
dismiss the question of the exclusion of a member of Congress from the
House of Representatives.
64
Congressman Adam Clayton Powell was re-elected to Congress in
November 1966, but the Congress voted to exclude him. Powell sought
a declaratory judgment that his exclusion was unconstitutional. The re-
spondents argued that, pursuant to article I, section 5,65 upon a two-
thirds vote of the House a member could be expelled for any reason.
Without deciding the question of the justiciability of the right of the
House to expel a member, the Court determined that exclusion was a
justiciable issue. The Court stated that section 5 did not give the House
judicially unreviewable power to set and judge qualifications for mem-
bership, 6 6 and concluded "that the Constitution leaves the House with-
out authority to exclude any person, duly elected by his constituents, who
meets all the requirements for membership expressly prescribed in the
Constitution."
6 7
An important consequence of the political question doctrine is that
holding it applicable to a cause of action theory renders the govern-
ment's conduct immune from judicial review. 68 Unlike other restric-
tions on judicial review - such as case or controversy requirements,
standing, and ripeness, all of which may be cured by different factual
circumstances - a holding of nonjusticiability is absolute in its foreclo-
committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative-"the political"--Depart-
ments of the Government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this
political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.' " Id. at 211 n.31 (quoting
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)).
61. 369 U.S. at 211-12.
62. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
63. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109-10
(1978).
64. Powell, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). Adam Clayton Powell was re-elected to Congress
while under heavy suspicion of wrongdoing. The House of Representatives refused to
seat him on the grounds of improprieties committed as a congressman.
65. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 2, states, "[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of
two thirds, expel a Member."
66. 395 U.S. at 520-22.
67. Id. at 522. (Emphasis in original.) The Court in Powell concluded that Congress'
discretion in seating members is limited to expulsion for failure to meet the age, citizen-
ship, or residence requirements of art. I, sec. 2. Id. at 548.
68. Baker, 369 U.S. 186, 209.
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sure of judicial scrutiny. 69
B. Specific Doctrines Limiting Judicial Review: Phelps v. Reagan
1. Case in Context
In Phelps v. Reagan,70 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed
the United States District Court for the District of Kansas' dismissal of
an action requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. Fred W. Phelps,
an attorney and Baptist minister, filed an action challenging President
Ronald Reagan's appointment of William A. Wilson as United States
Ambassador to the Vatican, or Holy See. Phelps sought a declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief, claiming that the institution of such rela-
tions, and particularly the appointment of an ambassador to the Holy
See, violated the first amendment of the Constitution.
The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss
holding that Phelps lacked standing to maintain the action and that the
case presented a nonjusticiable political question. Phelps appealed but
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held
that a taxpayer and minister did not have standing to challenge the ap-
propriations involved and that the question of whether to appoint an
ambassador was vested solely in the executive branch, and could not be
reviewed by a court.
7 1
2. Statement of the Case
As a citizen, taxpayer, and minister of the Old School Baptist Order,
Phelps filed a complaint in district court. Phelps claimed that the ap-
pointment of an ambassador to the Holy See, and the formalization of
diplomatic relations with the Holy See, violated the first amendment.
He charged that the Holy See is not a foreign government with which
the United States has a legitimate need to establish foreign relations, but
is instead the headquarters of the Roman Catholic Church. Phelps al-
leged that the government's conduct was patently violative of the estab-
lishment clause of the first amendment, in that it purposely
accomplished a predominantly religious purpose, had the effect of favor-
ing one religion over another, and involved the entanglement of the
United States in the religious affairs of a church. Phelps claimed stand-
ing to bring suit as a taxpayer and citizen, and as a Baptist minister with
a vested religious interest in the separation of church and state. Phelps
requested a declaration that the government's conduct violated the first
amendment and an injunction restraining the government from estab-
lishing full diplomatic relations with the Holy See or sending an ambas-
sador to the Holy See.
The government sought dismissal of the suit. They argued that the
court was without subject matter jurisdiction, since Phelps lacked stand-
69. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 102 (1986).
70. 812 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 1987).
71. Id. at 1294.
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ing and presented nonjusticiable questions.7 2
3. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of Phelps'
claim that he had standing to sue as a taxpayer under the doctrine set
forth in Flast.73 He alleged that tax funds were being used to fund the
diplomatic mission to the Holy See and the expenses of the United
States Ambassador to the Holy See. Phelps clearly did not meet the
two-part test to establish taxpayer standing set forth in Flast.
To invoke the power of a federal court, a party must show that "he
has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct in-
jury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in
some indefinite way in common with people generally."'7 4 In light of the
Supreme Court's decisions in the area of taxpayer standing, and the de-
cision in Valley Forge in particular, two points are well established. First,
the extremely narrow taxpayer standing doctrine of Flast v. Cohen may
not be invoked to challenge an action arising exclusively in the executive
branch. Second, to the extent that congressional action may be chal-
lenged under Flast, the challenge must be directed at a federal spending
program enacted pursuant to the taxing and spending power of art. I,
sec. 8, cl. 1.
Phelps, like the plaintiffs in Valley Forge75 and Schlesinger76 failed to
satisfy the Flast test. As in those cases, Phelps' real challenge was to the
actions of executive branch officials, and not to a congressional spend-
ing program enacted under the taxing and spending power of art. I, sec.
8, cl. 1. The appropriation of money by Congress for support of our
embassies cannot be considered an exercise of Congress' taxing and
spending power for the general welfare. Rather, it is spending pursuant
to Congress' power in the area of foreign relations.
7 7
While Phelps rested his assertion of standing primarily on his status
as a taxpayer, he also seemed to claim standing as a non-tax-
payer/citizen. He appeared to claim that he had standing to enforce the
values which underlie the establishment clause of the first amendment.
The Tenth Circuit also discounted this argument by affirming the dis-
trict court's holding that he failed to establish non-taxpayer standing.
Phelps' alleged injuries were simply a recasting of the policies which un-
derlie the establishment clause - i.e., not preferring one religion over
another and prohibiting entanglement in church affairs. Therefore,
Phelps was simply attempting to claim standing to enforce establishment
clause values. But as the Supreme Court's decision in Valley Forge
78
squarely holds, it is not enough to simply allege a belief that governmen-
72. Id.
73. Flast, 392 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1968).
74. Frothingham, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
75. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 479-80.
76. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 228 n.17.
77. See, TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-17 (1978).
78. 454 U.S. at 482-486. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
1988]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
tal action violates the Constitution, or a desire to protect the policies
which underlie the establishment clause. Phelps alleged that the formal-
ization of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Holy
See placed the nation's official imprimatur of recognition and approval
upon a selected religion, in aid of that religion, and in preference of that
religion over all other religions, thereby entangling this government in
the affairs of that religion in violation of the establishment clause of the
first amendment.
79
What Phelps described are theories supporting his claim of a consti-
tutional violation, and not "distinct and palpable" injuries that he had
personally sustained or was in immediate danger of sustaining. Like
Phelps, the plaintiffs in Valley Forge claimed standing on the basis that
they had a spiritual stake in the case to enforce etablishment clause val-
ues.80 The reasoning of Valley Forge is controlling here because standing
is not measured by the intensity of the litigant's interest or the fervor of
his advocacy; nor are his strong beliefs or commitment to a constitu-
tional principle a permissible substitute for the showing of injury it-
self.8 1 Even assuming that some plaintiff had met the requisite standing,
questions of diplomatic relations are committed by the Constitution to
final decision by the Executive Branch and thus present nonjusticiable
political questions.
8 2
The Tenth Circuit also rejected Phelps' argument that the court
could review the President's decision to enter into formal diplomatic re-
lations with the Holy See. It has long been settled that the President's
resolution of such questions constitutes a judicially unreviewable polit-
ical decision.83 Application of the political question doctrine calls upon
the court to determine whether the Constitution itself prohibits judicial
intrusion because the matter in dispute has been committed to a coequal
branch of government, and whether prudential considerations make a
judicial resolution inappropriate.8 4 In this case, the factors discussed in
Baker clearly indicate that the matter presented a nonjusticiable political
question.8 5 Judicial reluctance to become involved in the running of
foreign affairs, and to second-guess the judgments of the political
branches which make foreign policy decisions, is further compelled by
the standards discussed in Baker.8 6 These factors have special applica-
tion to this case since there is a constitutional commitment to recognize
governments and appoint and receive ambassadors in art. II, sec. 2, cl.
2, sec. 3. Resolution of Phelps' claims would be impossible without an
initial policy determination, which would clearly amount to nonjudicial
79. Phelps, 812 F.2d at 1294.
80. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 482-83.
81. Id. at 486.
82. Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Reagan, 786 F.2d 194,
201-02 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)). Baker v. Carr is the case
most frequently cited in discussions of the nonjusticiability of certain issues.
83. Id. at 201.
84. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 211.
85. Id. at 217.
86. Id. See supra text accompanying note 55.
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discretion.8 7 Moreover, to undertake the review requested by Phelps
would be impossible as expressing lack of respect due coordinate
branches of government. 88 To adjudicate this claim would have re-
quired the court to second-guess the decision of the President to ap-
point an ambassador and establish formal relations with the Holy See.
Plainly, adjudication of Phelps' claim would have permitted the court to
enter an order severing our relations with the Holy See and directing
the removal of Ambassador Wilson, involving the "potentiality of em-
barrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question."8 9 In short, it is difficult to think of a case where the
concerns discussed in Baker v. Carr are more applicable.
4. Implications of Holding
The precedential weight of this holding within the Tenth Circuit
demonstrates that although the Flast exception represents a significant
departure, from the Frothingham rule, there are clear limits to that excep-
tion. The court's follow of the Third Circuit's lead in this area is an
acknowledgment by the Tenth Circuit that there has been no change in
the law of standing to require a departure from the Frothingham, Flast, or
Valley Forge line of cases. Even though the court spent a lot of time ad-
dressing standing, the effect of this holding illustrates that once the is-
sues in a particular case are found to rest on the political question
doctrine, there is no need to address the issue of standing because a
court could not adjudicate such a case absent the requisite subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. Although the Tenth Circuit did not directly address the
issues presented in this case, it is likely that other courts will follow suit
in the areas of the standing and political question doctrines.




The first amendment prohibits the government from infringing
upon the people's right to free speech.90 Where first amendment pro-
tections begin and end is unclear; Supreme Court Justices and legal
scholars have heatedly debated the contours of the first amendment for
many years. 9 ' Generally, a court that reviews an ordinance or statute
abridging speech will make an initial analysis in the following manner. If
87. Id. See also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 n.43 (1969).
88. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
89. Id.
90. The first amendment provides, in part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment is extended to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. For cases applying the first amendment to
the states, see Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925).
91. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (majority adopted a balanc-
ing approach recognizing that speech may be restricted to favor a "subordinating" govern-
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the law prohibits only a category of speech unprotected by the first
amendment, the law will stand because there has been no constitution-
ally relevant abridgment of free speech.9 2 If the regulation as written is
wholly contradictory to the freedom of speech guarantee, the court will
strike it down as unconstitutional "on its face."
9 3
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,9 4 the Court struck
down a West Virginia statute which compelled all students to participate
in a daily flag salute ceremony, on the grounds that the law violated the
first amendment by forcing students to declare a particular belief. The
crucial question was "whether such a ceremony so touching matters of
opinion and political attitude may be imposed upon the individual by
official authority under powers committed to any political organization
under our Constitution." 9 5 Thus, for the Court, the issue was not
whether the children should be allowed an exemption from a required
ceremony, but whether governmental officials had the legitimate author-
ity to compel such participation in the first instance.9 6 The Court up-
held the right of the students, for whom saluting the flag was a serious
violation of religious duty, to be exempt from a school procedure which
forced them to express support for values which directly conflicted with
those espoused by their subcommunity. The Court, rather than evaluat-
ing the wisdom of the governmental policy, focused on the freedom of
speech clause of the first amendment and found that it contained a core
mental interest). Justice Harlan delivered the majority opinion in Konigsberg, specifically
rejecting the "absolutist" approach of Justice Black. Id. at 49-50.
As does Justice Black, Alexander Meiklejohn, a noted advocate of free speech, views
the first amendment as an absolute-a specific reservation of sovereign power by the peo-
ple to themselves. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245,
253-54. Meiklejohn suggested that the first amendment necessarily must protect all com-
munication that insures that the people will acquire and maintain the experience and
knowledge to effectively govern themselves. According to Meiklejohn, protected speech
therefore includes, among other things, education and any speech promoting an under-
standing of philosophy, the sciences, literature, the arts, and public issues. Id. at 256-57.
For other theories regarding first amendment protection, see Bork, Neutral Principles
and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (proposing protection of only polit-
ical speech); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877
(1963) (arguing for "definitional balancing").
For a general discussion of the first amendment, see BeVier, "The First Amendment and
Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of the Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299
(1978) (overview of the scope of the first amendment protections); DuVal, Free Communica-
tion of Ideas and the Quest for Truth: Toward a Teleological Approach to First Amendment Adjudica-
tion, 41 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 161 (1972) (general discussion of approaches to first
amendment protections).
92. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). The Chaplinsky Court
concluded that the Constitution does not prohibit a state from punishing "fighting words"
or speech which is "lewd or obscene." Id. at 571-72.
93. See, e.g., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). The Lovell Court found an ordi-
nance requiring a license to distribute religious pamphlets invalid on its face. The Court
stated that the regulation struck "at the very foundation of the freedom of the press." Id.
at 451. For Justice Stone's now famous statement that legislation which directly en-
croaches upon the domain of one of the first ten amendments must fall within a "narrower
scope" to receive the Court's "presumption of constitutionality," see United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
94. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
95. Id. at 636.
96. Id. at 634-36.
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of absolute protection which the government could not infringe consti-
tutionally, regardless of any perceived wisdom in so doing. Underscor-
ing the pivotal position of free expression within the American
constitutional framework and the necessity for school authorities to
honor first amendment guarantees within their classrooms, Justice Jack-
son wrote for the Court majority: "If there is any fixed star in our con-
stitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other mat-
ters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein."
9 7
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,9 8 the
Supreme Court recognized that neither student nor teacher "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school-
house gate." 99 The dispute in Tinker arose when three students decided
to publicize their opposition to the Vietnam War by wearing black arm-
bands to school. The principals of the schools became aware of the plan
and adopted a policy that students wearing armbands to school would
be asked to remove them; students refusing would be suspended until
they returned to school without the armbands. The students were aware
of the regulation, but they ignored it and were suspended. 100 The
Court held that the students' suspensions violated the first amendment
because the school administrators failed to show that the students' "si-
lent, passive"'' expression of opinion materially and substantially in-
terfered with school discipline and operation or collided with the rights
of the other students.'
0 2
In reaching its conclusion, the Court balanced the schools' concern
with discipline against the students' right to freedom of expression.
10 3
The Court rejected the district court's conclusion that school adminis-
trators acted reasonably in suspending the students because of the fear
that the students wearing the armbands might cause a disturbance. This
form of expression, "symbolic speech," the Court stated, is protected by
the first amendment and cannot be prohibited merely because of school
officials' fears of disruption. 0 4 The first amendment protects certain
97. Id. at 642.
98. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
99. Id. at 506.
100. Id. at 504. The students sought an injunction restraining the school district from
disciplining them. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 258 F. Supp.
971, 973 (S.D. Iowa 1966). The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that
the school principals' actions were constitutionally permissible because they prevented the
students from disturbing school discipline. Id. The Eighth Circuit considered the case en
banc and, by an equally divided court, affirmed the district court's decision without opin-
ion. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967)
(en banc).
101. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 541.
102. Id. at 513.
103. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506-08; see also supra note 93 and accompanying text.
104. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. The school administrators attempted to justify the regula-
tion on the grounds that some friends of a former classmate who was killed in Vietnam
might confront the students and cause a disturbance. Id. at 509 n.3.
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types of conduct as a symbolic form of speech. 10 5 When the govern-
ment attempts to regulate the conduct aspect of that speech, however, it
necessarily effects an incidental restriction on the speech. The Supreme
Court developed analysis for incidental restrictions on speech in United
States v. O'Brien.10 6 In O'Brien, a draft resister challenged his conviction
under a federal statute that prohibited the destruction of draft cards;
O'Brien contended that the statute infringed upon his freedom of
speech.' 0 7 The Court upheld the federal statute and O'Brien's convic-
tion. In doing so, it established a four-part test for evaluating a regula-
tion that governs conduct, but incidentally restricts speech.1
0 8
Governmental regulation of expressive conduct should be sustained
... if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if
it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the fur-
therance of that interest.10 9
2. Equal Protection
Each of the guarantees of the first amendment has been held to be a
fundamental right and made applicable to the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, when a state bur-
dens the freedom of speech, the law must be analyzed under the strict
scrutiny required by the first amendment as well as the general guaran-
tees of the due process and equal protection provisions."10 Whenever a
statute allows some persons to speak, but not others, the statute at issue
may be analyzed under equal protection as well as first amendment prin-
ciples.''' Pursuant to such a statute, a state or local government has the
power to treat different classes of persons in different ways in the area of
public health, safety and morality,' 12 unless the classification is based on
"criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of [the] statute."' 13 Govern-
mental bodies cannot, however, legislate persons into different classifi-
cations when the classifications are unrelated to the objective of the
legislation.1 14 If the classification is reasonable, the remedial scheme
105. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (striking statute prohibiting dis-
play of red flag); see also West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(rejecting requirement that children salute flag in violation of their religious beliefs).
106. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
107. Id. at 376. The Court noted that a "sufficiently important government interest in
regulating the non-speech element can justify incidental limitations on first amendment
freedoms." Id.
108. Id. at 377.
109. Id. See generally Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975) (discussion of the impli-
cations of the symbolic speech cases); Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-
Card Burning Case, 1968 SuP. CT. REV. I (discussion of the O'Brien case).
110. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 783 (3d ed. 1986).
111. Id. at 852.
112. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
113. Id. at 76. (The ends must of course be legitimate.)
114. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
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does not violate the equal protection clause "simply because it fail[s]...
to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked."
' 15
3. Vagueness and Overbreadth
The Court will strike down a regulation for vagueness if the word-
ing of the law is unclear and leaves speakers uncertain as to whether
their speech will fall within the rule's prohibition. A statute violates due
process if it is so vague that a person of common intelligence cannot
discern what conduct is prohibited, required, or tolerated. 1 16 Review-
ing courts will also strike down a regulation that chills speech if the reg-
ulation is overbroad, that is, if it reaches speech that is protected by the
first amendment as well as unprotected speech.' '7
In recent years the Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of the
overbreadth doctrine," l8 so that only when a reviewing court deter-
mines that a statute or ordinance is substantially overbroad may the
court strike it down under the overbreadth doctrine. 19
B. Freedom of Expression: Mini Spas v. South Salt Lake City Corp.
1. Case in Context
Mini Spas v. South Salt Lake City Corp. ,120 involved the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeal's review of the District Court for the District of Utah's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of South Salt Lake. This
was an action seeking to have an ordinance of the City of Salt Lake,
Utah 12 1 declared invalid as in conflict with the Constitution of the
115. Id.
116. See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
117. The overbreadth rule allows a court to strike down a statute that, while designed
to prohibit activities not protected by the constitution, also prohibits activities which are
constitutionally protected. SeeJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, &J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 868 (2d ed. 1983).
118. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). The Broadrick court rejected an
overbreadth challenge to Oklahoma's limitation on permissible political activity by civil
servants. The majority concluded that: "particularly where conduct and not merely
speech is involved ... the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as
well .... Id. at 615; See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). The Ferber court
concluded that New York's statute prohibiting the sale of any material depicting a child
engaged in sexual activity was not unconstitutionally overbroad. The court determined
that "the extent of deterrence of protected speech can be expected to decrease with the
declining reach of the regulation." Id. at 772. The Ferber court extended the substantiality
requirement from cases involving conduct combined with speech to traditional forms of
speech-books and films. Id. at 771.
119. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
120. 810 F.2d 939 (10th Cir. 1987).
121. The Ordinance, in pertinent parts, reads:
(4) Each establishment shall provide to all patrons clean, sanitary and opaque
coverings capable of covering the patron's specified anatomical areas. No
common use of such covering shall be permitted, and reuse is prohibited
unless having been adequately cleaned. In addition, no owner, operator,
responsible managing employee, manager, or licensee in charge of or in
control of the massage establishment shall permit nor shall any employee of
masseur administer a massage unless the patron is covered by the covering
provided by the establishment.
(5) With the exception of bathrooms, dressing rooms, or any room utilized for
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United States. The provisions of the ordinance mandated a dress code
for massage parlor employees. Mini Spas, Inc. and the Society of Li-
censed Masseurs ("Mini Spas"), massage establishments doing business
in South Salt Lake, contended that the dress code was unconstitutional
because it proscribed expressive conduct in the form of nudity.12 2 The
city countered that the ordinance was enacted to control prostitution.12
3
Cross motions for summary judgment were filed by both parties. The
district court granted the city's motion, upholding the ordinance.
In its affirmance of the district court's grant of summary judgment,
the Tenth Circuit held that: the city had a legitimate interest in regulat-
ing prostitution; the purpose of the ordinance was unrelated to inhib-
iting freedom of expression; the ordinance was not overly restrictive,
overbroad, or unconstitutionally vague; and it did not violate equal
protection.
The importance of this holding is that where a city adopts an ordi-
nance regulating conduct which it seeks to restrict, the ordinance must
be only restrictive enough to further the city's interest, that interest
must be a substantial one, and the city must draft the ordinance so that it
is a valid exercise of the police power. Regulation of prostitution falls
within this category.
2. Statement of the Case
On October 13, 1982, South Salt Lake adopted an ordinance enti-
dressing purposes, no owner, operator, responsible managing employee,
manager, or licensee in charge of or in control of any massage establishment
shall permit any person in any area within the massage establishment which
is used in common by the patrons or which can be viewed by patrons from
such an area, unless the person's specified anatomical areas are fully cov-
ered. In addition, no owner, operator, responsible managing employee,
manager or licensee in charge of or in control of a massage establishment
shall permit any person to be in any room with another person unless all
persons' specified anatomical areas are fully covered.
(6) No owner, operator, responsible managing employee, manager, or licensee
in charge of or in control of a massage establishment shall permit any mas-
seur or employee to be on the premises of a massage establishment during
its hours of operation while performing or available to perform any task or
service associated with the operation of a massage business, unless the mas-
seur or employee is fully covered from a point not to exceed four (4) inches
above the center of the knee cap to the back of the neck. The covering will
be of an opaque material and will be maintained in a clean and sanitary
condition.
(7) No masseur or employee, while performing any task or service associated
with the massage business, shall be present in any room with another person
unless the person's specified anatomical areas are fully covered.
(8) No masseur or employee shall be on the premise of a massage establishment
during its hours of operation while performing or available to perform any
task or service associated with the operation of a massage business, unless
the masseur or employee is fully covered from a point not to exceed four (4)
inches above the center of the knee cap to the base of the neck. For pur-
poses of this subsection, the covering will be of an opaque material and will
be maintained in a clean and sanitary condition.
SOUTH SALT LAKE, UTAH, REV. ORDINANCES tit. 38, ch. 8, § 3B-8-5 (1974) (as amended).




tied "Massage Parlors and Masseurs." 12 4 The purpose of the ordinance
was to regulate the licensing, dress, and operation requirements of mas-
sage parlors. Mini Spas attacked the constitutionality of the ordinance,
contending that the dress code (1) was unreasonable, arbitrary, over-
broad, and violated Mini Spa's first amendment right of freedom of ex-
pression; (2) denied equal protection of the law in violation of the
fourteenth amendment; and (3) was unconstitutionally vague in viola-
tion of due process.
125
3. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit recognized that non-verbal, expressive conduct
has often been accorded first amendment protection,' 2 6 but that not all
conduct is necessarily "speech" under that amendment. 12 7 In O'Brien,
the Court stated "[w]e can not accept the view that an apparently limit-
less variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person en-
gaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea."1 28 Nudity per
se is not accorded protection under the first amendment. 129 What is
protected as "speech" is expressive conduct. An example of protected
conduct would be nude dancing.130 The dress code ordinance of South
Salt Lake does not regulate nude dancing nor modeling, rather the dress
code regulates the manner in which massage practitioners should be
dressed while practicing their profession.
The Supreme Court also noted that "when 'speech' and 'non-
speech' elements arecombined in the same course of conduct, a suffi-
ciently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech el-
ement can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms."' 13 1 Using the above cited cases, it is clear that the dress code
passed the O'Brien test, therefore, constitutional muster as well. Accord-
ing to the mayor of Salt Lake, the ordinance was enacted to both ensure
that the massage parlors within the city be run in a clean, professional
manner and that the massage parlors not be allowed to degenerate into
houses of prostitution. 13 2 These non-speech elements of the ordinance
justify whatever small limitation there might be on any speech because
the government of Salt Lake has a substantial interest in the health and
moral welfare of the citizenry which it has addressed through its mas-
sage parlor ordinance.
The Tenth Circuit, in reaching its conclusion, adopted the initial
requirements for an overbreadth challenge outlined in Broadrick v.
124. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
125. Mini Spas, 810 F.2d at 940
126. Id. at 941 (citing as examples West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943) and Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969)).
127. Mini Spas, 810 F.2d at 941 (citing U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
128. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
129. Aini Spas, 810 F.2d at 941.
130. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc, 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975).
131. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
132. Mini Spas, 810 F.2d at 941-42.
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Oklahoma.' 33 The court recognized that the overbreadth doctrine re-
flects a concern that a broadly written "statute's very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally pro-
tected speech or expression."' 13 4 "[T]here must be a realistic danger
that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First
Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it [the stat-
ute] to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds."' 135 Even if the
manner in which massage practitioners should be dressed while practic-
ing their profession somehow is accorded first amendment protection as
a form of expression, the regulation did not affect the constitutional
rights of any third parties not before the court. Therefore, the over-
breadth challenge failed.
The court recognized that the fourteenth amendment, through its
equal protection clause, does not deny to states the power to treat differ-
ent persons in different ways. 136 However, the equal protection clause
does deny to states the power to legislate that different treatment be
accorded to persons placed by statute into different classes on the basis
of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute.' 3 7 The dress
code ordinance's distinction of singling out massage parlors is equally
applicable to every massage practitioner within the South Salt Lake city
limits. South Salt Lake also has a legitimate interest in prohibiting pros-
titution and there is sufficient connection between the dress code provi-
sion and the prohibition of prostitution for the ordinance to be
rationally related to this interest and withstand constitutional attack.
The Tenth Circuit accepted the district court's assumption that the
city would enforce the dress code ordinance in a reasonable manner.
138
By doing so, the court did not have to address the issue of the statute
being subject to more than one interpretation. A statute violates due
process if it is so vague that a person of common intelligence cannot
discern what conduct is prohibited, required, or tolerated.' 39 By ac-
cepting the city's assertion that the restrictions in the ordinance did not
apply to arms and hands of masseurs, the district court was able to con-
strue the ordinance in a way to avoid the problem of unconstitutional
vagueness.14
0
4. Implications of Holding
This decision sends a signal to cities within the Tenth Circuit not to
be too concerned about the vagueness of their ordinances restricting
speech. The Tenth Circuit seems to be saying that if a city can somehow
133. 413 U.S. 601 (1973). See supra notes 118 and 119 and accompanying text.
134. Member of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 799 (1984)
(quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612). Also, the O'Brien test is applied to states and munici-
pal regulations. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804-05.
135. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 801.
136. Reed, 404 U.S. at 75.
137. McDonald, 394 U.S. at 809.
138. Mini Spas, 810 F.2d at 942, 943.
139. Id. at 943. See Connally, 269 U.S. at 391.
140. Mini Spas, 810 F.2d at 943.
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show that the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of their police
power, or otherwise meets the O'Brien test, that in the face of vagueness,
it would find a way to avoid an unconstitutional interpretation. It is un-
clear whether other circuits will follow this holding, for ordinances like
statutes, should be drafted to avoid being susceptible to two different
readings.
III. STANDARD APPLIED IN THE TERMINATION OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
A. Background
1. Procedural Due Process
Procedural due process is derived from the fifth 14 1 and four-
teenth 142 amendments, which only provide protection to individuals
faced with governmental actions that may deprive them of life, liberty or
property. 143 The threshold question facing courts in procedural due
process cases is whether the private interest affected by government ac-
tion can be considered a liberty or property interest. A litigant must
show that he has been deprived of a protected liberty or property inter-
est before he can claim the protection of procedural due process.
144
a. Liberty
Federal courts have recognized a protected liberty interest in one's
reputation 14 5 and freedom to take advantage of alternative means of
employment. 14 6 The Supreme Court furnished a broad definition of lib-
erty that was afforded procedural protection against arbitrary depriva-
tion in Meyer v. Nebraska.14 7 In Miller v. City of Mission, 148 the Tenth
Circuit explained the circumstances in which a public employee's liberty
141. U.S. CONST. amend. V, provides in part: "No person shall ... be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law .... "
142. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 states, in part: "[nlor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law .... "
143. See generally Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property" Adjudicative Due Process in the
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL-L. REV. 445, 452 (1977).
144. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (no property interest in non-ten-
ured teaching position). But see Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (implied property
interest in non-tenured teaching system).
145. Roth, 408 U.S. 564; Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (197 1) (reputation
interest affected by posting notice forbidding sale of liquor to claimant). But see Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (no reputation interest affected by distribution of photo identi-
fying claimant as shoplifter).
146. Roth, 408 U.S. 564; Miller v. City of Mission, 705 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1983) (assis-
tant police chief stigmatized by public dissemination of reasons for firing).
147. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In attempting to describe the liberty interest, the Court
stated that liberty "denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God ac-
cording to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recog-
nized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Id. at 399.
(emphasis added).
148. 705 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1983).
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interest may be violated by the manner of termination. 149 Miller re-
quired that notice of charges must be given to an employee a reasonable
time before a hearing in order to provide the individual a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.' 50 Miller further required that, except in ex-
tremely unusual situations, the individual must be given a pretermina-
tion hearing in order to be afforded a meaningful time within which to
be heard. 151
In Paul v. Davis,'15 2 however, a sharply divided Court held that state
defamation of a private individual "standing alone and apart from any
other governmental action" did not implicate any liberty protected by
the due process clause. 15 3 The five-person majority argued that "repu-
tation alone, apart from some more tangible interest such as employ-
ment," lay outside the range of liberties protected by the fourteenth
amendment.154 The Court stated that interests other than judicially de-
clared fundamental rights acquire the status of liberty or property pro-
tected by due process only if they "have been initially recognized and
protected by state law."' 5
5
149. See Sullivan v. Stark, 808 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1987).
150. Miller, 705 F.2d at 372.
151. Id. The court stated: " 'The concept of liberty recognizes two particular interests
of a public employee: (1) the protection of his good name, reputation, honor and integ-
rity, and (2) his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. The man-
ner in which a public employee is terminated may deprive him of either or both of these
liberty interests. When the termination is accompanied by public dissemination of the
reasons for dismissal, and those reasons would stigmatize the employee's reputation or
foreclose future employment opportunities, due process requires that the employee be
provided a hearing at which he may test the validity of the profferred grounds for dismis-
sal." Id. at 373 (quoting Lipp v. Board of Educ., 470 F.2d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1972)).
152. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). The activity challenged in Paul was the distribution by police
of a flyer containing photographs of persons identified as active shoplifters to local
merchants. A picture of Davis was included because he had been arrested on a shoplifting
charge though he was never convicted. Davis brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the chief of police claiming that he had been deprived of liberty without due pro-
cess because the police had damaged his reputation without providing him with a prior
hearing to determine whether he was an active shoplifter.
153. Id. at 694.
154. Id. at 701. Although earlier cases had indicated that the personal interest in repu-
tation was included within the constitutional protection of liberty, the Court fabricated
tenuous ways to distinguish these cases. For example, Justice Rehnquist interpreted (or
rather reinterpreted) the recognition in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971),
of a liberty interest in not having one's name posted by the sheriff in a liquor store as an
alcoholic, as having been based on the fact that the " '[p]osting' . . . significantly altered
[Constantineau's] status as a matter of state law, and it was that alteration of legal status
which, combined with the injury resulting from the defamation, justified the invocation of
procedural safeguards." Id. at 708-09.
On Rehnquist's performance in Paul, one commentator noted: "The Court's re-ra-
tionalization of the earlier cases is wholly startling to anyone familiar with those prece-
dents. In many ways ... this [is] Paul's most disturbing aspect. Fair treatment by the court
of its own precedents is an indispensable condition of judicial legitimacy." Monaghan,
supra note 14, at 424. For additional criticism of the Court's opinion in Paul, see Tushnet,
The Constitutional Right to One's Good Name. An Examination of the Scholarship of Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, 64 6 Ky. L.J. 753, 754-57 (1976).
155. 424 U.S. at 710. The opinion further seemed to suggest that only in these areas of




The definition of property since the 1972 decision in Board of Regents
v. Roth 156 has centered on the concept of "entitlement." In Roth, the
plaintiff was a Wisconsin State University teacher whose one-year con-
tract had not been renewed. He challenged the nonrenewal partly on
the ground that the University's failure to provide a statement of rea-
sons and a hearing violated his right to procedural due process.157 Roth
was untenured, and the relevant Wisconsin statute provided that all
state university teachers would be on probation until they had served
continuously for four years. Because Roth was hired for one year only,
without any promise that his employment would continue beyond that
period, his expectation of reemployment was not "property" and was
therefore not within the protection of the due process clause. Accord-
ingly, Roth was not entitled to any procedural protections over and
above those provided by state law. Roth's substantive interest was "cre-
ated and defined by the terms of his appointment,"' 5 8 and the Court
looked to those state-law terms to determine whether or not Roth's ex-
pectation was "property."'
59
In Pery v. Sindermann,160 a companion case to Roth, the Court exem-
plified the implied contractual approach. In Sindermann, the Court held
that a property interest may arise from "such rules or mutually explicit
understandings that support [an individual's] claim of entitlement to the
benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing."' 6 1 Like Roth, Sindermann
was a teacher at a state college; unlike Roth, he alleged that his institu-
tion had a defacto tenure system. 162 Furthermore, he alleged that he had
legitimately relied on statements in the college's official faculty guide
that purportedly instituted an informal tenure system. ' 63 The Court ac-
cepted Sindermann's argument, advancing two theories to support its
finding that the defacto tenure system created a protected interest - an
implied contract theory and an industrial common law theory.' 64 If
156. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
157. Roth also alleged that his termination was invalid because it transgressed a sub-
stantive limitation. He charged that he had been fired because of first amendment activity.
This charge, however, was not before the Supreme Court; the district court had stayed
proceedings on that issue pending Supreme Court review of the summary judgment. Id. at
574.
158. Id. at 578.
159. Id. at 577. In a frequently cited passage, the Court explained: "To have a prop-
erty interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire
for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it .... Property interests, of course, are not created by
the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law. " Id.
See also Vanelli v. Reynolds School Dist. No. 7, 667 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1982); Kendall v.
Board of Educ., 627 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1980).
160. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
161. Id. at 601.
162. Id. at 599-600. Like Roth, Sindermann also claimed he had been terminated for
exercising his free speech right to criticize the school administration. Id. at 594-95.
163. Id. at 600.
164. Id. at 601-02. The court announced that property interests "are not limited by a
few rigid, technical forms," id. at 601, noting that the absence of a written contract does
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Sindermann, on remand, could prove "the legitimacy of his claim of
such entitlement in light of 'the policies and practices of the institu-
tion,' " the Court held, he would be entitled not to reinstatement but to
procedural due process - that is, to a hearing on the grounds for his
termination. 165
An enlightening example of the statutory entitlement approach is
Bishop v. Wood. 16 6 There, the Court closely examined the language of
the relevant state statutes and ordinances to determine whether Bishop,
a probationary employee of the police department, had an enforceable
expectation of continued employment and therefore could be dis-
charged only for cause. 1 6 7 Finding that, under those statutes and ordi-
nances, Bishop's employment was terminable at will, 168 the Court held
that Bishop had no property interest. Consequently, he had no right to
procedural protection against arbitrary dismissal.
169
not foreclose a claim of entitlement supported by principles of implied contract. Id. at
601-02 (citing 3A CORBIN, ON CONTRACTS, §§ 561-72A (1960)). As for the industrial com-
mon law theory, the court stated that Sindermann "might be able to show from the cir-
cumstances of [his] service-and from other relevant facts-that he has a legitimate claim
of entitlement to job tenure." Id. at 602. The basic principle was that a school may create
an entitlement by creating a system of tenure "in practice," much as the common law of a
particular industry may supplement a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 602 (citing
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579-80 (1960) (gaps
in a labor agreement were "to be filled in by reference to the practices of the particular
industry and of the various shops covered by the agreement "-such practices described as
the "common law of the shop")).
It now appears unlikely that a practice alone, with no explicit promise attached, would
be found to create a property entitlement. Subsequent case law has stressed the need for a
"rule or mutually explicit understanding." For example, in Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438,
441-43 (1979) (per curiam), the Court held that a consistent state practice of admitting
attorneys to practice pro hac vice did not give rise to property interest because the interest
involved was not derived from a statute or rule, and because any understanding that ex-
isted, even if reasonable, was neither mutual nor explicit. The court expressly rejected the
theory, put forth injustice Stevens' dissent that an implicit promise could create an entitle-
ment "as if by estoppel." Id. at 444 n. 5, thereby limiting the reach of Sinderman. See
Terrell, supra note 54, at 912-18. See generally Comment, Leis v. Flynt: Retaining a Nonresident
Attorney for Litigation, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 572 (1979).
165. 408 U.S. at 603 (citation omitted). See also, e.g., Orloff v. Cleland, 708 F.2d 372,
377 (9th Cir. 1983) (postponement of termination of Veterans Administration employee
after initial expiration date of appointment may have given rise to property interest in
continued employment); Ashton v. Civiletti, 613 F.2d 923, 928-30 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (repre-
sentations in FBI's employee's handbook amounted to "clearly implied promise of contin-
ued employment"). Id. at 930 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). Cf.
Fowler v. United States, 633 F.2d 1258 (8th Cir. 1980).
166. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
167. Id. at 345.
168. Id. The relevant ordinance provided:
Dismissal. A permanent employee whose work is not satisfactory over a period of
time shall be notified in what way his work is deficient and what he must do if his
work is to be satisfactory. If a permanent employee fails to perform work up to
the standard of the classification held, , . . he may be dismissed by the City Man-
ager. Any discharged employee shall be given written notice of his discharge set-
ting forth the effective date and reasons for his discharge if he shall request such a
notice.
Id. at 344 n.5 (quoting MARION, N.C. PERSONNEL ORDINANCE, Art. II, § 6).
169. Id. at 347. Nor, moreover, did Bishop have a liberty interest at stake, according to
the Court, because he had not been stigmatized or foreclosed from future employment
prospects. Id. at 347-49; see also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572-75 (1972).
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Once it has been determined that a specific private interest is a lib-
erty or property interest, within the meaning of the due process clause,
judicial due process analysis must address a second question: whether
minimal procedural safeguards were followed before deprivation of the
private interest. Mathews v. Eldridge adopted a balancing of private-ver-
sus-governmental interest approach.170 In the last decade the Court has
consistently applied the Mathews three-pronged balancing test' 7 1 which
maximizes judicial discretion. 172
B. Entitlement to Government Employment : Sullivan v. Stark
1. Case in Context
In Sullivan v. Stark, 17 3 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with
the dismissal of a complaint filed by Sullivan, a park ranger, against the
National Park Service for terminating his employment prior to the expi-
ration of the period specified in his employment agreement. 17 4 Sulli-
van's complaint alleged a violation of his constitutional rights because of
a refusal to give him an opportunity to answer and refute his termina-
tion, stating a deprivation of liberty and property without due process of
law. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, holding
that Sullivan was an "excepted service' 17 5 employee who could be dis-
charged at any time, with or without cause.
The Tenth Circuit held that (1) the termination of Sullivan by the
Park Service did not violate his liberty interest because the termination
neither damaged his reputation nor barred him from seeking other em-
ployment; (2) a public employee with a valid contract of employment for
a definite term has a property interest in employment for the duration of
the term; and (3) a government agency making an excepted service ap-
pointment has power to enter into employment contracts that confer
property rights on an employee for the duration of the contract period.
In so holding, the court reversed and remanded the case to the district
court for a determination as to whether there existed a contract for a
170. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
171. See Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599-600 (1979); Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 17 (1978); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977).
172. In Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334-35, the Court indicated the following
factors should be considered in determining the "specific dictates" of due process: (1) the
private interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens which the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
173. 808 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1987).
174. Id. at 739. (The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming dis-
missed the action).
175. " 'Excepted Service' employees are ordinarily considered to be 'at will' employ-
ees, and are not entitled to the statutory procedural protections against discharge ac-
corded federal employees in the competitive service." Sullivan, 808 F.2d at 740 (citing 5
U.S.C. §§ 751 l(a)(1), 7513(b)); Fowler v. United States, 633 F.2d 1258, 1260 (8th Cir.
1980).
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definite term of employment. 176
The Tenth Circuit's reversal of the district court's decision to dis-
miss Sullivan's complaint, based on the fact that he was an "excepted
service" employee, is an example of the Circuit's imposition of a high
standard of care on the government. Where the government contracts,
it will be held to the terms of the contract where the breach of that con-
tract would be a deprivation of a property interest in violation of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment.
2. Statement of the Case
Sullivan was hired as a seasonal employee in the excepted service.
On May 5, 1982, he signed a "Letter of Acceptance and Employment
Agreement" with the Park Service to work as a park ranger. This agree-
ment provided that Sullivan work approximately four months, from June
8, 1982 through September 30, 1982. The employment agreement con-
tained an express provision for early termination. 177 On August 8,
1982, Sullivan was advised that his employment at Grand Teton Na-
tional Park had been terminated for unsatisfactory performance. Sulli-
van immediately demanded, but was told that he had no right to, a
hearing.
Sullivan exhausted all administrative remedies in attempting to con-
test his termination and then filed suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming. Sullivan contended that the employ-
ment agreement created a legitimate expectation of continued employ-
ment; that his constitutional rights were violated when the Park Service
refused to give him an opportunity to answer, refute, and contest the
alleged grounds for the termination; and that the agreement further cre-
ated the expectation that the employment would continue throughout
the term of the contract and would be terminated only for cause. The
district court dismissed the complaint and the Tenth Circuit reversed.
The case was remanded back to the district court for a determination of
whether there existed a contract based on the agreement that only bore
Sullivan's signature. A finding of a valid contract for a term would re-
quire the district court to decide what type of hearing due process
requires. i 78
3. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit rejected the Eighth Circuit's approach to the ex-
cepted service employee,179 and recognized the right of the individual
to contract. 180 Relying on Board of Regents v. Roth 181 the court stated
176. Sullivan, 808 F.2d at 741.
177. "I understand that due to extenuating circumstances, such as lack of funds or
other management changes, this offer of employment may be withdrawn or I may be ter-
minated before my stated ending date." Sullivan, 808 F.2d at 738.
178. Id. at 741.
179. Id. at 740.
180. See supra note 164.
181. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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that if Sullivan had a valid contract of employment for a definite term he
had a property interest, protected by procedural due process, in em-
ployment for the duration of that term.182 The Tenth Circuit saw noth-
ing prohibiting the Interior Department from contracting for a definite
term under its summer employment program but didn't know whether it
had done so.' 8 3 When the court looked at the document in the record,
it noted that it was only signed by Sullivan with no expressed reciprocal
promise of term employment by the Park Service. 184 The Tenth Circuit,
by its reference to other information furnished in a letter of employment
and a Seasonal Employee Handbook, by implication suggested that on
remand the district court should apply the standards established in Perry
v. Sindermann.i8 5 In that case the Supreme Court stated that a written
contract with an explicit tenure provision is clear evidence of a formal
understanding that supports a teacher's claim of entitlement to contin-
ued employment unless sufficient cause is shown.
As previously stated, the agreement provided that Sullivan's em-
ployment was to be effective from June 8, 1982, through September 30,
1982. When Sullivan entered into the employment agreement, he relied
on the past practice, custom and procedures of the National Park Service
in thinking that his tenure of employment would not be interrupted ex-
cept upon the,showing of sufficient cause. Even in the absence of an
express reciprocal promise by the Park Service, the district court on re-
mand could have found that there was an explicit understanding be-
tween the parties that the agreement was for a fixed term, and that
Sullivan had a reasonable expectation of continued employment
through the end of that term by the provision in the agreement.
Relying on Miller v. City of Mission,' 8 6 the Tenth Circuit had no
problem disposing of Sullivan's liberty interest claim.' 8 7 The court
found that Sullivan's reputation was not damaged because the termina-
tion was not disseminated to the public nor was he barred from seeking
other employment. 188
4. Implications of Holding
The precedential weight of this holding within the Tenth Circuit
will make it likely that where the government breaches a contract of em-
ployment for a definite term, plaintiff's property interest in employment
for the duration of the term has been offended and a hearing will be
required. This holding could have an adverse effect on the govern-
ment's reliance on employee categories when dealing with the termina-
tion of an employee, because of the weight given to an individual's right
182. See supra notes 156-165 and accompanying text.
183. Sullivan, 808 F.2d at 741.
184. Id.
185. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). See supra notes 160-165 and accompanying text.
186. 705 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1983). See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); see also supra
notes 151-155 and accompanying text.
187. Sullivan, 808 F.2d at 739.
188. Id. at 739.
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to contract. By implication, this holding also stands for the proposition
that a public employee's liberty interests are implicated when the rea-
sons for his discharge impugn his reputation or good name, or hinder
his freedom to seek other employment.
IV. STANDARD APPLIED TO DETERMINE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
A. Background
1. Substantive Due Process
The, Constitution prohibits the federal government and the states
from depriving a person of "life, liberty or property without due process
of law." 189 The due process clauses traditionally have been held to pro-
vide a foundation for analyzing the adequacy of government proce-
dures. 190 In addition, apart from the procedural limitations inhering in
the concept of due process,19' the clauses have been construed to pro-
vide "substantive constitutional protection of liberty and property."'
192
This due process limit on the substance of government regulation has
come to be known as the doctrine of substantive due process.'
9 3
2. Corporal Punishment as a Violation of Substantive
Due Process
The protection of substantive due process has been used to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of statutes and regulations authorizing corpo-
ral punishment and of the discipline as administered in individual
cases. 194 The use of corporal punishment as a means of disciplining
school children has deep roots in this country. 195 It was used exten-
sively during the colonial period when the practice was justified as a Bib-
lical exhortation. 196 Corporal punishment is defined as "[pihysical
punishment as distinguished from pecuniary punishment or a fine; any
kind of punishment of or inflicted on the body." 197 Although there is a
sharp division of opinion among both educators and the general public
regarding its use, 198 corporal punishment remains an authorized
189. U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV. See also supra notes 141-142 and accompanying
text.
190. Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1166
(1980) [hereinafter Developments].
191. W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR &J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 420 (5th ed. 1980).
192. Developments, supra note 189, at 1166; see also E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERN-
MENT (1948).
193. Developments, supra note 189, at 1166.
194. Note, Corporal Punishment in Public Schools: Constitutional Challenge After Ingraham v.
Wright?, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (1978).
195. R. MNOOKIN, CHILDREN AND THE LAW (1978).
196. H. FALK, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 11-48 (1941).
197. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 306 (5th ed. 1979).
198. See, e.g., E. BELMEIER, LEGALITY OF STUDENT DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES (1976); H.
FALK, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT (1941); J. HYMAN & J. WISE, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICAN EDUCATION (1979); K. JAMES, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
(1963); S. LEVINE & E. CARY, THE RIGHTS OF STUDENTS 84-86 (rev. ed. 1972); National
Education Association, Report of the Task Force on Corporal Punishment (1972); B. SKIN-
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method of discipline in most public school systems. 199
In Ingraham v. Wright,20 0 the Supreme Court addressed the rights of
students in the context of public school corporal punishment. Pupils in
a Florida junior high school sought damages and injunctive relief, alleg-
ing that school officials had violated their constitutional rights by sub-
jecting them to disciplinary corporal punishment. The plaintiffs initially
based their claims on three grounds: first, corporal punishment of
schoolchildren amounts to cruel and unusual punishment; second, se-
vere corporal punishment of public school students violates fourteenth
amendment substantive due process because it is "arbitrary, capricious
and unrelated to achieving any legitimate educational goal"; and third,
the school system's policies for corporal punishment violate fourteenth
amendment due process standards by failing to provide the pupils with
any procedural safeguards before administering punishment.
20 1
Although the Court acknowledged that the punishment complained
of in Ingraham was "exceptionally harsh"2 0 2 it denied or avoided the var-
ious constitutional claims. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Powell,
20 3
the Court decided that the eighth amendment was designed to protect
persons convicted of crimes and did not apply to paddling of schoolchil-
dren. 20 4 All members of the Court agreed that the students had a four-
NER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 192-93 (1953); Reitman, Foliman, & Ladd, Corporal
Punishment in Public Schools, ACLU REPORT (1972).
199. Ingraham, 430 U.S. 651, 660-61 (1977).
200. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
201. 525 F.2d 909, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), aft'd, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). The
Supreme Court, however, denied certiorari on the substantive due process question. See
infra notes 260-262 and accompanying text.
202. 430 U.S. at 657. The testimony before the district court revealed the experiences
of students at the junior high school. For example, on one occasion a teacher asked some
students, including James Ingraham, to leave the stage of the school auditorium. The
students left, but were slow in doing so. Taken to the office to be paddled, James pro-
tested his innocence and refused to be hit. Aided by two other school officials who held
James, the principal hit him at least twenty times with a wooden paddle. The punishment
produced a hematoma on the buttocks; a doctor who examined James advised him to stay
home from school for at least one week.
Roosevelt Andrews, the other named plaintiff in the case, stated that one year he was
paddled at least ten times, often for being late for physical education class or for wearing
an improper gym uniform. On one occasion, paddling by the principal caused severe
swelling of his wrist and he was unable to use his arm for a week.
Another student's hand was fractured and apparently disfigured as a result of a pad-
dling. Yet another pupil accused of making an obscene telephone call to a teacher was
paddled approximately fifty times, a different child later confessed to the offense. Two
boys were struck about fifty times each for "playing hooky." One boy who had asthma and
heart trouble was hit on the back with a paddle because he wanted to clean his chair in the
auditorium before sitting down. The child had to have an operation to remove a lump that
developed where he had been struck. On two other occasions this same child vomited
blood after being paddled. Many students testified that they had been subjected to pad-
dlings for a variety of offenses, including chewing gum and not keeping their shirttails
tucked in, and also testified that administrators carried paddles and brass knuckles around
the school. Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248, 255-59 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on rehearing,
525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
203. Justice Powell's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,
Blackmun and Rehnquist. The dissenting opinion by Justice White was joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens. Justice Stevens also wrote a brief dissenting opinion.
204. 430 U.S. at 664.
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teenth amendment liberty interest and that the students were
deliberately punished by restraint and the infliction of "appreciable
physical pain" by school officials acting under color of state law.2 0 5 The
majority held, however, that the availability of common law restraints
and remedies adequately satisfied the requirements of procedural due
process in protecting those liberty interests.
20 6
The Ingraham Court denied certiorari on the substantive due pro-
cess question, 20 7 which was posed broadly: "Is the infliction of severe
corporal punishment upon public school students arbitrary, capricious
and unrelated to achieving any legitimate educational purpose and
therefore violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment?" 20 8 Ingraham thus left unanswered "the substantive due process
issue of the child's own right to physical integrity." 20 9
In Hall v. Tawney, 2 10 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit became the first federal court to recognize that public
school children have a substantive due process right to ultimate bodily
security. 2 1 ' The court held that to vindicate this right, a school child
may claim federal relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983212 When specific corpo-
ral punishment exceeds in severity that which is reasonably related to
the state interest in maintaining order in the schools. 2 13 In this case a
school administrator, purportedly without provocation, struck a minor
plaintiff with a paddle made of hard rubber and about five inches in
width, across her left hip and thigh. When the plaintiff resisted, she was
shoved against a large stationary desk and was again "stricken repeat-
edly and violently" by the administrator. As a result of this application
of force the plaintiff was taken to the emergency room of a nearby hospi-
tal where she was admitted and kept for a period of ten days for treat-
ment of traumatic injury to the soft tissue of the left thigh, and trauma to
the soft tissue with ecchyniosis of the left buttock. In addition, the plain-
tiff was "receiving the treatment of specialists for possible permanent
205. Id. at 674.
206. Id. at 672, 683. For an excellent commentary on Ingraham, see Rosenberg, Ingra-
ham v. Wright: The Supreme Court's Whipping Boy, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 75 (1978) [hereinafter
Rosenberg].
207. 430 U.S. at 659 n.12, 679 n.47.
208: Id. at 659 n.12.
209. Rosenberg, supra note 206, at 107. Professor Rosenberg stated that "[a] princi-
pled resolution thereof.., would have required a finding that severe corporal punishment
is unconstitutional." Id. at 100.
210. 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980).
211. Id. at 613. The substantive due process analysis has been engaged in within a
variety of contexts by lower federal courts, but has never been applied in the context of
school corporal punishment. See generally, Sewell, Conclusive Presumptions and/or Substantive
Due Process of Law', 27 OKLA. L. REv. 151, 165-71 (1974).
212. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), specifically provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute .. .subjects . . .any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
213. Hall, 621 F.2d at 611.
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injuries to her lower back and spine."'2 14
In its review of this case, the Hall panel upheld the United States
District Court's dismissal of the cruel and unusual punishment claim and
the procedural due process allegation; however, it overruled that court's
dismissal of the substantive due process complaint. 2 15 Although recog-
nizing that the Ingraham Court had refused to review a claim that exces-
sive corporal punishment violated a right to substantive due process, the
Fourth Circuit determined that the availability of state civil and criminal
remedies did not preclude a federal cause of action under section 1983
when rights to substantive due process might be implicated. 2 16 The
Fourth Circuit concluded that school children have a right to ultimate
bodily security based on substantive due process and set forth the fol-
lowing test to determine whether the right has been violated:
... the substantive due process inquiry in school corporal pun-
ishment cases must be whether the force applied caused injury
so severe, was so disproportionate to the need presented, and
was so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely care-
less or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and
inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the
conscience.
2 17
In Rochin v. Cahfornia,21 s the Supreme Court held that the forced
pumping of a suspect's stomach was a clear violation of fourteenth
amendment due process because it "shocks the conscience,
' 2 19
although it was the only means of obtaining the criminal evidence that
the police sought. 220 The Court indicated that an individual's interest
in freedom from bodily intrusion is a fundamental interest. In finding
that the treatment violated the due process clause, Justice Frankfurter
recognized that the clause protected "personal immunities" that are
"fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
'22 1
3. Section 1983 and Qualified Immunity
Most corporal punishment cases are litigated in state courts under
charges of battery,2 22 or assault and battery;2 2 3 however, an increasing
214. Id. at 614.
215. Id. at 615.
216. Id. at 611. The Court had held the allegations sufficient to state a claim for relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and further held that the episodic nature of the punishment did
not preclude the federal action. Id. at 614-15.
217. Id. at 613. The Hall panel acknowledged that the Supreme Court, in Ingraham,
had ruled that school paddlings violated neither procedural due process nor eighth
amendment rights, and that since neither of these two rights were violated it might be
possible to imply a holding that neither could there be a violation of any substantive due
process right. Id. at 611. However, the Hall panel reasoned that the implication was not
compelled due to the Supreme Court's express reservation of the issue.
218. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
219. Id. at 172. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 133 (1954), limited Rochin to situa-
tions involving coercion, violence, or brutality to the person.
220. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-9 (1978).
221. 342 U.S. at 169 (quoting Cardozo, J., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
222. People v. Ball, 58 Ill.2d 36, 317 N.E.2d 54 (1974).
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number of litigants are bringing actions in federal court under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.224 This federal law allows a plaintiff whose civil rights have
been violated by state officials, to bring a constitutional tort or equity
action in federal court against such officials 22 5 or the governmental
agency that employs the individuals accused of committing the civil
wrong.
Many individuals who claim that their civil rights have been violated
prefer to seek damages in federal court under section 1983 primarily
because federal law prevents school districts and other municipal agen-
cies from claiming immunity under existing state law for the civil rights
violations committed by employees. 2 26 However, qualified immunity,
also known as the good faith defense, generally protects a public official
from liability if he can prove he acted in "good faith.
'" 22 7
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,22 8 the Supreme Court significantly changed
the basis for establishing the defense of qualified immunity in section
1983 actions. Under the Harlow test, government officials "generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known." 2 29 The decision eliminated the
subjective considerations that were enunciated in Wood v. Strickland.
2 30
Determination of qualified immunity is now to be based "on the objec-
tive reasonableness of an official's conduct, as measured by reference to
clearly established law."
'2 3 1
B. Constitutional Implications of Corporal Punishment in Public Schools:
Garcia v. Miera
1. Case in Context
Garcia v. Miera2 32 involved the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' re-
223. Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So. 2d 49 (1954).
224. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
225. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Traditionally, defendants had their
conduct tested against both an "objective" and a "subjective" standard. See Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). However, Harlow dispensed with the subjective element
and held that the defendant is not liable under § 1983, so long as his official actions do not
violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." 457 U.S. at 818.
226. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). In this case, the Supreme
Court held that when a public body is subject to liability, it cannot assert an immunity
based on the good faith of its officers as a defense even though the officials themselves
might assert such a defense when they are sued individually.
227. See generally, Note, Eleventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survey: Civil Rights, 61 DEN. U.L.
REV. 163, 165-66 (1984) (discussing the distinction between the subjective and objective
test, as applied by the Tenth Circuit).
The defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in good
faith. S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION § 8.01 (1979).
228. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
229. Id. at 818.
230. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). See supra notes 235 and 237 and accom-
panying text.
231. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
232. 817 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1987).
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view of the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico's
grant of summary judgment. The district court found that the school
officials involved in the two incidents of corporal punishment were insu-
lated from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983233 by qualified immunity.
Teresa Garcia, an elementary school pupil at the Penasco Elemen-
tary School in New Mexico, by her parents and best friends Max and
Sandra Garcia, sued the school officials in their individual capacities for
denying her substantive due process in violation of section 1983 arising
from two beatings suffered at their hands. 23 4 The district court granted
summary judgment to the school district, concluding that it was shielded
from liability by the defense of good faith immunity23 5 because "the law
governing whether excess corporal punishment can give rise to a sub-
stantive due process claim [was] not clearly established." ' 236 Garcia ap-
pealed the district court's grant of summary judgment contending that
at the time of the beatings excessive corporal punishment by school offi-
cials did violate her clearly established substantive due process rights.
In reversing the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit referred
to the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Ingraham v. Wright,
2 3 7
where the Court declared that "corporal punishment in public schools
implicates a constitutionally protected liberty interest."
23 8
2. Statement of the Case
Teresa Garcia was a grammar school student at the Penasco Ele-
mentary School, Penasco, New Mexico in 1982 and 1983. On February
10, 1982, Theresa Miera, the school principal, summoned Garcia, then
in the third grade, to her office to punish her for hitting a boy who had
kicked her. Miera attempted to paddle Garcia, but she refused to coop-
erate, resulting in Miera's calling J.D. Sanchez, a teacher at the school,
for assistance. Sanchez grabbed Garcia's ankles and held her upside
down while Miera hit her leg with the paddle. 2 39 The beating made a
two inch cut on Garcia's leg that left a permanent scar. Shortly after this
incident, Garcia's parents voiced their concerns to Miera and requested
that they be notified in the event their daughter was to be subjected to
corporal punishment again.
Garcia received a second beating about one and one-half years later
when she was summoned to Miera's office for saying she had seen a
teacher, Judy Mestas, kissing a student's father, Denny Mersereas, dur-
ing a field trip. Garcia also said that Mestas had sent love letters to Mer-
sereas through his son. 240 After suffering two blows with the paddle,
233. See § 1983, supra note 212 and accompanying text.
234. Garcia, 817 F.2d at 652.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
238. Id. at 672.
239. The paddle "was split right down the middle, so it was two pieces, and when it hit,
it clapped [and] grabbed." Garcia, 817 F.2d at 653.
240. Id. at 653, see also n.3.
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Garcia refused to receive the remaining three and asked permission to
telephone her parents. Miera refused to allow Garcia to phone her par-
ents until the paddling was completed. Miera then called Edward Leyba,
an administrative associate at the school, to assist her in delivery of the
remaining three blows. Leyba assisted by pushing Garcia towards a
chair over which she was to bend and receive the last three blows. Gar-
cia and Leyba struggled and Garcia hit her back on Miera's desk. She
then submitted to the last three blows. Garcia suffered back pains for
several weeks as a result thereof.
Garcia received medical treatment for multiple and severe bruises
to her buttocks she sustained from the second paddling. Dr. Albrecht,
M.D., the attending physician, stated, "I've done hundreds of physicals
of children who have had spankings . . . and I have not seen bruises on
the buttocks as Teresita had, from routine spankings . . . [T]hey were
more extensive, deeper bruises .... ,,241 The examining nurse, Betsy
Martinez, testified that if a child received such injuries by a parent's
hand, she would be obligated to notify protective services.
24 2
Garcia alleged that the severity of the paddlings violated her sub-
stantive due process rights. Miera, defendant-appellee, based her mo-
tion for summary judgment on the fact that the law concerning
substantive due process rights of school children subjected to corporal
punishment was not clearly established, entitling them to good faith
immunity.
3. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit rejected the Fifth Circuit's approach to substan-
tive due process in Ingraham, aligning itself with the Fourth Circuit on
this crucial issue. In Hall v. Tawney, 24 3 the Fourth Circuit indicated that
the infliction of corporal punishment by a public school official may vio-
late a schoolchild's constitutional rights. The court determined that
"there may be circumstances under which specific corporal punishment
administered by state school officials gives rise to an independent fed-
eral cause of action to vindicate substantive due process rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983."244 Although the test Hall proposed for determining a
due process violation is extremely stringent, the decision provides a
framework for the analysis of the substantive due process rights of stu-
dents subjected to excessive physical punishment. In coming to its con-
clusion, the Hall court went beyond the scope of Ingraham, in which the
Supreme Court expressly reserved the issue of substantive due
process.
24 5
Ingraham made clear that reasonable corporal punishment violated
241. Garcia, 817 F.2d at 653.
242. Id.
243. 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980). See also Milonas v. William, 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983) (the use of excessive physical force may violate
schoolchildrens' constitutional rights).
244. 621 F.2d at 611.
245. Ingraham, 430 U.S. 651, 659 n.12.
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no substantive due process rights of school children. 24 6 The Tenth Cir-
cuit held that by acknowledging that "corporal punishment implicates a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause," In-
graham clearly signaled that, at some degree of excessiveness or cruelty,
the meting out of such punishment violates the substantive due process
rights of the pupils.
24 7
Because the Tenth Circuit had addressed the issue of excessive cor-
poral punishment of a student in Milonas v. Williams,2 48 it decided that
the law was clearly established at the time of the second beating. By
relying on Harlow's objective test of what a reasonable person would
have known, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged the split between the Fifth
and the Fourth Circuits, but stated that the Supreme Court when it ad-
dressed the Fifth Circuit's decision in Ingraham, indicated that corporal
punishment in public schools is a constitutionally protected right.
4. Implications of Holding
Although the Supreme Court in Ingraham foreclosed section 1983
actions based on the eighth amendment or procedural due process, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that corporal punishment could violate sub-
stantive due process and hence serve as a basis for federal relief under
section 1983. The Garcia court's recognition of the right to ultimate
bodily security as a matter of substantive due process provides review in
federal courts of the conduct of public school officials. The Tenth Cir-
cuit has helped clear the way for the Supreme Court to declare severe
corporal punishment of schoolchildren a violation of substantive due
process.
CONCLUSION
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit balanced the right of
the individual with that of the governmental interest. Jn Phelps v. Reagan,
the Tenth Circuit had to decide if the first amendment was a limitation
on the President's power to appoint ambassadors. The court decided
that the case was foreclosed by the political question doctrine but not
before it addressed the standing issue, determining that Flast and Valley
Forge were still the precedent in the area of the first amendment estab-
lishment clause cases. In Mini Spas v. Salt Lake City Corp., the court was
also faced with a first amendment claim, freedom of expression. Here
the court determined that massage parlor's interest in freedom of ex-
pression was outweighed by the city's interest in regulating their dress
so as to prevent the parlors from degenerating into houses of prostitu-
tion. In Sullivan v. Stark, the Tenth Circuit required the government to
comply with due process requirements. The court stated that it saw no
reason why the government could not enter into employment contracts
246. Id. at 676.
247. Garcia, 817 F.2d at 654.
248. 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982).
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- having so contracted - it was bound to the terms of such contract
because there is a property interest in employment. In Garcia v. Miera,
the Tenth Circuit found a substantive due process right of students in
public schools in the area of corporal punishment. In an area of confu-
sion among the circuits and faced with silence from the Supreme Court,
the Tenth Circuit pioneered the field for the Supreme Court to adopt a
substantive due process standard in the area of corporal punishment.
Although the Tenth Circuit swung back and forth between the individ-
ual's rights and the governmental interest in the areas of procedural and
substantive due process, its overall approach was well-balanced.
Boston H. Stanton, Jr.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
This article will summarize and discuss five criminal procedure
cases decided by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit during the
survey period. The first two cases involve questions arising under the
fourth amendment, and the third case concerns rights under the fifth
amendment. The final two cases of the survey involves habeas corpus
proceedings.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT- UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES:
UNITED STATES V. RUCKMAN
A. Overview
Although the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States I stated that the
fourth amendment was intended to protect privacy interests and not
property interests, United States v. Ruckman 2 held that reference to prop-
erty interests may be necessary in specific cases to determine whether
the privacy interest is legitimate for fourth amendment protection.
B. Background
Since 1967, Katz v. United States has been the touchstone of fourth
amendment analysis. Prior to this decision, property interests governed
search and seizure analysis. 3 However, the Supreme Court in Katz
enunciated the often quoted statement: "[T]he Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places."'4 The property interest analysis was re-
placed by a two-prong privacy test set forth in Justice Harlan's concur-
ring opinion in Katz. 5 This test requires "first that a person have
1. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2. 806 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir. 1986).
3. Until 1967, the fourth amendment was viewed by the courts as protecting certain
private property, not intangible privacy, interests. This analysis permitted law enforce-
ment agents to search without a warrant so long as they did not trespass on private prop-
erty in the process. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (search warrant not
required when information can be obtained without trespassing, by placing detectaphone
on outer wall of defendant's office); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927)
(speech projected beyond confines of home over telephone wires is not protected against
warrantless seizure).
4. 389 U.S. at 351. In Katz, FBI agents placed an electronic bug on a public tele-
phone booth from which Katz, a bookmaker, conducted his business. Under traditional
fourth amendment analysis, the FBI agents did not need a warrant since the telephone
booth was a public area. Id.
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the notion that the fourth amendment pro-
tects only private property. The Court stated that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment Protec-
tion. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
5. Id. at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reason-
able.' ",6 In practice, the first part of the test is rarely a matter of conten-
tion and, generally, the ultimate issue is whether or not the defendant's
subjective expectation of privacy is one which society is prepared to rec-
ognize as reasonable.
7
No single factor is dispositive in determining whether an individual
may legitimately claim, under the fourth amendment, that private prop-
erty should be free of government intrusion not authorized by warrant. 8
Instead, the court looks at several factors in order to assess the degree
to which such a warrantless search infringes upon individual privacy.9
These factors include the intention of the framers of the fourth amend-
ment, the uses to which the individual has put a location,' 0 and a socie-
tal understanding that certain areas deserve protection from
government invasion.11
Notwithstanding the above evolution of fourth amendment analysis,
the privacy test enunciated in Katz has not impaired the vitality of the
"open fields doctrine," which permits law enforcement officers to enter
and search open fields t2 without a warrant.' 3 The Supreme Court in Oli-
ver v. United States 14 stated that the "open fields" doctrine was consistent
with its holding in Katz because first, open fields are not included within
"persons, houses, papers, and effects,"' 15 and second, there is no socie-
tal interest in protecting the activities generally associated with open
fields. 16
C. Facts
Without a warrant, state and federal authorities searched a natural
cave located on remote government property which defendant Frank
Ruckman had been living in and around for eight months. The entrance
of the cave had been sealed by Ruckman with a wooden wall and door. 17
The authorities had gone to the cave to execute a state warrant for
6. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
7. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
(1978).
8. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (citing Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)).
9. Id. (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977)).
10. Id. at 178 (citingJones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)).
11. Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)).
12. "Open fields" is land that is beyond the area immediately surrounding the home.
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1970).
13. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). Justice Holmes concluded in Hester
that "the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, is not extended to the open fields. The distinction
between the latter and the house is as old as the common law." Id. at 59.
14. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16. 466 U.S. at 177-80. Its decision was consistent with Katz, explained the Court,
because society is not prepared to recognize privacy expectations in open fields as reason-
able. Id. at 178.
17. United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1472 (10th Cir. 1986). The land is
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Ruckman's arrest, which was issued when Ruckman failed to appear in
state court to answer a misdemeanor charge. Ruckman could not be
found when the authorities first arrived and searched the cave. Shortly
after the authorities found certain firearms, Ruckman appeared and was
taken into custody.
18
Eight days later, local authorities, accompanied by Bureau of Land
Management ("BLM") agents, returned to clean out the cave and found
thirteen illegal anti-personnel booby traps, resulting in charges being
brought against Ruckman. 19 At trial, Ruckman moved to suppress the
use of the anti-personnel weapons as evidence, but the motion was de-
nied 20 and thereafter the possession of the weapons formed the basis of
his conviction. 2 ' Ruckman appealed the conviction claiming that the
cave was his "home" and that the government's search thereof violated
his fourth amendment right to be free from warrantless searches.
D. Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit first rejected Ruckman's contention that the cave
was his home by holding that the cave could not be considered a perma-
nent residence. 2 2 The court concluded that Ruckman was just "camp-
ing" for an extended period of time and that the cave was not a "home"
within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
23
The decision, citing Katz stated that in order for the cave to come
within the ambit of fourth amendment protection, Ruckman must have
had a subjective expectation of privacy in the cave which society was
prepared to recognize as being reasonable. 24 In its analysis, the major-
ity assumed that Ruckman had such an expectation and then focused
exclusively on whether his expectation of privacy was reasonable under
the circumstances.
2 5
In concluding that Ruckman's expectation of privacy was not rea-
sonable, the majority's opinion revolved around the fact that Ruckman
was a trespasser on federal lands. The decision noted that Congress'
power over federal lands is without limitation 26 and that Ruckman was
owned by the federal government and controlled by the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM). Id. at 1472.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1471-72. The trial court, by minute order, denied the motion without any
comment. Id. at 1471.
21. Ruckman was convicted for unlawfully possessing destructive devices, within the
meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 5845(0(3), in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). 806 F.2d at 1471.
22. 806 F.2d at 1473. By arguing that the cave was his "home," Ruckman had at-
tempted to bring his claim within the literal language of the fourth amendment which
guarantees "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their 'persons, houses, papers and
effects,' against unreasonable searches and seizures .. " U.S. CONST. amend IV.
23. 806 F.2d at 1473. Counsel for Ruckman conceded that he was just "camping" in
the cave. Id.
24. 806 F.2d at 1472.
25. Id.
26. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. This clause provides Congress with the authority to
make all necessary rules and regulations respecting property belonging to the United
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subject to ejectment at anytime.2 7 The fact that Ruckman may have sub-
jectively deemed the cave to be his "castle" was not decisive.2 8 The le-
gitimacy of the expectation of privacy, explained the court, is not
dependent upon whether a person chooses to conceal private activity,
but whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and
societal values protected by the fourth amendment.
29
The majority conceded that Katz is often cited for the proposition
that the fourth amendment protects people, not places, but further ex-
plained that the reasonableness of an individual's expectation of privacy
cannot be determined without reference to a place.30 As support, the court cited
Oliver v. United States3 ' in which the Supreme Court noted a distinction
between "open fields" and "certain enclaves."' 32 The greater accessibil-
ity of "open fields" in general, stated the Court, has meant that these
fields are not protected by the fourth amendment, even when the field is
surrounded by fences and "No Trespassing" signs.3 3 The fact that the
owner of an "open field" has attempted to conceal private activity is not
a controlling factor; instead the Supreme Court examines the accessibil-
ity of open fields in general.
3 4
In further support of its decision, the court in Ruckman cited a case
arising out of the First Circuit which held that squatters on public land
have no reasonable expectation of privacy. 35 The First Circuit stated
the squatters' claim of a reasonable expectation of privacy was "ludi-
crous" because the squatters knew they had no colorable claim to oc-
cupy the land.
3 6
States. Pursuant to this authority, the Bureau of Land Management can control access to
public land.
27. 806 F.2d at 1473 (citing United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940)).
28. Id. In other words, Ruckman's expectation of privacy is meaningless unless soci-
ety recognizes it as being a reasonable expectation.
29. Id. at 1474.
30. Id. The location of the property searched is a factor in determining whether legiti-
mate expectations of privacy have been violated.
31. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
32. Id. at 179-80. The Court stated that open fields do not provide the setting for
those intimate activities that the fourth amendment was intended to protect against gov-
ernment intrusion or surveillance. The Court did not define "intimate activities," but,
presumptively, they are those activities which are expected to be private and not subject to
public observation. Certain enclaves are those areas in which we normally expect intimate
activities to take place. Id. at 179.
33. Id. In discussing the general accessibility of open fields, the Court stated that "[it
is not generally true that fences or 'No Trespassing' signs effectively bar the public from
viewing open fields in rural areas." See also United States v. Rucinski, 658 F.2d 741 (10th
Cir. 1981) (although lumber yard was located in secluded mountain valley and was sur-
rounded by barbed wire and no trespassing signs, no unreasonable intrusion occurred
when government agents took pictures of the defendants' mill yard from adjacent prop-
erty), cert. deied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982).
34. Id.
35. Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
916 (1976). The squatters' homes and belongings were bulldozed after they were asked
several days earlier to leave voluntarily. Id. at 9.
36. Id. at 11. Shortly after the squatters set up a community on government land,
officials from two commonwealth agencies visited the squatters on two occasions and tried




In dissent,3 7 Judge McKay contended first, that the majority's in-
quiry into whether Ruckman's cave constituted a home within fourth
amendment protection was unnecessary; and second, that their reliance
on Ruckman's status as a trespasser was not in accordance with Katz'
elimination of property interests in fourth amendment analysis.
3 8
McKay stated that the court's inquiry into whether the cave consti-
tuted a home presupposed that only homes are protected by the fourth
amendment. 39 He held this to be untrue since the Supreme Court had
previously acknowledged that a person could have a legally sufficient
interest in a place other than his own home, and still fall within fourth
amendment protection from unreasonable government intrusion into
that place.40 McKay asserted that the ultimate issue, as in all fourth
amendment cases, was whether the defendant had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the area searched. 4 1 Although the majority addressed
this issue, McKay argued that the majority's conclusion that Ruckman's
expectation of privacy was not legitimate was incorrect because it fo-
cused on property interests, rather than privacy interests.
4 2
Without reference to trespassing and other related property inter-
ests, McKay concluded that Ruckman's expectation of privacy was both
reasonable and legitimate because the cave contained all of his belong-
ings and he had tried to seal off the entrance of the cave by constructing
a wall and door.
4 3
F. Analysis
By following precedent, the majority was correct in concluding that
reference to property interests may be necessary in determining whether
asserted privacy interests are legitimate. The Supreme Court, in focus-
ing on these reasonable expectations of privacy, has not altogether
abandoned the use of property concepts in determining the presence or
absence of privacy interests protected by the fourth amendment. 44 The
relationship between property interests and society's perception of the
reasonableness of asserted privacy interests was discussed by the Court
in Rakas v. Illinois.45 The Court explained that "one who owns or law-
37. United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1474 (10th Cir. 1986) (McKay, J.,
dissenting).
38. Id. at 1475-78 (McKay. J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 1475-76 (McKay, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 1476 (McKayJ., dissenting) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)).
41. Id. (McKay, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 1478 (McKay, J., dissenting).
43. Id. (McKay, J., dissenting).
44. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 (1984) ("The existence of a prop-
erty right is but one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are legiti-
mate."); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 ("... by focusing on legitimate
expectations of privacy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether
abandoned use of property concepts in determining the presence or absence of the privacy
interests protected by that Amendment.").
45. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
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fully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy by virtue of [his] right to exclude
[others]." 
46
The Supreme Court has held that this right to exclude is not dispos-
itive in every case. 4 7 Even though the person asserting the privacy inter-
est has a property interest, the Court still examines the surrounding
circumstances to determine whether the privacy interest is legitimate.4 8
In the instant case, however, the Tenth Circuit found that the Gov-
ernment's property right to exclude was dispositive of Ruckman's pri-
vacy interests. 49 This conclusion, without more, was unsupported since
the court did not examine factors other than the property rights. Nor
did the court explain why a trespasser who is subject to ejectment has no
reasonable expectation of privacy. The Supreme Court has stated that
property rights and privacy interests are not coterminous. 50 Yet in the
instant case, the Tenth Circuit concluded that government officials
could disregard Ruckman's makeshift door and search his personal be-
longings, since the officials had authority to tell Ruckman, a trespasser,
to leave.
The court's analogy to "open fields" cases was not supportive of its
decision. As Justice Powell stated in Oliver, open fields are not protected
against unwarranted searches because they do not generally provide the
setting for those intimate activities which the fourth amendment was in-
tended to protect. 5 1 The court's reference to open fields in Ruckman
was therefore incomplete, since the court did not explain why a cave
enclosed with a wall and filled with personal belongings did not provide
a setting for protected intimate activities.
Additionally, the majority's reliance on Amezquita v. Hernandez-Co-
lon 52 does not strongly support its decision in Ruckman. In Amezquita the
squatters had been asked at least twice by commonwealth officials to vol-
untarily remove their belongings, 53 and thus the court determined that
they had no reasonable expectation of privacy. 5 4 In the instant case,
there was no evidence that Ruckman had been asked to leave. Further-
more, Ruckman had been living in the cave for more than eight
months. 5 5 In light of these facts, the court should have explained why it
imputed an absence of privacy rights from the fact that Ruckman had no
46. Id. at 143 n.12.
47. See, e.g., Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152-53
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring)).
48. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
49. Ruckman, 806 F.2d at 1473 ("Ruckman's subjective expectation of privacy is not
reasonable in light of the fact that he could be ousted by BLM authorities from the place
he was occupying at any time.").
50. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
51. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179.
52. 518 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976).
53. Id. at 11.
54. Id.
55. Ruckman, 806 F.2d at 1472. Ruckman's living in the cave all this time, without
being disturbed by the government, is in contrast to the squatters in Amezquita who were
approached by government officials shortly after moving onto public land.
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possessory rights in the cave. In other words, the court failed to explain
why society believes that a trespasser has no privacy interests. More-
over, the majority's opinion failed to distinguish Ruckman from campers
who camp without permits or overstay their permit. Campers do not
own the public land upon which they camp, but would expect to be
asked to dismantle their campsites and leave before they would be sub-
jected to a warrantless search. The court's opinion in Ruckman leaves
one wondering whether campers on government property will have any
privacy interests if they remain for a period beyond their camping
permits.
5 6
II. UNITED STATES V. MABRY
A. Overview
In United States v. Mabry,57 the court held that when police are in-
volved in undercover drug purchases where the objective is to arrest the
seller's suppliers and to confiscate the contraband, a search warrant for
the supplier's home does not have to be sought until the identity of the
supplier and the location of the contraband is established to the satisfac-
tion of the police. This standard is controlling even though exigent cir-
cumstances sufficient to excuse the procurement of a search warrant are
predictable.
B. Background
Typically, police officers must go before a neutral government offi-
cial5 8 and obtain a warrant prior to a search of an individual's premises.
The warrant is granted if sufficient facts are presented demonstrating
the probability that evidence of a crime can be found in that specific
private dwelling. 5 9 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that warrant-
less searches inside a home are presumptively unreasonable. 60 How-
ever, there are some "exceptional circumstances" to this presumption
that, if met, allow the police to intrude into a private dwelling without a
search warrant.
6 1
One of the better known exceptions to the warrant requirement is
that of exigent circumstances.6 2 This exception permits police officers to
56. Id. at 1474 (McKay, J., dissenting). Judge McKay argued that the majority's deci-
sion was a threat to all campers, including senior citizens who live in recreational vehicles.
"Under the majority's sweeping language, they could be found at any time to be 'trespass-
ing' on federal lands and be stripped of any legitimate expectation of privacy in their tem-
porary dwellings." Id.
57. 809 F.2d 671 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 33 (1987).
58. A neutral government official is a judicial officer or magistrate who is detached
from the law enforcement side of government. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971) (state attorney general is not a neutral and detached government official
for purposes of issuing search warrants).
59. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 558, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 885 (1928).
60. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
61. See United States v.Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); United States v. Erb, 596 F.2d 412
(10th Cir. 1979).
62. For other exceptions to the warrant requirement, see Chimel v. California, 395
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enter a private dwelling for some limited purpose if the prosecution es-
tablishes that the officers have probable cause and exigent circum-
stances exist.
6 3
Probable cause to search a dwelling exists "when circumstances
known to a police officer are such as to warrant a person of reasonable
caution in the belief that a search would reveal incriminating evi-
dence." 64 Exigent circumstances exist when officers have reason to be-
lieve that criminal evidence may be destroyed6 5 or removed 6 6 before a
warrant can be obtained. In assessing whether exigent circumstances ex-
ist, the court is "guided by the realities of the situation presented by the
record."' 6 7 Courts will not attempt to second-guess the police: the cir-
cumstances are evaluated as they would appear to a prudent, cautious
and trained officer.
6 8
In United States v. Cuaron,6 9 police entered and secured the defend-
ant's home without a search warrant because they feared that he would
destroy or attempt to remove drugs. The police theorized that the fail-
ure of the defendant's carrier to return from a drug transaction, at which
he was arrested by undercover police, might give notice to the defend-
ant that problems had arisen. 7° The Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit upheld the warrantless search by holding that exigent circum-
stances were created by the two or three hour time delay between the
arrest of the courier 7' and the procurement of a search warrant.
C. Facts
The defendants, John and Debra Mabry, appealed their convictions
of drug related offenses claiming that the trial court committed revers-
ible error by refusing to suppress evidence seized by government offi-
cials as a result of an unconstitutional entry into their home.72 The
U.s. 752 (1969) (after making an arrest, police may conduct a warrantless search of the
area within the defendant's (arrestee's) immediate control); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971) (evidence associated with criminal activity may be seized without a
search warrant when police are lawfully on the premises and the evidence is in plain view).
63. United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 586 (10th Cir. 1983) (citing United States
v. Erb, 596 F.2d 412, 417, 419 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 848 (1979); see, e.g., United
States v. Chavez, 812 F.2d 1295, 1298 (10th Cir. 1987).
64. United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting United
States v. Hawkins, 595 F.2d 751, 752 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 910 (1979)).
65. Cuaron, 700 F.2d at 586 (citing Erb, 596 F.2d at 418-19).
66. Id. (citing McEachin, 670 F.2d at 1144-45).
67. Id. (quoting McEachin, 670 F.2d at 1144).
68. Id.
69. 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983).
70. Id. at 585.
71. The police did not obtain a search warrant until after they had completed the drug
transaction and arrested the courier. Id.
72. United States v. Mabry, 809 F.2d 671, 676 (10th Cir. 1987). The Mabrys were
jointly tried along with co-defendant Roger Sanders. The issues raised here relate only to
the Mabrys. Sanders presented only one issue on appeal-he contended that the trial
court committed reversible error by denying his requested jury instruction on entrapment.
Id.
Each of the defendants were found guilty on various counts of conspiracy to distribute
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Mabrys specifically sought to exclude evidence discovered by the Albu-
querque, New Mexico Police Department, after officers entered their
home without consent and conducted a protective sweep of the premises
before obtaining a search warrant.
73
The trial court concluded, and the Mabrys agreed, that the investi-
gating officers had probable cause to search the Mabrys' home and that
exigent circumstances had made the warrantless entry necessary. 7 4 The
Mabrys argued, however, that the officers involved had sufficient facts to
justify the issuance of a search warrant before any exigent circumstances
arose.7 5 On that premise, appellants specifically argued that "police in-
activity and disregard of the procedures available to obtain a search war-
rant could not justify the warrantless entry into and seizure of a private
residence under the guise of exigent circumstances.,
'76
The facts giving rise to the warrantless entry and protective sweep
of the Mabry residence were derived from an undercover narcotics in-
vestigation which was conducted by the Albuquerque, New Mexico Po-
lice Department. That investigation consisted of several drug purchase
and sale transactions over the course of a month between an undercover
officer, Gonzales, and Rodger Sanders, co-defendant. During the
course of those transactions, Sanders would not reveal the identity of his
source, but did intimate to undercover officer Gonzales that his source
lived in nearby Tijeras, New Mexico.
7 7
On the morning of the defendants' arrests, Officer Gonzales met
with Sanders to discuss the purchase of a large quantity of cocaine. Af-
ter Sanders stated that he needed to call his source, Gonzales observed
and recorded the numbers that Sanders dialed. 7 8 By early afternoon,
the police learned that this telephone number belonged to the defend-
ant, John Mabry.
Two detectives went to survey and photograph the Mabry residence
that afternoon. By 7:00 p.m., a photograph of the Mabry residence was
made available to ten law enforcement detectives7 9 when they met to
plan their surveillance strategy for Gonzales' drug purchase that same
evening.
8 °
When Gonzales and another officer met with Sanders, a disagree-
ment over how much money should be paid in advance for the cocaine,
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (possession with intent to distribute cocaine); 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(l)(B) (distributing cocaine); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (aiding and abet-
ting). Id. at 673.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 679-80.
75. The Mabrys raised a total of seven issues on appeal, and the court ruled in favor of
the Government on all seven issues.
76. Id. at 678 (quoting Brief for Appellants at 12, United States v. Mabry, 809 F.2d
671 (10th Cir. 1987) (No. 85-2322).
77. Id. at 673-75.
78. Id.
79. Id. The photograph of the Mabry residence was attached to the affidavit in sup-
port of a search warrant. Id. at 689 (McKay, J., dissenting).
80. Id.
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and a desire by Gonzales to inspect some of the cocaine, caused Sanders
to make two trips to the Mabry residence between 9:00 p.m. and 10:30
p.m. During each trip, Sanders was observed by detectives driving up to
the Mabry residence and leaving.8 1
The police did not begin the process of obtaining a search warrant
for the Mabry home until after they arrested Sanders at 11:07 p.m. when
he returned from the Mabry residence with two ounces of cocaine.8 2 At
this time, the police also determined that there were exigent circum-
stances making it necessary for six officers to proceed to the Mabry
house in order to secure the home and its contents while awaiting the
search warrant.
8 3
Detective Gonzales was asked at trial why he did not obtain a search
warrant for the Mabry residence after he observed Sanders dialing the
telephone of John Mabry. He stated that he did not know who the con-
nection was or where the house was located, and therefore, probable
cause was not present.
8 4
D. Majority Opinion
The majority agreed that Officer Gonzales' observation of Sanders
calling the Mabry residence did not create sufficient probable cause to
justify the issuance of a search warrant for the Mabry house.8 5  More-
over, in determining the reasonableness of police activities, the majority
stated that courts must be sensitive to the nature of police investigations
and their public interest goals.
8 6
The objective of a drug investigation is to effect an undercover
transaction with a seller in such a manner that the seller will lead the
police to both the supplier and the contraband.8 7 In the instant case,
the court held it was perfectly proper that the police did not attempt to
obtain a search warrant until the source of the cocaine was established to the
satisfaction of the officers. 8 8 This did not come to pass until Sanders made
his last trip from the parking lot to the Mabry home, after Sanders had
been given money to bring back a portion of the one-half pound of
cocaine.
8 9
After the majority set the standard for obtaining a search warrant,
81. Id.
82. Id. at 690 (McKay, J., dissenting). Officers were dispatched to Albuquerque to
obtain a search warrant at approximately 11:30 p.m. The officers who secured the home
received the search warrant approximately two and one-half hours later, at 2:00 a.m. Id.
83. Id. at 674-75. The officers, experienced in drug transactions, feared that John
Mabry would get suspicious and destroy incriminating evidence when Sanders failed to
return.
84. Id. at 674.
85. Id. at 677. The majority merely stated that they agreed with Officer Gonzales, and
did not discuss why probable cause was lacking at this point.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (emphasis added). The majority appeared to be referring to the officers' actual




they focused on whether the officers' warrantless entry into the Mabry
home was supported by exigent circumstances. The court relied on
United States v. Cuaron9 ° by holding that the officers' fear, that Mabry
might grow suspicious about Sanders' failure to return, justified a war-
rantless entry into the Mabrys' home for the purpose of preventing the
destruction of evidence while a search warrant was being obtained.9 '
E. Dissent
In dissenting, Judge McKay suggested that although the majority
correctly quoted the Mabrys' chief contention on appeal, 92 the majority
failed to squarely confront this contention. 93 The court's decision fo-
cused entirely on the exigent circumstances which arose between the
time of the arrest of Sanders and the warrantless entry into Mabry's
home, and not the real issue of whether there was sufficient probable
cause far enough in advance of Sander's arrest that a warrant should
have been pursued prior to that time.
9 4
McKay asserted that it was not the function of a police officer to
determine whether there was sufficient probable cause to justify the issu-
ance of a warrant, because "the very person whose behavior is meant to
be circumscribed by the warrant requirement is the one who determines
whether a warrant should issue."19 5 This rule is particularly important,
McKay noted, when the rise of exigent circumstances is predictable and
inexorable.
96
McKay also argued that the majority's reliance on United States v.
Cuaron was misplaced because the issue in Cuaron was simply whether
the warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances, and not, as




Judge McKay, in dissent, was correct in asserting that the majority
90. 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983). In Cuaron, the officers in a clandestine drug inves-
tigation kept a surveillance on the route of a suspected drug seller to his source/supplier's
home one and one-half hours prior to the seller's arrest. The agents, as in the present
case, began efforts to obtain a search warrant for the home of the source/supplier,
Cuaron, after the seller's arrest. After waiting approximately 40 minutes, the officers pro-
ceeded to secure Cuaron's home before the search warrant was obtained. Id. at 585.
In upholding the officers' warrantless entry into Cuaron's home, the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit held that waiting to search does not necessarily remove the presence
of exigent circumstances, even if the officers may have waited long enough to obtain a
search warrant. Id. at 590 (citing United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1145 (D.C.
Cir. 1981)); see United States v.Johnson, 361 F.2d 832, 842, 844 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977)).
91. Wabry, 809 F.2d at 677-79.
92. See text accompanying notes 77-78.
93. 809 F.2d at 688-89 (McKay, J., dissenting).
94. Id. (McKay, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 692 (McKay, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 689 (McKay, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 694 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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did not address the Mabrys' chief contention, although it was correctly
cited by the court.9 8 The majority instead examined the presence of
exigent circumstances and concluded that its decision in Cuaron was dis-
positive.9 9 The court in Cuaron, however, addressed the issue of
whether exigent circumstances were present,10 0 and did not address the
issue of whether a warrantless search was excusable because probable
cause to obtain a warrant existed prior to the rise of exigent
circumstances.
As Judge McKay noted, there was no evidence presented by the
state as to why the officers had not made an attempt to obtain a warrant,
other than Officer Gonzales' assertion that he did not think he had prob-
able cause earlier in the afternoon.' 0 ' Thus, there was no evidence to
rebut the Mabrys' contention that probable cause existed as late as 7:00
that evening. Despite the absence of evidence, the majority concluded
that it was perfectly proper that the police did not attempt to obtain a
warrant until the source of the cocaine was established to the satisfaction
of the police. 10 2 The majority also failed to explain, as Judge McKay
noted in his dissent, why the officers could not have sought a warrant
earlier and waited to execute the warrant later in the day.10 3 As a result
of this case, the determination of whether probable cause exists is taken
away from the judiciary and left in the hands of the police. Such a result
is particularly disheartening in the instant case because exigent circum-
stances are almost always sure to arise in undercover drug
operations.1
0 4
98. The Mabrys contended that "the facts in possession of the police at least five
hours before the warrantless entry [of the Mabry residence] would have led any prudent
and trained officer to believe that there was a 'fair probability that contraband or evidence
of crime' would be found in the Mabry residence. Under the totality of the circumstances
of this case, the officers involved had probable cause to search the Mabry residence as
early as late afternoon on April 4, 1985, and no later than the strategy meeting at 7:00
p.m." Id. at 676-77 (quoting Brief for Appellants at 20-21, United States v. Mabry, 809
F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1987) (No. 85-2322) (citations omitted)); see also id. at 688 (McKay, J.,
dissenting).
99. In addressing the Mabrys' contention that probable cause existed prior to the exi-
gent circumstances, the court stated "[wie believe that this court, in United States v. Cuaron,
... effectively put this contention to rest." Id. at 678. The majority therefore believed that
Cuaron was controlling even though the Mabrys did not deny that exigent circumstances
were present.
100. Id. at 586. The chief contention of the defendant in Cuaron was that the police had
no objective basis to believe that destruction of criminal evidence was imminent: see also
Alabry, 809 F.2d at 694 (McKay, J., dissenting).
101. 809 F.2d at 691 (McKay, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 677 (McKay, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 693 (McKay J., dissenting).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Chavez, 812 F.2d 1295 (10th Cir. 1987) (examples of how predictably the police can pro-
ceed without warrants due to the fear of the destruction of evidence, i.e. drugs).
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III. FIFTH AMENDMENT-MIRANDA WARNINGS AND
VOLUNTARINESS OF CONFESSIONS:
UNITED STATES V CHALAN
A. Overview
In United States v. Chalan, l0 5 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit elaborated on the definitions of custody for purposes of administer-
ing Miranda warnings and eliciting involuntary statements.
B. Background
1. Custodial Interrogation
In Miranda v. Arizona, 10 6 the Supreme Court held that the prosecu-
tion may not use statements derived from custodial interrogation 10 7 un-
less it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.' 0 8 The Court
in Miranda explained the inherent threat of compulsion in custodial sur-
roundings and that statements obtained from suspects cannot truly be
the product of the suspect's free choice unless adequate warnings are
employed to dispel the compulsion. 10 9 Furthermore, the Court stated
that it would not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the de-
fendant was aware of his fifth amendment rights without a Miranda
warning being given.' 10 Thus, the Court laid down a blanket rule which
excludes all statements obtained from custodial interrogation unless it is
shown that the suspect received adequate warnings as to the availability
of the privilege prior to the questioning. I''
Since the compulsion of self-incrimination is derived from the cus-
todial surroundings and not necessarily the interrogation, statements
obtained from police interrogation are admissible so long as the suspect
was not in custody at the time of the questioning. 1 2 The Supreme
Court in Miranda stated that "[b]y custodial interrogation, we mean
105. 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1987).
106. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Landmark decision whereby the Court set forth procedural
safeguards, now more commonly known as Miranda warnings, which must be followed by
police when subjecting suspects to "custodial interrogation").
107. See text accompanying note 115.
108. 384 U.S. at 458-65.
109. Id. at 457. Prior to Viranda, the admissibility of statements obtained from police
interrogation was generally determined by reference to the voluntariness of the statement,
in light of due process protection provided by the fourteenth amendment. See text ac-
companying notes 126-28.
110. 384 U.S. at 467-68.
111. Id. at 468 ("The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of
constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of
the privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the de-
fendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given.").
112. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (suspect who voluntarily accompanied
police to station house after reporting a homicide was not in custody for purpose of Mi-
randa warnings when he was told that he was not under arrest and afterward was permitted
to leave); Oregon v, Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (burglary suspect who voluntarily
came to police station for questioning and then left without being arrested was not in
custody for purpose of Miranda warnings).
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questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way."' 13 Although the question of whether a person is in
custody is not very ambiguous, the latter part of the Court's definition of
custody-"otherwise deprived of his freedom"-has been the focus of
numerous decisions' 1 4 subsequent to Miranda.
The Supreme Court in Miranda alluded that an accused who was the
focus of an investigation must be given Miranda warnings, 15 but the
Court has since rejected such an interpretation of "custodial interroga-
tion.'" 116 Instead, the Court had stated that the ultimate inquiry in de-
ciding the custody question "is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest
or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a
formal arrest."' I 71n making this determination the Court has examined
"how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood
his situation."' 18
In Oregon v. Mathiason,' 19 the Court held that a suspect who "volun-
tarily" came to the police station in response to a police request was not
in custody, and was therefore not entitled to Miranda warnings.' 2 0 In
reversing the Oregon Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court
stated that a noncustodial situation was not converted to one in which
Miranda applies simply because the questioning took place in a coercive
environment. A formal arrest or "restraint on freedom of movement"
of the kind associated with a formal arrest must be present before Mi-
randa warnings are triggered, even though the questioning takes places
in a coercive environment.'
2 '
2. Voluntariness
The fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination prohibits
the admission of incriminating statements obtained by government acts,
threats, or promises which permit the defendant's will to be overborne
113. Mfiranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
114. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492
(1977); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324
(1969); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323
(1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
115. Mfiranda, 384 U.S. at 444 n.4.
116. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976). The Court explicitly rejected
the defendant's argument that the mere fact that an investigation had "focused" on him
meant that he was entitled to Miranda warnings. See also United States v. Ellison, 791 F.2d
821, 823 (10th Cir. 1986).
117. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curium) (quoting Oregon
v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).
118. MXcCarty, 468 U.S. at 442. "[A]n objective, reasonable-man test is appropriate be-
cause, unlike a subjective test, 'it is not solely dependent either on the self-serving declara-
tions of the police officers or the defendant nor does it place upon the police the burden of
anticipating the frailties or idiosyncracies of every person whom they question.' " Id. at
442 n.35 (summarizing and quoting People v. P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 9-10, 233 N.E.2d 255, 260,
286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 233 (1967)).
119. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).




and thus rendered involuntary. 1 2 2 To determine whether a suspect's
statements are made voluntarily, a court examines the "totality of the
circumstances" including both the characteristics of the accused and the
details of the interrogation.1
2 3
Prior to Miranda, the admissibility of statements obtained from po-
lice interrogation was generally determined only by reference to the vol-
untariness of the statement. 124 The Miranda decision did not pre-empt
or alter the application of the voluntariness test; instead, the decision
merely added another variable into the admissibility of those confes-
sions obtained during custodial interrogation. 12 5 Statements made in-
voluntarily are still inadmissible, regardless of whether Miranda
warnings are given or were not required because the questioning did
not constitute "custodial interrogation." 1
2 6
Because the subjective nature of the "voluntariness" test prevents
any formulation of clear guidelines, the admissibility of confessions
must be determined on a case-by-case basis. The ultimate inquiry, how-
ever, is whether the confession was the product of free will. 12 7 If the
confession is not the product of free will, the confession will not be ad-
missible even though it appears to be reliable and not the result of con-
scious wrong doing by the interrogator. 12 8 Although no single factor is
determinative of the issue of voluntariness, the following factors are im-
portant when considering the "totality of the circumstances:" the na-
ture of the questioning, the length of interrogation, the number of
interrogators, the suspect's age, education and experience, and the use
of physical punishment.1
2 9
122. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1969); United States v. Fountain, 776 F.2d 878 (10th
Cir. 1985); United States v. Falcon, 766 F.2d 1469 (10th Cir. 1985).
123. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), where the court stated:
"Some of the factors taken into account have included the youth of the accused,
his lack of education, or his low intelligence, the lack of any advice to the accused
of his constitutional rights, the length of detention, the repeated and prolonged
nature of the questioning, and the use of physical punishment such as the depri-
vation of food or sleep."
Id. at 226 (citations omitted). See also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961);
United States v. Fountain, 776 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Falcon, 766 F.2d
1469 (10th Cir. 1985).
124. The aim of this inquiry was to determine whether a suspect's right to due process
under.the fourteenth amendment had been violated. See, e.g., Townsend v. Sam, 372 U.S.
293 (1963) (confession not admissible when obtained after suspect was given drug with
truth serum qualities); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) (confession induced after
police pretended to arrest suspect's sick wife held not admissible).
125. Mfiranda directs that statements are to be excluded, regardless of their voluntari-
ness, if the statements were obtained during custodial interrogation and were not pre-
ceded by Miranda warnings.
126. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966).
127. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 225.
128. See Sam, 372 U.S. 293 (confession held involuntary, even though investigators
were unaware of truth serum qualities of drug which they gave to the defendant to sup-
press symptoms of withdrawal from heroin).
129. Buslamomle, 412 U.S. at 226; see supa note 124 (for the Court's language listing the
factors).
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C. Facts
Defendant Daniel Chalan, an adult Indian who lived on the Cochiti
Pueblo in New Mexico, was identified by a witness as being one of four
young Indian males seen near a convenience store at the time that it was
robbed and its assistant store manager shot and bludgeoned to
death. 3 0 The day after the robbery and murder, federal and local law
enforcement officers contacted Chalan through a message conveyed to
him by his mother, and asked him to meet them at the Pueblo Gover-
nor's office.
1 3 1
Chalan arrived at the Governor's office, accompanied by his
mother. At the beginning of the interview he was explicitly informed
that he did not have to answer any questions, that he was not a suspect
in the case, and that the officers merely wanted him to provide them with
information.' 3 2 The questioning, however, was often accusatory, and
the investigators,133 the Governor, and Chalan's mother exhorted him
to tell the truth.
At no time during the interview was Chalan arrested or given any
Miranda warnings. After approximately one and one-half hours of ques-
tioning, the interview ended and Chalan departed without ever admitting to
any participation in the robbery and murder.
13 4
The day after the interview at the Pueblo Governor's office, Chalan
spoke with several of his cousins about the murder and robbery and de-
cided to discuss the crimes with the law enforcement officers again. An
FBI agent came to the home of Chalan's cousin after Chalan asked his
relative to summon the Bureau. When the agent arrived, Chalan con-
fessed to having committed the crimes before the agent had asked
Chalan any questions. 13 5 The agent then informed Chalan of his Mi-
randa rights and Chalan signed a written waiver-of-rights form and then
gave a detailed confession, which was later reduced to writing and
signed. 13 6 The confession occurred approximately twenty-two and one-
half hours after Chalan was questioned the day before at the Pueblo
Governor's office. 1
3 7
At the suppression hearing preceding the trial, Chalan sought to
exclude both his confession made to the FBI agent and his statements
made the day before at the Pueblo Governor's office. Chalan argued
that he was subjected to custodial interrogation at the Pueblo Gover-
130. United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1305 (10th Cir. 1987).
131. Id. at 1305.
132. Id. The officers wanted to know whether Chalan knew anything about the crimes
at the convenience store.
133. Chalan was questioned by an FBI agent, two investigators from the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, and an officer from the local sheriff's department. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. The court did not state what Chalan said specifically.
136. Id.
137. Id. rhe time frame of the confession sheds light on the validity of Chalan's claim
that he was still operating under coercion that allegedly was placed on him at the Gover-
nor's office. As more time transpires between the questioning and confession, there is less
likelihood that the coercive questioning caused the subsequent confession.
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nor's office without first being admonished of his constitutional rights in
violation of Miranda. Specifically, Chalan argued that his attendance at
the interview was compelled by tribal custom, which demands he not
refuse a request by the Pueblo Governor to come to his office and which
requires him to remain until dismissed.
138
Alternatively, Chalan argued that his statements at the Pueblo Gov-
ernor's office were made involuntarily because his mother, the investiga-
tors, and the Governor exhorted him to tell the truth. Furthermore, he
argued that the confession made the following day was also given
involuntarily.
D. Tenth Circuit Opinion
1. Custody
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that
Chalan could not reasonably have believed that he was in custody during
the interview at the Pueblo Governor's office.'139 Chalan's argument
that his attendance at the interview was compelled by tribal custom was
also rejected by the court. 14 0 The court stated that it was unconvinced
that the Governor's influence sufficiently restrained Chalan's freedom so
as to necessitate the safeguards required by Miranda, although Chalan
had presented evidence at the suppression hearing that suggested that
obedience to the Governor is expected of all tribal members.
14 1
As in Mathiason v. Oregon,14 2 the court apparently was not influenced
by the coercive and accusatory nature of the interview. 14 3 The determi-
native factor was that Chalan came to the interview voluntarily and was
free to leave at anytime. 1
4 4
2. Voluntariness
The court assessed the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding
Chalan's statements at the Governor's office by examining the personal
characteristics of Chalan and the details of the investigation, and con-
138. Id. at 1307.
139. Id.; see also United States v. Ellison, 791 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1986) (when reviewing
denial of motion to suppress, trial court's findings of fact must be accepted unless clearly
erroneous).
140. 812 F.2d at 1307.
141. Id. In addition to being in charge of the Pueblo police force, the Governor is the
head of the Pueblo and presides over the tribal council.
142. 429 U.S. 492 (1977). The defendant in Mathiason had been asked to come to the
police station to discuss his involvement in a recent burglary. While at the police station, a
detective lied to Mathiason by stating that Mathiason's finger prints had been found at the
scene of the burglary, when in fact no finger prints were found. Thereafter, Mathiason
confessed to committing the burglary, but he was not arrested, and after further question-
ing was allowed to leave. Id. at 493-94.
The Supreme Court held that Mathiason was not in custody despite the coercive envi-
ronment in which the questioning took place. The important fact, stated the Court, was
simply whether Mathiason was free to leave during the questioning. Id. at 495.
143. Chalan, 812 F.2d at 1307.
144. Id. at 1307-08.
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cluded that Chalan's statements were made voluntarily.14 5 In regard to
the details of the investigation, the court noted that Chalan's consistent
denial of any participation in the crimes throughout the interview indi-
cated that his free will was not overburdened by the questioning. 14 6 In
addition, although all those present at the Governor's office exhorted
Chalan to tell the truth, he was specifically informed at the beginning of
the interview that he was not obligated to answer any questions. Finally,
the court interpreted the presence of Chalan's mother throughout the
interview as an indication that the interview was not unduly coercive. 147
With respect to Chalan's personal characteristics, the court noted
that he was not uneducated and that he also had experience with law
enforcement procedures both as an officer for the Pueblo Police Depart-
ment and as a prior arrestee.
148
Chalan's confession was also examined, even though the court had
already found that he was not subjected to undue coercion at the Gover-
nor's office. 149 The court noted that twenty-two hours had elapsed be-
tween his confession and the interview at the Governor's office and that,
during this time, Chalan did not have any contact with the police. More-
over, Chalan initiated the contact and spontaneously confessed to the
crimes upon seeing the FBI agent. 150 Finally, the court found the
signed waiver form as strong proof of the voluntariness of Chalan's
waiver to remain silent prior to confessing. 
15 1
E. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit aptly applied Supreme Court precedent in con-
cluding that Chalan was not subjected to "custodial interrogation" at
the Pueblo Governor's office. Although Chalan was asked by the police
to come to the Governor's office, and the interrogation was often coer-
cive and accusatory, the only relevant inquiry was whether there was a
formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associ-
ated with a formal arrest.152 The coercive nature of the environment in
which the questioning took place was irrelevant for purposes of Miranda
warnings, so long as Chalan remained free to leave. 1 53
It was also correct for the Tenth Circuit to reject Chalan's argument
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1308.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1305. Chalan was 22 years old at the time of the investigation and had at-
tended some college. He also had been arrested twice and had earlier worked approxi-
mately one year as a law enforcement officer for the Pueblo.
149. Note that Chalan argued that his confession was involuntary because the coercion
used in the interview was still operating when he made his confession the next day. Thus,
it appears that the court's further examination of Chalan's confession was unnecessary,
since the court had already found that the interview was not coercive.
150. Id. at 1308.
151. Id. (citing United States v. Fountain, 776 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1985)).
152. See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam); Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)(per curiam).
153. See Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 ("[A] noncustodial situation is not converted to one
in which Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the
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that his attendance at the Governor's office was compelled because, by
tribal custom, he could not refuse the invitation. If the court did not
reject this argument, then any citizen who is asked to come to the police
station could argue that his sense of civic duty compelled his attendance,
and that he therefore could be considered "in custody" for the purpose
of Miranda warnings. Such a result would be contrary to the Supreme
Court's desire to limit Miranda to formal arrests or restrictions on free-
dom of movements of the degree associated with arrests.
15 4
In regard to the voluntariness of Chalan's statements, the court was
correct in concluding that Chalan was not subjected to undue coercion
at the Governor's office. Since the ultimate inquiry in examining "vol-
untariness" is to determine whether the suspect's will was
overburdened, Chalan's consistent denials illustrate that his will was not
overburdened, even though all those present exhorted him to tell the
truth.




In Phillips v. Murphy, 155 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that habeas corpus petitioners are not entitled to evidentiary hearings in
federal court, when their applications are supported by allegations that
are vague and conclusory, and are wholly incredible in the face of the
record.
B. Background
Federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings are empowered to
provide trial-like proceedings in which the court may receive evidence
and try the facts anew. 156 Indeed, in Townsend v. Sain 157 the Supreme
Court held that this exercise of power by the federal courts is mandatory
when the habeas applicant has not received a full and fair evidentiary
hearing in state court.
158
The Supreme Court elaborated in Blackledge v. Allison,159 however,
absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took
place in a 'coercive environment.' ").
154. See Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1124.
155. 796 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1986).
156. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1985); see also Townsend v. Sam, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). "The
whole history of the writ-its unique development-refutes a construction of the federal
courts' habeas corpus powers that would assimilate their task to that of courts of appellate
review." Id. at 311.
157. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
158. Id. at 312. The defendant in Townsend had been injected with a drug to suppress
symptoms of withdrawal from heroin before confessing. The defendant was then denied
an opportunity in state court to present evidence that the drug had "truth serum" qualities
which caused his confession to be involuntary Id. at 321-22.
159. 431 U.S. 63 (1977).
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that it would be unwise to allow hearings in all federal post-conviction
proceedings, 160 and that finality in the sentencing process should be
sought for the good of the prisoner and the court. 16 1 It was recognized
that many collateral attacks may be inspired by " 'a mere desire to be
freed temporarily from the confines of the prison.' ",162 Despite the
concern, the Court stated that the habeas corpus applicant in Blackledge
was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the allegations were not
vague and conclusory but were supported by specific facts. 163 The criti-
cal question, explained the Court, was whether these allegations, when
viewed against the record of the plea hearing, were so "palpably incredi-
ble," so "patently frivolous or false," as to warrant summary
dismissal. 164
C. Facts
The petitioner pleaded guilty in two separate state cases 165 and, af-
ter a pre-sentence investigation, received sentences totaling eighty-five
years.1 6 6 In so pleading, the petitioner was subjected to extensive in-
quiry by the state district court judge to determine whether the guilty
pleas were voluntary and informed. 16 7 After sentencing, petitioner
160. Id. at 71.
161. Id. The defendant can then focus on rehabilitation, and the courts conserve vital
resources, such as court time and the expense of revisiting judgments.
162. Id. at 72 (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 284-85 (1948)).
163. Id. at 75-76. The petitioner in Blackledge sought habeas corpus relief on the
ground that his guilty plea was involuntary due to an unkept plea agreement. At the state
arraignment, the petitioner had entered a guilty plea by responding to form questions on
an "adjudication form." One of the form questions asked petitioner whether he under-
stood that he could be sentenced up to life, while another asked whether anyone had made
any promises that would influence his plea of guilty. Petitioner was required to only write
no or yes, and there were no other records or transcripts of the arraignment. Id. at 66 n. 1.
Three days after his guilty plea, petitioner was sentenced to 17 to 21 years imprison-
ment. Thereafter, petitioner sought habeas corpus relief in federal district court claiming
that his guilty plea was induced by his attorney's promise that he would get only a 10 year
sentence. The petitioner elaborated on his claim with specific factual allegations, indicat-
ing exactly what the terms of the promise were; when, where, and by whom it had been
made; and the identity of a witness to its communication. Id. at 76-77.
The federal district court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing and
held that the printed "form" was conclusive evidence that petitioner's guilty plea was vol-
untary. The dismissal was reversed by the Fourth Circuit. Blackledge v. Allison, 553 F.2d
894 (4th Cir. 1976).
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's reversal by holding that the district
court could not fairly adopt a per se rule excluding all possibility that a defendant's repre-
sentations on the record at the time his guilty plea was accepted were so much the product
of such factors as misunderstanding, duress, or misrepresentation by others as to make the
guilty plea a constitutionally inadequate basis for imprisonment. Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 76.
The Court stated that a petition can be dismissed without an evidentiary hearing when
the allegations are vague or conclusory, but not when the petitioner elaborates on his
claim with specific factual allegations. Id. at 76-77.
164. Id. at 76.
165. Phillips v. Murphy, 796 F.2d 1303, 1303 (1986). The petitioner was charged in
C.R.F. 80-346 with lewd molestation of a minor. In C.R.F. 80-653, he was charged with
one count of robbery with a firearm, one count of first-degree rape, three counts of sod-
omy and two counts of kidnapping for extortion.
166. Id. Petitioner was sentenced to five years imprisonment in C.R.F. 80-346 and 80
years imprisonment in C.R.F. 80-653 to be served consecutively.
167. Id. at 1304-05. The state court asked the petitioner in open court whether he was
[Vol. 65:4
1988] CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
sought state relief claiming that his guilty pleas were neither voluntary
nor intelligently made because he was operating under the impression
that the district attorney had agreed to recommend a forty year sentence
in exchange for his guilty pleas.'
68
The state court denied the petitioner's application for state post-
conviction relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The same
state district court judge that had questioned the petitioner before ac-
cepting his guilty pleas also ruled on the petitioner's motion for post-
conviction relief. The state court judge concluded that, in light of the
record and prior proceedings, the matter was a question of law and did
not require an evidentiary hearing. 169
Thereafter, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,170 petitioner brought a
petition in federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus. The district
court dismissed petitioner's petition by order without an evidentiary
hearing and petitioner appealed. 171 In addition to his original claim for
post-conviction relief, the petitioner argued on appeal that he should
have received an evidentiary hearing because his post-conviction pro-
ceeding raised material issues of fact.
172
D. Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that, if the facts are in dispute and
the habeas corpus applicant does not receive a full and fair evidentiary
hearing in state court, the applicant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing
in federal court.17 3 However, the applicant is not entitled to an eviden-
tiary hearing when his assertions are wholly incredible in the face of the
record. '
74
aware of the following: the court was advised that there were no negotiations between the
District Attorney's office and his lawyers, whereby there would be any recommended sen-
tence to be presented to the court; that the sentence would be left to the discretion of the
court; and that the defendant in the related case who was charged conjointly with the
petitioner in C.R.F. 80-653 (alleging robbery with a firearm, first degree rape, sodomy,
and kidnapping for extortion) received a 70 year sentence and that the court would proba-
bly take that verdict into consideration in determining the petitioner's sentence.
The court also asked whether he was entering his plea of guilty due to any force, or
threats or inducements made to him by any officer, attorney, or anyone else. Id.
168. Id. Since the petitioner stated in court that his guilty plea was not induced by any
promises, the assumption must be that petitioner argues he responded negatively in order
to receive a lower sentence.
Petitioner also argued that his guilty pleas should be set aside because he was not
placed under oath at the time of the plea proceedings. The Fifth Circuit has a supervisory
rule which requires that defendants be placed under oath when the court inquiries as to
plea agreements. See Coody v. United States, 470 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated, 588
F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
The Tenth Circuit declined to adopt such a rule and noted that no constitutional basis
for the procedural rule was intimated by the Fifth Circuit in Coody. Thus, in the Tenth
Circuit, statements made in open court during plea proceedings are accepted even when
the defendant is not placed under oath.
169. 796 F.2d at 1305.
170. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982).
171. 796 F.2d. at 1305.
172. Id. at 1303.
173. Id. at 1304 (citing Townsend v. Sam, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)).
174. Id. (citing Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977)) ("Solemn declarations in
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The court reviewed the record and findings from the plea proceed-
ings and concluded that the petitioner's assertion that the district attor-
ney was to recommend a forty year sentence was wholly incredible.175 The
court noted that the petitioner was aware of statements in the plea pro-
ceedings indicating there were no negotiations on the sentence and that
the judge's sentencing decision would be influenced by a seventy-seven
year sentence given to another defendant charged conjointly with the
petitioner. 176 Thus, since the petitioner's assertion was found to be
"wholly incredible," he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in fed-
eral court, even though he alleged factual disputes and did not receive
the hearing in state court.'
7 7
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit held that the state district court's
finding that the plea was entered without negotiations with the office of
the district attorney was a historical fact 178 subject to a habeas corpus
presumption of correctness standard. Thus the petitioner was not free
to contest this finding in federal court unless he met the requirements of
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 179 Although the ultimate question-whether a
open court carry a strong presumption of verity. The subsequent presentation of con-
clusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are con-
tentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible."). See text accompanying
note 166.
175. 796 F.2d at 1305.
176. Id. The court also noted that petitioner did not attempt to support his allegations
with specifics as to when or how such an understanding between him and the district attor-
ney was made.
177. Id.
178. The factual circumstances surrounding a habeas corpus petitioner's claim are de-
termined by the state court. See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036-40 (1984).
179. Section D states:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a
determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State
court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ
and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written
finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be
presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise
appear, or the respondent shall admit-
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State
court hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not ade-
quate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court
hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the
person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of
his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State
court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the
State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State
court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which
the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of
the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced
as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration of such part
of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly
supported by the record ....
[Vol. 65:4
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
challenged confession was obtained in a manner compatible with the
Constitution-is generally a matter for independent federal determina-
tion, 180 the court found that here the historical fact was dispositive of
petitioner's claim for federal habeas relief.181
E. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Phillips was dictated by Blackledge v.
Allison, 18 2 in which the Supreme Court made it clear that summary dis-
missal is appropriate when habeas corpus petitioners state vague and
conclusory allegations.18 3 The petitioner in Phillips failed to include any
factual allegations which would support his claim that the district attor-
ney had agreed to recommend a lower sentence in exchange for his plea.
Philips summary dismissal was therefore appropriate, unlike in Blackledge
where the petitioner alleged exactly what the terms of the alleged un-
kept promise was, who it had been made by, when and where it had been
made, and the identity of a witness to the communication. 184 As a result
of Philips, it is clear that future habeas corpus petitioners will be subject
to summary dismissal unless they include factual allegations in the peti-
tion to support their claims.
V. PROSECUTOR'S DuTy TO DISCLOSE FAVORABLE EVIDENCE:
BoWEx V. MAINARD
A. Overview
The framework for evaluating the materiality of undisclosed evi-
dence has recently been changed by the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Bagley.' 8 5 The Tenth Circuit, in recently decided Bowen v.
Maynard,18 6 held that the standard set forth in Bagley is satisfied if the
materiality of the undisclosed information meets both standards of
United States v. Agurs. 187
B. Background
In Brady v. Maryland,'8 8 the Supreme Court held that "the suppres-
sion by the prosecution of requested evidence favorable to an accused
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or
180. 796 F.2d at 1305 (citing Mitter v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985)). While the habeas
corpus court is not free to challenge the facts found by the state court, it can disagree with
the state's legal conclusions based on those facts.
181. Id. Since the petitioner's claim of involuntariness was based on the assertion that
the district attorney agreed to recommend a lower sentence, the claim was disposed of by
the state court's finding of fact that there were no negotiations conducted with the district
attorney.
182. 431 U.S. 63 (1977).
183. See text accompanying notes 161-66,
184. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
185. 473 U.S 667 '(1985).
186. 799 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1986).
187. 427 U.S 97 (1976).
188. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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punishment.. 189 Such evidence is commonly referred to as Brady
evidence.1 90
The law has recently been changed, however, with respect to the
framework for evaluating the materiality of Brady evidence. Prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Bagley,' 9 the materiality of
evidence was judged according to three distinct standards enunciated in
Agurs. 19 2 These three Agurs standards were replaced with one standard
in Bagley, 19 3 but it is yet to be determined whether Bagley will be applied
retroactively. 1
9 4
The Tenth Circuit did not determine in Bowen whether Bagley
should be applied retroactively; rather, they examined the standards set
forth in Agurs. The applicability of the Agurs standards was dependent
upon the factual circumstances of each case. First, where the prosecu-
tion knew or should have known that its case included perjured testi-
mony, the conviction would be overturned if there was any reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the
jury. 19 5 Second, where defense counsel requests disclosure of specific
evidence, the request puts the prosecution on notice of its obligation to
disclose, and the verdict therefore has to be set aside if the suppressed
evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial. 19 6 This test is
commonly referred to as the "lower" Agurs standard. Third, where the
prosecution received no request or a general request for all Brady mate-
rial, 19 7 the judgment would be set aside if the omitted evidence created
a reasonable doubt that would not otherwise have existed.' 9 8 This last test
is commonly referred to as the "strict" Agurs standard.
In Bagley the Court replaced the three Agurs standards of material-
ity with one single test to be applied in all instances of nondisclosure.
The Court held that evidence is material only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different. 199 "Reasonable probability" was
defined as probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.20 0
189. Id. at 87. Impeachment evidence also falls within the protection of the Brady rule,
if its suppression would deprive the defendant of a fair trial. See Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150 (1972).
190. See Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95 (1972).
191. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
192. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
193. See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
194. Bagley was decided while Bowen was on appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Since the
Tenth Circuit found that the withheld material satisfied both of the applicable Agurs tests
of materiality, it held that there was no need to determine whether the unitary test of
Bagley should be applied retroactively. Bowen, 799 F.2d at 603.
195. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103-04.
196. Id. at 104.
197. A general request does not give the prosecution notice of any specific obligation,
and therefore is treated as though no request was made. Id. at 112.
198. Id.
199. 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); see also id. at 685 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and
Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and in judgment).




Defendant Clifford Bowen was convicted of three counts of first de-
gree murder, 20 ' in charges stemming from a notorious triple homicide
in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, known as the "Guest House Murders."
The three victims were shot at the Guest House Hotel while sitting
around a poolside table late at night. 20 2 The State's theory of the crime
was that Bowen was hired by a local drug dealer, Harold Behrens, 20 3 to
kill one of Behrens' conspirators, Ray Peters, whom Behrens feared
would turn informant in light of pending drug charges.
20 4
The evidence used to convict Bowen consisted primarily of testi-
mony by two witnesses who testified that they saw Bowen in the pool
area before the shooting, and that after gunshots were heard, they saw
Bowen run and flee in a waiting vehicle. In defense, Bowen claimed that
he was not in Oklahoma when the murders occurred, and offered twelve
witnesses who testified that he was at a rodeo in Tyler, Texas until mid-
night on that night.
2 0 5
After Bowen was convicted, his attorneys learned that earlier in the
investigation the police had an initial prime suspect, Lee Crowe, who
resembled Bowen in physical appearance. 20 6 Based on this information,
the defense attorneys motioned for a new trial claiming that the prose-
cution withheld exculpatory evidence from the defense in violation of
the Brady rule.2 0 7 Furthermore, the defense attorneys stated that prior
to trial, they had made a specific oral request to the prosecution to pro-
201. Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 595 (10th Cir. 1986). At trial, Bowen received
death sentences on each count. His convictions were affirmed on appeal and the court set
his execution for August 12, 1985. See Bowen v. Oklahoma, 715 P.2d 1093 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1984), cert denied, 473 U.S. 911 (1985).
202. Bowen, 799 F.2d at 596-98.
203. Id. Behrens was formerly a detective in the organized crime detail of the
Oklahoma City Police Department. He became a suspect when his former supervisor,
Detective Sergeant David McBride, recognized the circulated description of the gunman as
being someone who Behrens had investigated while on the force. The supervisor recalled
that toward the later stages of the investigation, Behrens quit the department and shortly
thereafter Bowen was no longer seen in Oklahoma City. Id. at 597.
204. Shortly before the shooting, Behrens and his lover Herman Borden had been sit-
ting at the poolside table with Peters and the two other murder victims. Upon leaving the
table, Behrens put his hand on Peters' shoulder and said he would see him tomorrow. A
former lover of Behrens testified at trial that it was not Behrens' custom to make physical
contact with people upon parting company. The State contended that Behrens' gesture
"fingered" Peters for the hit man. Id. at 598-99.
205. Id.
206. Lee Crowe was employed as a police officer in Hanahan, South Carolina, at the
time of the murders. Both Crowe and Bowen fit the description of the shooter: white, six
feet two inches tall, 225 pounds, salt and pepper hair, beer belly, and pale complexion. Id.
at 600.
Crowe also habitually carried a .45 caliber pistol with unusual and expensive silver-
tipped hollow point ammunition; the type found at the scene of the murders. Id. at 599,
600 n.2.
Bowen's lawyers became aware of Crowe when they were contacted by South Carolina
law enforcement agents who suspected that Crowe was a hit man for organized crime. Not
until the first day of the federal hearings (five years after Bowen's convictions) did Bowen's
attorneys discover the full extent of information which the state had concerning Lee
Crowe. Id. at 602. See infia note 216.
207. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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duce any information concerning other suspects. As a result of the non-
disclosure, the defense attorneys argued that the materiality of the
undisclosed information might have affected the outcome of the trial
and should be judged by the lower Agurs standard.
208
Following an evidentiary hearing to determine the materiality of the
withheld information, the state court concluded that the withheld infor-
mation did not warrant a reversal of Bowen's convictions.2 0 9 The state
court applied the stricter Agurs standard2 10 and found that the evidence
did not undermine the confidence of the guilty verdict. 2 1 1 It is not clear
from the state court record, however, whether the court found that no
oral request was made or whether the court simply held that Brady re-
quests must be in writing in order to trigger the stricter Agurs
standard.
2 12
After the motion for post-conviction relief was denied in state court,
Bowen sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court pursuant to 28
U.S.C § 2254.213 Before the petition was addressed by the federal
court, Bowen's attorneys obtained police investigative reports from the
prosecution 2 14 which further implicated the earlier suspect, Lee Crowe.
Bowen argued to the federal court that the Lee Crowe material was ex-
culpatory within the meaning of Brady because it could have been used
to impeach witnesses and because it cast doubt on his guilt.
2 15
The federal district court held hearings and determined first that
the prosecution had in fact received an oral request from Bowen's attor-
208. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
209. 799 F.2d at 603.
210. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
211. 799 F.2d at 601-02.
212. If the court had found that no oral request had been made, this finding would
have been a "historical fact" entitled to a presumption of correctness by the federal court.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1985); see also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 n.6 (1963).
213. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982). For a general discussion of habeas corpus proceedings
and the purpose of the writ, see Hutson v. Justices of Wareham Dist. Court, 552 F. Supp.
974 (D. Mass. 1982) (remedy is available only when circumstances are presented which
demonstrate fundamental unfairness in trial, or the infringement of important constitu-
tional rights).
214. 799 F.2d at 615-18. These reports revealed that Ray Peters, who was considered
by police to be the prime target of the murders, was divorced and that his former wife,
Patsy Peters, was engaged to Crowe. Patsy and Crowe lived in Hanahan, South Carolina,
along with another woman, Deana Burns. Crowe provided protection in their apartment
while Patsy and Deana worked as prostitutes.
Ray Peters' mother, Mae Margraves, recalled that Ray had phoned Patsy a week before
his death and had told her not to come out to Oklahoma City because he did not want to
see her but only his children. He threatened Patsy by telling her that if she came out to
Oklahoma he would tell her parents that she was a prostitute. Id.
The reports also revealed that South Carolina authorities suspected Crowe to be a hit
man, and that on several occasions Crowe had left South Carolina and, upon his return, it
was discovered that a homicide had occurred where he had been. Crowe had also been a
suspect in a murder unrelated to organized crime. Crowe's former girlfriend had a boy-
friend who persisted in bothering her. The boyfriend was later found dead with five bullet
wounds in the head. When Crowe was asked to produce his gun, he said that he lost it. Id.
Finally, the reports revealed that Crowe and Patsy were in Oklahoma on the day of the
murders and that Crowe's exact whereabouts at the time of the murders were undeter-
mined. Id.
215. Id. at 610.
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neys for prior suspects.2 16 The court then applied the lower Agurs stan-
dard to the withheld evidence, including the police investigative reports
which were not before the state court, and held that Bowen's convictions
were constitutionally invalid.2 17 The State appealed, claiming that the
withheld material was not exculpatory within the meaning of Brady.
D. Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit held that the prosecution had a federal constitu-
tional duty to reveal the Lee Crowe material either with or without a
specific request by the defense. In holding that the withheld material
met both applicable Agurs tests, 2 18 the court declined to determine
whether the unitary test 2 19 of Bagley should be applied retroactively.
220
The court first examined the district court's finding of an oral re-
quest for other suspects, and concluded that the finding was supported
by both federal and state court records and was not clearly errone-
ous. 2 2 1 The decision then stated that a specific oral request which is not
on the record is legally equivalent to a formal, written motion for pur-
poses of the prosecution's duty to disclose favorable evidence. The oral
request gives the prosecution specific notice of exactly what the defense
desires.
2 22
The court then noted that the State's case against Bowen was based
upon testimony of two identification witnesses, whose testimony may
not have been flawless. 22 3 Lee Crowe's marked resemblance to the de-
scription of the suspect could have been used by the defense to impeach
the witness' identifications of Bowen. 2 24 Furthermore, the opinion
noted that the police reports documenting the connection between Lee
Crowe and one of the victims to organized crime in South Carolina
216. Id. at 605-06. During questioning by the court, the prosecution conceded that an
oral request had been received from Bowen's attorneys. This concession overcame any
presumption of correctness, to the extent that the state record could be interpreted to
include a court finding that no oral request had been made, and thus a historical fact
entitled to a presumption of correctness. Id. at 609.
217. Id. at 613.
218. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
220. 799 F.2d at 603.
221. Id. at 607.
222. Id. at 603. The standard for judging the materiality of information not disclosed
after a specific request is lower than the standard for evaluating the materiality of nonre-
quested information because the specific denial has a greater affect on strategic decisions.
Thus, in the absence of any specific denial by the prosecution that there were no prior
suspects, the defense is less likely to pursue that line of inquiry than if they had never
requested such information. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682-83 (1985)
("the more specifically the defense requests certain evidence. . . the more reasonable it is
for the defense to assume from the nondisclosure that the evidence does not exist, and to
make pretrial and trial decisions on the basis of this assumption.").
223. 799 F.2d at 611. One witness had only viewed the suspect from a distance of 85
feet, and the other witness had undergone hypnosis to sharpen her memory before trial
and had possibly misidentified a police detective in a live line up.
224. Id. at 610. See also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (suppression of
evidence which could be used to impeach witnesses violates the Constitution iW it deprives
the defendant of a fair trial).
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would have alerted the defense to focus on the motive, opportunity, and
ability to kill of Lee Crowe.2 25 Therefore, the Crowe material would
have been invaluable in undermining the identifications of the
witnesses.
22 6
The court further held that the Crowe material cast doubt not only
upon the testimony of witnesses, but on Bowen's guilt. The court re-
jected the State's argument that Moore v. Illinois2 27 was controlling, be-
cause unlike the instant case, there was no evidence in Moore that the
undisclosed prior suspect had any opportunity, motive, or ability to kill
the victim.2 2 8 In contrast, Lee Crowe was a suspected hit man living
with the ex-wife of one of the victims and was visiting Oklahoma at the
time of the murders. In addition, Bowen offered twelve witnesses who
said that he was in Tyler, Texas, at the time of the murders. Further-
more, the only supportable motive Bowen could have to commit the
murders was money, but the prosecution offered no proof that Bowen
received any payment.
2 29
While it was admittedly within the province of the jury to weigh the
credibility of Bowen's alibi, the court concluded that the jury would have
viewed Bowen's alibi differently had it been given the opportunity to
learn of Lee Crowe's existence. 230 The court held therefore that the
stricter Agurs test, 2 3 ' in addition to the lower test, had been met because




The Tenth Circuit's decision in Bowen v. Maynard illustrates the
complex application of the Agurs standards. These standards require
that the court first make factual determinations as to the circumstances
giving rise to the nondisclosure before evaluating the materiality of the
withheld information.2 3 3 The complexity of applying these standards is
compounded by the court's decision in Bowen, because it means that re-
viewing courts cannot rely just on the record for determining what mate-
rial was or was not requested by the defense. It is clear from the court's
decision that the courts must conduct factual inquiries to determine
whether or not certain oral requests were received by the prosecution
and, if so, what was the nature and scope of the information requested.
The Supreme Court's replacement of the Agurs standards with the
unitary standard set forth in Bagley will probably not reduce the type of
225. 799 F.2d at 611.
226. Id.
227. 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
228. 799 F.2d at 611.
229. Id. at 612.
230. Id.
231. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
232. 799 F.2d at 612.
233. The factual circumstances surrounding discovery requests determine what Agurs
standard will be applied. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
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extensive fact finding illustrated in Bowen. 2 34 Justice Blackmun, joined
by Justice O'Connor, stated in Bagley that a specific request by the de-
fense for certain evidence should be taken into account in applying the
unitary standard.2 3 5 The Bagley Court recognized that an incomplete
response to a specific request not only deprives the defense of certain
evidence, but also has the effect of representing to the defense that the
evidence does not exist.2 3 6 This in turn may cause the defense to rely
on this misleading representation and abandon lines of independent in-
vestigations, defenses, or trial strategies that it might otherwise have
pursued.
23 7
Thus, although the court in Bowen applied the Agursstandards, the
future application of the unitary Bagley standard will be affected by the
holding in Bowen that oral requests for discovery are equivalent to writ-
ten requests.
Steve Louth
234. See Bowen, 799 F.2d at 613 (reviewing the lower court proceedings and record of
oral arguments to determine whether an oral request for prior suspects was received bv
the prosecution); see also supra note 214 (for applicability of Agurs standards).





LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
OVERVIEW
In considering a variety of important labor law topics, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals issued a number of unanimous opinions. This
article will examine the major issues in four of these decisions. In
Harberson v. NLRB,' the court considered the appropriateness of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board's (the "Board") deferral to an arbitrator's
decision on an unfair labor practice issue. Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp. 2 marked
a reassessment of the Tenth Circuit's position on the standard for deter-
mining when an employee has been constructively discharged. In ad-
dressing the issue of hybrid versus non-hybrid actions, the court in
Garcia v. Eidal International Corp.3 made an important exception to the
DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters4 rule in selecting the
proper statute of limitations period. Finally, in Crenshaw v. Quarles Drill-
ing Corp.,5 the Tenth Circuit construed the Fair Labor Standards Act fo-
cusing on the requirements necessary for a Belo contract, and the
questions regarding liquidated damages and statute of limitations.
I. THE STANDARD FOR BOARD DEFERRAL TO ARBITRATION
A. Background
It is not uncommon in labor law for an employee to assert that one's
"rights," under both section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act 6 (the
"Act") and a collective bargaining agreement, have been violated by the
employer. An employee's statutory rights under section 7 of the Act
include the right to form, join or assist labor unions, bargain collec-
tively, and engage in other concerted activities. 7 Section 10 of the Act
empowers the Board to protect such rights by making findings, issuing
orders, and petitioning for the enforcement of such orders in a court of
law.8
In addition to the rights under the Act, employees can obtain rights
under a collective bargaining agreement, such as the right to refuse to
cross an approved picket line and the right of arbitration. In this situa-
tion, the enforcement of such rights is contractual, with both manage-
ment and labor agreeing to submit to an impartial arbitrator any
contractual dispute.
An employer's single act can, in many situations, be a violation of an
I. 810 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1987).
2. 796 F.2d 340 (10th Cir. 1986).
3. 808 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1986).
4. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
5. 798 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1986).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
7. Id.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a)-(i) (1982).
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employee's statutory, as well as contractual, rights. The question that
then arises is: what happens when a union, after submitting a losing
dispute to arbitration, files an unfair labor practice action? Can or
should the Board defer to the arbitrator and assume that the unfair la-
bor practice issue was also resolved? The Board has determined that in
some situations it will defer to an arbitrator's decision on an unfair labor
practice. The standard used to determine when this deferral is appro-
priate has, however, been a volatile one.
In Spielberg Manufacturing Co. ,9 the Board determined that if the arbi-
tration proceedings appeared to be fair and regular, if the arbitrator's
decision was not "clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the
Act" and if all parties agreed to be bound, Board deference was
proper.10 Eight years later, in Raytheon Co.,'' the Board added a fourth
requirement that an unfair labor practice issue had to be "fully and fairly
litigated" before the Board would give effect to an arbitrator's deci-
sion.' 2 In Yourga Trucking,'3 the Board insisted that the party urging
deferral bear the burden of proving that the statutory issue was ad-
vanced in the arbitration. However, in 1974, the Board, in Electronic Re-
production Service Corp., 4 changed its course radically by holding that if
an unfair labor practice issue was not raised in arbitration but could
have been, the Board must defer unless there were "unusual circum-
stances."' 15 However, a few years later, in Suburban Motor Freight, Inc.,
16
the Board disavowed the Electronic Reproduction decision by holding that
it would not defer to an arbitration decision which bore "no indication
that the arbitrator ruled on the statutory issue."' 7 Finally, in 1984, the
Board reaffirmed a modified Spielberg standard in Olin Corp.' 8 and re-
versed Suburban Motor Freight by shifting the burden of proof onto the
party opposing deferral.19
9. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
10. Id. at 1082.
11. 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963).
12. Id. at 887.
13. 197 N.L.R.B. 928 (1972).
14. 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974).
15. Id. at 764.
16. 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980).
17. Id. at 147.
18. 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984). The Board held that:
[Aln arbitrator has adequately considered the unfair labor practice if (1) the con-
tractual issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor practice issue, and (2) the
arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair
labor practice. In this respect, differences, if any, between the contractual and
statutory standards of review should be weighed by the Board as part of its deter-
mination under the Spielberg standards of whether an award is 'clearly repugnant'
to the Act. And, with regard to the inquiry into the 'clearly repugnant' standard,
we would not require an arbitrator's award to be totally consistent with Board
precedent. Unless the award is 'palpably wrong,' i.e., unless the arbitrator's deci-
sion is not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act, we will defer.
Id. at 574.
19. Id. at 574.
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B. Interpreting the Olin Standard
1. Case in Context
Harberson v. NLRB 20 reviewed the Olin standard as applied by the
Board in this case. The Tenth Circuit's interpretation was that the Olin
standard could be interpreted in different ways, depending on the par-
ticular factual setting to which it is applied. Because the Board had not
adequately explained why it had rejected the administrative law judge's
(the "ALJ") interpretation and application of the Olin standard, the
court remanded the dcase to the Board. The Tenth Circuit held that
merely stating the Olin decision, without discussing it in light of the ap-
plicable factual circumstances, was not acceptable.
2. Statement of the Case
Two sympathy strikers, Harberson and Talley, refused to cross a
lawful picket line organized by one of the three unions representing the
Hilton Hotel employees. When the strike was settled, the two strikers
returned to work and were told that they had been permanently re-
placed and put on a preferential hiring list.
2 1
As a result of the employer's actions, two issues arose. First, be-
cause the collective bargaining agreement stated that employees would
not be disciplined or discharged for refusing to cross a legally approved
picket line,22 there was a potential breach of contract. Secondly, there
was a potential unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
23
It was determined in arbitration that there was not a violation of the
contract when the two employees were permanently replaced. Thereaf-
ter, the union filed an unfair labor practice action. The employer urged
that the ALJ defer to the arbitrator's decision; however, the ALJ found
that deferral was not appropriate because the contractual claims were
not relevant in deciding the statutory claims. 2 4 The Board reversed the




The AL took the position that the contractual issue was not factu-
ally parallel to the unfair labor practice issue because the arbitrators did
not consider the factual question of whether the employees hired to re-
place the plaintiffs undertook the same job assignments. Because this
issue was essential to the unfair labor practice question,26 the ALJ held
20. 810 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1987).
21. Id. at 979-80.
22. Id. at 980.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982) provides in part that an employer cannot discrimi-
nate for the purpose of discouraging an employee's right to engage in concerted activities.
24. Denver Hilton Hotel, 272 N.L.R.B. 488, 491 (1984).
25. Id. at 488.
26. Id. at 491. This issue is important under the Act because economic strikers' right
for reinstatement hinges upon whether permanent replacements have actually been ob-
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that the Olin standard had not been met and, consequently, that the un-
fair labor practice issue had not been presented in arbitration.
The Tenth Circuit found this interpretation to be reasonable and
refused to sanction the Board's rejection of the same. 27 In what can be
considered the heart and soul of the Harberson opinion, the Tenth Cir-
cuit noted that "[w]hen applied to a particular factual situation, the stan-
dard for deferral set out in Olin may be interpreted in various ways." '28
The ALJ's finding that the facts relating to the unfair labor practice were
not adequately presented to the arbitrator were, according to the court,
strongly supported in the record. Whereas, the court could not find
such support in the Board's decision.2 9 Thus, the Board's mere asser-
tion that the ALJ was wrong was rejected because the court had no idea
how the Board was interpreting Olin in light of the specific factual situa-
,tion. Consequently, rather than manufacturing an interpretation of the
Olin standard for the Board, the court remanded the case in hopes that
the Board would provide one.
4. Implications of Holding
Absent from the Tenth Circuit's opinion is an analysis of the Olin
standard. While the court was certainly aware of the debate over the
standard, 30 the judges apparently did not wish to state their position
until they could review the Board's interpretation of the various ele-
ments of the Olin standard. Presumably, the court will eventually have to
resolve the issue of whether the Olin standard, as implemented by the
Board, is allowable under the Act. Thus, it will be useful to explore
some of the major areas of controversy surrounding Olin.
Several problems are raised by those who disagree with the Board's
decision in Olin. One scholar noted that even though there are two
"safety devices" in the Olin standard - the contractual issue must be
"factually parallel" to the unfair labor practice issue and the arbitrator
must be presented with the facts necessary to resolve the unfair labor
practice, 3 ' - they are rendered completely ineffectual by the Board's
insistence that the party resisting deferral bear the burden of proof.32
Professor Ray also noted that the records of many arbitration decisions
are far from complete, sometimes stating an award in only a few
sentences. 33 Consequently, the Board, without the arbitrator's reason-
tained. If the replacements are not permanent and the employer refuses to reinstate the
economic strikers after they have made an unconditional offer to return, there is a poten-
tial unfair labor practice under sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act. See NLRB v. Int'l
Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48 (1972), and NLRB v. McKay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333
(1938).
27. Harberson, 810 F.2d at 983.
28. Id. at 984.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 982-83.
31. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984).
32. Ray, Individual Rights and NLRB Deferral to the Arbitration Process: A Proposal, 28




ing and factual basis before it, is not able to make determinations under
the established standards. 34 Furthermore, the Olin standard provides
that the General Counsel, who is never present at an arbitration, bear
the burden of proving that relevant facts and evidence were not
presented. 3 5 Given these circumstances, it seems unlikely that the
Board will be able to protect the individual rights mandated in section
10(a) of the Act.
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit has explicitly denounced Olin in Tay-
lor v. NLRB. 3 6 Taking note of several factors addressed by the Fifth Cir-
cuit,3 7 the court communicated its conviction that employees need to
have a forum, independent of the arbitration arena, to advance their
statutory rights. 3 8 The factors that the court considered especially im-
portant were that many arbitrators are principally educated in the "law
of the shop," and thus may lack the sophistication to decide intricate
statutory issues, and that fact finding in arbitration is usually not analo-
gous to judicial fact finding. 39 The Eleventh Circuit further condemned
the Board's position that deferral is appropriate unless it is affirmatively
shown that an unusual situation exists, thus necessitating an independ-
ent exploration by the ALJ into the employee's statutory claims. 40 The
court stated that this position neglects those situations where contrac-
tual and statutory issues factually correspond but entail different levels
of proof and issues of factual relevance.
4 1
The final problem is raised by the forceful dissent in Olin. Board
member Zimmerman recognized that the deferral policy adopted by the
Board could actually deter arbitration rather than encourage it. Zim-
merman suggested that unions might begin demanding that all arbitra-
tions be performed in a very formal, on-the-record manner. Thus, many
advantages of arbitration - less expensive, quicker, and less formal -
could quickly evaporate.
4 2
II. THE STANDARD FOR ASSESSING CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
A. Background
The utilization of constructive discharge in Title V1143 cases has its
34. Id. at 13.
35. Id.
36. 786 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1986).
37. McNair v. United States Postal Service, 768 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1985).
38. Taylor, 786 F.2d at 1521.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1522.
41. Id.
42. Henkel and Kelly, Deferral to Arbitration After Olin and United Technologies: Has the
NLRB Gone Too Far?, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 37 (Wntr. 1986).
43. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982) provides that:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such an individual's race, color,
religion, sex or national origin; or
(2) To limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
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roots in the National Labor Relations Act's (the "Act") prohibition on
employer discrimination "in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage mem-
bership in any labor organization. ' 44 To establish an unfair labor prac-
tice under section 8(a)(3) of the Act, it must be shown that an employee
was terminated because of his union activity. 4 5 The Board has, how-
ever, recognized that employers could subject union employees to harsh
working conditions, thereby avoiding the literal prohibition of anti-
union discrimination.
46
Applying Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it was found that
employers could use the same methods to circumvent the prohibition on
discrimination under the Civil Rights Act as they had used to avoid the
Act's prohibition of anti-union discrimination. As a result, the circuit
courts also adopted the doctrine of constructive discharge.4 7 The utili-
zation of this doctrine, however, resulted in a controversy among the
circuit courts as to what an employee must prove to establish a construc-
tive discharge. The "objective standard" - adopted by the First,4 8 Sec-
ond, 49 Third,50 Fifth,5 1 Sixth, 52 Ninth,5 3 Eleventh, 54 and District of
Columbia5 5 Circuit Courts of Appeals - is met upon an employee's
showing that the working conditions "have been so difficult or unpleas-
ant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt
compelled to resign. "56 Under the "subjective standard" - adopted by
the Fourth, 57 Eighth 58 and, until recently, the Tenth 59 Circuit Courts of
Appeals - a constructive discharge "exists when an employer deliber-
ately renders the employee's working conditions intolerable and thus
forces him to quit his job."60 Thus, this two-prong subjective standard
requires one to not only consider the unpleasantness of the working
conditions, but to consider the employer's subjective mental state or
intent.
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
45. 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 187 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983).
46. O'Toole, Choosing a Standard for Constructive Discharge in Title VII Litigation, 71 COR-
NELL L. REV. 587 (1986) [hereinafter "O'Toole"].
47. Id. at 591.
48. Rosado v. Santiago, 562 F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 1977).
49. Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1983).
50. Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1984).
51. Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980).
52. Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1982).
53. Heagney v. University of Wash., 652 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1981).
54. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
55. Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
56. Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting
Rosado v. Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 1977)).
57. EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1983).
58. Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1981).
59. Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 825 (1975).
60. Muller, 509 F.2d at 929.
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B. The Employment of the Objective Standard. Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp.
1. Case in Context
The holding in Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp.6 1 is important in that the Tenth
Circuit explicitly changed the requirements for proving a constructive
discharge. The decision marks the rejection of the subjective standard
established by the Tenth Circuit in Muller v. U.S. Steel Corp.6 2 and the
adoption of the objective standard as developed by the Fifth Circuit in
Bourque v. Powell Electric Manufacturing Co. 63
2. Statement of Case
After Gail Derr was demoted, she resigned and filed an action alleg-
ing that the demotion was the result of sex discrimination in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The trial court agreed with Ms.
Derr's contentions that Gulf had discriminated against her when it trans-
ferred her to the lower position and that she had been constructively
discharged, and thus ordered that she be reinstated and awarded back
pay.64
3. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's "unqualified adoption" 65 of the less stringent
objective standard seems to reflect a frustration with the troublesome
task of analyzing an employer's state of mind. Indeed, ascertaining what
a particular person "intended" is one of the most difficult and elusive
problems in the law. Thus, in rejecting the two-prong subjective test,
the court simply presumed that an employer "intended those conse-
quences it could reasonably have foreseen,"'6 6 thereby making an em-
ployer's state of mind irrelevant notwithstanding an employer's denial
of the existence of any wrongful intent. Consequently, the objective
standard simplifies the fact finder's task by redirecting the focus away
from the employer's nebulous mental state onto a more manageable
"reasonable person" standard.
4. Implications of Holding
The acceptance of the objective standard will be advantageous to
workers and their unions. Employees may prevail where they would not
have otherwise had the subjective standard been applied. For example,
consider the situation where an employer is satisfied with an employee's
performance in a particular job classification but refuses to promote the
worker because of the employee's sex. Under the subjective standard, a
constructive discharge would not be found because the employer did
61. 796 F.2d 340 (10th Cir. 1986).
62. 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1975).
63. 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980).
64. Derr, 796 F.2d at 341-42.
65. Id. at 344.
66. Id. (quoting Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1175 n. 8 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
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not have the requisite intent to make working conditions so intolerable
that the employee would resign. The employer wants the employee to
stay in the position without having to promote. Whereas, under the ob-
jective standard, an employee would prevail upon the trier of fact's find-
ing that the employer, by his illegal discrimination, had "made working
conditions so difficult that a reasonable person in the employee's posi-
tion would feel compelled to resign."'6 7 Thus, the employee would be
fully compensated regardless of the employer's intent.
68
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the utilization of the
less burdensome objective standard will necessarily manifest a major in-
crease in the number of employee resignations. The leading circuit in
this area, the Fifth Circuit, has stated that "the policies underlying Title
VII will best be served if, whenever possible, unlawful discrimination is
attacked within the context of existing employment relationships.
'" 6 9
The objective standard does not allow an employee to resign solely be-
cause the employer's discrimination takes the form of unequal pay. An
employee has a duty to mitigate damages by remaining on the job and
trying to rectify the problems either through internal grievance proce-
dures or by filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. Only when there is no reasonable possibility of rescuing
the employment relationship - measured by the court's objective stan-
dard - will an employee who resigns be considered constructively
discharged.
III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN HYBRID ACTIONS
A. Background
Because Congress remained mute on the issue, a question arose in
Garcia v. Eidal International Corp. 70 as to what statute of limitations period
should apply to suits brought under section 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947 (the "LMRA"). 7 1 For over one hundred
years, the established precedent has been that, when Congress does not
supply a statute of limitations for a federal cause of action, the states'
statutes of limitations apply. 72 However, in DelCostello v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters,73 the United States Supreme Court made an ex-
ception to this general rule. The Court held that when an employee files
a "hybrid action" - a suit against the employer for a breach of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement and the union for a breach of its duty of fair
representation - the six-month statute of limitations period provided
for by section 10(b) of the Act 74 controls the claim against both the em-
67. Id. at 344.
68. See O'Toole, supra note 46, at 615.
69. Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 66 (5th Cir. 1980).
70. 808 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1986).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
72. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966); see also M'Cluny v. Silliman,
27 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830).
73. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
74. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
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ployer and the union under section 301 actions. 75
B. An Exception to DelCostello: Garcia v. Eidal International Corp.
1. Case in Context
Garcia v. Eidal International Corp.76 involved a review of the district
court's interpretation and application of the DelCostello hybrid standard.
The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court's decision to impose
the six month federal statute of limitations, and held that the DelCostello
standard is not to be applied when an employer has renounced all of its
responsibilities under a collective bargaining agreement. 77 Conse-
quently, the court indicated that a worker's section 301 claim under the
LMRA should be "analogized to an action on a contract, and the appro-
priate state limitations period should be applied."
'78
2. Statement of the Case
Eidal International Corporation ("Eidal") terminated all of its bar-
gaining unit employees after it allegedly sold its business to Jencor In-
ternational Corporation ("Jencor"). Because Eidal did not transfer their
collective bargaining agreement with the sale, Jencor's employees -
only a few of whom were former Eidal employees - were subject to less
favorable working terms.
79
Eighteen months after being notified of the sale, Eidal's former em-
ployees filed an action under section 301 of the LMRA8 0 against the
union, Eidal, and Jencor. 8 1 The employees asserted that Jencor was
simply Eidal's alter ego and that the actions taken by Eidal were pursued
for the sole purpose of avoiding its obligations under the collective
bargaining agreement. The employees further contended that, because
the union had not informed them of the sale and had signed a pre-hire




In hybrid actions, employees assert not only that their employers
treated them unfairly, but also that the union treated them unfairly be-
cause it represented them in a discriminatory, arbitrary, and perfunctory
manner in the arbitration process. Consequently, in order to prevail in
this type of action, the employees must prove that the union breached its
duty of fair representation. Otherwise, if the union has met its duty of
75. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 166, 172.
76. 808 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1986).
77. Id. at 719.
78. Id. at 721.
79. Id. at 719.
80. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
81. Garcia, 808 F.2d at 719.
82. Id.
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fair representation, the arbitrator's decision will be final and binding.83
The question facing the Tenth Circuit in Garcia was whether the
particular factual situation was a hybrid action as defined in DelCostello.
8 4
Rejecting the lower court's position that it was a hybrid action, the
Tenth Circuit carved an exception to the DelCostello rule because of fac-
tual differences and policy considerations.
85
On the surface, Garcia appears to fit into the DelCostello mold in that
an employee sued both his employer for breach of contract and his
union for breach of the duty of fair representation. The court, however,
found a subtle factual difference which took Garcia out of the scope of
DelCostello.
Unlike the DelCostello situation, 8 6 the employees in Garcia claimed
that the employer unilaterally sold out to its alter ego, Jencor, in order
to repudiate the collective bargaining agreement and escape arbitration.
Therefore, in order for the employees to prevail against the employer
under these circumstances, the employees do not have to prove that the
union failed in its duty of fair representation. Instead, if the employees
prove their assertion against their employer, the employer will be liable
and such liability will be separate from the union's liability.8 7 The
Tenth Circuit, therefore, refused to allow the employer to label the
claim as a hybrid action simply because the union had consented to the
breach. Since the claim against the employer is contractual, the court
found that the appropriate state statute of limitations must be applied.
88
Judge Seymour's opinion also noted that the policy considerations
which had contributed to the outcome in DelCostello are absent in Garcia.
The Court in DelCostello implemented the shorter six month statute of
limitations primarily because it recognized that if decisions interpreting
a collective bargaining agreement could be challenged years later, the
relationship between labor and management could be severely dis-
rupted. 8 9 Speed and finality are paramount when the issue under con-
sideration is intertwined with the open and ongoing working
relationships between management and labor. 90
In Garcia, there was no open and ongoing relationship. Assuming
the truth of the employees' allegations, the employer had repudiated the
entire contract, thereby leaving those employees covered under the con-
tract "outside and looking in." With all contractual relationships shat-
tered by the company's bad faith and unilateral actions, the employees'
83. United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 62-63 (1981).
84. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
85. Garcia, 808 F.2d at 721.
86. In DelCostello, a single employee charged that his employer had discharged him in
violation of the collective bargaining agreement and that his union had not properly repre-
sented him in the grievance procedure. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 155.
87. Garcia, 808 F.2d at 721.
88. Id. at 723.
89. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169 (quoting from United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell,
451 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1981)).
90. Adams v. Gould, Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 867 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1122
(1985).
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allegation that the dispute was not subject to arbitration was legiti-
mate. 9 1 Hence, because there was no longer any resemblance of a day-
to-day working relationship, the rationale for swift and uniform resolu-
tions of labor disputes vanished.
4. Implications of Holding
The significance of this opinion is the Tenth Circuit's creation of a
limited exception to the DelCostello rule - a bad faith dissolution of the
day-to-day employment relationship. Therefore, in determining what
statute of limitations will be applied in a particular section 301 action,
labor attorneys are well advised to carefully scrutinize all cases which at
first glance appear to be a hybrid-DelCostello variety.
IV. ASSESSING THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
A. Background
1. The Belo Contract
Section 207(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (the "FLSA")
specifies that an employer cannot force his employees to work more
than forty hours a week unless he pays them time-and-a-half for the time
worked over forty hours.9 2 This overtime provision was instituted to
reduce unemployment by prodding employers to hire more workers
who would work fewer hours, and to offset, at least partially, the margi-
nal costs incurred by employees who work additional hours.
93
An exception to this standard, however, was recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in Walling, DOL v. A.H. Belo Corp.9 4 The
so-called "Belo contract" was subsequently codified by the United
States Congress. 9 5  This exception was created in response to the
problems which arose when particular job classifications required em-
ployees to work hours fluctuating above and below forty hours per
week. 96 Rather than subjecting employees to the uncertainty of fluctuat-
ing weekly paychecks, the Belo contract permits employers and employ-
91. Garcia, 808 F.2d at 722.
92. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1982).
93. Donovan v. Brown Equip. and Service Tools, Inc., 666 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1982).
94. 316 U.S. 624 (1942).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 207(0 states that:
No employer shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) of this section by
employing any employee for a workweek in excess of the maximum workweek
applicable to such employee under subsection (a) of this section if such employee
is employed pursuant to a bona fide individual contract, or pursuant to an agree-
ment made as a result of collective bargaining by representatives of employees, if
the duties of such employees necessitate irregular hours of work, and the contract
or agreement (1) specifies a regular rate of pay of not less than the minimum
hourly rate provided in subsection (a) or (b) of section 206 of this title (whichever
may be applicable) and compensation at not less than one and one-half times
such rate for all hours worked in excess of such maximum workweek, and (2) pro-
vides a weekly guaranty of pay for not more than sixty hours based on the rates so
specified.
96. Donovan, 666 F.2d at 153.
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ees working "irregular hours" 9 7 to agree upon a fixed weekly salary.
98
B. Employer Limitations Under the FLSA: Crenshaw v. Quarles Drilling
Corp.
1. Case in Context
Crenshaw v. Quarles Drilling Corp.9 9 provides a useful discussion of
several of the important concepts found in the FLSA. After characteriz-
ing the elements of the section 207(f) exception,10 0 the Tenth Circuit
held that the exception did not apply in this case because the "irregular
hours" requirement had not been satisfied.' 0 1 After much discussion,
the court further found that the three-year - not the two-year - statute
of limitations was appropriate because the employer had committed a
"willful violation" of the Act.' 0 2 Finally, after analyzing section 216(b)
of the FLSA, 10 3 which provides for liquidated damages equal to the
amount of the unpaid overtime, and concluding that the employer did
not show that its actions were taken in good faith, Judge Tacha upheld
the district court's decision to award plaintiff liquidated damages.
10 4
2. Statement of the Case
Crenshaw, a drilling equipment mechanic for Quarles Drilling Cor-
poration ("Quarles"), performed routine maintenance and responded
to emergency situations at drilling sites. Crenshaw and Quarles entered
into a contract whereby Crenshaw was to be paid a set biweekly wage
based on a sixty-hour work week. After working for Quarles for approx-
imately three years, Crenshaw filed this suit alleging that Quarles had
violated the overtime requirements of the FLSA. The district court
agreed with Crenshaw's assertions, and Quarles appealed.
3. Analysis
a. The Belo Contract
Two of the three requisite elements of a Belo contract were dis-
puted in Crenshaw. The first element at issue was whether the contract
designated a "regular rate" of pay
10 5 as required by section 207(f).'
0 6
97. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
98. Donovan, 666 F.2d at 153.
99. 798 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1986).
100. Id. at 1347. (The elements of the section 207(f) exception are, as described in
Donovan v. Brown Equip. and Service Tools, Inc., 666 F.2d 148, 153 (5th Cir. 1982), as
follows: "First, the duties of the employee must 'necessitate irregular hours of work.' 29
U.S.C. § 207(f) (1982). Second, the employee must be employed pursuant to a bona fide
individual contract or collective bargaining agreement. Id. Third, that contract must
'specifqy] a regular rate of pay' for hours up to forty and one and one-half times that rate
for hours over forty. Id. at § 207(f)(1). Finally,. the contract must provide a weekly pay
guarantee for not more than sixty hours, based on the specified rates.").
101. Id. at 1349.
102. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1982).
103. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
104. Crenshaw, 798 F.2d at 1351.
105. The "regular rate" of pay has been defined as "the hourly rate actually paid for
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After the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court's reliance on an
employee's testimony 10 7 was justified, the court emphasized that it
would not tolerate after-the-fact calculations by unscrupulous
employers. ' 0 8
The second element disputed was whether Crenshaw worked "ir-
regular hours."' 109 The court, acknowledging that fluctuating hours are
not necessarily equivalent to "irregular hours," 1 10 concurred with a
Fifth Circuit decision which held that "[flor hours to be considered ir-
regular within the meaning of section 7(f), they must, in a significant
number of weeks, fluctuate both below forty hours per week as well as
above." 1 1 ' Therefore, working fifty hours one week and ninety hours
the next constitutes fluctuating hours but does not constitute "irregular
hours" as contemplated under section 207(f) of the Act. Instead, there
must be a "significant" number of weeks worked under forty hours
before a court will conclude that an employee has worked "irregular
hours." 1 12
b. The Statute of Limitations under the FLSA
The Tenth Circuit was also faced with determining the applicable
statute of limitations period. Section 255(a) establishes a two-year stat-
ute of limitations for any cause of action concerning "unpaid minimum
wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages, under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938."113 However, if there is a "willful
violation" of the Act, a three-year statute of limitations is applicable.
1 14
In contemplating whether an employer's behavior is "willful," the
court adopted the Fifth Circuit's former approach. ' 15 In Coleman v. Jiffy
June Farms, Inc. ,116 the Fifth Circuit held that an "employer's decision to
change his employees' rate of pay in violation of the FLSA is 'willful'
when ... there is substantial evidence in the record to support a finding
that the employer knew or suspected that his actions might violate the
FLSA." 1 17
the normal, non-overtime work-week." Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37,
40 (1944).
106. 29 U.S.C. § 207(f)(1) (1982).
107. Quarles' testimony that the parties had designated a "regular rate" of pay contra-
dicted Crenshaw's testimony. Crenshaw, 798 F.2d at 1348.
108. Id. (quoting Triple "AAA" Co. v. Wirtz, 378 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1967)).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 207(f) (1982).
110. Crenshaw, 798 F.2d at 1348.
111. Id. (quoting Donovan v. Brown Equip. and Service Tools, Inc., 666 F.2d 148, 154
(5th Cir. 1982)); see also Donovan v. Tierra Vista Inc., 796 F.2d 1259, 1260 (10th Cir.
1986).
112. Crenshaw, 798 F.2d at 1348.
113. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1982).
114. Id.
115. Donovan v. McKissick Products Co., 719 F.2d 350 (10th Cir. 1983).
116. 458 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
117. Id. at 1142. The Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S.
111, 127-28 (1985), held that this broad standard is inappropriate for determining liqui-
dated damages, but the Court did not rule on what is the appropriate standard for the
statute of limitations. The Fifth Circuit, in Halfertz v. Pulse Drug Co., 826 F.2d 2 (5th Cir.
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In Crenshaw, the company's tax manager testified that he believed
that Crenshaw should have been paid overtime for hours exceeding
sixty.' " 8 This, coupled with Crenshaw's time sheets demonstrating that
he continually worked more than sixty hours a week, was substantial evi-
dence for the district and the Tenth Circuit courts to conclude -that
Quarles should have known that the FLSA was applicable. Accordingly,
the court found Quarles' violation to be "willful" and, thus, applied the
three-year statute of limitations.' 19
c. Liquidated Damages
The Tenth Circuit also reviewed the district court's liquidated dam-
ages award to Crenshaw. The FLSA permits the awarding of liquidated
damages in an amount equal to the unpaid overtime unless the em-
ployer proves that its failure to pay overtime compensation was in good
faith and that it reasonably presumed that such action/inaction would
not constitute a FLSA violation.120 The court rejected Quarles' conten-
tion that its misbelief that Crenshaw's employment contract fell under
the section 207(f) exception constituted "reasonable grounds" since the
statute's mandate could be easily evaded by an employer simply claim-
ing that it misunderstood the FLSA's requirements.' 2 1 Consequently,
the court held that the district court did not err in awarding liquidated
damages. 
122
4. Implication of Holding
a. The Belo Contract
There are several important issues which the court addressed in its
interpretation of the FLSA provisions enumerated in Crenshaw. One of
the most significant comes from the discussion on the so-called "Belo"
contract. In reaffirming the notion that fluctuating hours are not neces-
sarily equivalent to "irregular hours," the Tenth Circuit clearly stated
that an employer cannot work a salaried employee as much as it wants
without compensating for overtime. To fall within the Belo exception, a
"significant"' 123 number of the work weeks must fall below forty hours.
However, the court did not define "significant." The only conclusion
that can be drawn with any certainty is that if an employee works fewer
than forty hours per week, 6.9% 124 of the time, then the Tenth Circuit
will deem the same to be insignificant.
1987), and Peters v. City of Shreveport, 818 F.2d 1148, 1168 (5th Cir. 1987), subsequently
rejected its Jiffy June standard as being too broad in light of Trans World. The Tenth Cir-
cuit, in Crenshaw, rejected this interpretation of Trans World. See infra note 118 and accom-
panying text.
118. Crenshaw, 798 F.2d at 1350.
119. Id.
120. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1982).
121. Crenshaw, 798 F.2d at 1351.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1349.
124. Id.
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b. The Statute of Limitations and Liquidated Damages
The court's findings regarding the statute of limitations and liqui-
dated damages place an employer on notice that it must analyze not only
the FLSA provisions but also the particular factual setting at issue. The
Tenth Circuit has made it clear that it will not condone tenuous justifica-
tions by the employer such as "I did not know" or "I did not understand
the law."
In the case of liquidated damages, for example, an employer is re-
quired to show "reasonable" grounds for believing that it had not vio-
lated FLSA. Several circuits, including the Tenth Circuit, have held that
an employer's claim of ignorance of the Act's requirements is not a rea-
sonable ground. 12
5
Similarly, if a statute of limitations issue arises, it is evident that the
court will not tolerate an employer ignoring the particular factual situa-
tion when claiming it did not willfully violate FLSA. If an employer
should have known that its employees might have been covered by the
Act, it will be held that the employer's violation of FLSA was
"willful." 126
CONCLUSION
In a series of well written opinions, several important themes and
positions emerged during the 1986-87 survey period. First, the Tenth
Circuit insisted upon the need for a careful factual analysis. This was
evident in the Harberson opinion when the court refused to uphold a
Board decision because of the Board's failure to adequately discuss the
factual aspects of the case. In the Garcia case, the Tenth Circuit again
showed its preoccupation with factual detail and careful analysis by dis-
tinguishing this case from the closely related DelCostello standard in ana-
lyzing the statute of limitations in a hybrid action.
Finally, the court in this survey period showed a willingness to pro-
vide workers with some protection against unscrupulous employers. In
Crenshaw, the Tenth Circuit clearly stated that it will not tolerate employ-
ers who work employees long hours without paying overtime compensa-
tion. The court also noted that an employer will not be able to avoid the
FLSA by simply asserting that it did not understand the FLSA. Instead,
the court adopted a "should have known" standard which provides
working people with a greater degree of protection and carries out the
legislative intent of the FLSA. Similarly, in dealing with the issue of con-
structive discharge, the court in Derr rejected the subjective standard
and replaced it with the more manageable objective standard. This,
125. Sinclair v. Auto. Club of Okla., Inc., 733 F.2d 726, 730 (10th Cir. 1984); see also
Marshall v. Brunner. 668 F.2d 748, 753 (3d Cir. 1982) and Barcellona v. Tiffany English
Pub, Inc., 597 F.2d 464, 468-69 (5th Cir. 1979).
126. Crenshaw, 798 F.2d at 1349-50.
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also, should give employees more protection against those employers
with a predisposition towards illegal conduct.
Steven Al. Francy
EMINENT DOMAIN: A CASE COMMENT-MOUNTAIN
STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION V. HODEL
I. INTRODUCTION
The founding fathers of the United States, in their creation of the
Constitution, went to great lengths to protect private property from
governmental use and invasion. While government has the right to ex-
propriate private property for purposes beneficial to the general public,
it cannot require a single property owner to bear the costs of providing
property for the general public.' This principle, which is the essence of
the property clause of the fifth amendment, 2 commands that the cost of
public benefits must be borne by the public. 3 The fifth amendment de-
mands just compensation to property owners as a governmental
restraint.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Mountain States Legal Founda-
tion v. Hodel,4 has lifted the restraints on governmental power by al-
lowing the use of the Rock Springs Grazing Association's (the
"Association") land by wild horses without just compensation. The hor-
ses are exclusively and affirmatively under the control of the Secretary of
the Interior under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act (the
"Act"). 5 The Act was promulgated to protect wild horses from "cap-
ture, branding, harassment, or death." 6 It places them under the sole
dominion of the Secretary of the Interior and prevents any management
or control of such horses by private parties. 7 Due to the Secretary's
noncompliance with the Act, the unmanaged horses caused thousands
of dollars of damage8 to the Association's property.
This article addresses the different types of takings, the tests used to
determine whether a property owner is entitled to compensation, and
the case law through which these tests developed. It will also demon-
strate how the tests were confused and misapplied by the Tenth Circilit
Court of Appeals to the facts in Hodel.
II. BACKGROUND
The determination of whether a governmental action constitutes a
taking is not a clear-cut task. Although there is no analytical formula in
1. Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981).
2. Clause four of the fifth amendment provides that "private property (shall not) be
taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend V, § 2.
3. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980).
4. 799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986), vacated sub nomn. Mountain States Legal Found. v.
Clark, 740 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1616 (1987).
5. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1982).
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1338(a)(3) (1982).
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
8. Brief for appellant at 19, Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 779 F.2d 1423
(10th Cir. 1986), indicates the amount of damage.
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which to insert the facts and render a solution, guidelines have evolved
through case law which facilitate a takings analysis. 9
The landmark case in takings jurisprudence is Mugler v. Kansas,10
where the Supreme Court in 1887 upheld the shutdown of a brewery
under the Kansas prohibition law. The United States Supreme Court
closely examined the character of the action and recognized the need for
categorization of governmental action.I The Court distinguished two
types of governmental takings which necessitate compensation: (1) a
regulatory taking, which is a restriction on land use outside the authority
of the police power, and (2) an actual physical invasion. 12 When gov-
ernment causes the latter, the landowner may recover through an in-
verse condemnation action. "Inverse condemnation" is the term used
to "[describe] the manner in which a landowner recovers just compensa-
tion for a taking of his property when condemnation proceedings have
not been instituted."' 13 Such action is brought by the landowner when
government causes a physical invasion to private property.
Thirty-five years after Mugler, in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, the
Supreme Court developed a balancing approach to the takings analy-
sis. 14 In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes placed the government's au-
thority to regulate on a continuum by stating that if a regulation goes
too far, it will be recognized as a taking. 15 Like Mugler, Pennsylvania Coal
represents the theory that a regulatory taking may be present without a
physical occupation, but it is most noted for the balancing test it estab-
lished, weighing the private burden against the public benefit.
16
Though not often cited in recent cases, Mugler still influences case
law today. The following demonstrates the necessity of characterizing
the nature of the government interference as either a regulation or a
physical occupation. The standards applied in determining whether a
property owner deserves compensation depend on which category the
government action belongs. Whether governmental action is a regula-
tion properly exercised under the police power, or a permanent physical
occupation warranting inverse condemnation is the issue upon which
Hodel turns.
A. Inverse Condemnation Based on "Permanent Physical Occupation"
In a takings analysis, the court often analogizes property rights to a
"bundle of sticks," with each stick representing a property right.
17
Some sticks in that bundle are more valuable than others, the right to
9. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978). See infra
notes 11-71 and accompanying text.
10. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
I 1. See Note, "Taking" Jurisprudence and its Application to Regulations of Sensitive Ecological
Environments, Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 489, 493 (1981).
12. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. at 666-69.
13. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980).
14. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
15. Id. at 415.
16. Id. at 413-15.
17. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982);
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exclude being the most valuable. The Supreme Court applies a per se
rule when the government physically and permanently occupies one's
land. The per se rule renders a physical invasion to be a taking regard-
less of an offsetting public interest and differs from the ad hoc test ap-
plied to regulatory takings which balances several competing factors.' 8
The regular use of private property by the government is "[t]he one
incontestable case for compensation."' 9 Indeed, both federal and state
governments have been required to compensate property owners for the
use of their property in numerous cases. 20 A discussion of the inverse
condemnation case law will facilitate the understanding of when com-
pensation is required for government action.
The United States Supreme Court in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhat-
tan CA TV Corp. 21 applied the per se rule and found for the landowner in
an inverse condemnation proceeding. In Loretto, the Court determined
that a New York statute, forcing a landlord to permit installation of cable
facilities on private property, constituted a taking. 22 The Loretto Court
held that the permanent physical occupation by the cables is a taking
regardless of offsetting public interests which include the educational
and recreational benefits provided by cable television. Justice Marshall
stated that "[o]ur cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of
the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an impor-
tant public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the
owner."
2 3
Airplane flights in U.S. v. Causby2 4 infringed on a farmer's property
rights to the extent that the Supreme Court found a taking in an inverse
condemnation proceeding. The land over which the airplanes flew was
held to have been "appropriated as directly and completely as if it [was]
used for the runways themselves."' 25  The Court compared Causby's
facts to Richards v. Washington Terminal Co. ,26 where a property owner was
denied compensation for the nuisance of smoke, noise, and vibrations
from a nearby railroad. 2 7 In Richards, the elimination from the property
owner's "bundle of sticks," that stick which represented the right to en-
joy property free from nuisance, was not a substantial enough loss to
constitute a taking. However, in Causby, the stick the government took
from the "bundle of property rights" was the right to exclude; thus, the
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
176 (1979).
18. Tarlock, Regulatory Takings, 60 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 23, 26 (1984).
19. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation of 'Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1184 (1967).
20. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987); Loretto, 458 U.S.
419; United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
21. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
22. Id. at 426.
23. Id. at 434-35.
24. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
25. Id. at 262.
26. 233 U.S. 546 (1910).
27. Causby, 328 U.S. at 262.
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govenment effectuated a taking. 28 The degree of actual governmental
appropriation of the land in Causby and Richards was crucial in the
Court's determination of whether land had actually been physically in-
vaded, necessitating compensation.
The Court again emphasized the right to exclude as being highly
protected in Kaiser Aetna v. United States.2 9 In order to create a marina, a
pond owner dug an inlet through a natural barrier. The owner was
faced with a government claim that the marina had become part of the
navigational waterways, and therefore must be open to the public. The
Supreme Court held that the government servitude constituted a taking
of the landowner's right to exclude which is "one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as prop-
erty. ' 3" The Kaiser Court, in order to avoid compensation from the in-
verse condemnation, however, found the marina did not constitute a
navigational waterway.
The Supreme Court reconfirmed the importance of a property
owner's right to exclude in Leo Sheep Co. v. United States.3 1 There, the
government's easement over private property to a public recreational
area necessitated compensation in an inverse condemnation proceeding.
The government argued that the public use of the road was an easement
by necessity and therefore no compensation should be paid. However,
because the government has the power of eminent domain, the Court
found that the easement of necessity doctrine is not available to the
sovereign.
3 2
The United States government has been required to compensate
private property owners for physical occupation of property. This has
included compensation for use of water rights,33 underlying secured
materials,3 4 and the use of a leasehold.
3 5
B. Regulatory Takings
Although at one time eminent domain and police power were two
different concepts, they have merged to mean practically the same thing:
the government's authority to regulate land use is for the common well-
being of the public. 3 6 In short, the police power is the government's
authority to regulate private property for public use. 3 7 When a regula-
28. Id. at 262.
29. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
30. Id. at 176.
31. 440 U.S. 668 (1979).
32. Id. at 680.
33. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
34. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
35. United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
36. See Comment, Eminent Domain, the Police Power and the Fifth Amendment: Defining the
Domain of the Takings Analysis, 47 U. Prrr. L. REV. 491, 499 (1986).
37. Id. at 499. "Public use" means the furtherance of the public interest in health,
safety, welfare or morals. The decision of what constitutes public use is left to the legisla-
ture. Most courts, although empowered to decide questions of public use, choose not to
second-guess the legislature.
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tion is outside the boundaries of authority granted by police power, it is
a "regulatory taking" which requires compensation.
The government's authority to regulate under the police power was
very broad in 1915 when the Supreme Court rendered the opinion of
Hadacheck v. Sebastian.38 Hadacheck represents the theory that, although a
regulation diminishes the value of property, compensation is not due
where diminution is the result of the police power.3 9 In Hadacheck, the
City of Los Angeles passed an ordinance prohibiting the manufacture of
bricks within city limits. Although the regulation diminished the value
of Hadacheck's land from $800,000 to $60,000, diminution of value
alone was not enough to constitute a taking. Because the restriction
served a substantial public purpose, it was upheld against the takings
challenge. The scope of judicial review was thus extremely limited so
long as the legislative act supported a public purpose.
40
In 1922, Justice Holmes did find a regulatory taking in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon4 ' when the Pennsylvania legislature went beyond its
constitutional powers by enacting a statute which prohibited the mining
of coal in a manner that would cause surface subsidence. Using a bal-
ancing test, Justice Holmes weighed the public benefit against the pri-
vate burden and found the regulation to be an infringement of such
magnitude on mine owner's property rights that it could not be al-
lowed. 4 2 Justice Holmes sustained the coal company's argument that
enforcement of the Pennsylvania statute constituted a taking under the
fifth and fourteenth amendments.
43
After Pennsylvania Coal, the Court for many years found that regula-
tions did not constitute takings because they fell under the pervasive-
ness of the police power;44 however, there were a few exceptions. In
Nectrow v. City of Cambridge,45 property suitable for commercial purposes
was rezoned to residential. Justice Sutherland found the rezoning to be
a taking because the area in question adjoined land used for commercial
purposes and the property would have been of little value if limited to
residential use.
4 6
Until recent years, the Court sustained land use regulations despite
claims that the government had taken private property. Courts do not
often scrutinize the legislature's decision to regulate property for the
common good of the public. Although courts have not commented di-
rectly on the issue, because of the nature of land use regulation, they
have used a more deferential standard than that used with a physical
invasion of land. 4 7 The Supreme Court has been consistently reluctant
38. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
39. See Comment, supra note 19.
40. Id.
41. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
42. Id. at 413.
43. Id. at 413-15.
44. See notes 49-70 and accompanying text.
45. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
46. Id. at 187. See also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987).
47. See Comment, supra note 19.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
to require compensation for the loss of property caused by government
regulation.
48
In 1978, the Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City,4 9 one of the most frequently cited takings cases, articulated a test
composed of three factors to be considered in compensation or takings
analysis: (1) the character of the governmental action, 50 (2) the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation, 5 1 and (3) the extent government action
interferes with investment-backed expectations. 52 These factors have
been interpreted to mean that unless property is one hundred percent
diminished by a regulation, there is no taking.
53
The Supreme Court's analysis of Agins v. City of Tiburon54 demon-
strates a combined approach of the Penn Central three factor test and the
Pennsylvania Coal balancing test. Claimants challenged a zoning ordi-
nance which limited the development of their property to one-family
dwellings, accessory buildings, and open space uses. The court held
that the issue of whether to compensate the landowners required a
weighing of private and public interests. 5 5 In Agins, the public interest
in preserving open space outweighed the private interest. In support of
the holdings that there can be no taking without just compensation, the
Court used the Penn Central test. 56 Because there was no complete de-
nial of the owner's economically viable use of land, the zoning ordinance
did not effectuate a taking.
The Agins Court's analysis also set forth an additional test to be
used in evaluating a regulatory taking, that which has come to be called
the "ends-means" test.5 7 A regulation on property is upheld under the
state's police power if that regulation promotes a legitimate public pur-
pose and is likely to advance that purpose. 5 8 "The public interest,"
courts have found, includes the protection of endangered species and
wildlife. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1916,59 for example, was up-
held against the challenges of landowners who claimed its promulgation
amounted to a taking in Bishop v. United States.60 Property owners sued
the government for the alleged taking of hunting facilities and for crop
damage resulting from a prohibition to hunt wild geese. The Court held
48. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Hadacheck v. Sebas-
tian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
49. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
50. Id. at 130.
51. Id. at 128.
52. Id. at 136.
53. See Euclid, 272 U.S. 365 (1926)(75% diminution of property value, resulting from
enactment of a zoning ordinance, was not sufficient to constitute a taking); Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394 (1915) (87% diminution of property's value, resulting from prohibition of brick
manufacturing within city limits, did not constitute a taking).
54. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
55. Id. at 260.
56. Id. at 262-63.
57. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980).
58. Id. at 261.
59. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (1982).
60. 126 F. Supp. 449 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 955 (1955).
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the important goal of protection and preservation of game justified the
restriction and found that there was no taking under the fifth amend-
ment.6 1 In Sickman v. United States,62 a claim similar to that in Bishop was
brought by property owners. There, the Court held that the govern-
ment did not own the wild geese, and therefore they were not responsi-
ble for their trespass and the resulting damage.
63
Andrus v. Allard64 demonstrated that there is unlikely to be a taking
of property when an alternative use for property exists. The court also
reinforced the substantial public interest in protecting wildlife through
regulation. Merchants who sold artifacts containing eagle feathers
brought a claim for damages resulting from the enforcement of the Bald
and Golden Eagle Protection Act 6 5 which prohibited destroying or re-
moving their nests and selling or collecting their feathers. The Court
held that because the regulation did not compel the surrender of the
feathers and there was no physical invasion or restraint on the
merchants, there was not a taking. 66 Although the Court banned the
most profitable use of the feathers,6 7 their value had not been suffi-
ciently reduced since the merchants were allowed to keep therfi. 6 8
As demonstrated by the preceding discussion of case law, regula-
tory takings analysis requires the Pennsylvania Coal balancing approach of
weighing the public interest versus the private interest. In evaluating
the private interest, courts use the Penn Central test to consider the eco-
nomic hardship on the property owner.69 The Court has refused to find
a taking even in the face of substantial diminution of property.
70
The inverse condemnation analysis, however, does not require the
same balancing and economic hardship test. The rule to be followed, in
a situation where there is a permanent physical occupation resulting
from government action, is just compensation to the property owner.
7 1
C. The Wild and Free Roaming Horses and Burros Act
Congress passed The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act
72
in order to protect the dwindling population from hunting and commer-
61. 126 F. Supp. at 452-53.
62. 184 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 939 (1951).
63. 184 F.2d at 618.
64. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
65. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1982).
66. 444 U.S. at 64.
67. Id.
68. "[Wihere an owner possesses a full "bundle" of property rights, the destruction
of one "strand" of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its
entirety." Id.
69. See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261-62; Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66.
70. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). In Goldblatt, the owner
of a gravel pit was not compensated for a taking when regulation banned excavation from
the potentially dangerous pit. No regulatory taking was found because the owner failed to
present evidence that the value of the lot on which the pit was located was completely
diminished. The court held that diminution of value alone did not establish a taking.
71. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
72. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982).
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cial exploitation by prohibiting "malicious harassment."7 3 This Act
placed all wild horses under the sole dominion of the Secretary of the
Interior, preventing any management or control of such horses by pri-
vate parties. 74 Kleppe v. New Mexico75 upheld the Act as a proper exer-
cise of congressional power, thereby confirming the duty and authority
of the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") to manage the horses and
burros as part of the public land system.
Under the Act, the Secretary of Interior has exclusive control to
manage wild horses and is required to remove horses from private prop-
erty upon the owners request. 76 This affirmative duty to manage means
the Secretary must locate and relocate the horses from time to time "in a
manner that is designed to achieve and maintain a thriving natural eco-
logical balance on the public lands."' 77 Only the Secretary of Interior
may capture, move, or otherwise manage the horses; any other person
found to perform these acts could be criminally prosecuted.
7 8
III. FACTS
The Mountain States Legal Foundation 79 filed this action because
wild horses were destroying the Association's land. They argued that
because the Secretary of the Interior failed to perform his duty of re-
moving the horses upon their request, as mandated under section 4 of
the Wild Horses Act, the government was liable for resulting damage to
their property. 80 The nature of the government's action, they con-
tended, was best characterized as inaction, having resulted in the physi-
cal occupation of wild horses on private property.
The Wyoming land in question covers an area about 115 miles long
by forty miles wide and is called the "checkerboard." This title was
given to land granted by the federal government to the Union Pacific
railroad in the Union Pacific Act of 1862.81 Odd-numbered sections of
640 acres each, running along the original railbed, were granted to the
73. 43 C.F.R. § 4700.0-5(k) (1985). Malicious harassment was defined by the Depart-
ment of the Interior as:
an intentional act which demonstrates a deliberate disregard for the well-being of
wild and free roaming horses and burros and which creates the likelihood of in-
quiry, or is detrimental to normal behavior patterns.... Such acts include but are
not limited to, authorizing chasing, pursuing, herding, roping, or attempting to
gather or catch wild, free-roaming horses and burros.
74. 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (1982).
75. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
76. 16 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982).
77. 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (1982).
78. 16 U.S.C. § 1338(a)(3) (1982).
79. Mountain States Legal Foundation is a non-profit public interest law foundation,
dedicated to the preservation of individual liberties and private property rights. Many of
the Foundation's members are shareholders in the Rock Springs Grazing Association.
The Foundation initiated the lawsuit to protect its members' property interests and consti-
tutional rights.
80. 16 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982) ("If wild, free-roaming horses or burros stray from public
lands onto privately owned land, the owners of such land may inform the nearest federal
marshall or agent of the Secretary, who shall arrange to have the animals removed ... ").
81. For history and discussion of railroad land grants, see J. Laitos, Natural Resources
Law 251-253 (1985).
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Union Pacific, while even numbered lots were retained by the federal
government, thus creating a "checkerboard" pattern. Union Pacific has
since sold portions of their property to private landowners who mainly
use it for grazing. The Association purchased their land from Union
Pacific in 1909 and has since used it for winter cattle and sheep grazing.
The BLM has issued grazing permits to allow the Association to graze
their livestock on federal land. 82 The wild horse herds have continually
grazed the Association's unfenced private property, as well as adjoining
public lands.
In 1972, there were an estimated 1,116 wild horses on the checker-
board. At the time the Association filed their lawsuit in 1979, the popu-
lation had more than doubled. As a result of the drastic herd population
increase, vast quantities of the Association's forage were consumed.
Due to the nature of the sensitive soil and growing conditions, it will be
many years before the depleted land will be replenished to its former
grazing capacity.
83
The Association's property is comprised of high desert badlands
and sand dunes. Horse trails are frequently found in steep terrain
where the soil is particularly sensitive to overuse and erosion, resulting
in damage to the forage.
84
In order to stem the loss of forage and water, the Association,
within six months of the passage of the Act, made repeated oral and
written requests, pursuant to section 4 of the Act, to the BLM to remove
the horses from their property. 85 Despite the requests and offers of aid
from the Association, the horses were not removed, and in fact, the
numbers greatly increased.
86
The Association's cause of action for compensation was the result
of the BLM's noncompliance with the mandates of the Act which require
that the Secretary shall remove the wild horses upon request within a
reasonable time. 8 7 The Association sought a declaratory judgment that
the Secretary mismanaged the horses. 8 8 They also filed a writ of manda-
mus to compel the Director of the BLM to reduce the herd population
on the adjacent public land. Damages of $500,000 were requested by
the Association from the Director of the BLM for the alleged uncompen-
82. Brief for appellant at 6, Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 779 F.2d 1423
(10th Cir. 1986).
83. Id. at 7.
84. Id. at 5-7.
85. Id. at 7 n. i. The ineffectiveness of the program is revealed by the total number of
horses rounded up yearly. The wild horse population increases 15% to 25% each year.
The BLM was not even able to remove the annual increase, much less reduce the overall
population.
86. See Opening Brief for appellant at 26, Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 779
F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986)(Frank Gregg, director of the BLM, and under pressure from
various media sources, was alleged to have diverted funds, originally appropriated for wild
horse removal and adoption, to an investigation of the treatment of already adopted hor-
ses. As a result, the BLM cancelled the wild horse gathering activities for 1979).
87. See supra note 77.
88. 799 F.2d at 1424.
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sated taking of its property. 8 9
The District Court granted the Association's petition for mandamus
to remove the horses, dismissed the claim against the Director, and
granted the summary judgment. In the Tenth Circuit Court's first hear-
ing, it affirmed the dismissal of the claim against the director but re-
versed and remanded the grant of summary judgment, holding that an
unresolved factual issue precluded a summary determination of the tak-
ings claim. The government respondents sought a rehearing en banc in
September of 1984. In March of 1985, the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals granted rehearing of the case as to whether the trial court properly
dismissed the Association's claim and whether the Secretary's failure to
manage the horses constituted a taking.90
A. Majority Holding
Judge McKay, writing for the four member majority of the court,
affirmed the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment for the
government. The court held that the Association was not entitled to
compensation because the government action was nothing more than a
land use regulation enacted by Congress to ensure the survival of a par-
ticular species of wildlife.9 1 The court cited a series of cases 92 to show
that damage to private property by protecting wildlife did not constitute
a taking. Through a discussion of Andrus v. Allard,9 3 Sickman v. United
States9 4 and Barrett v. State,95 the court demonstrated the Supreme
Court's stance on the paramount interest of wildlife protection by regu-
lation. Through these case analyses, the majority likened the Wild Hor-
ses Act to the Endangered Species Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,
and the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. The degree of govern-
mental control in these acts, the Tenth Circuit stated, was no different in
character from the Wild Horses Act.
96
A second line of reasoning in support of the constitutionality of the
Wild Horses Act was addressed by the court through the Penn Central
test. Government regulation, the majority stated, often necessitates ad-
justment of private rights for the public good. 9 7 Although regulation
often diminishes the economic use of property, it would be unreasona-
ble to compensate every affected landowner, thus requiring regulation
by purchase. Because the court found no taking had occurred, they also
dismissed the Association's claim against the Director of the BLM.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1425.
91. Id. at 1428.
92. Id. at 1428-29.
93. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
94. 184 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950).
95. 220 N.Y. 423, 116 N.E. 99 (1917).
96. 799 F.2d at 1428-29.
97. Id. at 1429.
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B. The Dissenting Opinion of Judge Seth
In his dissent, Judge Seth emphasized that the case primarily in-
volved the BLM's failure to perform specific duties under the Act. 9 8
Judge Seth argued that the Association was entitled to compensation for
the consumption and destruction of its property from the public use.9 9
C. The Dissenting Opinion of Judge Barrett
Judge Barrett, in his dissent, disagreed with the majority's charac-
terization of the Act as nothing more than a land use regulation.10 0 He
reasoned that Congress did not intend the Act to burden private parties
because of the duty it imposed on the BLM to remove the horses at the
request of the landowners. He therefore believed that a fifth amend-
ment taking violation was possible and summary disposition of the Asso-
ciation's claim was inappropriate.'
0 1
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Court's Mischaracterization of the Governmental Action
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hodel, showed a gross mis-
understanding of the Association's claim. This misunderstanding led
them to improperly apply the law by sidestepping the takings issue and
devoting three pages of discussion to the authority of the federal gov-
ernment to control wildlife. The discussion by the majority on the gov-
ernment's authority over marine animals, waterfowl, and endangered
species is irrelevant. The issues presented in Hodel have little to do with
the government's exclusive authority to control the horses. They pri-
marily involve the consequences of the Director's mismanagement or
nonaction. The Association agrees with the majority, that government
management is essential for protection of the wild horses and ecological
balance; however, it is not the authority to control that is disputed by the
Association. It is the failure of the Director to manage the wild horses
properly that violates the Act.
The majority cited Bishop v. United States102 and Sickman v. United
States 103 to illustrate that damage caused by wildlife protected under
congressional acts did not constitute a taking.H)4 In both Bishop and
Sickman, wild geese damaged crops. The property owners' claims were
denied because the importance of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which
served to protect the geese, outweighed the property owners' rights for
compensation. However, these cases cannot be applied to Hodel because
98. Id. at 1431.
99. Id. at 1434.
100. Id. at 1435.
101. Id. at 1438.
102. 126 F. Supp. 449 (1954).
103. 184 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950).
104. 799 F.2d at 1428-29.
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there is no clause mandating government control in the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, as there is in the Wild Horses Act.
Judge McKay, who stated in the majority opinion that the Act "is
nothing more than a land-use regulation enacted by Congress to ensure
the survival of a particular species of wildlife,"' 10 5 did not address the
real issue. As Judge Barrett stated in his dissent, the Association's claim
was not for compensation due to the promulgation of a regulation; the
case was instead about actual physical invasion of property. 10 6
The key to an analysis of the Association's claim is a proper under-
standing of the character of the governmental action. The government's
action or inaction, the Supreme Court has said, must be characterized as
either a regulatory taking or inverse condemnation. 10 7 The Supreme
Court cases which have distinguished regulatory takings from inverse
condemnation have emphasized the seriousness of the government's ac-
tion when physical use and occupation occur. 10 8 The comparison of
regulatory takings with inverse condemnation was made in Penn Central,
where the Court stated that a taking was more likely to be found when
the government action was characterized as a physical invasion than
when it was characterized as a regulatory action meeting a public pur-
pose. 109 A physical invasion is a government intrusion of unusually seri-
ous character, and the remedy is just compensation.1 10 In Loretto v.
Teleprompter, the court held that a physical intrusion by the government
was of unusually serious character.' 1 ' When the government physically
invades private property, it does not simply take a "single strand" from
the "bundle" of property rights; it chops through the bundle taking a
slice of every strand.11
2
In Hodel, the regulatory takings issue would not have been improp-
erly addressed by the court had the Association contended their damage
was the result of the enforcement of the Act. Instead, the Association
argued that nonenforcement of the Act caused the actual physical pres-
ence of the horses which resulted in the consumption of their forage and
deprived them of their right to exclude.
The Tenth Circuit accepted the government's argument that the ac-
tion was regulatory. The court erred, however, in basing its decision on
regulatory takings standards, when the actual damage was not caused by
the regulation, but by the noncompliance with the regulation. The court
should have based its analysis on the physical invasion aspect of the
claim resulting from the BLM's inaction. Loretto provided that a perma-
105. Id. at 1428.
106. Id. at 1435.
107. See supra notes 18-72 and accompanying text for comparison between regulatory
takings and inverse condemnation.
108. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); United States v. Causbv, 328
U.S. 256 (1946); Loretto v. [eleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
109. 438 U.S. at 124.
110. Sailet, Regulatorv "Takings" and Just Compensation. The Suprenme Court's Search for a
Solution Continues, 18 UuR. LAW. 635, 645 (1986).
111. 458 U.S. at 426.
112. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979).
[Vol. 65:4
MOUNTAIN STATES v. HODEL
nent physical occupation authorized by the government is a taking with-
out regard to the public interest it may serve.' 13
B. Government Ownership of a Damaging Instrumentality is not a Prerequisite
for Finding a Taking when Government has Assumed Control
The facts supporting the finding of a taking in United States v.
Causby 114 are analogous to the situation at hand. In Causby, the govern-
ment owned the military aircraft which was found to have taken an ease-
ment by continually flying low over private property. In Hodel, the
government did not own the horses which grazed continually on the As-
sociation's property; however, the Secretary of Interior had assumed
complete and exclusive control over the horses. United States v. Cress 1 15
held that the government need not own the instrumentality of the inva-
sion as long as the actual use or invasion is caused by the government
action. In Cress, construction of a government flood control project
caused the private property owner's land to be repeatedly flooded by
water. Although the government did not actually own the water that
occupied the land, the United States was responsible for the invasion
and thus a compensable taking was found. 1 16 Similarly, in Hodel, the
inaction of the Secretary of the Interior resulted in the physical invasion
of the Association's property. Because the Secretary is mandated by the
Act to remove the horses upon request, the government is responsible
for the damage.
C. Takings Case Law Decided After Hodel
In its 1986-1987 term, the United States Supreme Court decided
more takings cases on the merits than in its entire history. The Supreme
Court has yet to deal with the Hodel issue of whether "nonaction," when
the government clearly has a duty to act, constitutes a taking. However,
three of the recently decided cases are relevant to the takings analysis
set forth above and deserve discussion relative to Hodel and the future of
takings case law.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 117 the California Coastal
Commission conditioned its approval of rebuilding permits for beach-
front property on the requirement that owners provide lateral access to
the public. The public easement, the commission argued, was in fur-
therance of the state interest of providing beach access to the public and
therefore was not a violation of the fifth amendment under the police
power. However, the Supreme Court focused on the Commission's jus-
tifications for the condition and found that the easement would not fur-
ther a public interest. The Agins ends-means test was not met: the
government's use of property as an easement did not further a legiti-
113. 458 U.S. at 426.
114. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
115. 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
116. Id. at 328.
117. 107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987).
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mate public interest.1 18
Along with this ends-means analysis, Justice Scalia reiterated the
per se takings rule set forth in Loretto and stated that Supreme Court
precedent has uniformly held there is a taking to the extent of the occu-
pation' Thus, a taking exists without regard to whether the action
achieves an important public benefit or causes only minimal economic
impact on the owner. 19
The Nollan ends-means analysis is not directly applicable to Hodel
because there is no issue as to whether the Act furthers a legitimate pub-
lic interest. However, application of the per se rule strengthens the As-
sociation's argument. The majority in Nollan found a permanent
physical occupation by the public's continuous right to pass back and
forth, even though no individual was permitted to station himself per-
manently upon the premises. 120 Therefore, it would seem that the same
finding of a permanent physical occupation should have been applied in
Hodel by invoking the per se rule.
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. Debenedictis, 121 mineowners
attacked the constitutionality of sections of an act prohibiting mining
that caused surface subsidence damage to pre-existing buildings. ' 2 2 Be-
cause it was a facial attack and not an as-applied challenge claiming dam-
ages resulting from application of the act to the mineowners, the inquiry
was limited to whether the mere enactment of the statute constituted a
taking. 123
Although the facts in Keystone were somewhat similar to those of
Pennsylvania Coal, 124 Pennsylvania Coal did not control the Keystone hold-
ing. Whereas Justice Holmes found the act in Pennsylvania Coal to be
solely for the benefit of private parties, the act in Keystone was found to
serve legitimate public interests, that of avoiding further subsidence
damage to surrounding surface estate owners.
12 5
The second factor on which the Court relied to distinguish Keystone
from Pennsylvania Coal is the degree of diminution of property. In Key-
stone, the court held a regulatory statute is only a taking if it denies own-
ers of all economically viable uses of of their land. 26 However, as the
Court held in Andrus v. Allard, to take one strand from the bundle of
rights is not a taking because the aggregate must be viewed as an en-
118. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. The Court in Vollan believed suffi-
cient public access to the beach existed and that increased access was not in furtherance of
a legitimate public interest.
119. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35.
120. Nollan, 107 S.Ct. at 3145.
121. 107 S.Ct. 1232 (1987).
122. The Act in question is the Pennsylvania Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land
Conservation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1406.4, 1406.6 (Purdon 1980).
123. 107 S.Ct. at 1236.
124. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
125. Keystone, 107 S.Ct. at 1246.
126. Id. at 1248 (emphasis added); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 260 (1980); Penn Cen-
tral Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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tirety. 12 7 Thus, the Court in Keystone denied the mineowners' facial chal-
lenge of the act because they did not prove it was impracticable for the
miners to continue mining all types of coal.'
2 8
The final relevant case decided by the Court during this term, Hodel
v.. Irving,12 9 involved an amendment of the Indian Land Consolidation
Act of 1983 which threatened to deprive Indian landowners of the right
to pass property to their heirs. Property would only be subject to the
amendment, section 217, if it was small, undivided, and if its productiv-
ity was low during the year preceding the owner's death. Upon the
death of the owner, this small parcel would escheat to the tribe to ame-
liorate the problem of extreme fractionalization of the land. Justice
O'Conner, after making an ad hoc inquiry as to the impact of the regula-
tion, its interference with investment-backed expectations, and the char-
acter of the governmental action, found the new amendment to be a
taking. 13 0 The impact of the regulation was determined to be substan-
tial even though the income from the land was de minimis. Justice
O'Conner stated that, although the value of the land may not be much,
the right to convey land to heirs is itself a valuable right. 13 1 The stick in
the bundle of rights involved here, the right to pass property to heirs,
could be equated to the right of a property owner to occupy land free
from physical invasion, as in Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel. '
3 2
Denial of either stick invokes the per se rule, resulting in the finding of a
taking.
Through these recently decided cases, the Court has reaffirmed the
framework for examining whether a regulation amounts to a taking. By
examining the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
governmental action, the Court makes an ad hoc factual inquiry and de-
termines which test should be used. If the character of the governmental
action is a permanent physical invasion, as in Nollan, the inquiry is lim-
ited, and the per se rule is applied. The holdings in these recent
Supreme Court cases, which are consistent with established precedent,
are contrary to the finding of Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel.
V. CONCLUSION
The character of the government's action must be identified by the
courts in a takings analysis in order to determine what precedent to fol-
low. The nature of the government's interference with private property
owners' rights should be distinguished as either a regulation or a physi-
cal occupation. Differentiation by the courts is essential because the
Supreme Court has developed different standards in their takings analy-
127. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
128. Ken'stone, 107 S.Ct. at 1250.
129. 107 S.Ct. 2076 (1987).
130. Id. at 2084.
131. Id. at 2082.
132. 799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986).
1988]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
sis, depending on the character of the action. Although the Court has
given deferential treatment to the legislature to regulate as they see fit,
because of the serious character of a governmental action which physi-
cally uses and occupies private property, government physical invasion
has been closely scrutinized. Permanent physical occupation of private
property by the government is a taking without regard to the public pur-
pose it may serve, and thus deserves compensation under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments.
In Hodel, there is no doubt that the wild horses, as a result of the
BLM's noncompliance with the Wild Horses Act, physically invaded the
Association's property. Therefore, the regulatory takings analysis set
forth by the Tenth Circuit was inappropriate. Enforcement of the Wild
Horses Act did not cause the damage to the Association's property and,
furthermore, compliance with the Wild Horses Act would have pre-
vented the damage. The wild horses are controlled exclusively and af-
firmatively-by the BLM under the Act. Had the BLM complied with the
Act, the damage caused by the wild horses would never have occurred.
The majority, in their analysis of Hodel, whether inadvertently or
intentionally, misconstrued the basis for the cause of action in uphold-
ing the government's authority to regulate. As a result, the court's anal-
ysis did not address the issues around which Hodel centers.
Sarah S. Godfrey
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OVERVIEW
Economic exposure and contractual uncertainty have intensified for
the oil and gas and mining industries. These negative factors are a di-
rect result of the Tenth Circuit Court's decisions analyzed during this
survey period.
In Park County Resource Council v. Department of Agriculture,' the court
concluded that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) does not
automically require the preparation of an Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS) for issuance of federal onshore oil and gas leases. The court
ruled, however, that NEPA challenges may be initiated against holders
of federal onshore oil and gas leases at any time, so long as exploration or
development operations are in progress or contemplated for the leased
land. NEPA contains no statute of limitations and the court was unwill-
ing to limit its application with other federal statutes. Thus, the Park
County court has vested NEPA proponents with new latitude to pursue
NEPA challenges free from time restraints. Susceptibility to this contin-
uous right to assert NEPA challenges serves to undermine the value of
issued and approved federal oil and gas leases by diminishing the oil and
gas industry's incentive to undertake costly and often risk laden explora-
tory ventures on federal lands.
While the oil and gas industry began to battle with this new dimen-
sion of economic uncertainty, the coal industry learned from the com-
panion cases of Coastal States Energy Co. v. Hodel 2 and FMC Wyoming Corp.
v. Hodel3 that the coal industry's vested, indeterminate-term commercial
coal lease contracts are no longer vested contractual rights. Rather,
these contracts are actually agreements of a finite term, subject to mate-
rial alteration by the Federal Coal Lease Amendment Act when such
leases celebrate their next anniversary. These changes create substan-
tial economic problems for coal mining companies who have tailored
their supply and price committments to the 'original terms of the coal
lease contract.
In Martin Exploration Management Co. v. FERC,4 the Tenth Circuit
held that when Congress provides oil and gas producers with the right
to elect the highest price for natural gas under the complex regulatory
scheme found in the Natural Gas Policy Act, such right shall not be sum-
marily abrogated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in the
name of reasonable rulemaking.
The Tenth Circuit held in Navajo Tribe of Indians v. New Mexico,5 that
I. 817 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1987).
2. 816 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1987).
3. 816 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1987).
4. 813 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1987).
5. 809 F.2d 1455 (10th Cir. 1987).
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the Indian Claims Commission Act was established to provide the sole
forum and remedy for Indian claims arising before 1946. The harsh
outcome of this case renders all courts incompetent to entertain any
claim arising before 1946 and those not timely submitted to the Indian
Claims Commission. By sleeping on its rights, the Navajo Tribe missed
the opportunity to avail itself to the only forum empowered to hear its
case.
I. NEPA CHALLENGE TO FEDERAL ONSHORE OIL AND GAS LEASING
A. Park County Resource Council v. Department of Agriculture
1. Background
This case further defined the relationship between the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 6 and onshore federal oil and gas
leases by expanding plaintiff's rights under NEPA. The primary issue in
Park County 7 was whether an EIS was required prior to the issuance of a
federal onshore oil and gas lease. The lease at issue covered non-wil-
derness federal lands and was subject to customized stipulations limiting
the scope of exploration activities. These stipulations restricting the
lessee's activities, were designed to minimize environmental damage. 8
Before reaching the primary issue, however, the Park County court faced
three distinct procedural issues of equal importance: (1) whether Park
County Resource Council's (Park) claim was time-barred by the ninety
day statute of limitations as found in the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of
1920 (MLLA), 9 (2) whether Park's claim was time-barred by the equita-
ble doctrine of laches, 10 and (3) whether the courts were unavailable to
Park due to its failure to exhaust administrative remedies.' ' The district
6. The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1982) provides:
all agencies of the Federal Government shall- . . . (C) include in every recommen-
dation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by
the responsible official on - (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the propo-
sal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship
between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and
enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action
should it be implemented. Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsi-
ble Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal
agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any envi-
ronmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and
views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized
to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the
President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by
section 552 of title 5, and shall accompany the proposal through the existing
agency review processes.
7. Park Count,, 817 F.2d at 620.
8. Id. at 612-13.
9. 30 U.S.C. § 226-2 (1982).
10. Park County, 817 F.2d at 617. The district court concluded that the equitable doc-
trine of laches applied since Park County's delay in filing a known claim prejudiced the
intervenor, Marathon Oil Company. Park County v. Department of Agriculture, 613 F.
Supp. 1182 (D. Wyo. 1985).
11. Park Comity, 817 F.2d at 619. See 43 C.F.R. § 4.411 (1987).
[Vol. 65:4
NATURAL RESOURCES
court found that all three procedural points barred Park from pursuing
its substantive claim in court. This ruling forced Park to appeal the
lower court's decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
2. Facts
Park's case was comprised of three substantive claims. First, Park
asserted that the BLM should have prepared an EIS covering the entire
lease area prior to issuing the oil and gas lease. 12 It claimed that lease
issuance constitutes a major federal action significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment, thereby requiring an EIS under
NEPA. 13 Second, it claimed that the site specific North Fork well EIS
was inadequate because it failed to address the cumulative surface im-
pact that may result from a successful well completion. 14 Third, Park
contended that the defendants violated the Endangered Species Act, 15
alleging that they failed to draft appropriate measures protecting nearby
grizzly bears. 16
In June 1983, Marathon Oil Company (successor in interest to May
Petroleum, Inc., and representing co-owners Amarada Hess Corp. and
Rosewood Resources, Inc.) submitted to the BLM an Application for
Permit to Drill (APD) covering the North Fork well location. 17 The APD
was approved after the BLM prepared an EIS for the well site.
Thereafter, Park filed a complaint seeking an injunction prohibiting
oil and gas exploration and drilling on the lease, alleging that the BLM
prepared an inadequate EIS and thus failed to comply with NEPA. 18
Park also sought a declaratory judgement that an EIS should have been
prepared prior to the issuance of the federal oil and gas lease. Park alleged
that the act of issuing the lease constituted a major federal action which
significantly affected the quality of the human environment because the
lease vested the lessee with the right to drill wells on National Forest
Service land. 19
a. North Fork Lease and Well Location
Park's request for a preliminary injunction prohibiting drilling at
the North Fork site obligated Park to prove that irreparable harm would
12. Id. at 615, 620.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 614.
15. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1982).
16. Park County, 613 F. Supp. at 1185, 1188.
17. Id. at 1184.
18. Id. at 1184-85.
19. Id. at 1185. Park County, 817 F.2d at 614. Moreover, Park County prayed for an
order "requiring defendants to withdraw their approval on any leases or permits previ-
ously given pending their compliance with ... NEPA." Id. Park's motion for a temporary
restraining order was denied June, 1985. The parties agreed to consolidate the hearing of
Park's motion for preliminary injunction with a trial on the merits. The district court de-
nied Park's motion for preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
Park unsuccessfully sought a stay pending appeal from the Tenth Circuit. Thereafter, Park
petitioned the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court for a stay in July 1985.
This petition was denied in October 1985. 106 S. Ct. 42 (1985).
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occur to the surrounding environment. 20 The North Fork well was
staked on an untimbered ridge located 28 miles west of Cody, Wyoming,
and 26 miles east of Yellowstone National Park, in the Shoshone Na-
tional Forest. 2 1 The district court concluded the area was "not pristine,
or primitive, or even very unusual."' 22 The North Fork well was com-
pleted as a dry hole during the course of this action and reclamation
work has been completed and continues to be monitored. 23 Moreover,
Congress had had three opportunities to designate the area as a "Wil-
derness Area," but declined to do so.
24
Prior to offering the lease, the Forest Service issued a "Finding of
No Significant Impact" (FONSI). 2 5 This means, that with appropriate
controls protecting environmental resources, an EIS at the leasing stage
would not be necessary. 2 6 Indeed, when the lease was issued, it was
subject to a number of provisions and stipulations protecting the envi-
ronment from the harmful affects of oil and gas exploration.
2 7
The district court ruled that the EIS prepared on the North Fork
well site was adequate. It also declared that the BLM was not obligated
to prepare an additional EIS prior to lease issuance. 2 8 Its ruling on this
issue, however, was one of accommodation only, since it had ruled that
Park County lost the right to attack the issuance of the lease.2 9 The
district court found that Park's EIS attack was time-barred by the ninety
day statute of limitations in the MLLA; furthermore, Park's claim was
barred by the equitable doctrine of laches; and finally it was prohibited
from pursuing its claim because it failed to exhaust the administrative
remedies30
3. The Tenth Circuit Decision
Affirming in part and reversing in part the district court's decision,
the Tenth Circuit declared that the BLM's decision to issue the lease
without first preparing an EIS was reasonable, 3 ' in that the lease issu-
ance itself was not a major federal action significantly affecting the qual-
ity of the human environment. The court grounded its conclusion on
the bases that (1) substantial mitigating measures were imposed on Mar-
athon's activities; (2) further environmental appraisals prior to any sur-
face disturbance were required; (3) the possibility of future drilling
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 103.
21. Id. at 1184.
22. Id. at 1187. The court noted that the North Fork well area has always been a
multiple-use area, as recently reaffirmed by Congress when it enacted the Wyoming Wil-
derness Act of 1984. See Wyoming Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-550, 98 Stat.
2807 (1984).
23. Park County, 817 F.2d at 614.
24. Park County, 613 F. Supp. at 1187.
25. Park County, 817 F.2d at 612.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 613.
28. Park County, 613 F. Supp. at 1186-87.
29. Id. at 1186.
30. Id.
31. Park County, 817 F.2d at 624.
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activities at time of lease issuance were remote; and (4) federal agencies
would have significant involvement in any future exploration activities.
32
Judge McKay, writing for the court, removed the procedural hur-
dles erected by the lower court's decision. He declared that Park's ac-
tion was not time-barred under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920,
that the equitable doctrine of laches did not bar Park from pursuing its
action, and that the failure to exhaust the administrative remedies doc-
trine was inapplicable to Park in this case. 33 The Tenth Circuit refused
to address, however, the adequacy of the EIS covering the APD. It had
declared this issue moot since the well was completed as a dry hole.
5 4
a. NEPA Not Subject to MLLA's Statute of Limitations
In an issue of first impression, the district court held that a NEPA
challenge to an oil and gas lease on federal forest land issued without an
EIS is not subject to the ninety day statute of limitations found in the
Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920.35 The statute, in the pertinent part,
provides that "[n]o action contesting a decision of the Secretary involv-
ing an oil and gas lease shall be maintained unless such action is com-
menced or taken within ninety days after the final decision of the
Secretary relating to such matter."' 36 Park knew as early as 1983 that the
lease was issued without an EIS, but chose not to bring this action until
1985.3 7 The Tenth Circuit, in concluding the trial court had erred,
adopted the reasoning established by the Ninth Circuit Court in Jones v.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 619.
34. Id. at 614-15. The court discussed the case-or-controversy requirement for fed-
eral court jurisdiction: the litigant must have suffered actual injury "that can be redressed
by favorable judicial decision." Park County, 817 F.2d at 614. The court concluded that
the "redressability arm of the case-or-controversy requirement is not satisfied here." Id at.
615. There was no meaningful remedy which Park County could obtain because the com-
pletion of all activities authorized by the permit to drill had been completed. Thus, it
concluded, reversal of the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction prohibiting
drilling would result in an "empty gesture." Id. at 615. The court conceded that although
redressability was possible when the suit was initiated (well activity in progress), the court
forfeited its jurisdiction at the time the well was plugged, abandoned and reclaimed. "[A]
court can determine the merits of a controversy only if jurisdiction exists at all stages of
the proceeding." Id. at 615 (quoting Amalgamated Sugar v. Bergland, 664 F.2d 818, 822
(10th Cir. 1981)).
Plaintiffs addressed the mootness issue by arguing that in spite of the fact that the
North Fork well was plugged and abandoned, the issue surrounding the adequacy of the
EIS was of such "great public importance" it required consideration by the court. The
court rebutted that the "[elmotional involvement in a law suit is not enough to meet the
case-or-controversy requirement." Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Mathis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977)
(per curiam).
35. 30 U.S.C. § 226-2 (1982). The court overruled the district court's finding which
declared that the statute was "clear and unambiguous and that no action contesting an oil
and gas lease decision shall be maintained unless taken within 90 days." Park County, 613
F. Supp. at 1186. The lower court's decision was based on the rationale that NEPA chal-
lenges can be devastating to the predictability of title, which is precisely what the statute is
intended to guard against. Id. See also Geosearch v. Andrus, 508 F. Supp. 839, 845 (D.
Wyo. 1981).
36. Park County, 817 F.2d at 616 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 226-2 (1982)).
37. Id.
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Gordon.3 8
i. Jones v. Gordon Analysis
In Jones, an operator of an aquatic zoological park, Sea World, ap-
plied for a permit to capture killer whales for purposes of scientific re-
search and public display.3 9 The Marine Mammal Protection Act of
1972 (MMPA) 40 provides authority for such proposed ventures. In May
of 1984, Jones sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service in federal court alleging that the Ser-
vice's issuance of the permit to Sea World without preparation of an EIS
violated NEPA. 4 ' The Service contended that Jones' action was time-
barred by the sixty day statute of limitations found in § 104(d)(6) of the
MMPA, 4 2 since Jones did not file his action until six months after the
Service issued the permit to Sea World.
43
The Ninth Circuit, affirming the lower court's decision, held that
the statute of limitations period set forth in the MMPA does not apply to
NEPA challenges since NEPA itself provides an independent source of
jurisdiction forJones' action.4 4 The court interpreted the statute of lim-
itations in the MMPA to apply to "substantive" elements of the permit
only, and not to the "procedural" requirements of NEPA. 45 Thus, since
Jones' challenge was essentially procedural in nature, the sixty day stat-
ute of limitations did not operate to bar his action.
4 6
By direct analogy to Jones, the Tenth Circuit reasoned in Park County
that the statute of limitations embodied in the MLLA only applied to
"actions contesting either the lease issuance or substantive decisions re-
lating to the lease itself."'4 7 In short, since a NEPA challenge is proce-
dural in nature and does not attack the substantive elements of an oil
and gas lease, the MLLA's provision simply does not apply to NEPA
attacks. Therefore, they held that a NEPA challenge to the issuance of
oil and gas leases on federal forest lands is not subject to the ninety day
statute of limitations found in the MLLA. 48 The court also held the eq-
38. 792 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1986).
39. Id. at 823.
40. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1982). The statute authorizes the Secretary to issue per-
mits for the taking or importation of any marine mammal.
41. Jones, 792 F.2d at 823.
42. Section 104(d)(6) of the MMPA provides that:
Any applicant for a permit, or any party opposed to such permit, may obtain judi-
cial review of the terms and conditions of any permit issued by the Secretary
under this section or of his refusal to issue such a permit. Such review, which
shall be pursuant to Chapter 7 of Title 5, may be initiated by filing a petition for
review in the United States District Court for the district wherein the applicant for
a permit resides, or has his principal place of business, or in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, within sixty days after the date on which
such permit is issued or denied. (emphasis added).
16 U.S.C. § 1347(d)(6) (1982).




47. Park County, 817 F.2d at 616.
48. Id. at 616-17.
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uitable doctrine of laches as the sole defense against an untimely NEPA
challenge since NEPA contains no statute of limitations.
49
b. Application of Laches Under NEPA
While the laches doctrine is invoked at the discretion of the trial
court, courts have held that "laches must be invoked sparingly in envi-
ronmental cases because ordinarily the plaintiff will not be the only vic-
tim of alleged environmental damage. A less grudging application of
the doctrine might defeat Congress' environmental policy." '50 With this
qualification in mind, the Tenth Circuit overruled the district court's ap-
plication of laches5 ' in the instant case. By reasoning that the district
court abused its discretion by invoking the doctrine of laches, it held
that the district court failed to explicitly recognize that laches must be
invoked sparingly in NEPA cases in order to protect Congress' environ-
mental policy.
52
Contrary to the district court's ruling, the Tenth Circuit did not per-
ceive Park's tactical decision to fight the APD first rather than the lease
issuance as constituting unreasonable delay. The court stated that evi-
dence of an unreasonable delay in pressing a known claim, coupled with
prejudice to the defendant resulting from such delay, was necessary to
sustain a laches claim. They viewed Park's decision as a tactical maneu-
ver and not as an unreasonable delay causing prejudice to the defend-
ants. The court recognized that because Park was an organization with
limited financial resources, it was forced to pursue the one claim that
could result in the maximum benefit. 53 The two year delay in challeng-
ing the lease issuance was not due to a lack of vigilance, but rather, be-
cause "plaintiffs expected that their strategic decision to focus on the
APD approval would render challenge to the underlying lease issuance
49. Park County, 817 F.2d at 617. In the context of NEPA challenges, there are three
criteria that must be satisfied before laches can be applied: (1) a delay in asserting a right
or a claim; (2) such delay was not excusable; and (3) there was undue prejudice to the
defendants as a result of the delay. Sierra Club v. Cavanaugh, 447 F. Supp. 427, 429 (D.
S.D. 1978).
50. Id. (quoting Preservation Coalition, Inc., v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir.
1982)). "[L]aches ... has received a lukewarm reception in suits presenting environmen-
tal questions, for not only will others than the plaintiff suffer the possible adverse environ-
mental effects, but the agency will escape compliance with NEPA, a result not to be
encouraged." Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1324
(8th Cir. 1974).
51. Park County, 613 F. Supp. at 1186. The district court was convinced that Park
knowingly delayed the filing of a known claim concerning the lease issuance and that such
delay prejudiced the defendants. Park was aware no later than June 1983, that the North
Fork lease was issued without an EIS and failed to bring an action at that time. Instead,
Park demanded that an EIS be prepared on the North Fork APD even though it was con-
vinced that such APD would never be approved. Once the APD was approved, Park
County reversed its position and brought an action challenging the issuance of the North
Fork lease. Id.
52. Park County, 817 F.2d at 617.
53. Id. at 617-18. The court further added that "[t]he general public, whose interest
plaintiffs essentially represent in environmental cases, should not be penalized for plain-
tiffs decision to pursue the avenue that they thought to be most fruitful in vindicating their
concerns." Id. at 618.
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superfluous."
54
Moreover, the court failed to find that Marathon was prejudiced by
the two year delay.5 5 In determining whether a delay is prejudicial, the
pertinent inquiry is whether substantial work on the project has been
completed before suit is brought.5 6 Here, the North Fork well had been
completed and reclaimed and further drilling under the lease had yet to
transpire. Therefore, the court resolved that preparation of an EIS at
this point in time could still reasonably be expected to ameliorate any
feared environmental damage arising from future lease activities.
5 7
The court did not find that the one million dollar expenditure by
Marathon or the costs incurred by the Environmental Assessment (EA)
and EIS delay constituted prejudice. 58 The use of capital expenditures
in defining prejudice was eroded by the way the court defined the rela-
tionship between laches and NEPA. Specifically, the dispositive issue
seems to be not the amount of dollars spent, but rather what "percent-
age of total costs has already been committed." 5 9 Furthermore, the
court considered any increase in costs due to delay as an irrelevant fac-
tor of prejudice since NEPA, by its very nature, contemplates such
delay.
60
c. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The thirty day period to appeal the lease issuance to the Interior
Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) had long passed when Park lost on the
APD issue.6 1 Hence, since Park could not appeal to the IBLA even if it
had wanted to, the court stated that the administrative process was not
disrupted. Moreover, the Park County court found that the McKart fac-
tors, which are necessary to promote the exhaustion doctrine, were in-
applicable to NEPA cases. 62 McKart presupposes that an administrative
agency possesses expertise beyond that of the courts and that it is there-
54. Park County, 817 F.2d at 618. In the environmental arena, laches will not attach if
(1) the party has made an attempt to make its position known to the agency before filing
suit; (2) the agency makes some response to such request; and (3) physical developments
such as partial construction or drilling have not taken place that would motivate citizens to
investigate the legal basis for challenging the agency's action. Watershed Associates Res-
cue v. Alexander, 586 F. Supp. 978, 984 (1982). In the instant case, the initial challenge to
the APD, rather than the lease itself, constituted Park County's attempt to make its overall
position known to the BLM and Forest Service. Furthermore, absent additional drilling,
there was no immediate physical indication that drilling activity would soon resume.
Hence, the public had no on-the-ground evidence that would motivate their interest to
seek legal redress; thus, the delay associated with pursuing their claim did not constitute
laches.
55. Park County, 817 F.2d at 618.
56. Watershed, 586 F. Supp. 978, 985.
57. Park County, 817 F.2d at 619. For example, in light of more probing information
found in an EIS, as opposed to an environmental assessment, additional lease stipulations
may be devised which could further protect the environment. Id.
58. Id. at 618.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 619. See43 C.F.R. § 4.410-.411 (1986).
62. The McKart factors are: (1) avoidance of premature interruption of the administra-
tive process; (2) deference to bodies possessing expertise in areas outside the conventional
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fore better qualified to handle the issue affecting that agency's deci-
sion.6" In the NEPA context, however, the Park County court opined that
it was every bit as qualified as the agency to pass judgment on NEPA
claims, and that application of the exhaustion doctrine in this case would
undermine the goal that prompted NEPA's development; therefore, it
concluded that the trial court erred when it applied the exhaustion
doctrine.
64
d. EIS Not Required For Issuance of Oil and Gas Lease
The Park County court upheld the trial court's ruling that the BLM's
lease issuance was not unreasonable. Thus, at the leasing stage, with the
proper stipulatory controls, an EIS was held not to be required. 6 5 The
court found that "the hybrid goal [of the] nation is to encourage the
development of domestic oil and gas production while at the same time
ensuring that such development is undertaken with an eye towards envi-
ronmental concerns." '66 The Park County court stated that the goals of
NEPA must be harmonized with the seemingly divergent views of both
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 197667 (FLPMA) and
the Energy Security Act, 6 8 which "explicitly [establishes] a national pol-
icy to end dependence on foreign energy sources." '69
e. Application of NEPA
NEPA is essentially a procedural statute; it does "not require agen-
cies to elevate environmental concerns over other appropriate consider-
ations."'70 It simply requires that an agency take a "hard look" at the
environmental consequences of any major federal action. 7 1 In the in-
stant case, it is the BLM's and Forest Service's responsibility to deter-
mine whether an EIS is required prior to lease issuance.7 2 To aid in this
determination, the agency is required to prepare an environmental as-
sessment (EA). 7 3 The EA process allows the agency to identify adverse
environmental consequences that may arise from the contemplated op-
experience of judges; (3) recognition of executive and administrative autonomy; and (4)
development of a factual record. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-94 (1969).
63. Park County, 817 F.2d at 620.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 624. The district court applied an arbitrary and capricious standard to the
agency's decision of whether an EIS must be prepared. Park County, 613 F. Supp. at 1186.
See also Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d. 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Hanly
v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1972). However, the
Tenth Circuit used a reasonableness standard when it reviewed the agency's action.
66. Park County, 817 F.2d at 621.
67. 43 U.S.C. § 1701-84 (1982). Section 1701(a)(12) stands for the proposition that
public lands must be managed in a manner which recognizes the nation's need for domes-
tic sources of minerals, food, timber and fiber from public lands.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 8701(b)(1) (1979).
69. Park County, 817 F.2d at 620.
70. Id. (quoting Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983)).
71. Id. (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 (1976)).
72. Id. at 620.
73. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) (1986).
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eration. If the envisioned environmental harm can be substantially miti-
gated through the use of protective measures and restrictions on lease
activity, this exercise will lead to a Finding of No Significant Impact
("FONSI"), in which case an EIS will not be required. Should such miti-
gating measures fail to satisfy a sufficient number of environmental con-
cerns, however, an EIS will be required.
74
Based on the strength of the EA that was drafted prior to issuance
of the contested lease, 75 the BLM determined that the lease issuance
itself did not warrant prior preparation of an EIS. 76 To determine
whether an EIS should have been prepared, the role of the reviewing
court is a narrow one. Its role is to determine whether it is reasonable
for the BLM and the Forest Service to conclude that "the action under
review will have no significant environmental consequences."-77 The
party challenging the agency's decision "shoulders the burden of estab-
lishing that the FONSI was unreasonable."-78 Finally, in its analysis of
whether an EIS is required under NEPA, the BLM and Forest Service
may properly weigh the mitigating measures it will impose on lease ac-
74. Park County, 817 F.2d at 621. Federal onshore oil and gas leases are issued
through the Department of Interior-BLM pursuant to the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, as
amended in 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-226 (1982). Upon lease issuance, the lessee is entitled to
conduct exploration and/or drilling activities in accordance with the terms and conditions
of the lease, subject to any stipulations attached to the lease. Often, as in this case, special
lease stipulations require approval of activities by the Forest Service, which is the surface
managing agency. If lease offerings affect lands administered by the Forest Service, the
BLM submits them to the Forest Service for review. The Forest Service makes a recom-
mendation whether the lease should be issued and, if so, recommends mitigating measures
in the form of lease stipulations that will control the environmental impacts that may be
caused by lease activity. It is the general practice of the BLM to accept Forest Service
recommendations.
The Forest Service administers responsibility over the EA process. In addition, when
the lessee or its designated operator exercises its rights to drill under the oil and gas lease,
it is required to file a proposed operating plan to the BLM in order to receive an approved
permit to drill. 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-1(a) (1986). Environmental documents pursuant to
NEPA are prepared prior to approval of the proposed operations. 43 C.F.R. § 3162.5-1 (a)
(1986). The BLM and Forest Service work in tandem to scrutinize the proposed plan in
light of NEPA and, if appropriate, tailor environmental stipulations allowing the operator
to fulfill his operating plan while minimizing any impact his operations may have on the
environment. Brief for Appellees/Cross Appellants at 5-7, Park County Resource Council
v. Department of Agriculture, 817 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1987).
75. Park County, 817 F.2d at 621. The Forest Service prepared an EA exceeding 100
pages. It evaluated the effects of, and alternatives for, its recommendations on oil and gas
lease offers involving the Shoshone National Forest. The Forest Service opted to recom-
mend lease issuance with appropriate stipulations to protect surface resources. The EA
also recommended against leasing where strict statutory control over operations would be
insufficient to avoid unacceptable irreversible damage to resources. Id.
76. Id. On November 9, 1979, the Regional Forester issued a Finding of No Signifi-
cant Impact ("FONSI"). Hence, its final determination stated that there would be no sig-
nificant impact on the human environment as a result of oil and gas lease issuance under
the stipulations promulgated by the Forest Service. Id.
77. Id. at 621. There is a split among the circuit courts as to the appropriate standard
of review in evaluating whether an agency's determination to forego an EIS should be
overturned. Id. at note 4. The Tenth, Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits adhere to
the "reasonableness standard." The First, Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits apply the
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law"
standard, as set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). Id.
78. Park County, 817 F.2d at 621 (citing Vieux Carre Property Owners, Residents &
Associates v. Pierce, 719 F.2d 1272, 1279 (5th Cir. 1983)).
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tivity which serve to reduce negative environmental impacts. 79
As a result of these factors, the Park County court held that Park
failed to meet its burden. The Court concluded that the BLM and the
Forest Service took the requisite "hard look" at the environmental con-
sequences of oil and gas leasing, and that the FONSI was "within the
bounds of reasonable decision making.
'"80
The issuance of the oil and gas lease was fundamentally a paper
transaction, that is, the lease issuance itself did not allow the lessee to do
anything. A gamut of environmentally mitigating measures were in
place forcing the lessee to obtain prior federal approval and conduct
futher environmental analysis before carrying out any surface disturbing
activities. 8 ' Hence, the BLM and Forest Service maintained tight con-
trol over future activities. They reserved the right to impose strict modi-
fications, or in the case of threatened or endangered species, disallow
those activities that they considered detrimental.82
Park argued that an EIS must be prepared at the leasing stage be-
cause they were convinced that exploratory drilling would eventually
lead to full field development. 8 3 They argued that if such effects are not
considered at the leasing stage, they could not adequately be addressed
at a later time.8 4 The court noted, however, that there are no definite
foreseeable effects of full field development at the leasing stage. 85 In-
deed, oil and gas exploration statistics prove that one exploratory suc-
cess, let alone full field development, is extremely tentative and
speculative at the leasing stage. 8 6 The court recognized that requiring a
cumulative EIS, which contemplated full field development at the leas-
ing stage, would result in a gross misallocation of resources and would
not provide a useful environmental analysis for major federal actions
that affect the environment.
87
The court added that when an APD for a specific site is proposed,
an EIS evaluating the myriad environmental concerns should be initi-
ated.8 8 The purpose of an EIS can only be fully realized when a project
79. Id.
80. Id. at 622 (quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, 462 U.S. 87, 125 (1983)).
81. Id.
82. Id. The court in Park County relied on Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.
1972), where the major issue was whether the lease of Indian land to a corporation consti-
tuted a "federal" action, which would trigger NEPA. Id. In that case the court held that an
EIS was required prior to lease issuance because there were plans to develop the leased
land. The Park County court held that Davis "does not stand for the proposition that an EIS
is required whenever the Federal Government leases land." Park County, 817 F.2d at 622.
83. Park County, 817 F.2d at 622.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 623.
86. Id. Exploration activities take place on only one out of ten federal leases issued
and development activities are conducted on only one of ten of those leases on which
exploration activities have been approved and completed.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 623.
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is proposed not merely contemplated.89 "[T]he project must be of sufficient
definitiveness before an evaluation of its environmental impact can be
made and alternatives proposed."9 0 Otherwise, requiring an EIS at the
leasing stage is like "demanding that the Department specify the prob-
able route of a highway that may never be built from points as yet un-
known over terrain as yet unchartered in conformity with state plans as
yet undrafted. A more speculative exercise can hardly be imagined." 9' 1
4. Conclusion
At first blush it appears the oil and gas industry can claim a victory
in that the BLM is not required to prepare a cumulative EIS prior to
issuance of an onshore federal oil and gas lease, because such action
does not constitute a "major federal action significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment."'9 2 This ruling, however, rests on
the tender underpinnings that the reviewing agency reasonably identify
the potential environmental harm arising from speculative lease activi-
ties and that these concerns are adequately embodied in an EA with
companion lease stipulations mitigating any adverse environmental ef-
fects. NEPA contains no statute of limitations, thus leaving the equita-
ble doctrine of laches as the sole remaining affirmative defense available
to the lessee who is forced to defend against a NEPA challenge. 9 3 Since
courts sparingly apply laches to environmental issues raised in the name
of NEPA, the weakness of the laches defense is obvious. This effectively
means that exploration and development plans for federal leases will
remain susceptible to NEPA attack until these activities have been com-
pleted and reclaimed.
II. FEDERAL COAL LEASE READJUSTMENTS
A. Background
The companion cases of Coastal States v. Hodel
9 4 and FMC v. Hodel9 5
dealt with the statutory application of the rules and regulations gov-
erning the leasing of federal coal lands. The primary issues presented to
the Tenth Circuit concerned the timeliness of the Bureau of Land Man-
agement's (BLM) coal lease readjustment practices and the reasonable-
ness of the terms mandated thereunder. The results of these two cases
dramatically change the vested rights conferred upon pre-Federal Coal
Leasing Amendment Act 9 6 leases, a result that will have a far reaching
89. Id. (citing Weinberger v. Catholic Action, 454 U.S. 139, 146 (1981) (emphasis in
orginal)).
90. Id. at 624 (quoting Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir.
1971), vacated on other grounds, 409 U.S. 1021 (1972) (emphasis added)).
91. Id. (quoting County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1379
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978)).
92. Id.
93. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
94. 816 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1987).
95. 816 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1987).
96. 30 U.S.C.S. § 207(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986).
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impact on the mining and development of western federal coal lands.
B. Coastal States Energy Co. v. Hodel
1. Facts
Coastal States Energy Company (Coastal) owns and operates an un-
derground coal mine in Sevier County, Utah, known as the SUFCO
Mine. 97 In March 1985, the BLM attempted to readjust two federal coal
leases9" owned by Coastal pursuant to the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of
1920 (MLLA) 99 and the regulation promulgated thereunder. These two
leases embrace the largest portion of the coal reserves making up the
SUFCO Mine. The two leases, issued pursuant to the MLLA, 10 0 carried
royalty burdens equal to 15 cents per ton of coal mined. 10 '
In accordance with the MLLA, the leases were issued for an indeter-
minate period of time, subject to the BLM's right to reasonably readjust
and fix the terms and conditions of each lease at the end of twenty years
from the date of issuance and thereafter at the end of each succeeding
twenty-year period.10 2 Thus, on September 1, 1981, and February 28,
1982, the two leases in question (the "SL" lease and "U" lease, respec-
tively) were subject to readjustment.
10 3
Two months before the end of the second twenty-year period, the
BLM notified Coastal that it had intended to readjust the SL lease. The
notice did not outline the readjustment terms, but simply stated that the
terms and conditions would be forwarded within two years, and that the
readjustment would take effect sixty days after the anniversary date.'
0 4
Seventeen days after the second twenty-year period had expired, the
BLM sent Coastal a Notice of Proposed Readjustment of Lease, and no-
tified Coastal that it had sixty days in which to file objections to the pro-
97. The SUFCO Mine employs over 250 people. In recent years Coastal has made
capital improvements to the mine in amounts in excess of $33,000,000. To date, the mine
has produced over two million tons of coal, of which 80% of the annual production is
committed and sold pursuant to long term coal supply contracts. The price that Coastal
receives for this coal is directly tied to the royalty it must pay to the federal government
pursuant to the underlying coal lease. Opening Brief for Appellant at 6, Coastal States
Energy Co. v. Hodel, 816 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1987).
98. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 12. On September 11, 1941, Coastal's predecessor, Lo-
renzo R. Hansen, as Lessee, entered into coal lease Number SL-062583 (the -SL" Lease)
with the United States. Id. On March 1, 1962, the United States, as Lessor, and Coastal
State's predecessors, Southern Utah Fuel Company and Equipment Rental Service, as Les-
sees, entered into coal lease Number U-062453 (the "U" Lease), Id.
99. Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1985).
100. See 30 U.S.C. § 207 (1976) which mandated that each federal lease contain the
following material terms: a royalty of not less than 5 cents per ton of coal mined payable
on a quarterly basis; annual lease rentals topping out at no greater than $1.00 per acre on
the fifth anniversary date; lease term was for an indeterminate period of time conditioned
upon diligent development and continued operations.
101. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 12.
102. 30 U.S.C. § 201-07 (1976).
103. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 12.
104. Id. See also BLM Instruction Memorandum No. 80-463 (April 17, 1980) requiring
that such notices be sent to lessee at least 120 days prior to the end of the current twenty
year period.
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posed terms or surrender the lease.' 0 5
In similar fashion Coastal received a readjustment notice from the
BLM affecting the U lease. Two months prior to the U lease's twenty-
year anniversary, specific readjustment terms were proposed.
10 6
The Secretary proposed the readjustment of several lease provi-
sions '0 7 similar for both leases, mandating an increase in the royalty rate
from 15 cents per ton to 8% of the value of the coal removed by under-
ground mining methods. 10 8 Coastal, objecting to the proposed read-
justments, made a timely protest to the BLM. The BLM refused to
amend the proposed readjustments, forcing Coastal to appeal the
BLM's decision to the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA).' 0 9 The
IBLA affirmed the BLM's decision,' 10 after which Coastal appealed to
the Federal District Court for the District of Utah, challenging both the
readjustments and the underlying regulations and policies upon which
they were grounded."I ' The district court entered summary judgment
in favor of the BLM, holding that: "(1) [the] readjustment process was
not required to be completed prior to end of lease term; (2) the Federal
Coal Leasing Amendments Act (FCLAA) royalty provisions apply to re-
adjustments of a pre-FCLAA lease; and (3) the regulations (underlying
the BLM's action) were valid."' 12 Coastal appealed this adverse deci-
sion to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.' '3 Judge McWilliams af-
firmed the lower court's decision and ruled that (1) the coal lease
readjustments were timely and (2) that the FCLAA applies to pre-
FCLAA leases.' 1
4
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The two principle issues presented on appeal were (1) whether the
BLM preserved the right to formally readjust the leases after the expira-
tion of the twenty year anniversary date by serving Coastal with a notice
of intent to readjust the coal leases before the expiration of their twenty
year anniversary date, and (2) whether Section 6 of the FCLAA, and the
regulations and policies promulgated thereunder should apply to pre-
FCLAA leases on their anniversary dates.' 
5
105. Id. Coastal filed its objections with the BLM regarding the SL lease on November
24, 1981.
106. Id.
107. In addition to the royalty readjustment the BLM had proposed readjusting the
following terms: (I) increase in the bonding requirement from $3,000 to $450,000; (2)
change in royalty payments from monthly to quarterly; and (3) the deletion of the right ,to
credit rental payments against royalty payments. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 12-13.
108. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 12.
109. Id. at 13.
110. 70 I.B.L.A. 386 (Feb. 9, 1983).
111. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 13.
112. Id. at 9.
113. Coastal States Energy Co. v. Hodel, 816 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1987).




a. Timeliness of the Readjustment
Coastal reasserted it's argument made in the district court, that for
readjustment to be effective, the terms of the readjustment must be final
before the end of the leases' twenty-year anniversary period., 16 The
Department of Interior took the contrary position, that final readjust-
ment is effective so long as the BLM sends a notice of intent to readjust
to the coal lessee prior to the end of the twenty years.' 17 Both parties
claimed that Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrews I 18 is controlling.
i. The Tenth Circuit's Interpretation of the
Rosebud Decision
In Rosebud, the Tenth Circuit held that the BLM's attempt to read-
just the terms and conditions of a coal lease was unlawful, when the
notice of intent to readjust was provided two and one half years after
expiration of the lease's twenty-year period.' 19 The Rosebud court, how-
ever, did not address the issue of whether filing a notice of intent to
readjust prior to expiration of the twenty year period preserved the right
to readjust the lease after expiration of such time. ' 20 In the instant case,
however, the district court, by relying heavily on the Tenth Circuit's
contemporaneous decision in FMC v. Hodel, 12 1 expanded the rationale
of Rosebud. It declared that "[a]ll Rosebud required was that Notice of
Readjustment be given on or before the Twenty-year anniversary date of
the lease," to preserve the Secretary's right to readjust.' 2 2 The district
court claimed that its finding was consistent with the MLLA, the FCLAA
(1976) and the language embodied in the leases themselves.
The MLLA, as amended by the FCLAA (1976) establishes the
framework by which the government must abide in the leasing of federal
coal lands to private parties. The statute, as amended, vests the Secre-
tary of the Interior with the right to readjust the terms and conditions of
a coal lease at the end of the lease's anniversary period.' 2 3 Coastal ar-
gued that the phrase, "at the end of" such period, is unambiguous and
must be afforded its plain meaning, which required the readjustment to
be final at the end of the twenty-year period for it to be effective.12 4 The
district court, however, found Coastal's statutory interpretation too nar-
row and unconvincing. The court insisted that such interpretation is
subject to the examination of all relevant statutes and regulations
116. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 13.
117. Id.
118. 667 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1982).
119. Id. The court emphasized that it was not "difficult to reach the conclusion that the
readjustment was to be when each twenty-year period expired, on that date and not at a
later time." It concluded that the statement of time " 'at the end of' on its face is not
susceptible to any variation as it is a precise time." Id. at 951.
120. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 13.
121. 816 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1987). See also infra notes 159-91 and accompanying text.
122. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 13 (quoting Gulf Oil v. Clark, 631 F. Supp. 29 (D.N.M.
1985)).
123. 30 U.S.C.A. § 207 (Law. Co-op. 1971).
124. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 13.
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promulgated thereunder. Since there are numerous regulations gov-
erning the readjustment process, the district court concluded that the
requirements of these regulations created a readjustment process as op-
posed to requiring the BLM to readjust the leases in a single act. 125 As a
result, the otherwise plain meaning of the word "at" as interpreted in
Rosebud has turned from a particular point in time, to an entire period of
time required for readjustment.
ii. Reasonableness of the Coal Leasing Regulations
Coastal next attacked the reasonableness of the regulation process
that had been established to accomplish the mandated readjustments.
As authorized in the MLLA, the Secretary promulgated regulations that
implemented the specifics of the FCLAA. This resulted in the installa-
tion of a comprehensive procedure whereby the Secretary would be re-
quired to notify the lessee, prior to the expiration of the twenty-year
lease term or any succeeding ten-year period thereafter, of whether
readjusted terms would be made prior to the end of such period.
12 6 If
the Secretary fails to notify the lessee of its intent to readjust, this shall
be deemed a waiver of its right to readjust for the ensuing lease pe-
riod. 127 The regulations further provide that the Notice to Readjust
must inform the lessee when the specific terms will be transmitted, and
that such transmission must be done within two years upon receipt of
notice. If the BLM fails to comply within this two year period it waives
its right to readjust. 128 Finally, the regulation scheme allows the lessee
a sixty-day period following receipt of the readjusted terms to lodge an
objection thereto with the IBLA.'
2 9
Coastal asserted that the foregoing regulations must be set aside
because they were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and
otherwise not in accordance with law."' 3 0 The court analyzed the rea-
sonableness of the regulations by the standards set out by the Adminis-
125. Id. at 15.
126. Id.. at 14. See 30 U.S.C. § 207 (1976). See also 43 C.F.R. § 3451.1(a)(1) (1981)
(which subjects the two leases to readjustment at the end of their current twenty year
period and at the end of each ten year period thereafter).
127. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 14. See also 43 C.F.R. § 3451(d)(1) (1981) which states
that: "[t]he Secretary shall, prior to the expiration of the current or initial twenty year
period or any succeeding ten year period thereafter, notify the lessee of any lease which
becomes subject to readjustment after June 1, 1980, whether any readjustment of terms
and conditions will be made prior to the expiration of the initial twenty year period or any
succeeding ten year period thereafter. On such a lease the failure to so notify the lessee
shall mean that the United States is waving its right to readjust the lease for the readjust-
ment period in question." Id. The BLM sent Coastal notice, required by this Section, 63
days prior to the end of the second year period of the SL Lease and well in advance of the
end of the initial twenty year period of the U Lease. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 12.
128. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 14. See 43 C.F.R. § 3451.1(d)(2) (1981).
129. Id. at 14-15. See 43 C.F.R. § 3451.1 (1981).
130. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 17. Coastal asserts that the Secretary violated the Admin-
istrative Procedures Act, which in pertinent part required the Court to "hold unlawful and
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, and
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law .... (C) in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; [or] (D) without obser-
vance of procedure required by statues." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1982).
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trative Procedures Act (APA). 13 1 A regulation is considered arbitrary
and capricious only if the agency relied on factors which were not in-
tended by Congress or if it failed to consider the crucial aspects of the
problem, or issued a decision so implausible as to defy reality.' 3 2 The
court found the BLM's regulations to be consistent with the APA and
accordingly held that the regulations were not arbitrary, capricious, or
an abuse of agency discretion.' 3 3 "Congress has authorized the Secre-
tary to 'prescribe necessary and proper rules and regulations to carry
out and accomplish the purposes of the Act of 1920."134 Since Con-
gress failed to define the procedures by which readjustment was to take
place, the regulations established by the BLM setting forth those proce-
dures are within the BLM's authority so long as the regulations are not
contradictory to the MLLA.1 35 Furthermore, the recognized policy of
the FCLAA was "to provide a more orderly procedure for the leasing
and development of coal presently owned by the United States and to
assure its development in a manner compatible with public interest."1
36
The court concluded that the regulations promulgated by the Secretary
were consistent with the goals of the MLLA, and therefore they were
within the bounds of the Secretary's authority.'
37
In Rosebud, the court concluded that the plain meaning of "at the
end of" each twenty year period was clear, that "it is a precise point in
time and not susceptible to any other meaning."' 3 8 By adopting the
lower courts analysis, as discussed above, the Tenth Circuit in essence
transformed this "precise time" into a continuum whereby the process
of readjustment may take place over a period of time, provided that the
process begins before the end of the lease period.' 3 9
b. Application of FCLAA to Pre-FCLAA Leases
Citing section 7 of the MLLA the court noted that "leases shall be
for an indeterminate period . . . upon the further condition that at the
end of each twenty-year period succeeding the date of the lease such
readjustment of terms and conditions may be made as the Secretary of
Interior may determine, unless otherwise provided by law at the expiration of
such periods."' 40 The court, relying heavily on FMC, '41 interpreted this
131. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
132. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 17-18.
133. Id. at 17. The court concluded that the APA Standard was satisfied since the BLM
complied with the Act by publishing the challenged regulations for comment and incorpo-
rating some of the comments received in the final regulation. Coastal, 816 F.2d at 505. In
fact, the district court noted that Coastal did not object to the challenged rule when pro-
posed. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 16.
134. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 18.
135. Id.
136. Id. (quoting H.R. REi,. No. 681, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, repintedin 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1943).
137. Id. at 19.
138. Id. 667 F.2d at 951.
139. Coastal, 816 F.2d at 505.
140. 41 Stat. 437 § 207 (1920).
141. 817 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1987).
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language to mean that Congress empowered the Secretary with the right
to impose any new lease term or condition, no matter how broad or wide
sweeping those changes might be, at the readjustment stage of the sub-
ject leases. 14 2 The Tenth Circuit conceded this was a very broad author-
ity, subject only to the stipulation "unless otherwise provided by law
.... '143 The Tenth Circuit, departing from the trial court, recognized
that this language required the statutes in effect at the time of readjust-
ment to be incorporated into the leases. 144 Hence, at readjustment
time, the Secretary was required to readjust the leases in conformity
with the FCLAA.
145
Close examination of the court's interpretation of the FCLAA
reveals that the FCLAA transformed the lessee's lease from an indeter-
minate term coal lease to one with a finite period, which will expire
when commercial production ceases. Coastal argued that such a change
would undermine the fundamental character of the lessee's vested prop-
erty rights, a result they concluded, was not intended by Congress when
it enacted the FCLAA. 146 Furthermore, by applying the FCLAA to pre-
FCLAA leases, Coastal asserted that such statutory application served to
interfere with Coastal's antecedent rights, thus giving the statute retro-
active effect.1 4 7 Coastal relied on the general proposition that such ret-
roactive application of the FCLAA must be supported by explicit
"unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms [of the statute] and the
manifest intention of the legislature."' 14 8 Coastal claimed the govern-
ment failed to make such necessary showing in this case. The district
court concurred with Coastal's argument, however, it did not view the
application of the FCLAA to pre-FCLAA leases as interfering with ante-
cedent rights through retroactive application.' 49 To the contrary, the
district court asserted that the Secretary "specifically reserved the power
to readjust the leases, both in the leases themselves and in the Act of
1920, as amended."' 50 The district court concluded, and the Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed, that the powers granted to the Secretary by Congress in
no way altered the rights that the original leases gave to Coastal.'
5'
i. The Eight Percent Royalty
The MLLA of 1920 set the minimum royalty rate at five cents per
142. Coastal, 816 F.2d at 505.
143. Id.
144. Id. The trial court determined that 'the unless otherwise provided by law' lan-
guage only allows the Secretary to readjust leases "unless the law in effect at the time of
readjustment has taken that right away." Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 20. The Tenth Circuit
interpreted the same language to mean that the Secretary was required to base readjust-
ments according to the law in effect at the time of readjustment. Coastal, 816 F.2d at 506.
145. Coastal, 816 F.2d at 506.
146. Coastal, 629 F. Supp. at 20.
147. Id.
148. Id. (quoting Union Pacific v. Larimie, 231 U.S. 190 at 199 (1913)).
149. Id. at 20-21.
150. Id. at 21.
151. Coastal, 816 F.2d at 506.
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ton. 1 52 This rate was increased by the FCLAA to not less than 8% of the
value of the coal removed from an underground mine, subject to the
proviso that the BLM may select a lesser amount, but in no case less
than 5%.153 The BLM argued that this regulation required the imposi-
tion of the 8% royalty rate at readjustment time and that a lower rate
could not be considered. 15 4 It further asserted that Coastal, if finding
the 8% rate excessive, could file application for relief under Section 39
of the MLLA.' 5 5 Coastal rebutted the BLM's argument asserting that
the regulations required the imposition of the 5% rate as the authorized
minimum royalty rate.' 56 The district court affirmed the BLM's position
that the 8% rate was the reasonable minimum rate. 15 7 The Tenth Cir-
cuit aligned itself with the district court's analysis, with one minor depar-
ture. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Secretary, prior to installing
an 8% rate, must take into consideration conditions that would justify
the imposition of the lower 5% rate. 158
C. FMC v. Hodel
1. Facts
Unlike the mining operation in Coastal States 159 the two leases at
issue here make up a surface coal mine near Kemmerer, Wyoming,
known as the Skull Point Mine. 16 0 Both leases were issued in March,
152. Supra note 100 and accompanying text.
153. C.F.R. § 3473.3-2(a)(3) (1979).
154. Coastal, 816 F.2d at 506.
155. Id. See 60 Stat. 957 (1946), reprinted in 30 U.S.C. § 209 (1982). This section allows
the Secretary to reduce or waive a royalty rate whenever he judges it necessary in order to
promote development or allow the lessee to successfully operate. The royalty readjust-
ment period is limited to a maximum of three years. Furthermore, the royalty relief may
be terminated at the annual evaluation period or upon transfer of lease ownership.
Coastal, 816 F.2d at 536 n.7.
156. Coastal, 816 F.2d at 507. Coastal relied on the underground readjustment royalty
regulations promulgated by the Secretary, primarily 43 C.F.R. § 3451.1 (a)(2) (1976)
which states: "[any lease subject to readjustment which contains a royalty rate less than
the minimum royalty prescribed in § 3473.3-2 of this title shall be readjusted to conform
to the minimum prescribed in that Section." They also relied on Section 3473.3-2(a)(1)
which provides in pertinent part that: "[r]oyalty rates shall be determined on an individual
basis prior to the lease issuance . . . " and Section 3473.3-2(a)(3) which states: "[a] lease
shall require payment of a royalty of not less than 8% of the value of the coal removed
from an underground mine, except that the authorized officer may determine a lesser
amount, but in no case less than 57 if conditions warrant." Coastal, 816 F.2d at 507 (emphasis
added).
157. Coastal, 816 F.2d at 507.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 502 (10th Cir. 1987).
160. The two coal leases are lease W-061421 and lease W-061422. FMC has spent
millions of dollars to produce coal from its mine. The majority of its production fuels
FMC's Kemmerer coal generated electrical facility and Green River Trona plant. In fact,
FMC spent in excess of $70 million converting its Trona Plant from natural gas to coal
generation. The balance of FMC's production is sold under spot purchase orders and
long term contracts. In addition, the mine is classified as one of only two mines in the
country (the other being Pittsburgh & Midway's mine directly adjoining and in direct com-
petition with FMC's mine) as a special bituminous coal mine. This classification is awarded
to mines when the cost of extracting coal increases over the life of the mine and the mine is
therefore exempt from certain reclamation standards. FMC v. Watt, 587 F. Supp. at 1546
1988]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
1963, pursuant to the MLLA and "called for a royalty payment of 17 1/2
cents per ton of coal while providing for periodic readjustment of the
terms and conditions of the lease at twenty year intervals."'
16 1
The twenty year anniversary date for both leases was March, 1983,
some seven years following the enactment of the FCLAA.16 2 The BLM
sent FMC actual notice 16 3 of its intent to readjust, and a petition of the
specific proposed terms and conditions prior to the twenty year anniver-
sary of the leases. 164 The readjusments increased the royalty rate from
the present 17 1/2 cents per ton to 12 1/2% of the value of the coal
mined. 16 5 FMC objected to the timeliness and substance of the pro-
posed terms.' 6 6 On administrative appeal the Interior Board of Land
Appeal (IBLA) upheld the BLM's judgment that the royalty readjust-
ment was timely and that the adjusted terms were lawful. 16 7 FMC filed a
petition for review in the United States District Court for Wyoming.16
8
The IBLA's decision was affirmed in part, and reversed in part, by the
district court. The court held that the readjustment was timely but un-
lawful. 169 Both parties appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Judge McWilliams held that the royalty readjustment was both timely
and lawful. 17
0
2. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
Like Coastal before it, the central issues on appeal in FMC con-
cerned whether (1) the BLM waived its right to readjust FMC's leases for
failure to provide final readjusted terms within the anniversary deadline,
and (2) whether the FCLAA should be applied to pre-FCLAA leases on
their post-FCLAA anniversary dates. 17'
a. Timeliness of Readjustment
FMC argued that readjustment occurs when the BLM issues its final
decision and the lessee is made aware of what the terms and conditions
will be. ' 72 FMC based its position on its interpretation of Section 7 of
the MLLA.17 3 FMC took the position that under the MLLA, a final BLM
decision to readjust terms and conditions of a coal lease cannot take
(1984); see also Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1277
(1977).
161. FMC v. Hodel, 816 F.2d at 498 (10th Cir. 1987).
162. Id.
163. FMC received the BLM's notice on August 23, 1982. FMC, 587 F. Supp. at 1546.
164. Id. The actual new terms were proposed by the BLM on December 22, 1982.
165. FMC, 816 F.2d at 498. This is a royalty increase of over 1,000%. See FMC, 587 F.
Supp. at 1548.
166. Id.
167. 74 I.B.L.A. 389 (1983).
168. FMC, 816 F.2d at 498.
169. FMC v. Watt, 587 F. Supp. 1584 (1984).
170. FMC, 816 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1987).
171. Id. at 499-500.




effect when the terms are set after the anniversary date.' 74 Here, the
final terms occurred thirty seven days after the lease's anniversary
date. 17 5 Thus, argued FMC, since the readjustment of the existing
leases did not occur at the end of twenty years after the date of the leases,
as required by the MLLA and the leases themselves, the readjustment
was void. '
76
The BLM argued that so long as it sends notice to the lessee of its
intent to readjust a lease prior to the twenty-year anniversary date, it
reserves the right to establish final readjusted terms at a later date, and
that such practice is in compliance with both the statute and the lan-
guage of the leases.1 77 As in Coastal States, both parties placed reliance
on Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrews.1
78
i. Rosebud Revisited
As previously stated, in Rosebud the anniversary date of readjust-
ment was April, 1975.179 However, no notice of any type was sent to the
lessee until two and a half years after the expiration of the second
twenty-year lease period. Both the district court and the Tenth Circuit
found that such a belated adjustment attempt was "untimely and
thereby barred."' 8 0 However, the Tenth Circuit in the instant case
strongly suggested that its Rosebud holding incorporates the notion that if
the BLM sends a Notice of Intent to readjust the terms and conditions of
a coal lease "on or shortly before the 20-year anniversary period" such
notice operates to preserve the BLM's rights under the MLLA and the
language of the lease to readjust the terms in a reasonable fashion
thereafter. 181
b. Application of FCLAA to Pre-FCLAA Leases
The district court found that the BLM's application of Section 6 of
the FCLAA (specifically the 12 1/2% royalty mandated therein) to
FMC's leases was "arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion."
18 2
It conceded that the 12 1/2% royalty rate is now a statutory minimum.
But it stopped short of applying it to pre-FCLAA leases by recognizing
that such application would abrogate the provision of the leases which
provides for reasonable readjustment. 1 83 The district court viewed the
imposition of a 1,000% royalty increase imposed without any inquiry
into the factual basis supporting such an increase as arbitrary and as




176. Id. (emphasis added).
177. Id.
178. 667 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1982).
179. Id. at 950.
180. Id. at 953.
181. FMC, 816 F.2d at 500.
182. FMC, 587 F. Supp. at 1547.
183. Id. at 1549.
184. The district court noted that the method for readjustment applied to pre-FCLAA
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The Tenth Circuit found the district court's judgment untenable in
light of its interpretation of the MLLA and the language in the leases.
The court construed the statute and the lease language to mean that the
Secretary may fix "such a new royalty rate as he, or she, may determine
is proper, unless the law in effect at the expiration of such twenty-year
period provides differently."' 8 5 Thus, the court concluded that, the
Secretary had no choice but to impose the 12 1/2% royalty rate, since it
was the rate mandated by law at the readjustment period. 18 6 Implicit in
the court's analysis is that the statutory language not only militates
against the use of the language in the lease calling for reasonable read-
justment, but actually subordinates this reasonableness requirement to
the "unless otherwise provided by law" language found in Section 7 of
the MLLA.
187
c. Retroactive Application of FCLAA
FMC argued, and the district court agreed, that "mandatory appli-
cation of the 12 1/2% royalty rate to pre-existing leases, without factual
evaluation is retroactive application of the provision, which everyone
concedes was not intended and is not proper." 18 8 The district court
opined that readjustment of an existing lease is not a new event, rather it
is part of the inherent process of the original lease, and to mandatorily
apply a 12 1/2% royalty rate materially altered the original term of the
lease. 189 No such expressed intent can be found in the FCLAA. 190 The
Tenth Circuit found no merit to FMC's argument or the district court's
ruling. It concluded that the Secretary clearly had the right to set new
terms on the readjustment date and that it is not retroactive application
of FCLAA to set new terms in accordance with existing law. 19 1
C. Conclusion
The implications of Coastal States 192 and FMC 193 deserve closer at-
leases called for the construction of an evidentiary basis based on an individual analysis of
each coal lease up for readjustment. Items analyzed by the BLM with regard to pre-
FCLAA cases included: (1) the "existence of a competitive bituminous coal mine which is
not subject to readjustment and, therefore, the allegedly mandatory 12 1/2% royalty rate
could not be applied until 1998; [and (2)] the very nature of plaintiff's mine, which pre-
sumably will be forced to produce less coal as a 12 1/2% royalty rate contributes to mak-
ing the costs of mining prohibitive." FMC, 587 F. Supp. at 1548.
185. FMC, 816 F.2d at 501.
186. Id.
187. The court discounts the harsh economic realities caused by the readjustment by
shifting the burden to Congress. FMC, 816 F.2d at 501.
188. FMC, 587 F. Supp. at 1548 (emphasis supplied). The district court based its hold-
ing on Rosebud wherein the court concluded that "[tihe Section 7 amendment provided for
a primary term and also for the royalty to be not less than 12.5%. There is no suggestion
whatever that the amendment was to be retroactive and the contrary is indicated." Id.
(quoting Rosebud 667 F.2d at 952).
189. FMC, 587 F. Supp. at 1548.
190. 30 U.S.C. § 201 (1982).
191. FMC, 816 F.2d at 502.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 496.
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tention and further judicial review.
Coal mining is a unique business. It often takes more than ten years
to move a mine from the exploration stage, through the permitting pro-
cess, to actual development. This process requires the expenditure of
millions of dollars before one ton of coal can be mined. To justify this
expenditure, long term coal sales contracts must be secured. These
contracts serve to provide a stable and assured fuel supply for the pri-
mary end user and a predictable and assured market for the miner. The
long term sales contracts, coupled with the long term nature of pre-
FCLAA leases, provided the miner with the necessary confidence and
security upon which to undertake the large capital investment required
for the successful development of the large, often remote, federal coal
reserves.
Congress, aware of the unique nature of the coal business, deliber-
ately provided for indeterminate term leases so that coal companies
would have a reliable and a stable estate upon which to plan their invest-
ments. 19 4 Now, as a result of Coastal States and FMC, the lessee's estate
has been transformed from an indeterminate term lease to a much lesser
defeasible interest: one which makes coal production a condition prece-
dent to the continuation of that interest. Moreover, the 1,000% in-
crease levied against the leases is repugnant to the notion of reasonable
predictability of lease adjustments envisioned by Congress and bar-
gained for by the lessees when they entered into the coal lease contract.
The courts claimed that retroactive adjustment was not employed in
these cases; 1 9 5 the results of the application of FCLAA to pre-FCLAA
leases, however, suggests otherwise.
III. ANTECEDENT TRIBAL CLAIMS UNDER THE INDIAN TRIBAL CLAIMS
COMMISSION ACT
A. Navajo Tribe of Indians v. New Mexico
196
1. Overview
The principle established in this case is quite simple: all Indian
claims, regardless of their nature, that accrued before 1946 and which
were not lodged with the Indian Claims Commission by 1951 are for-
ever barred. In the instant case, the Navajo Tribe lost its only remedy
available under the law because of the timeliness of their action in ac-
cordance with the Indian Claims Compensation Act (ICCA).
19 7
194. The legislative history of the MLLA suggests that Congress chose indeterminate
coal leases and phosphate leases primarily to satisfy what Congress perceived to be a
greater need for reliability of investment in coal mines and phosphate plants. See 51 CONG.
REC. 14,945 (Sept. 12, 1914).
195. FMC, 816 F.2d at 500.
196. 809 F.2d 1455 (10th Cir. 1987).
197. Navajo Tribe of Indians v. State of N.M., 809 F.2d 1455, 1470-71 (10th Cir. 1987).
Indian Claims Commission Act of Aug. 13, 1946, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946) (formerly
codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 70-70V (1976)) (omitted from current code because
Indian Claims Commission terminated on September 30, 1978).
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2. Facts
Executive Order Number 709 (Original Order),19 8 issued by Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt, conveyed 1.9 million acres of land to the Nav-
ajo Tribe, augmenting the original Navajo Reservation as established by
the Treaty of 1868. Subsequently, discoveries revealed that the bounda-
ries of the reservation created by the Original Order intruded upon the
boundary of theJicarilla Apache Reservation. President Roosevelt recti-
fied the problem by issuing Executive Order Number 744 (Amendatory
Order), 199 which redefined the lands granted under the Original Order.
Both Executive Orders were designed to create temporary reservations
of land (allotted lands) which were to be assigned to and occupied by
qualified individual Navajo tribal members.
20 0
Within five months following the issuance of the Amendatory Or-
der, Congress enacted section twenty-five of the Act of 1908201 which
authorized the President to return all unalloted parcels to the public do-
main when he was satisfied that all qualified Navajo tribal members had
been settled. 20 2 In December of 1908, President Roosevelt exercised
the authority granted under the this Act and issued Executive Order
1,000 (Final Order), 20 3 restoring to the public domain for further dispo-
198. The Order states:
It is hereby ordered that the following-described tract of country in the Territo-
ries of Arizona and New Mexico, viz: [description of metes and bounds] is hereby,
withdrawn from sale and settlement and set apart for the use of the Indians as an
addition to the present Navajo Reservation: Provided, That this withdrawal shall
not affect any existing valid rights of any person.
Exec. Order No. 709 (1907) reprinted in H.R. 1663, 60th Cong., Ist Sess., 2 (1908).
199. The Order states:
Whereas it is found that the Executive order of November 9, 1907, setting apart
certain lands in Arizona and New Mexico as an addition to the Navajo Indian
Reservation, conflicts in part with Executive order of November I1, 1907, setting
apart certain lands as an addition to theJicarilla Indian Reservation, N. Mex., said
Executive order is hereby so amended that the description of the tract of land set
apart as an addition to the Navajo Reservation shall read as follows: [description
of metes and bounds].
Exec. Order No. 744 (1907), reprinted in H.R. 1663, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1908).
200. Navajo, 809 F.2d at 1458-59.
201. Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216, 35 Stat. 444 at 457.
202. This legislation was in direct response to the concerns of non-Indian settlers who
believed the Indians would hold the land for tribal purposes too long. Navajo, 809 F.2d at
1458. The Act of 1908 provided in pertinent part:
That whenever the President is satisfied that all the Indians in any part of the
Navajo Indian Reservation in New Mexico and Arizona created by Executive Or-
ders [709/744] have been allotted, the surplus lands in such part of the reserva-
tion shall be restored to the public domain and opened to settlement and entry by
proclamation of the President.
Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216, 35 Stat. 444 at 457.
203. Executive Order Number 1,000 (1908) states:
It is hereby ordered that the unallotted lands in Tps. 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21 N.,Rs.
5, 6, 7, and 8 W., and Tps. 22 and 23 N., Rs. 6, 7, and 8 W. of the New Mexico
principal meridian, withdrawn from sale and settlement and set apart for the use
of the Indians as an addition to the Navajo Reservation by Executive orders dated
November 9, 1907, and January 28, 1908, be, and the same are hereby, restored
to the public domain, except the following-described lands, embracing 110 unap-
proved allotments, namely: [description of land].
Exec. Order No. 1000 (1908).
Subsequent to Executive Order 1000, President Taft issued Executive Order 1284 on
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sition, unallotted lands within the reservation created by the Original
Order and as amended by the Amendatory Order.
20 4
Following the enactment of the ICCA of August 13, 1946,205 the
Navajo Tribe filed a claim seeking compensation under section two of
the ICCA for the cession of its lands, which included the lands defined
in the Original Order and Amendatory Order, under the Treaty ofJune
1, 1868.206 The Tribe successfully argued that it held aboriginal title to
the subject lands at the time of the 1868 Treaty and that the United
States had paid an unconscionably low price for the land. 20 7 As a result
of the complaint, the United States Court of Claims awarded the Nav-
ajo's $14.8 million for the loss sustained.
20 8
Thereafter, the Tribe brought this second action in October 1982,
in the Federal District Court of New Mexico, seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that the Tribe held equitable title to the unallotted lands that were
added to the Navajo reservation by the Original and Amendatory Or-
ders and that the United States breached its fiduciary duty to the Tribe
by prematurely restoring the lands to the public domain. 20 9 The district
court dismissed the Tribe's complaint, holding that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the case because the Tribe's claim against the
United States accrued prior to 1946 and, thus, fell within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Indian Claims Commission. 2 10 At the same time, the
Court dismissed the complaint of the private defendants. The Tribe ap-
pealed the decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Mc-
Kay, writing for the court, held that: (1) the Tribe's claim was cognizable
exclusively under the ICCA; (2) the Tribe's claim was compensable only
by money damages; (3) the claim was barred by the statute of limitations
under the ICCA; and (4) the district court properly dismissed the action
January 16, 1911, restoring the remaining unallotted lands in that reservation to the public
domain. Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216, 35 Stat. 457.
204. Navajo, 809 F.2d at 1459. This order was issued in spite of the fact that over one-
half of the eligible Navajo allottees had not received allotments. Id.
205. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. Prior to enactment of the ICCA, Indian
tribes could not litigate claims against the United States. Navajo, 809 F.2d at 1460.
Although the Court of Claims was available to hear claims against the United States, Con-
gress specifically excluded from that court's jurisdiction the power to hear Indian claims
based on treaties. Id. See, Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765 at 767. "The ICCA
confined the Commission's jurisdiction to tribal claims that accurred before its 1946 enact-
ment, while it conferred jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to adjudicate any tribal claim
accruing after 1946 that would be cognizable in the Court of Claims if the claimant were
not an Indian tribe." Navajo, 809 F.2d at 1460. Further, Congress limited the period for
filing claims to five years. The ICCA further provided that the Commission was to be
dismantled 10 years after its creation. Due to the Commission's enormous case load, how-
ever, the period to hear pre-1946 claims was extended several times until 1978. Id. at
1461.
206. Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 23 Ind. Cl. Comm. 244 (1970).
207. Navajo, 809 F.2d at 1461-62.
208. Id. at 1462.
209. Id.
210. Id. In addition, the district court held that, as to the remaining defendants,
"under Rule 19(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the action could not proceed
against them in the absence of the United States as grantor of the patents through which
those defendants derive title." Id. at 1462-63.
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against the private defendants. 2 11
3. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The primary issue addressed by the Tenth Circuit Court was
whether the Tribe's claim fell within section 12 of the ICCA. If the claim
did qualify as a section 12 action, the district court then lacked jurisdic-
tion over the action against the United States, since the statute of limita-
tions had expired under the ICCA. 2 12 Second, the Tenth Circuit had to
determine whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing
all remaining defendants pursuant to Rule 19(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Since the United States was deemed an indispensable
party, it could not be joined and without it the action could not
proceed.
2 13
a. "Claim" as Defined Under the Indian Claims Commission Act
The Tribe argued that the district court erred by categorizing the
Tribe's action as a claim within the exclusive jurisdiction of the ICCA,
rendering the action susceptible to the statute of limitations in said
Act. 2 14 The Tribe claimed that its title to the land reserved, under the
Original and Amendatory Orders, was never extinguished because the
President breached the fiduciary requirement not to return the lands to
the public domain until the allotment process had been completed. 2 15
Based on this argument the Tribe interpreted the word "claim," within
the meaning of ICCA, to mean exclusively a demand for money for its
land.2 16 In other words, since "the Commission was only authorized to
award money damages for extinguishment of title to Indian lands, this
suit, which seeks to establish the Tribe's existing title to land, could not
have been entertained before the Commission. '2 17 Finding the Tribe's
argument unpersuasive and that the action did indeed fall under the
ICCA the district court dismissed the complaint against the United
States for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 2 18 The basis of the district
court's holding was derived primarily from Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge
Indian Reservation v. United States2 19 and Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Homestake
Mining Co.
2 2 0
The Oglala cases resolved issues directly on point with those issues
appealed in Navajo Tribe. In Oglala I, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed a $17.1 million award to the Sioux Nation for the "taking" of
211. Navajo, 809 F.2d at 1463.
212. Id. at 1470.
213. Id. at 1471. The remaining defendants were the State of New Mexico, Santa Fe
Mining, Norman Ashcroft, Fernandez Company, and Don R. Smouse.





219. 650 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982) [hereinafter Oglala
I].
220. 722 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1983).
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the Black Hills of South Dakota which were decreed as part of their res-
ervation by an 1877 Act.22 1 Following the decision, the Oglala filed suit
against several parties including the United States seeking restoration of
the lands for which the Sioux Nation received compensation. The Sioux
Nation argued that the 1877 Act was unconstitutional and, therefore,
void. 2 22 The district court dismissed the Oglala's action against the
United States for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the
action against the private defendants after concluding that the United
States was an indispensable party. 22 3 In upholding the district court's
decision, the Eighth Circuit held that the ICCA created a "one time,
exclusive forum" for the resolution of pre-1946 Indian Treaty claims.
2 24
Although the ICCA's awards are limited to money damages, the court
nonetheless determined that "Oglala's action to quiet title, 'as an Indian
claim accruing before 1946 and arising under the constitution, [came]
within [the] exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian Claims
Commission.' "
2 25
Based on the persuasive authority presented by the Oglala cases,
the court readily adopted the principle that the ICCA bars any action
against the United States or third parties seeking the return of tribal
lands that were allegedly taken from the Tribe by the unlawful conduct
of the United States prior to 1946. The Tribe also argued that the ex-
clusive jurisdiction provision of the ICCA should only apply to the them
if it was seeking monetary damages as opposed to the return of its lands.
The court found this argument untenable, since the ICCA was enacted
specifically to provide a remedy for all possible accrued claims existing
before its passage.
2 2 6
In addition, the Tribe attempted to escape the exclusivity of the
ICCA by distinguishing its claim from the one asserted in Oglala I and H.
The Tribe asserted that unlike Oglala I and II, which were predicated on
the unconstitutional taking for which the Tribe had already received
compensation, the instant case was one where the Navajo's title was
never extinguished and, therefore, its cause of action did not raise the
unconstitutional taking issue. 22 7 In essence, the Tribe argued that un-
constitutional takings claims are not cognizable under the ICCA. The
221. Navajo, 809 F.2d at 1463. See United States v. Sioux Nation, 220 Ct. Cl. 442, 601
F.2d 1057 (1979), aft'd, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
222. Navajo, 809 F.2d at 1463. See Oglala 1, 650 F.2d at 141-42.
223. Id. See Oglala 1, 650 F.2d at 143-44.
224. Oglala 1, 650 F.2d at 143.
225. Vavajo, 809 F.2d at 1464 (quoting Oglala I, 650 F.2d at 143). The Oglala I1 case
involved an action against a private defendant named in 0glala I and was dismissed on the
basis of res judicata. 0glala 11, 722 F.2d at 1411.
226..Vavajo, 809 F.2d at 1465-66. Congress was concerned that some meritorious In-
dian claim might be inadvertently omitted from the Commission's jurisdiction. Therefore,
it recommended that the jurisdiction conferred upon the Commission be as broad as pos-
sible. "The bill would establish . . . a body, responsible to the Court of Claims and the
Supreme Court of the United States with respect to all legal controversies. It would re-
quire all pending Indian claims of whatever nature, contractual and non-contractual, legal
and nonlegal, to be submitted to this fact- finding body within five years, and would outlaw
claims not so submitted." /d. at 1465.
227. Id. at 1464.
1988]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
court found this argument unpersuasive, and concluded that the Tribe's
claim was cognizable under the ICCA, since the taking was one which
arose under executive orders of the President. Claims which arise under
executive orders are specifically covered under section 2 of the ICCA
and, therefore, are within the jurisdiction of the Commission. 22 8 More-
over, as illustrated in Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States,2 29 the ICCA
"clearly granted jurisdiction to litigate just what the Navajo Tribe would
like to litigate in this case - validity of Indian title to land."' 230 As in
Yankton, if the Tribe here had timely brought its actions under the ICCA,
its sole remedy would have been an award of money damages.
23 1
Finally, the Tribe attempted to categorize its claim as an action to
quiet title.2 3 2 Such action, however, invokes the Quiet Title Act of
1972, which contains a twelve year statute of limitations that was ex-
ceeded by the Tribe in the instant case.
23 3
b. Indispensability of the United States
The Tribe argued that the district court erred in holding that the
claim against the remaining defendants must be dismissed pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b). Relying on Rule 19(b), the dis-
trict court opined that since the action against the United States had
failed and given that the United States was deemed an indispensable
party to the litigation, the action against the private defendants should
also be dismissed. Implementation of Rule 19(b) is largely left to the
discretion of the trial court. Therefore, the reviewing court will disturb
the trial court's holding only if it finds that the trial court abused its
228. Id. at 1471. Under section 2 of the ICCA the Commission was empowered to hear
cases falling under the following five broad categories:
(1) claims in law or equity arising under the constitution, laws, treaties of the
United States, and Executive Orders of the President; (2) all other claims in law
or equity, including those sounding in tort, with respect to which the claimant
would have been entitled to sue in a court of the United States if the United
States was subject to suit; (3) claims which would result if the treaties, contracts,
and agreements between the claimant and the United States were revised on the
ground of fraud, duress, unconscionable consideration, mutual or unilateral mis-
take, whether of law or fact, or any other ground cognizable by a court of equity;
(4) claims arising from the taking by the United States, whether as the result of a
treaty of cession or otherwise, of lands owned or occupied by the claimant with-
out the payment for such lands of compensation agreed to by the claimant; and
(5) claims based upon fair and honorable dealings that are not recognized by any
existing rule of law or equity.
25 U.S.C. § 70(a) (1976).
229. 272 U.S. 351 (1926).
230. .Vavajo, 809 F.2d at 1466. In Yankton, the Tribe claimed title to a piece of land
known as the Red Pipe-Stone Quarry. It sought judicial reformation of its title, not com-
pensation for the taking of the land by the United States. The Tribe prevailed in that the
Supreme Court recognized that it owned the property in fee. However, because the land
was subsequently conveyed to bona fide third party purchasers by the United States, the
Court ordered monetary compensation. Yankton v. United States, 272 U.S. 351 (1926).
231..Vavajo, 809 F.2d at 1467.
232. Id. at 1469. The Tribe argued in the alternative, that since its claim was not for
monetary damages it had the right to classify its action as a Quiet Title Action, which falls
outside the bounds of the ICCA, and thus vests the district court with subject matter
jurisdiction.
233. Navajo, 809 F.2d at 1469.
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discretion. 2 34 Here, the Tenth Circuit court found no such abuse and
affirmed the lower court's dismissal. 2 35 The Tenth Circuit adopted the
trial court's reasoning that the Tribe's claim against the remaining de-
fendants was, in reality, a challenge to the validity of the transaction by
which the United States assumed title to the subject land. "It is a funda-
mental principle of the law that an instrument may not be cancelled by a
court unless the parties to the instrument are before the court."
' 2 36
The Tenth Circuit was satisfied with the lower court's inquiry as to
whether in "equity and good conscience" it could find the United States
indispensable. The Tenth Circuit found that to avoid potential preju-
dice both to the interest of the United States and those of the other
defendants, dismissal of the remaining defendants was required.
2 37
The court conceded, however, that by affirming the dismissal, the
tribe had no alternative adequate remedy at law. The court reasoned,
however, that the weight afforded this particular factor should be mini-
mal because it arose from the tribe sleeping on its rights and not from
the actions of a third party.
2 38
4. Conclusion
The court was compelled to uphold the legislative intent behind the
ICCA, in which the Act was established to be the exclusive remedy for
Indian claims arising before 1946.239 As the ICCA's sponsor stated:
[L]et us see that the Indians have their fair day in court so that
they can call the various governmental agencies to account on
the obligations that the federal Government assumed. And let
us make sure that when the Indians have their day in court, they
have an opportunity to present all their claims of every kind of
shape, and variety, so that this problem can truly be solved
once and for all without coming back to haunt us or our
successors.
24 0
Here, the Navajo tribe had a claim that was cognizable only under
the ICCA; however, by sleeping on its rights and not bringing its action
timely, it missed its only window of opportunity provided under the law.
234. Id. at 1471; See also Glenny v. American Metal, 494 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1974).
235. Id. at 1476.
236. Id. at 1472 (quoting Terra v. Morton, 360 F. Supp. 452 (D.N.M. 1973), aff'd, 498
F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1974)).
237. Id. at 1472. The trial court found:
(1) the claims against the non-federal parties rested on documents of title or
possession derived from the United States; (2) that the tribe seeks to cancel all
such instruments; (3) that this court has affirmed the principle that all parties to
an instrument must be present, else it may not be cancelled; (4) that, more specif-
ically, validity of a deed or patent issued by the Federal Government cannot be
questioned in suit by a third party against the grantee; and (5) that the Eighth
Circuit Court has found indispensability in analogous circumstances.
Id.
238. Id. at 1473.
239. Id. at 1465.
240. 92 CONG. REC. H5312 (1946) (statement of Rep. Jackson, Chairman, House Com-
mittee on Indian Affairs).
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IV. FERC INTERPRETATION
A. Martin Exploration Management Co. v. FERC
24 '
1. Overview
This case presents a challenge by natural gas producers to the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) natural gas pricing regu-
lations. Specifically challenged are those provisions which provide that
natural gas which qualifies for both a ceiling price or regulated price,
and a deregulated price, as established by the complex statutory scheme
in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA)24 2 must be deemed to be
deregulated for purposes of price determination.
2 43
2. Facts
In the NGPA, Congress developed an intricate pricing system by
which natural gas was divided into numerous pricing categories and as-
signed a maximum lawful price. 244 In response to the pricing system
embodied in section 121 of the NGPA, FERC issued a notice of pro-
posed rule making to institute partial decontrol for intrastate gas, gener-
ally, and gas produced from "new wells,"'2 4 5 defined as operations
which commenced on or after February 19, 1977, specifically. 246 This
241. 813 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1987).
242. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1978). Specifically, the producers challenged FERC Or-
der 406 codified at 18 C.F.R. § 270.208 (1986) which provides in pertinent part that:
First sales of natural gas that is deregulated natural gas . . . is price deregulated
and not subject to the maximum lawful prices of the NGPA, regardless of whether
the gas also meets the criteria for some other category of gas subject to a maxi-
mum lawful price under Subtitle A of Title I of the NGPA.
Id.
243. 813 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1987).
244. Martin, 813 F.2d at 1062. The NGPA is a comprehensive esoteric scheme outlin-
ing Congress' intent to settle the market and price imbalance that have historically plagued
the intrastate and interstate gas markets. In 1938 Congress enacted the Natural Gas Act
(NGA), Pub. L. No. 75-688, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 717-
717W (1976)). "The NGA was enacted in response to reports suggesting that the monop-
oly power of interstate pipelines was harming consumer welfare." Aarlin, 813 F.2d at
1062 (quoting Public Service v. Mid-Louisiana, 463 U.S. at 327 (1983)). "The NGA au-
thorized the Federal Power Commission (FPC was superceded by FERC in response to the
Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7101, et seq., 7134) to estab-
lish such price ceilings for the sale of interstate gas for resale as were 'just and reason-
able.' " .Martin, 813 F.2d at 1062; (citing in part 15 U.S.C. § 717(c)(a) (1976)). The NGA
did not regulate the price of gas sold in intrastate markets. This resulted in intrastate gas
commanding higher prices than the regulated interstate gas, which created an artificially
high demand for interstate gas and a coincident shortage in the interstate market.
In response to this market imbalance, Congress and the President endeavored to es-
tablish legislation providing for predictable and steady supplies of natural gas in both the
intrastate and interstate gas markets. Their efforts resulted in the NGPA of 1978 which
"did not adopt either the uniform regulation or the complete deregulation approach in
their entirety; rather, the bill was the 'careful reconciliation of two strong, but divergent,
responses to the natural gas shortage.' " Id. at 1063; (quoting Public Service v. Mid-Louisi-
ana, 463 U.S. at 331 (1983)).
245. Martin, 813 F.2d at 1063. The NGPA defines a new well as one whose surface
drilling began on or after February 19, 1977, or which was deepened by at least 1,000 feet
after that date. See 15 U.S.C. § 3301(3) (1978).
246. Section 121 of the NGPA defines a portion of the complicated pricing system. In
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proposed rule making was entitled Order Number 406.247 Order 406
essentially assigned a deregulated price to gas that qualifies for both a
regulated incentive price and deregulated price.
The price categories established under the NGPA are not mutually
exclusive, "a particular sale may be 'dually qualified' within a 'new' or
'old' gas category and also a 'difficult to produce category.' ",248 This
provides the producer with two pricing categories from which to choose.
Each category is defined and a procedure for price determination is set
out in the statute.24 9 FERC's proposed rule would eliminate the produ-
cers pricing election.
The purpose of the regulated incentive price scheme was to in-
crease the availability of difficult to produce gas and encourage produc-
tion from otherwise marginal wells. 25 ° FERC construed this policy to
mean that natural gas producers should be denied access to a still-regu-
lated category if such access would result in a higher price over a der-
egulated gas price. 25 1 Several parties contested FERC's proposed
order, but FERC upheld the essence of Order No. 406 when it promul-
gated Order Number 406(A). 25 2 Order 406(A) again stated that when-
ever gas qualifies for a deregulated and regulated price, the deregulated
price category would prevail.
2 53
Unhappy with FERC's rehearing results, the gas producers sought
judicial review to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to the
judicial review provision found in the NGPA.2 54 The Tenth Circuit af-
firmed in part and reversed in part, holding that if natural gas qualifies
under more than one pricing category or for an exemption from such a
pricing category, then the statute requires application of the category
that would result in the highest price. This means that if gas qualifies for
both a regulated and deregulated category, the category which yields the
highest price shall prevail. The court also ruled that the application of a
special rule that limits the price obtainable pursuant to an indefinite
price escalator clause to any indefinite price escalator clause in existing
or successor intrastate contracts that was or would have been in excess
of one dollar per million BTU's on December 31, 1984, was a reason-
essence the NGPA "divides natural gas production into numerous categories that are dis-
tinguished by the date that production began from a well or the particular type of drilling
involved." .artin, 813 F.2d at 1063. The three gas categories are "old" gas, "new" gas,
and "difficult to produce" gas.
247. See supra note 242.
248. Martin, 813 F.2d at 1064.
249. Id. at 1064-65; see also NGPA § 503, 15 U.S.C. § 3413 (1978).
250. Martin, 813 F.2d at 1065.
251. Id. at 1066. This case centers around the interpretation of § 121(b)(5) which
states: "If any natural gas qualifies under more than one provision of this subchapter pro-
viding for any maximum lawful price or for any exemption from such a price with respect
to anv first sale of such natural gas, the provision which could result in the highest price
shall be applicable." See 15 U.S.C. § 331 l(b)(5) (1978).
252. Marlin, 813 F.2d at 1065; (Order 406-A, RM 84-14-000. 111 FERC Stats. Regs.
(CCH) 30,614 (November 16, 1984)).
253. Martin, 813 at 1072. The court also reviewed FERC Order 406(B), which ad-
dressed the application of price increases under indefinite price escalator clauses.
254. Id. at 1065.
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able interpretation of the statutes that deregulated intrastate, natural
gas.255
3. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The court addressed (1) whether Section 101(b)(5) of the NGPA
gives natural gas producers the inherent right to elect any applicable
NGPA pricing category, regulated or deregulated, that would result in
the highest price for its product; and (2) whether the commission's regu-
lation regarding the impact of Indefinite Price Escalator Clauses found
in gas purchase contracts on otherwise decontrolled sales of gas was rea-
sonable in light of the congressional intent underlying the NGPA.
2 56
a. Standard Of Review For FERC Actions
The threshold inquiry concerning the standard of review applicable
to FERC interpretations of the NGPA by the court is whether Congress
has addressed the precise issue. If Congressional intent is unambigu-
ous, the court, as well as the agency, must give it effect. 2 57 It is the
traditional stance of the court to defer to the agency's position when it
has chosen between alternative possible constructions of an ambiguous
statute, especially in a highly complex statutory design as is found in the
NGPA. 2 58 The court stated that "[w]here the plain words of the statute
do not answer a particular question, the agency interpretation must be
reasonable, but it need not be the only reasonable interpretation or the
interpretation that the reviewing court would adopt."'2 59 The court
found FERC's regulations to be in direct contravention to the clear in-
tent of Congress, and therefore held FERC's regulation void, as it was
applied to incentive price determination.
2 60
b. Interpretation of NGPA Pricing System
Gas producers argued that Congress, by enacting section 101 (b)(5)
of the NGPA, expressly conferred upon producers the right to select the
highest price its gas could achieve under the applicable pricing catego-
ries. They also argued that the commission's regulation automatically
eliminated this statutory right of election. 2 6 1 The court, finding the pro-
ducer's argument dispositive, concluded that Congress "anticipated pre-
cisely" the dual category pricing question in section 101 (b)(5), and that
FERC could not deny gas producers a right which Congress specifically
255. Id. at 1059. 1065.
256. Id. at 1065.
257. Id. (quoting Chevron v. Natural Resources, 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984)).
258. Id. See also Union Texas v. FERC, 721 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1983).
259. Id. See, e.g., Chemical v. Natural Resources, 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1066. FERC interprets the "cease to apply" language of § 121 of NGPA,
that applies to the deregulation of certain categories of gas, to mean that "if gas has been
determined to be in one o[lthe listed categories, there is no longer a ceiling price for such




c. Incentive Pricing Under Section 1Ol(b)(5)
In deciding an issue of first impression, the Tenth Circuit held that
section 101(b) (5) applied to those categories of gas "providing for any
maximum lawful price or for any exemption from such a price."126 3 FERC
argued that reference to "any exemption from such a price" does not
refer to deregulated gas, but allows FERC to establish special ceiling
prices in particular situations.26 4 The court responded that FERC's
ability to establish special ceiling prices in certain situations is covered
by section 101(b)(5); however, the court also declared that section
101(b)(5) applied to deregulated gas.
26 5
The producers argued that Congress established higher ceiling
prices for certain categories of natural gas, i.e., those gases that are con-
sidered difficult to produce, for the express purpose "[of assuring] ade-
quate supplies of natural gas at fair prices."' 2 66 Two of these categories,
stripper wells and tight formation producing gas, fall within dual pricing
categories: incentive pricing under sections 108 and 107(c)(5), respec-
tively; and, deregulated prices under sections 102 and 103.267 When
faced with such a pricing dilemma, the producers argued that section
101(b)(5) allows them to elect the provision which could result in the
highest price, assuming the underlying contract permits such an elec-
tion. Any other interpretation, producer's argued, eliminating the pric-
ing election would circumscribe the intent of Congress. 268 Embracing
the producers analysis, the court concluded that FERC's orders rested
on the erroneous assumption that gas can be determined to qualify for a
particular category without going through the specific determination
procedure set forth in the statute. The court therefore concluded that
FERC's interpretation could not be upheld.
2 69
The court noted that the NGPA was a hard fought compromise
262. Id. at 1066.
263. Id. at 1067 (emphasis supplied).
264. Id.
265. Id. In support of its position the court points out that its interpretation of the
word "exemption" is also consistent with the meaning of "exemption" as found through-
out the NGPA, speciicallv § 101(b)(9), which provides: "In the case of ... any price which
is established under any contract for the first sale of natural gas which is exempted under
Part B of this subchapter from the application of a maximum lawful price under this sub-
chapter, such maximum lawftl price, or such exemption from such a maximum lawful
price shall not supercede or nullify the effectiveness of the price established under such
contract." Id. (emphasis added). See also 15 U.S.C. § 331 I(b)(9) (1978); Pennzoil v. FERC,
645 F.2d 360, 374 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1147 (1982).
266. ,la tint, 813 F.2d at 1070 (quoting Transcontinental v. State, 106 S. Ct. 719
(1986)).
267. Id. at 1064.
268. When addressing Section 121(b)(5) the court quoted SenatorJackson who noted
that it "stands for (the proposition that a producer may claim or apply for the highest price
to which he is entitled. It does not imply an administrative duty to compel a State or
Federal agency to search through the various price classifications tinder the Act and find
the permissible price." Id. at 1070 (quoting 124 (oN,. REc. 29.109 (1978)).
269. Marin, 813 F.2d at 1070.
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"and a careful reconciliation of two strong, but divergent responses to
the natural gas shortage." 2 70 The overall purpose of the Act was "to
provide incentive prices to encourage exploration and development of
new reserves in the short-term, and to gradually substitute market forces
for regulated prices by phasing in deregulation in 1985 and 1987."271
The court emphasized that the NGPA is not exclusively a deregulation
statute, but rather a combination of phased deregulation and incentive
pricing, that serves to maximize gas production from all phases of the
gas exploration effort. The general wisdom was that natural gas prices
would rise steadily in the future.
272
Prices have actually dropped drastically, however, and this ac-
counts for the anomalous situation we now see: producers seek
the regulated ceiling price rather than the deregulated market
price. As enunciated in section 101(b)(5), the category which
could result in the highest price is available to producers.
Hence, "gas that has been qualified in both a regulated and
deregulated category will now be sold at the regulated price
until the market price rises above the ceiling price." Therefore,
provided the market price remains below the ceiling price sec-
tion 101 (b)(5) will have the unanticipated effect of operating as
a price floor for producers.
2 73
The court also remarked that Congress surely possessed the author-
ity to amend this perhaps unintended application of the NGPA, how-
ever, since Congress has to date refrained from doing so, the courts'
only role is "simply to give effect to the words Congress has chosen."
'2 74
Accordingly, the court held that "FERC acted contrary to the intent of
Congress as evidenced in the unambiguous language of section
101 (b) (5).
2 7 5
d. Application of Indefinite Price Escalator Clauses
The court also reviewed a segment of FERC Order 406-B, concern-
ing the deregulation of intrastate gas.2 76 The relevant statutory provi-
sion, 15 U.S.C. § 3331(a)(3), 27 7 "deregulates intrastate gas that is sold
under a contract that had set a price in excess of $ 1.00 on December 31,
270. Id. at 1070 (quoting Public Service v. Mid-Louisiana, 463 U.S. at 331).
271. Id. at 1070 (quoting FERC Reg. 49 Fed. Reg. at 36,401; § 49 Fed. Reg. at 46,878).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1071.
274. Id. at 1072.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1072; Rule 406-B, issued February 15, 1985, RM 84-14000-30, FERC (CCH)
61,152, adopts rules under NGPA § 121(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 3331(a)(3); § 121(e). 15 U.S.C.
§ 3321(e) and 15 U.S.C. § 3315 (b)(3)(A).
277. Section 121(a)(3) provides for the deregulation of "natural gas sold under an ex-
isting contract, any successor to an existing contract, or any rollover contact if (A) such
natural gas was not committed or dedicated to interstate commerce on November 8, 1978;
and (B) the price paid for the last deliveries of such natural gas occurring on December 31,
1984, or, if no deliveries occurred on such date, the price that would have been paid had





Of the gas producers involved in this litigation, only Shell Oil Cor-
poration contested FERC Order 406-B. This Order, which essentially
allowed for any gas found to be sold at a price established under an
indefinite price escalator clause, returns that gas to a controlled status
thus subjecting its price to the limitations set forth in Sections 121(e)
and 105(b)(3)(A) of the NGPA. 279 Congress enacted these statutes in
response to the fear that "following deregulation, the operation of in-
definite price escalator clauses . . . could operate to increase rapidly in-
trastate gas prices following deregulation.
'280
Shell concurred with the commission that the pricing rule in section
105(b)(3)(A) operates to limit only those price increases created by an
indefinite price escalator clause. Shell's position departs from that of
the Commission on the issue of what gas category is subject to the pric-
ing rule. Shell urged a narrow interpretation of the statute that would
provide that "the limitation applies to intrastate contracts only 'if they
were above $1.00 on December 31, 1984 solely by reason of indefinite price
escalator clauses.' "281 This argument advanced by Shell was found by the
Commission to be inconsistent with the governing statutory provisions
and the legislative history.2 82 FERC concluded "that the limitations im-
posed by sections 121(e) and 105(b)(3)(A), apply to any indefinite price
escalator clause in an existing or successor intrastate contract that is, or
would have been, in excess of $1.00 per MMBTU's on December 31,
1984."283
The crucial difference between the two positions is that the "FERC
interpretation does not focus on how the price was established on De-
cember 31, 1984, while Shell would limit the application of the special
rule to those circumstances in which the indefinite price escalator clause
established the price on December 31, 1984. ' '284 The court concluded
that FERC's interpretation of the statute was reasonable and that the
language of the statute did not require the interpretation promoted by
Shell.285
5. Conclusion
While oil and gas producers struggle with the unprecedented low
gas prices plaguing the contemporary market, this case reaffirms the
278. Marlin, 813 F.2d at 1072.
279. Id. at 1073. Sections 121(e) and 105(b)(3)(A) serve to limit the price that can be
established by an indefinite price escalator clause.
280. Id. at 1072-73; quoting 124 CONG. REC. 38,365 (1978) (Statement of Rep.
Dingell).
281. Id. at 1073 (quoting Supplemental Initial Brief of Shell Offshore Inc. and Shell
Western E & P, Inc. in Brief for Appellant at 12, Martin Exploration Management Co. v.
FERC, 813 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1987) (emphasis supplied)).
282. Id. For example, the conference report makes it clear that how the December 31,
1984, price exceeds $1.00 is irrelevant.
283. Vartin, 813 F.2d at 1073 (quoting FERC 49 Fed. Reg. at 50, 641).
284. Id. at 1073.
285. Id. at 1074.
1988]
DENVER UVIVERSITY LA IF REVIE [V 6
producers' right to elect whichever gas category could result in the high-
est price for its product. Such ruling serves (1) to encourage drilling
and production of natural gas, particularly tight gas sands which are
found in ample supply in certain areas of the Rocky Mountain Region of
the United States; and (2) promotes the Congressional intent to estab-
lish a viable gas market characterized by predictable supplies and prices
of natural gas.
CONCLUSION
In general, the natural resource extraction industry did not fare well
in a number of cases decided during this survey period. In Park County,
the court found that the paper transaction of issuing an onshore federal
oil and gas lease does not automatically trigger the EIS requirement
found in NEPA. Once a lease has been issued, however, virtually un-
restricted court access is available to claims pursued in the name of
NEPA. In Coastal States and FMC, the court decided that a coal lease
subject to readjustment will be adjusted according to the law in effect at
the time of readjustment, regardless of how drastic it changes the terms
and conditions of the original coal lease contract. In Navajo Tribe of Indi-
ans, the court held firm to the congressional intent behind the Indian
Claims Commission Act, by holding that any Indian claim arising before
1946 and not timely filed with the Commission is forever barred. Fi-
nally, in Martin Exploration Management Co., the court concluded that in-
centive natural gas pricing means that producers may elect the highest
price for its natural gas if such gas falls into both a regulated and der-
egulated category.
It seems evident that based on the cases analyzed during this survey
period, the Tenth Circuit Court will not be accused of showing favorit-
ism to the extractive industries that do business within its jurisdictional
borders. It appears that the narrow statutory construction practiced by
the court in the cases discussed herein, requires future industry litigants
to approach the Tenth Circuit forum with much care and caution.
David N. Karpel
ol. 5:4
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ADDENDUM
After the preceeding article was accepted for publication, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's Martin Explo-
ration Management Co. v. FERC I decision in FERC v. Martin Exploration
Management Co.2 The entire Court joined in Justice Brennan's opinion
except Justice White who took no part in the decision. The Court up-
held FERC's interpretation3 of The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1969
(NGPA).4
The NGPA established various categories of natural gas for the pur-
poses of phased price deregulation and also set up a three stage elimina-
tion of price ceilings. 5 Recognizing that many of the catagories
overlapped, Congress provided in § 101(b)(5) of the NGPA "[i]f any
natural gas qualifies under more than one provision of this title provid-
ing for any maximum lawful price or for any exemption from such a
price with respect to any first sale of such natural gas, the provision
which could result in the highest price shall be applicable."
'6
Many gas producers had entered long term contracts containing a
two tiered pricing structure. If the gas was regulated the contract price
was usually near the ceiling allowed by law; if the gas was deregulated
the contract price was based on market price.7 Because market prices
had plunged below the regulated price ceilings, the producers stood to
reap higher prices if their gas was classified as regulated rather than
deregulated. 8
The Court held the language of the NGPA "[i]f any natural gas
qualifies under more than one provision of this title . . . the provision
which could result in the highest price shall be applicable" meant that
where gas could be classified as regulated or deregulated it would be
classified as deregulated. 9 The Court reasoned that a deregulated clas-
sification could result in a higher price than a regulated price.' 0 The jus-
tices rejected the Tenth Circuit's reasoning that "could" in § 101(b)(5)
meant that the gas must be classified according to the highest price that
could be obtained at any particular point in time."I Reasoning that "the
conditional meaning of 'could' makes perfect sense if the statute does
not refer to particular contracts but rather to the generic situation of
parties in a precontract state: the provision that allows the parties to
contract to the highest conceivable price applies."'
12
After examining the legislative history of the NGPA, the Court
I. 813 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1987).
2. 108 S.Ct. 1765 (1988).
3. FERC Order 406 codified at 18 C.F.R. § 270.208 (1986).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 3311 (b)(5) (1978).






!1. Id. at 1769.
12. Id.
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found the Tenth Circuit's decision contrary to the whole thrust of the
Act because it would have the effect of changing a statutory scheme of
price ceilings and deregulation to one of unintended price supports for
producers.' 3 No one involved in the legislative process suggested pro-
ducers should receive more than deregulation would allow. Deregula-
tion was seen as "the maximum economic incentive" for producers.14
Finally, the Court rejected the Tenth Ciruit's decision because it
would make the applicable provision of the NGPA vary from producer to
producer, contract to contract and day to day depending on the market
price of gas for any particular type of gas. 15 The Court found "[t]he
statute is phrased in a general way that implies that all gas fitting the
same overlapping provisions will be treated the same, and one would
normally expect that a regulatory regime would apply uniformly rather
than varying in such a chaotic fashion."' 16 The Justices found no Con-










This survey article summarizes and discusses six important Tenth
Circuit decisions made in the area of taxation during the survey period.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in United
States v. Schmidt,' placed two limitations on the fifth amendment privilege
allowing a taxpayer not to produce business records during a tax investi-
gation. First, Schmidt requires the taxpayer to prove by specific evidence
that the danger of self-incrimination was substantial and real. Second,
Schmidt holds that the taxpayer may only claim the privilege for specific
documents and individual questions. In United States v. Kansas,2 the
Tenth Circuit found that the Kansas tax system, 3 which used military
income to compute tax brackets for Kansas source income, did not vio-
late the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act's 4 ban on taxing military com-
pensation. Another decision of the court, United States v. Payne,5 limited
the good faith misunderstanding of law defense to certain criminal tax
prosecutions. The Tenth Circuit held the defense may only be used
where the mistake of law is not based on a misunderstanding of the
United States Constitution. In Smalldridge v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue,6 the court held that a taxpayer could not switch his tax return status
to "married, joint" after the Commissioner had filed a tax return in the
taxpayer's name with a "married, separate" status. First Western Govern-
ment Securities, Inc. v. United States,7 dealt with a Revenue Agent Ruling
(RAR) which mentioned the plaintiff had invoked the privilege against
self-incrimination. The court held that the RAR could be disclosed to
the public because it was not "return information" within Internal Reve-
nue Code (I.R.C.) section 6103(a). Finally, Flanagan v. United States,8 es-
tablishes that a split interest transfer, pursuant to I.R.C. section
2055(e)(2), does not occur where property under a will is transferred to
charity via a settlement agreement.
I. INTERPRETATION OF FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE NOT TO PRODUCE
DOCUMENTS IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES
A. Background
The United States Supreme Court has determined that the contents
1. 816 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1987).
2. 810 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1987).
3. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-32,109(h) (1984), 79-32,110(a) & (b) (1979), 79-32,115(d)
& (e) (1979), 79-32,116 (1978), and 79-32,117 (1982).
4. 50 U.S.C. App. § 574 (1981).
5. 800 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1986).
6. 804 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1986).
7. 796 F.2d 356 (10th Cir. 1986).
8. 810 F.2d 930 (10th Cir. 1987).
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of business records9 prepared voluntarily in the normal course of busi-
ness are not privileged under the fifth amendment.' 0 In United States v.
Doe,'I however, the Court held the act of producing subpoenaed business
records may be privileged.12 The Court reasoned that when a taxpayer
produces his business records, he makes certain admissions including
the fact that the records exist, that they are in his possession or control,
and that they are authentic. 13 The Supreme Court held that these
admissions are privileged under the fifth amendment if the facts and
circumstances indicate the admissions are "testimonial" and
"incriminating." 14
The Supreme Court, however, did not provide a definite standard
for either "testimonial" or "incriminating".' 5 When the Tenth Circuit
tried to apply this test to the fact pattern in Schmidt,16 it attempted to
give meaning to the concept of "testimonial self-incrimination". It did
so by holding that a taxpayer could only invoke the self-incrimination
privilege for the act of producing business records where 1) the taxpayer
proved by specific evidence that the danger of self-incrimination was sub-
stantial and real 17 and 2) the taxpayer claimed the privilege only for
specific documents and individual questions.'
8
B. United States v. Schmidt
1. Statement of Case
In this case, 19 Mr. and Mrs. Schmidt were being audited regarding
their federal income tax liability for 1981 to 1983. On two different oc-
casions, the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) issued an administrative
summons to Mr. and Mrs. Schmidt which directed them to testify before
9. The contents of personal records are privileged under the fifth amendment. The
Supreme Court has attempted to justify this distinction between personal and business
records on two grounds. First, the Court has held that individuals have no privacy interest
in organization records. Second, the Court has held that the government interest in con-
trolling business crime outweighs any personal privacy concerns. Some commentators,
believing these distinctions are no longer persuasive, have argued that the contents of
both personal and business records should be privileged. E.g., Organizational Papers and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 99 HARV. L. REV. 640 (1986).
10. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88 (1974); United States v. White, 322 U.S.
694, 698 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 384-85 (1911). See generally S.
SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 385-88 (2d ed. 1984); Friendly, The Fifth
Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671, 679-98
(1968) (for a discussion of the rationales underlying the fifth amendment).
!1. 454 U.S. 605 (1984).
12. Id. at 612.
13. Id. at 613 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976)).
14. Doe, 465 U.S. at 613; Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (3rd Cir. 1976);
accord Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (2nd Cir. 1957).
15. In fact the Court's ambiguity led one judge to sarcastically thank the Court for its
'amphibolic guidance" in creating "the most recent example of... uncertainty [in the
law.]" In re Grand Juiy Subpoenas Served Feb. 27, 1984, 599 F. Supp. 1006, 1008-09 (E.D.
Wash. 1984) (Opinion of Quackenbush, J.).
16. 816 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1987).
17. Id. at 1481.
18. Id. at 1481-82.
19. 816 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1987).
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Revenue Agent Kawbata and to produce certain documents. Both
times, the Schmidts appeared as ordered and were willing to answer
questions. They claimed, however, a fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination based on Doe,20 and therefore refused to produce any
documents. On both occasions, Agent Kawbata terminated the pro-
ceeding because the Schmidts declined to produce the subpoenaed
documents.
The I.R.S. sought judicial enforcement of the summonses to require
production of these documents. The United States District Court for
the District of Utah granted the I.R.S. an order for enforcement. The
taxpayers appealed.
2 1
2. Discussion and Analysis of Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's de-
cision that the Schmidts had not properly invoked the fifth amendment
privilege in order for them to not produce business records. As noted
above, the United States Supreme Court held the act of producing sub-
poenaed business records privileged if the production involved a risk of
"testimonial self-incrimination" ' 22 because the act of producing would
force the taxpayer to make certain admissions.2 3 The Tenth Circuit
applied the United States Supreme Court's "testimonial self-incrimina-
tion" standard to the Schmidt fact pattern by interpreting the standard to
include two restrictions. 24 First, the taxpayer would have to prove by
specific evidence that the danger of self-incrimination was substantial
and real. This would require the taxpayer to prove that he or she had a
"'reasonable cause to apprehend danger' upon giving a responsive an-
swer that 'would support a conviction' or 'would furnish a link in the
chain of evidence needed to prosecute.' "25 The Schmidts did not meet
this burden. The court referred to the Schmidts' claim of self-incrimina-
tion as "speculative and generalized."' 26 The court, however, did not
reveal what evidence the Schmidts had offered or what degree of speci-
ficity would be necessary in the future to substantiate a fifth amendment
self-incrimination privilege. 2 7 Second, the Tenth Circuit limited the
20. Id. at 1480 (citing Doe, 465 U.S. at 605). See supra notes 9-18 and accompanying
text.
21. Schmidt, 816 F.2d at 1478-80.
22. Id. at 1480 (citing Doe, 465 U.S. at 611-612).
23. Doe, 465 U.S. at 613 n. I1 ("enforcement of the subpoenas would compel [the
taxpayer] to admit that the records exist, that they are in his possession, and that they are
authentic. These communications, if made under compulsion of a court decree, would
violate [the taxpayer's] fifth amendment rights.").
24. For a survey of the many ways Doe could be interpreted see Note, The Fifth Amend-
ment and Production of Documents After United States v. Doe, 66 B.U.L. REV. 95 (1986).
25. Schmidt, 816 F.2d at 1481 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486
(1951)). Accord Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968) (risk of self-incrimina-
tion must not be "merely trifling or imaginary.
26. Schmidt, 816 F.2d at 1481.
27. This may be a shortcoming in the opinion because to the extent that the "specific
evidence" test is left undefined, the court is merely trading one ambiguous standard
(Supreme Court's "testimonial self-incrimination") for another. In this respect, future
courts and attorneys may not find a great deal of guidance in this opinion.
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fifth amendment self-incrimination privilege to specific documents and
individual questions. The Schmidts could not claim a blanket, genera-
lized privilege not to produce any of the documents demanded in the
summons. They would have to produce some documents, but would be
allowed to claim some specific documents as privileged.
28
3. Implication of Holding
There is still a great deal of uncertainty as to when the act of pro-
ducing business documents is "testimonial" and "incriminating" such
that a taxpayer may claim a fifth amendment privilege not to produce
records. However, the Tenth Circuit appears to be defining these terms
by focusing on the degree of specificity. Thus, in the future, it appears
that the Tenth Circuit will require a taxpayer to present evidence proof
that there is a substantial and real danger of self-incrimination. Addi-
tionally, the court will allow the privilege to be invoked only for specific
documents.
II. INTERPLAY BETWEEN KANSAS INCOME TAX STATUTE AND THE
SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF ACT OF 1940
A. Background
Before the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 194029 (SSCRA)
was enacted by Congress, there was a dispute among the states regard-
ing which state(s) should be able to tax the income of military personnel.
For example, a service person might be a resident of Colorado, but be
stationed in New Mexico pursuant to military orders. The service per-
son would be put in the difficult position of being taxed on the same
military compensation in both states. Congress stopped this inequity by
enacting the SSCRA which vested the sole right to tax income of military
personnel in the home state ("residence" or "domicile") of such per-
sons, as opposed to the state where service persons were stationed.3 0 In
United States v. Kansas,3s the court addressed whether the Kansas tax sys-
tem3 2 indirectly taxed military income in violation of the SSCRA.
B. United States v. Kansas
1. Statement of Case
The Kansas income tax statutory scheme was more complicated
28. Schmidt, 816 F.2d at 1481-82 (citing Borgeson v. United States, 757 F.2d 1071,
1073 (10th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175, 1177 (10th
Cir. 1974)). Accord, United States v. G & G Advertising Co., 762 F.2d 632, 635 (8th Cir.
1985).
29. 50 U.S.C. App. § 574 (1981).
30. See 50 U.S.C. APP. § 574 (1981); California v. Buzard, 382 U.S. 386, 393 (1966);
Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322, 325-6 (1953) (construing H.R. REP. No. 2198, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 6 (1942); S. REP. No. 1558, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942)).
31. 810 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1987).
32. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-32,109(h) (1984), 79-32,110(a)(b) (1979), 79-32,115(d)(e)
(1979), 79-32,116 (1978), and 79-32,117 (1982).
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than the illustration given above. When calculating tax brackets for non-
military income earned in Kansas (Kansas source income), the Kansas
statutes took into account the military wages of non-resident service per-
sonnel stationed in Kansas. Inclusion of this military income would
push the taxpayer into a higher tax bracket, causing the Kansas source
income to be taxed at a higher rate than if the military wages had not
been considered.
The Kansas tax system made a real dollar difference in the tax liabil-
ity of service persons.33 Indeed, both Kansas and the United States
agreed that including military wages in Kansas tax-rate calculations
would result in higher Kansas state income taxes.
34
The United States contended that the Kansas tax system was an in-
direct tax on military income because the taxpayer would have had a
lower Kansas tax liability if not for his service earnings. Kansas argued
that its tax statutes did not levy an indirect tax on military income be-
cause the tax was actually levied only on Kansas source income and not
the military income.
The United States District Court for Kansas did not allow a full trial
on the issue of whether the Kansas tax system imposed a tax on military
income. Rather, it dismissed the United States' complaint. The United
States appealed, arguing the Kansas income tax statutes conflicted with
the SSCRA's prohibition against taxing military pay. Therefore, the
United States contended, that the Kansas provisions should be struck
down under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
3 5
33. The United States illustrated:
Assume that a nonresident serviceman stationed in Kansas earns $10,000 from
his military employment and earns an additional $10,000 of Kansas source in-
come. In that circumstance, his Kansas adjusted gross income would be $20,000.
Assuming for the sake of simplicity that he has no Kansas deductions or exemp-
tions, his Kansas taxable income would also be $20,000 and the tentative tax
computed on that income would be $1,200. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-32, 110(a)
(1979). The serviceman's modified Kansas source income would be $10,000, i.e.,
his $20,000 Kansas adjusted gross income less his military income. Thus, the
final tax due would be $600 ($1,200 x $10,000/$20,000). Had the serviceman in
the above example, however, earned only the $10,000 Kansas source income, his
tax liability would have been $450. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-32, 110. Accordingly,
the serviceman in the example, solely as the result of the inclusion of his military
compensation in the tax formula, would be required to pay $150 more in Kansas
income tax than if his military compensation were excluded from such formula.
Brief for Appellant at 12-13, United States v. Kansas, 810 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1987).
34. Kansas, 810 F.2d at 936. In fact, the Tenth Circuit noted that these higher income
taxes would most often hit some of our more destitute military families, those who were
forced to supplement their incomes with second jobs because the family units could not
make ends meet on the military pay alone. Id. at 936, n. 2.
35. In the process of concluding that the Kansas income tax statutes did not violate
the SSCRA, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit gave a concise review of its
Supremacy Clause analysis. (Kansas, 810 F.2d at 936-38 (citing Louisianna Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 476 U.S. 355 (1986), Hillsborough County
v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985), State Corp. Comm'n
v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 787 F.2d 1421, 1425 (10th Cir. 1986)). The court
noted that a state law will be struck down under the Supremacy Clause if it "conflicts with
a federal law or a federal constitutional right." Kansas, 810 F.2d at 937. A conflict has been
established where the state law '" 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' "Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519, 526 (1977) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). With these princi-
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2. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision to dismiss the United States' complaint. 36 The appel-
late court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Sullivan v.
United States.3 7 In that case, the Court held that a state statute, which
imposed a 3.5 percent sales tax on retail sales and a complimentary use
tax, did not violate the SSCRA. The Supreme Court reasoned that this
statutory scheme taxed the property sold or used rather than the mili-
tary income spent to pay the taxes.3 8 The Tenth Circuit applied Sullivan
to the instant case by holding that the Kansas statutes were merely a
potentially higher tax on income derived in Kansas, rather than an indi-
rect tax on the military income, even though military income was used to
compute tax brackets.
39
The Tenth Circuit also noted that nontaxable property could be
used to calculate tax brackets. Such a practice was not a violation of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 40 The Tenth Circuit re-
lied on two older Supreme Court cases 4 1 for the proposition that using
nontaxable property as a measure for calculating other taxes was not a
tax on the nontaxable property.
4 2
3. Implication of Holding
In future cases, this decision could be limited to its facts. The lan-
guage of the opinion, however, is sufficiently broad that it might be cited
in later decisions for the general proposition that the SSCRA allows
some forms of indirect taxation on service income. This would be the
pies in mind, the Tenth Circuit will follow the U.S. Supreme Court's two-step test of
(1) construing the state and the federal statute and (2) determining whether the two stat-
utes as construed conflict with each other. Kansas, 810 F.2d at 937 (citing Chicago & N. W.
Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Title Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981), Perez v. Campbell, 402
U.S. 637, 644 (1971), and United States v. Onslow County Bd. of Educ., 728 F.2d 628, 635
(4th Cir. 1984)).
36. Even though it held against the military in this case, the court of appeals recog-
nized the United States Supreme Court's directive to interpret the Act "'with an eye
friendly to those who dropped their affairs to answer their country's call.'" Kansas, 810
F.2d at 937 (quoting California v. Buzard, 382 U.S. 386, 395 (1966) (quoting Le Maistre v.
Leffers, 333 U.S. 1, 6 (1948)). See also Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561 (1943). The court
also recognized the SSCRA's purpose, "to broadly free servicemen of the burden of sup-
porting the governments of the states where they are present solely in compliance with
military orders." California, 382 U.S. at 393; Dameron, 345 U.S. at 326.
37. 395 U.S. 169 (1969).
38. Id. at 175. The Supreme Court also noted that the SSCRA could not be inter-
preted beyond its express purpose. "[SSCRA] does not relieve servicemen stationed away
from home from all taxes of the host State. It was enacted with the much narrower design
'to prevent multiple State taxation of the property.' " Id. at 180.
39. Kansas, 810 F.2d at 938.
40. The United States did not raise due process or equal protection arguments and
conceded that there were no due process violations. Kansas, 810 F.2d at 938. Rather, the
United States assault on the Kansas tax system was grounded solely on the Supremacy
Clause.
41. Id. (citing Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937); Maxwell v.
Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525 (1919)).
42. Id. (quoting .MIaywell, 250 U.S. at 539).
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case where the tax is most appropriately categorized as a tax on some
property other than military income, rather than a tax on service
compensation.
III. GOOD FAITH MISUNDERSTANDING OF LAW DEFENSE TO A CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION FOR NOT FILING INCOME TAX RETURNS
A. Background
Section 7203 of Title 26 of the United States Code makes it a crime
to willfully fail to file income tax returns. In the past, the Tenth Circuit
had recognized some defenses to this provision by establishing that a
taxpayer did not meet the required element of willfulness if he acted
through "negligence, inadvertence, justifiable excuse, mistake, or due to
a good faith misunderstanding of the law." '4 3 The Tenth Circuit further
made it clear that a good faith misunderstanding of law was based on a
subjective standard (the taxpayer's personal state of mind) as opposed
to an objective test (reasonable taxpayer standard).
4 4
In Phillips, for example, the defendant's conviction for willfully fail-
ing to file income tax returns was reversed by the Tenth Circuit because
a jury instruction had stated, "[a] mistake of law must be objectively reason-
able to be a defense .... -45 In holding that the mistake of law defense
must be measured by a subjective standard, the Tenth Circuit relied on
Supreme Court decisions which inferred that a subjective standard
should be employed in assessing willfulness in criminal tax prosecu-
tions.46 The Tenth Circuit also cited other circuit court decisions which
required a subjective test for measuring willfulness in criminal tax
prosecutions.
4 7
Yet, in the United States v. Payne decision, 48 the Tenth Circuit may
have slightly undercut the subjective standard for the mistake of law de-
fense. The court of appeals held that where the mistake of law is based
on a misunderstanding of our highest law, the United States Constitu-
tion, the subjective standard for willfulness is not applicable.
43. United States v. Harrold, 796 F.2d 1275 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Phillips,
775 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Ware, 608 F.2d 400 (10th Cir. 1979).
44. Phillips, 775 F.2d at 264.
45. Id. at 263.
46. The Supreme Court has defined willfulness as an "intentional violation of a
known legal duty." United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976) (quoting United
States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973)).
47. See United States v. Aitken, 755 F.2d 188, 191 (lst Cir. 1985); United States v.
Burton, 737 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Krager, 711 F.2d 6, 7 (2d Cir.
1983); United States v. Ingredient Technology Corp., 698 F.2d 88, 97 (2d Cir. 1983), ert.
denied, 462 U.S. 1131 (1983); Cooley v. United States, 501 F.2d 1249, 1253 n.4 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1123 (1975); Mann v. United States, 319 F.2d 404, 409-10 (5th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 986 (1964); Yarborough v. United States, 230 F.2d 56, 61
(4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 969 (1956); Battjes v. United States, 172 F.2d 1,4 (6th
Cir. 1949).
48. 800 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1986).
19881
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
B. United States v. Payne
1. Statement of Case
Mr. Payne's misunderstanding of the law revolved around his inter-
pretation of the fifth and thirteenth amendments to the Constitution.
He believed the fifth amendment permitted him to not file a tax return
and that the federal tax system violated the thirteenth amendment's pro-
hibition against involuntary servitude.
4 9
Mr. Payne filed tax returns for the years 1965 to 1975. Yet in 1976,
increasingly aware of constitutional concerns surrounding the payment
of income tax, Mr. Payne filed what he called a "fifth amendment" re-
turn in which he refused to pay taxes. He soon amended his 1976 re-
turn, however, and met his tax liability for that year. Finally, in 1977,
Mr. Payne decided to express his constitutional objections to the tax sys-
tem by not filing any tax return.
50
The Tenth Circuit admitted that Mr. Payne was "certainly fixed in
his beliefs and perhaps sincere." However, it concluded that Mr. Payne
was "very misguided and must now suffer the consequences." '5 1 The
"consequences" were one year in prison, three years of probation after
incarceration, and ten thousand dollars in fines.
2. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
a. Good Faith Misunderstanding of Law as Defense for Failure to
File Income Tax Returns
On appeal, before the Tenth Circuit, Mr. Payne objected to the dis-
trict court's instructions to the jury on the ground that the instructions
resulted in an objective standard for "good faith misunderstanding of
the law." Specifically, Mr. Payne objected to the jury instruction stating
that Mr. Payne's "belief that the tax laws violate his constitutional rights
does not constitute a good faith misunderstanding of the requirements
of the law." 52 The Tenth Circuit upheld this instruction by distinguish-
ing between people who understand the conditions of the law but refuse
to meet the law's criteria, and those people who mistakenly believe the
law does not require them to act. 5 3 It would appear that this distinction
would support the subjective test if the jury were allowed to decide
whether the defendant fits into the former or into the latter category.
Mr. Payne might have truly misunderstood the fifth and the thirteenth
amendments to the Constitution. On the other hand, he might have had
a perfect understanding that the Constitution required him to file tax
returns, but stubbornly refused to do so notwithstanding such knowl-
edge. Mr. Payne was entitled to have the jury make this decision. The
49. Id. at 228.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 229.
52. Id. at 228.
53. Id. at 228 (quoting United States v. Ware, 608 F.2d 400, 405 (10th Cir. 1979). See




complained of instruction appears to assume that any misunderstanding
of constitutional law cannot be held in good faith-that such a belief
does not constitute a good faith misunderstanding.
54
It is difficult to understand why the court would seemingly remove
from the jury's consideration whether a misunderstanding of the Consti-
tution could constitute a good faith misunderstanding of law. After all,
the court has already mandated that misunderstandings of other less im-
portant laws must be considered by the jury as relevant to the willful-
ness/intent element.
5 5
b. Admissibility of Certain Evidence in Criminal Tax Prosecution for
Not Filing Income Tax Returns
The Tenth Circuit held that the I.R.S. could present evidence of Mr.
Payne's gross income. 56 The court found such evidence admissible on
the grounds that it showed that his failure to file was "willful." Thus,
the evidence showed that Mr. Payne knew he had made enough income
to trigger the filing requirement. 5 7 In another evidentiary ruling, the
Tenth Circuit determined that Mr. Payne would be prevented from
showing that, despite his large gross income, his actual tax liability was
minuscule. The court held that such evidence was irrelevant. 5 8 Yet,
Federal Rule of Evidence 401 makes it very difficult to exclude evidence
on relevance grounds. 59 The fact that his actual tax obligation was mi-
nuscule should therefore be relevant to determine whether he actually
misunderstood the Constitution or understood it perfectly but was just
attempting to avoid a large tax bill.
60
54. The jury appeared to rely on the court's instruction that a misunderstanding of
constitutional law would not negate the element of willfulness. Mr. Payne's brief on ap-
peal pointed out that the jury "requested clarification of intent" by asking the judge,
"Does this [the intent element embodied in willfulness] mean that Mr. Payne simply in-
tended not to file returns ... or was his purpose for not filing?" Brief for Appellant's at 7,
United States v. Payne, 800 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1986). The judge responded by repeating
the same instruction quoted earlier. Thus, it appears the jury was confused as to whether
Mr. Payne's "purpose for not filing," which was his misunderstanding of the Constitution,
was relevant to the intent element of willfulness.
55. As the Appellant's Brief notes, there is little difference between:
A) I did not believe I was legally required to file because the statutory pro-
visions of Title 26 [of the United States] Code do not apply to me; or,
B) I did not believe I was legally required to file because the provisions of
the Constitution forbid it. That [is] why the tax system is a voluntary system and
legally I do not have to volunteer to file because the [clourts will not require me
to voluntarily waive my [clonstitutional [r]ights.
Brief for Appellants at -, United States v. Payne, 800 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1986).
56. Payne, 800 F.2d at 229. Mr. Payne's income was approximately $100,000. per year.
57. Interestingly enough, Mr. Payne was willing to stipulate that his gross income was
over the dollar figure necessary to trigger the filing requirement. However, the I.R.S.
refused this offer, insisting instead on the jury's hearing exactly how much Mr. Payne
made. It would appear that if the I.R.S. truly sought admission of this evidence to prove
that the filing requirement had been triggered, a stipulation to that effect would have
reached this goal most convincingly.
58. Payne, 800 F.2d at 229 (citing United States v. Stillhammer, 706 F.2d 1072, 1075
(10th Cir. 1983) and United States v. Garcia, 553 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1977)).
59. Evidence is relevant where it makes any fact of consequence more or less prob-
able. FED. R. EviD. 401.
60. Mr. Payne objected to the dual effect the following two evidentiary rulings: 1) the
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4. Implication of Holding
This decision appears to modify the subjective standard of Phillips
for determining willfulness in criminal tax prosecutions. The Tenth
Circuit apparently will not allow a defendant the benefit of the subjec-
tive standard when the law of the United States Constitution is misun-
derstood rather than any other law.
IV. INTERPLAY BETWEEN INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
SECTIONS 6013 AND 6020
A. Background
Section 6013 of the Internal Revenue Code 61 provides that a mar-
ried individual who has filed a separate return for a given year may,
under certain circumstances, switch to a married,joint return. Usually, a
married couple will minimize tax liability by filingjointly instead of sepa-
rately. Thus, section 6013 allows a married taxpayer to reduce his tax
liability by switching to the joint status. This is the case even where the
taxpayer does not realize that the joint status is more favorable until
after he had filed a separate return.
Section 6020 of the Internal Revenue Code allows the Commis-
sioner to file a return for a taxpayer when that individual has not done
so himself.6 2 The issue of whether a taxpayer could utilize I.R.C. sec-
tion 6013 by switching to a married, joint status after the Commissioner
had already filed on behalf of the taxpayer, pursuant to I.R.C. section
6020, was addressed in Smalldridge v. Commissioner.
63
B. Smalldridge v. Commissioner
1. Statement of Case
Mr. Smalldridge did not file his federal income tax returns for sev-
eral years. His employer, however, withheld taxes throughout this pe-
riod and sent a wage statement to the I.R.S. Based on this data, but
without any information regarding items such as deductions or exemp-
tions which would reduce tax liability, the Commissioner filed a return
for the taxpayer pursuant to I.R.C. section 6020. When filing these re-
turns "on behalf of" Mr. Smalldridge, the Commissioner elected the
married, separate status for the taxpayer even though Mr. Smalldridge
had filed using married, joint status for a number of years. 6 4 As is typi-
cal for most taxpayers, Mr. Smalldridge's tax liability would have been
I.R.S. refusal to allow stipulation, and 2) the I.R.S. opposition to demonstrating that his
actual tax liability was minimal. Mr. Payne felt the combined effect of these rulings
prejudiced the jury by painting a picture of a rich man, well able to pay his taxes, who
nonetheless proceeded to deprive his country of an assumably great amount of money.
Payne, 800 F.2d at 227.
61. I.R.C. § 6013 (1984).
62. I.R.C. § 6020 (1984).
63. 804 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1986).
64. Id. See also Brief for Appellant at 5, Smalldridge v. Commissioner, 804 F.2d 125
(10th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant Smalldridge].
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lower if the Commissioner had elected married, joint status for him.6 5
Mr. Smalldridge petitioned the United States Tax Court to allow
him to switch his return status from married, separate status to married,
joint status pursuant to I.R.C. section 6013(b). The tax court dismissed
Mr. Smalldridge's petition, however, holding that the taxpayer's option
to switch status would not be allowed where the Commissioner had filed
a tax return for the taxpayer. Mr. Smalldridge appealed on the grounds
that 1) a correct reading of I.R.C. section 6013 and section 6020 to-
gether, would not allow the Commissioner, while purportedly acting on
behalf of the taxpayer, to refuse to consider anything which would re-
duce tax liability; and 2) allowing the I.R.S. to file a return for the tax-
payer pursuant to I.R.C. section 6020 without allowing the taxpayer to
switch to a married, joint status under I.R.C. section 6013 was a taking
of property without due process of law under the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution.
66
3. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
a. Interplay Between Internal Revenue
Sections 6013 and 6020
Section 6013 of I.R.C. only allows the taxpayer to switch to a mar-
ried, joint status where he has not been sent a notice of deficiency. Mr.
Smalldridge had been sent such a notice. However, Mr. Smalldridge
argued that this part of section 6013 should be applicable only where
the taxpayer himself had filed a return. This would prevent the Com-
missioner from choosing the separate status where the taxpayer had
used the joint status for years and joint status would significantly reduce
tax liability.
6 7
The court of appeals did not accept Mr. Smalldridge's argument
and reasoned that the Commissioner had to make some election of sta-
tus in order to file a return.6 8 The court held that once the Commis-
sioner had filed a return for Mr. Smalldridge, the taxpayer was "in the
same position" as if he himself had elected to file and did file a return. 69
This reasoning seems flawed. While the Commissioner did have to
make some election regarding status, there was no reason for him to
choose a status which went against all past practice of the taxpayer and
which would generally result in a higher tax liability. 70 Further, the tax-
payer was not "in the same position" as if he had filed a separate return.
If Mr. Smalldridge himself had filed a separate return, he would not
have received a notice of deficiency. Instead, he would have been able
to switch to the married, joint status. Indeed, the very essence of Mr.
65. See supra notes 45-46.
66. Smalldridge, 804 F.2d at 126.
67. Id. at 128.
68. Id. at 127.
69. Id. at 128. See also Conovitz v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 929, 931 (1980);
Rev. Rul. 70-632, 1970-2 C.B. 286.
70. Smalldridge, 804 F.2d at 125. See Brief for Appellant Smalldridge at 5 and n.43.
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Smalldridge's appeal was the fact that he was put in an entirely different
position than he would have been if he had filed himself.
7 1
b. Due Process of Law
Mr. Smalldridge also appealed on the basis that allowing the I.R.S.
to file a return for the taxpayer pursuant to I.R.C. section 6020 without
allowing the taxpayer to switch to a married, joint status under I.R.C.
section 6013 was a taking of property without due process of law under
the fifth amendment. Smalldridge argued that he had done nothing
which would lead a reasonable person to believe that he gave up his
property right to switch to a married, joint status. 72
Interestingly, although the court did recognize that one of the
grounds for the appeal was that the deficiency had been assessed with-
out due process of law, 73 the Tenth Circuit did not discuss this due pro-
cess issue. Thus, it is evident that the court must have read appellant's
brief, which devoted several pages to the due process issue, however,
the Tenth Circuit ignored the issue in its opinion.
7"
4. Implication of Holding
Where a taxpayer for any reason neglects to file a tax return, he or
she is taking the risk that the Commissioner will file a return on his or
her behalf. If the Commissioner acts as he did in this case, the Commis-
sioner's filing a return could result in the taxpayer incuring a greater tax
liability than if the taxpayer had filed himself. This is so because the
Commissioner may take all the evidence of a taxpayer's income while
ignoring any deductions, exemptions, and past status practices which
minimize tax liability.
V. MEANING OF "RETURN INFORMATION" WITHIN INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE SECTION 6103 AND WHEN RETURN INFORMATION MAY
BE DISCLOSED BY THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
UNDER SECTION 6103(H)(4)
A. Background
Section 6103(a) of I.R.C. makes information on tax returns confi-
71. Smalldidge, 804 F.2d at 126-27.
72. As appellant Smalldridge stated in his brief:
The Smalldridge's had for a number of years previous to the years in question,
always filed joint tax returns, and the I.R.S. had no basis to believe that any
change had occurred in their status so as to prohibit or terminate that election
.... General due process notions require that the Petitioners, before they are
deprived of the benefit of the joint filing election, be on reasonable notice of the
effect of their actions.
Brief for Appellant Smalldridge at 5-6.
73. Smalldridge, 804 F.2d at 126.
74. The opinion appeared to rely on a type of you-made-your-bed-now-lie-in-it phi-
losophy. For instance, the court began its analysis by proclaiming, -[t]he failure of the
taxpayer to himself file any return for those years is the inescapable root of the present
problem." Smalldridge, 804 F.2d at 127.
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dential and prohibits the I.R.S. from disclosing it. 75 Return information
is defined in I.R.C. section 6103(b)(2) 76 as specifically including the tax-
payer's identity and whether he is subject to an investigation. 77 A
number of exceptions exist to the general non-disclosure rule. 7 8 One of
these is I.R.C. section 6103 (h)(4)(C). This provision allows disclosure
of return information where 1) the disclosure is to a judicial or adminis-
trative proceeding; 2) the return information involves a transactional re-
lationship between a party to the proceeding and the taxpayer; and
3) the return information directly affects the resolution of an issue in the
proceeding.
First Western Government Securities, Inc. v. United States 79 involves a
Revenue Agent Ruling (RAR) which revealed the fact that the president
of First Western had invoked the fifth amendment privilege. First, the
court considered whether the RAR was tax return information.8 0 Sec-
ond, assuming arguendo that the RAR was return information, the court
considered whether the RAR fit within the exception to the non-disclo-
sure rule.
8 1
B. First Western Government Securities, Inc. v. United States
1. Statement of Case
Sidney Samuels was president of both First Western Government
Securities Incorporated and Samuels, Kramer and Company (the Cor-
porations). The I.R.S. suspected the Corporations of promoting abu-
sive tax shelters.8 2 During an investigation of twenty-five of the
Corporations' customers, the I.R.S. served seventy-five summonses on
Mr. Samuels which called for both testimony and production of corpo-
rate records. At Mr. Samuels' deposition, he invoked his fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination 135 times.
8 3
Before Mr. Samuels's deposition, a RAR had been sent to some of
the Corporations' customers. The RAR explained why the I.R.S. was
disallowing certain of the customers' deductions as abusive tax shelters.
After Samuels's deposition, the I.R.S. revised the RAR to include the
fact that Mr. Samuels had invoked the fifth amendment privilege. This
revised RAR was sent to many of the Corporations' Denver customers.
8 4
75. I.R.C. § 6103(a) (1987).
76. 1.R.C. § 6103(b)(2) (1987).
77. Different circuits have ennunciated varied standards for return information. For a
very extensive discussion of the circuit interpretations, see Note, Information Disclosure and
Competent Authority: A Proposal, 17 CASE W. RES. 485 (1985).
78. Many commentators believe that I.R.C. § 6103 should be interpreted to allow for
greater disclosure. For some persuasive arguments in favor of that position see Comment,
The Freedom of Information Act and the .R.S. Confidentiality Statute: A Proper Analysis, 54 U. CIN.
L. REV. 605 (1985).
79. 796 F.2d 356 (10th Cir. 1986).
80. Id. at 359.
81. Id. at 360.
82. Id. at 357.
83. Id. at 357-58.
84. Id. at 358.
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Mr. Samuels and the Corporations filed suit against the I.R.S. claiming
that this disclosure was tax return information and thus fell within the
nondisclosure protection of I.R.C. section 6103(a). The district court
granted summary judgment8 5 in favor of the I.R.S.; subsequently, Mr.
Samuels and the Corporations appealed.
2. Discussion of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that Mr.
Samuels' invocation of the fifth amendment was not "return informa-
tion." The court also held, that even if it were considered to be return
information, it fit within an exception to the non-disclosure rule.
86
a. Meaning of Return Information
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis of whether Mr. Samuels' invo-
cation of the fifth amendment privilege was tax return information by
noting the standard for tax return information established by the Sixth
Circuit. 8 7 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that information is
confidential tax return information where a "nexus" exists between "the
data obtained and the furtherance of obligations controlled by Title
26."88
The Sixth Circuit applied this nexus standard in Mid-South Music v.
United States Department of the Treasury.89 In that case, the I.R.S. sent let-
ters to taxpayers which mentioned plaintiff's name and stated that the
taxpayers would be audited if they claimed certain deductions. The
court reasoned that the letters contained return information because
they revealed both plaintiff's identity and the fact that plaintiff was
under investigation.9 0
The Tenth Circuit carefully noted the Sixth Circuit's standard for
return information, but it did not specifically adopt or reject it. The
Tenth Circuit found that it did not need to adopt a standard for the
instant case because Mr. Samuels' invocation of the fifth amendment
privilege was not return information under any standard.9 ' First, the
85. The Tenth Circuit reiterated that its test for summary judgment under FED. R.
Civ. P. 56, is whether any genuine issue of material fact remains when all evidence is con-
strued in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Id. at 357.
86. Id. at 360.
87. Id. at 358-59. The Tenth Circuit also noted the standards for tax return informa-
tion developed by other circuits: The Ninth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit
had defined return information not to include "data in a form which cannot be associated
with or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer." Long v. United
States I.R.S., 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980). See also Neufeld
v. I.R.S., 646 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Thus, data tapes and check sheets were not return
information where all mention of taxpayer names, addresses, and social security numbers
were expunged. Long, 596 F.2d at 362.
88. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 688 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1982), reh. denied, 696 F.2d
449 (1982).
89. 579 F. Supp 481 (M.D. Tenn. 1983), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 756 F.2d 23 (6th Cir.
1984).
90. Mid-South Music, 756 F.2d at 25.
91. First Western, 796 F.2d at 359-60.
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invocation was not made during an audit of Mr. Samuels. Instead, his
statements were made during an investigation of his customers in Dal-
las. The court found that the nondisclosure protection of I.R.C. section
6103 could only be invoked by a party under investigation. 9 2 Second,
the RAR did not contain return information because it did not disclose
plaintiffs' names in the context that they would be investigated.
93
b. Exception to Non-Disclosure General Rule
The Tenth Circuit noted that even if the invocation of the fifth
amendment was based upon return information, the I.R.S. had a right to
disclose the information under an exception to the non-disclosure
rule. 94 The Tenth Circuit held that this exception to the non-disclosure
rule had been met. First, the audit of the plaintiffs' customers was an
administrative proceeding. Second, a transactional relationship existed
between the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs' customers, who were parties to
the proceeding. Finally, Mr. Samuels' invocation of the fifth amend-
ment, regarding the return information, directly affected the resolution
of an issue in the proceeding.
9 5
3. Implication of Holding
While the Tenth Circuit found that it did not need to adopt a stan-
dard for return information to decide the instant case, it did carefully
review the Sixth Circuit's nexus test. Although predicting which stan-
dard a court will adopt is always uncertain, the First Western decision
could indicate that the Tenth Circuit is strongly considering the nexus
test.
VI. INTERPRETATION OF SPLIT INTEREST TRANSFERS WITHIN INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE SECTION 2055(E)(2)
A. Background
Section 2055(a) of the I.R.C. permits charitable contributions to be
deducted from a decedent's gross estate before computing estate taxes.
I.R.C. section 2055(e)(2), however, disallows such deductions if the
92. Id. at 359.
93. First Western, 796 F.2d at 359. The two elements present in the Sixth Circuit's Mid-
South Music decision were also present in the instant case: 1) plaintiff was identified by
name; and 2) an investigation of plaintiff, if not explicitly expressed, was clearly implied be-
cause a person would have no reason to invoke the fifth amendment privilege unless an
investigation was occurring or threatened.
94. First Western, 796 F.2d at 360-61 (following I.R.C. § 6013(h)(4)(C) (1984).
95. Id. at 360-61. The Fifth Circuit held that I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4)(C) granted an excep-
tion to the non-disclosure rule only where the information was disclosed to federal officials
as opposed to the general public. Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979). The Tenth Circuit specifically rejected the Fifth Circuit's in-
terpretation. The Teeth Circuit held that I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4)(C) applied to disclosures
made to anyone because (in contrast to § 6103(h)(1), (2), and (3)) the statutory language
did not specifically limit itself to disclosures made to federal officials. First Western, 796
F.2d at 360. The Tenth Circuit's decision on this matter is in accord with Davidson v.
Brady, 559 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Mich. 1983), aftd, 732 F.2d 552 (6th Cir. 1984).
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charitable contributions are deemed to be split interest transfers. A split
interest transfer occurs when property under a decedent's will is first
transferred to a noncharitable entity, such as an heir or devisee, and
then transferred to a bona fide charity. 9 6 In Flanagan v. United States,
9 7
the Tenth Circuit decided whether a split interest transfer had occurred
where property passed under a settlement agreement to a bona fide
charity.
B. Flanagan v. United States
1. Statement of Case
On April 21, 1976, Frank Parkes died, leaving an estate valued in
excess of one million dollars. With the exception of a few bequests, Mr.
Parkes devised his estate to a charitable trust for the purpose of further-
ing high standards in horse breeding and training. His heirs sought to
have the will set aside. Eventually, the heirs and the trustees agreed to a
settlement under which part of the estate went to an Oklahoma charita-
ble foundation.
The estate filed its federal estate tax return claiming a charitable
deduction for the property transferred to the foundation under the set-
tlement agreement. The I.R.S. disallowed the charitable deduction on
the ground that a split interest transfer had occurred. 98 The administra-
tor of the estate paid the taxes allegedly owed and then sought a tax
refund in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma. The district court denied the administrator's claim for a re-
fund and the administrator appealed.
2. Discussion of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
a. Interpretation of Split Interest Transfer
The Tenth Circuit Court reversed the district court's decision by
holding that a split interest transfer did not occur where property under
a will passed pursuant to a settlement agreement. The I.R.S. had held
that a split interest transfer occurred in this situation and the district
court accepted the I.R.S. determination. The Tenth Circuit disagreed
with the I.R.S. reasoning because the court decided the reasoning was
inconsistent with other I.R.S. determinations.9 9 The court noted that
logically the I.R.S. ruling concerning settlement agreements should
96. There are also some exceptions to the general rule that split interest transfers are
disallowed: I.R.C. § 2055(e)(A) & (B) allow charitable contributions which are split inter-
est transfers to be deducted from the decedent's gross estate when the contributions are in
the form of a charitable remainder or a guaranteed annuity.
97. 810 F.2d 930 (10th Cir. 1987).
98. Id. at 933. The I.R.S. reached its decision by reasoning that the property first
passed under the will and subsequently when the parties came to a settlement agreement,
part of the property passed pursuant to that agreement. As a result of two different docu-
ments, the will and the settlement agreement, portions of the property passed to two dif-
ferent entities, a charitable and a noncharitable entity. The I.R.S. considered this a split
interest transfer. Rev. Rul. 77-491, 1977-2 C.B. 332.
99. Flanagan, 810 F.2d at 933-34.
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have applied to a spouse's election to set aside a will in order to take her
statutory share. This is because both a settlement agreement and an
election to take a statutory share have the effect of partially abrogating a
will after the death of the testator. 10 0 It would have made sense for the
I.R.S. to hold that all of the property passed under the will and then part
of the property passed in a different manner when the spouse elected
her statutory share.' 0 ' The I.R.S., however, did not come to this con-
clusion. Instead, it decided that a settlement agreement would create a
split interest transfer, whereas a spouse's election would not result in a
split interest transfer. 10 2 The I.R.S. attempted to distinguish the two
situations by holding that they had "different effects recognized for fed-
eral estate tax purposes."'
0 3
The Tenth Circuit stated that the I.R.S. position was "a distinction
without a difference,"' 0 4 and determined that neither a settlement
agreement nor a spouse's election created a split interest transfer. The
court held that such property only passed pursuant to the settlement
agreement or to the spouse's election and never passed under the will.
Thus, the property was never transferred to both a charitable and a non-
charitable entity and consequently a split interest transfer did not oc-
cur. 10 5 Since a split interest transfer did not occur, a charitable
contribution could be deducted from a decedent's gross estate. Accord-
ingly, the district court's decision was reversed.
10 6
b. Weight of Revenue Rulings
In reaching its decision regarding what constituted a split interest
transfer, the Tenth Circuit overturned a Revenue Ruling. This ruling
had erroneously determined that a split interest transfer occurred when
property under a will was distributed according to a settlement agree-
ment.' 0 7 In overturning the ruling, the Tenth Circuit recognized that
Revenue Rulings, while entitled to consideration, were in fact nothing
more than an agency's opinion of the law. 10 8 The Tenth Circuit refused
to "blindly resolve all doubts in favor of the I.R.S."' 0 9 Rather, the court
held that Revenue Rulings which interpreted legislation would have to
be examined to determine whether they were in accord with congres-
sional intent. '' 0
Applying this holding, the court noted that Congress enacted I.R.C.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 934.
102. Id. at 933-34. See Rev. Rul. 77-491, 1977-2 C.B. 332 (property passing under set-
tlement agreement is split interest transfer); Rev. Rul. 78-152, 1978-1 C.B. 297 (property
passing under spouse's election is not split interest transfer).
103. Flanagan, 810 F.2d at 933; Rev. Rul. 78-152, 1978-1 C.B. 297.
104. Flanagan, 810 F.2d at 934.
105. Id. at 934.
106. Id. at 935.
107. Id. at 934 (overturning Rev. Rul. 77-491, 1977-2 C.B. 333).
108. Flanagan, 810 F.2d at 934.
109. Id. at 935.
110. Id. at 934 (citing BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596-97 (1983)).
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section 2055 to promote charitable contributions. Ill Also, the Tenth
Circuit specifically adopted the Seventh Circuit's finding that Congress
placed a greater value on charitable contibutions than on estate
taxes.' 12 Since the Revenue Rulings regarding split interest transfers
had the effect of maximizing taxes instead of charitable contributions,
the Tenth Circuit determined that the Revenue Rulings were not consis-
tent with congressional intent.' 
1
3. Implication of Holding
The Tenth Circuit's decision may motivate parties engaged in fu-
ture settlement agreements to allocate part of the property covered by
the agreement to charity. Such an allocation will be rewarded by a tax
deduction, which will promote the congressional purpose behind I.R.C.
section 2055 which encourages charitable contributions.
CONCLUSION
This article has summarized certain taxation decisions of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. United States v. Schmidt 114
restricted the fifth amendment privilege not to produce business records
during a tax investigation. United States v. Kansas 115 held that using mili-
tary income to compute tax brackets for Kansas source income did not
violate the SSCRA 116 ban on taxing military compensation. United States
v. Payne 117 narrowed the good faith misunderstanding of law defense in
certain criminal tax prosecutions. Smalidridge v. Commissioner 118 held that
a taxpayer could not substitute a married, joint tax return for a married,
separate return filed by the Commissioner on the taxpayer's behalf. First
Western Government Securities, Inc. v. United States 1 19 found that a Revenue
Agent Ruling revealing plaintiff's invocation of the fifth amendment was
not "return information" within I.R.C. section 6103(b)(2). Finally,
Flanagan v. United States 120 established that a split interest transfer pur-
suant to I.R.C. section 2055(e)(2) does not occur when property left by a
will is transferred to charity via a settlement agreement.
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